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VIII 
SYNOPSIS 
This dissertation presents five research essays evaluating the performance of 
managed funds in light of the investment strategy and manager characteristics exhibited 
by institutional investment companies.  An analysis of investment performance with 
respect to a fund manager’s strategy provides important information in determining 
whether performance objectives have been achieved.  There are a number of different 
types of investment strategies managed funds may adopt.  However, the primary 
dichotomy is on the basis of whether the portfolio manager implements either an active 
or index approach.  Active managers attempt to outperform the market through the use 
of price-sensitive information, whereas a passive manager’s objective is to replicate the 
returns and risk of a target benchmark index.  The evaluation of investment manager 
characteristics is also evaluated.  This is motivated on the basis that asset management 
entities place significant emphasis on both the articulation and differentiation of their 
investment style relative to competitors, and selling the strengths of their portfolio 
management skills (in terms of past performance) as well identifying the key individuals 
comprising their investment team and their unique attributes. 
For active equity managers, the methods used in constructing portfolios and 
implementing the investment strategy include security selection, in terms of ‘top-down’ 
or ‘bottom-up’ strategies, value-biased, growth-biased or style-neutral strategies, and 
portfolios exhibiting market capitalisation biases (i.e. preferences to large or small-cap 
securities).  In terms of active bond portfolio management, the most common strategies 
include duration management and yield curve positioning.  Active managers’ strategies 
are likely to extend beyond stock selection, in particular, where the fund manager 
adjusts the portfolio’s composition in anticipation of favourably capitalising on future 
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movements in the market.  For index managers, replication of both the returns and risk 
of the underlying index may be achieved through either full-replication of constituent 
stocks comprising the index, or through non-replication techniques (stratified sampling 
and/or optimisation).  Each essay provides a unique contribution to the literature with 
respect to the performance of active and index funds, as well as an analysis of funds that 
invest specifically in domestic equities, domestic fixed interest, and diversified funds 
that invest across the broad spectrum of asset classes. 
The origins of the performance evaluation literature are ascribed to Cowles’ 
(1933) pioneering work, and the literature has given increasing attention to the topic.  
However the most fundamental issue considered in almost all previous studies of 
managed fund performance is the extent to which actively managed portfolios have 
earned superior risk-adjusted excess returns for investors.  The literature has 
overwhelmingly documented (with a small number of exceptions) that active funds have 
been unable to earn superior returns, either before or after expenses (e.g. Jensen (1968), 
Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996)).  While the international evidence is 
supported by the few Australian managed fund studies available, Australian research 
remains surprisingly scarce.  This is perplexing considering the sheer size of the 
investment industry in Australia (around $A717 billion as at 30 June 2001) and the 
importance placed on the sector with respect to successive Federal Governments’ 
retirement income policies.  The objectives of this dissertation therefore involve an 
analysis of managed fund performance with respect to differences in investment 
strategies (i.e. active and index), as well as providing an analysis of funds invested in 
equities, bonds and diversified asset classes (or multi-sector portfolios). 
The first essay evaluates the market timing and security selection capabilities of 
Australian pooled superannuation funds.  These funds provide institutional investors 
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with exposure to securities across many different asset classes, including domestic and 
international equities, domestic and international fixed interest, property and cash.  
Surprisingly, the specific analysis of multi-sector funds is scarce in the literature and 
limited to Brinson et al. (1986, 1991), Sinclair (1990), and Blake et al. (1999).  This 
essay also evaluates performance for the three largest asset classes within diversified 
superannuation funds and their contribution to overall portfolio return.  The importance 
of an accurately specified market portfolio proxy in the measurement of investment 
performance is demonstrated, where the essay employs performance benchmarks that 
account for the multi-sector investment decisions of active investment managers in a 
manner that is consistent with their unique investment strategy.  This approach rectifies 
Sinclair’s (1990) analysis resulting from benchmark misspecification.  Consistent with 
the literature, the empirical results indicate that Australian pooled superannuation funds 
do not exhibit significantly positive security selection or market timing skill. 
Given the evidence in the literature surrounding the inability of active funds to 
deliver superior returns to investors, lower cost index funds have become increasingly 
popular as an alternative investment strategy.  Despite the significant growth in index 
funds since 1976, when the first index mutual fund was launched in the U.S., research 
on their performance is sparse in the U.S. and non-existent in Australia.  The second 
essay provides an original analysis of the Australian index fund market, with specific 
analysis applicable to institutional Australian equity index funds offered by fund 
managers.  While indexing is theoretically straightforward, in practice there exist 
potential difficulties in exactly matching the return of the underlying index.  Therefore 
the magnitude of tracking error is likely to be of concern to investors.  This essay 
documents the existence of significant tracking error for Australian index funds, where 
the magnitude of the difference between index fund returns and index returns averages 
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between 7.4 and 22.3 basis points per month for funds operating at least five years.  
However, there is little evidence of bias in tracking error, implying that these funds 
neither systematically outperform or underperform their benchmark on a before cost 
basis.  Further analysis documents that the magnitude of tracking error is related to fund 
cash flows, market volatility, transaction costs and index replication strategies used by 
passive investment managers. 
The third essay presents evidence of the performance of U.S. mutual funds, 
where attention is given to both active and index mutual funds for which the applicable 
benchmark index is the S&P 500.  This essay examines both the magnitude and 
variation of tracking error over time for S&P 500 index mutual funds.  The essay 
documents seasonality in S&P 500 index mutual fund tracking error, where tracking 
error is significantly higher in the months of January and May, together with a seasonal 
trough in the quarters ending March-June-September-December.  Statistical evidence 
indicates tracking error is both positively and significantly correlated with the dividend 
payments arising from constituent S&P 500 securities.  In terms of a performance 
comparison between actively managed and index funds, active funds on average are 
found to significantly underperform passive benchmarks.  On the other hand, S&P 500 
index mutual funds earned higher risk-adjusted excess returns after expenses than large 
capitalisation-oriented active mutual funds in the period examined.  These results 
suggest the S&P 500 is consistent with capital market efficiency, implying an absence 
of economic benefit accruing to the average investor utilising actively managed U.S. 
equity mutual funds. 
The fourth essay presented in the dissertation examines the performance of 
Australian investment management organisations with direct reference to their specific 
characteristics and strategies employed.  Using a unique information source, 
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performance is evaluated for actively managed institutional balanced funds (or 
diversified asset class funds), Australian share funds and Australian bond funds.  
Performance is evaluated with respect to the investment strategy adopted, the 
experience and qualifications held by investment professionals, and the tenure of the 
key investment professionals.  This essay also evaluates the performance of senior 
sector heads to determine the skills of individuals driving the investment process, even 
though these individuals may migrate to competitor organisations.  The essay finds 
evidence that a significant number of active Australian equity managers earned superior 
risk-adjusted returns in the period, however active managers perform in line with 
market indices for balanced funds and Australian bond funds. 
A number of manager characteristics are also found to predict risk-adjusted 
excess returns, systematic risk and investment expenses.  Of particular note, 
performance of balanced funds is negatively related to the institution’s age and the 
loyalty of non-senior investment staff.  Performance is also found to be significantly 
higher for managers that predominantly operate their portfolios using a bottom-up, stock 
selection approach.  Interestingly, the human capital of managers, measured as the years 
of tertiary education undertaken, does not explain risk-adjusted excess returns.  
Systematic risk is positively related to an institution’s age and negatively related to both 
senior manager loyalty and the implementation of bottom-up portfolio management 
strategies.  In terms of management expenses, fees are directly related to the Australian 
equities benchmark allocation, the years of tertiary education, the number of years 
service (loyalty) for non-senior investment professionals and the total years experience 
of senior money managers.  This concluding essay also documents that changes in top 
management have significant performance effects.  In the 12-month period after a 
change in fixed income director or chief investment officer, performance is significantly 
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lower and significantly higher, respectively.  There is no significant difference in 
performance where changes in top management occur for Australian equities.  The 
years of service (loyalty) provided to asset management firms by equities directors is 
inversely related to risk-adjusted return. 
The fifth and final essay examines the investment performance of active 
Australian bond funds and the impact of investor fund flows on portfolio returns.  This 
essay represents a significant and original analysis in terms of its contribution to the 
literature, given the absence of Australian bond fund performance analytics and also the 
limited attention provided in the U.S.  Both security selection and market timing 
performance is evaluated using both unconditional models and conditional performance 
evaluation techniques, which account for public information and the time-variation in 
risk.  Overall, the results of this essay are consistent with the U.S. and international 
mutual fund evidence, where performance is found to be consistent with an efficient 
market.  While actively managed institutional funds perform broadly in line with the 
index before expenses, the paper documents significant underperformance for actively 
managed retail bond funds after fees.  The study also documents that retail fund flows 
negatively impact on market timing coefficients when flow is not accounted for in 
unconditional models. 
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“The essence of performance evaluation is to measure the value of the 
services (if any) provided by the portfolio management industry.  It is to 
investigate whether a fund manager helps enlarge the investment 
opportunity set faced by the investing public and, if so, to what extent the 
manager enlarges it.  Put differently, if the manager provides a portfolio 
that is also achievable by the investing public, he offers no service; it is 
when the managed fund lies outside of the existing opportunity set faced by 
the public that the manager offers a genuine service.” 
Zhiwu Chen and Peter Knez, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 9(2): p.512 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives of the Dissertation 
This dissertation presents five research essays that revolve around a common theme 
– the evaluation of managed fund performance and therefore the ability of professional 
investment managers to achieve their investment objectives.  The extent to which an 
appropriate assessment can be made concerning investment managers’ performance is 
ultimately dependent on understanding a manager’s mission statement that articulates their 
investment goals.  Understanding an investment manager’s strategy is therefore critical in 
portfolio performance measurement, specifically in terms of determining the appropriate 
benchmark index for performance comparison and, most importantly, being able to 
conclude whether the investment performance achieved is consistent with these objectives 
and strategies identified by the fund manager. 
Each essay in this dissertation provides a unique study of investment performance 
issues and measurement across different asset class sectors offered to investors, 
predominantly in Australian and U.S. markets.  The dissertation presents original research 
of fund performance with respect to the two competing investment strategies available to 
investors in the market – actively managed funds and index funds.  Active management is 
concerned with the collection and synthesis of price-sensitive information in order to 
identify those securities that are either undervalued (buy or overweight relative to the 
benchmark) or overvalued (sell or underweight relative to the market index).  Passive or 
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index portfolio management offers investors both the returns and risks that are 
commensurate with the underlying benchmark. 
The principal objective of this dissertation is to extend the performance evaluation 
literature.  This is achieved through the consideration of other types of funds in terms of 
asset class exposure (i.e. diversified or multi-sector funds), evaluating performance with 
respect to the investment strategy adopted (active and index portfolio management), and 
investigating the extent to which fund manager characteristics/attributes and their specific 
portfolio management strategies relate to performance. 
1.2 Motivation of the Dissertation 
There exist a number of motivating reasons why a study concerning managed funds 
and their performance is important.  The first and most obvious reason is the sheer size of 
the industry, valued in excess of $A717 billion as at 30 June 2001.  In addition, the 
Commonwealth Government’s emphasis on superannuation as the primary vehicle for 
increasing national savings has also ensured the investment industry and its performance 
has become closely scrutinised.  Both employees and retirees (self-funded) have a direct 
interest in the performance of investment markets, as superannuation and personal savings 
have become the critical means for the provision of future goods and services.  The Federal 
Government has also highlighted the significance of superannuation policy with two 
important inquiries in the 1990s, namely the Fitzgerald (1993) report on national savings 
and the Wallis (1997) report concerning Australia’s financial system.  The regulation of 
investment providers and the supervision of superannuation funds are also instances of 
how important the Australian investment industry has become. 
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Thirdly, there exists a lack of empirical investigation in Australia concerning the 
performance of managed funds.  While the literature investigating U.S. mutual fund 
performance is extensive, evaluation of managed funds in Australia is significantly under-
researched.  Specifically, Australian research is limited to Bird, Chin and McCrae (1983), 
Robson (1986), Sinclair (1990), Hallahan (1999), Hallahan and Faff (1999), Sawicki 
(2000), Sawicki and Ong (2000), Holmes and Faff (2000), Gallagher (2001) and Hallahan 
and Faff (2001). 
This dissertation also attempts to provide insight into the performance of different 
types of managed funds, both in terms of the portfolio management strategy adopted by 
investment managers as well as considering funds that invest in a diversity of financial 
securities. 
In summary, an analysis of managed fund performance in Australia is of critical 
importance to investors, practitioners, academics and regulators in terms of providing a 
better understanding of the financial services industry, an analysis of the performance of 
investment providers as well as identifying the factors that explain performance outcomes. 
1.3 The Importance of Investment Strategy in Performance Evaluation 
The investment strategy adopted by managed funds is of critical importance in 
understanding (a) how portfolio performance should be measured, (b) the sources of 
investment performance and (c) the factors that differentiate performance between 
managed investment vehicles on the basis of qualitative and quantitative criteria.  
Assessments of investment manager performance by investors can only be made once a 
managed fund’s investment objectives are clearly defined.  This includes disclosure of the 
nature of securities that represents the investible universe available to investment managers 
3 
and the investment process that will be implemented.  Therefore, investors must identify 
the appropriate benchmark index that is applicable to the specific investment strategy being 
adopted.  In the case of diversified or multi-sector funds, this will also include information 
on the asset-mix of funds. 
Investment strategy is equally important to users of index funds, active funds and 
enhanced index funds.  For index investors, investment manager strategy includes 
specification of the target benchmark index as well as the replication strategy to be 
adopted.  For active investors, fund managers exhibit different beliefs concerning the way 
capital markets operate and how market inefficiencies can be exploited to deliver active 
returns to unit holders.  These include an investment manager biasing the portfolio toward 
companies on the basis of valuation, growth and market capitalisation (i.e. large versus 
small stocks).  In addition, the strategy is executed by individual investment professionals 
with varying levels of industry experience, loyalty (or tenure), degree qualifications (or 
education) and incentive structures (i.e. remuneration policies).  The extent to which 
investment manager performance can be differentiated with respect to the investment 
strategies adopted, particularly in the Australian market, represents a gap in the literature. 
1.4 Structure and Contents of the Dissertation 
This dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 provides an extensive institutional 
details section surveying the Australian investment management market.  This is important 
as the dissertation provides a unique synthesis concerning the Australian institutional 
structure, identification of the major participants, detailed information defining the types of 
managed funds available, and the different investment strategies undertaken by portfolio 
managers.  This section also documents specific Australian investment manager 
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characteristics, including the general operational structure of the funds management 
organisation, investment strategies implemented across various asset classes, the types of 
professional personnel employed (degrees, experience and loyalty), expenses charged and 
compensation arrangements offered.  The chapter also documents merger and acquisition 
activity that has occurred in the Australian investment management industry between 1988 
and 2001. 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation provides a broad literature review of the published 
research in the mutual funds field.  The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of 
how the literature has evolved, the key findings with respect to mutual fund performance 
published in the literature, and the likely direction of research into the future.  The 
literature specifically relating to the key empirical chapters in the dissertation (i.e. Chapters 
4-8) are discussed within each relevant chapter. 
The main body of the dissertation is contained in Chapters 4 to 8.  The dissertation 
presents five essays evaluating the performance of managed funds with direct 
consideration of the investment strategies adopted by fund managers.  While there are 
numerous studies that cover international markets in the performance evaluation area, little 
empirical work has been undertaken in Australia evaluating active funds and research is 
non-existent (in Australia) in the evaluation of passively managed investment offerings.  
The research also provides a significant contribution to the understanding of whether 
information asymmetries exist in the Australian market as well empirically testing the 
extent to which specific manager characteristics can predict investment performance.  As 
such, this dissertation considers both actively managed funds, which attempt to outperform 
appropriate benchmark indices, as well as the ability of passive funds to replicate the 
returns and risk of the underlying benchmark index. 
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The first essay (Chapter 4) presented in this dissertation provides an analysis of 
actively managed, institutional pooled superannuation funds in Australia.  Pooled 
superannuation funds are among the largest unitised investment products (in terms of asset 
size) offered by investment managers.  These funds are also more complex for fund 
managers to administer as they are diversified across multiple asset classes, including 
domestic and international equities, domestic and international fixed interest, property and 
cash.  This essay extends the literature in two ways.  First, the analysis highlights the 
importance of using a correctly specified benchmark proxy where funds invest across 
multiple asset classes.  Notably, Sinclair (1990) evaluated the performance of pooled 
superannuation funds against a benchmark that did not account for asset class exposure 
beyond the Australian equities sector.  Sinclair (1990) found that pooled superannuation 
funds exhibited superior security selection ability coupled with perverse market timing, 
however, performance measurement, which is consistent with each fund’s unique strategic 
benchmark, shows that security selection and market timing ability are indeed 
insignificant.  Second, the study uses a unique data set of fund asset allocations relative to 
strategic benchmark weights.  This detailed level of information provides insight into the 
tactical investment strategies that fund managers have adopted in their pursuit of active 
returns.  Both arithmetic and geometric performance methodologies are used in the 
attribution of performance into market timing and security selection components.  Overall, 
the results indicate that pooled superannuation fund managers do not exhibit superior 
portfolio management skill. 
The second essay (Chapter 5) examines the performance of institutional Australian 
equity index fund managers seeking to replicate the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation 
Index.  The essay provides an examination of the magnitude of performance differentials 
between fund managers’ returns and the underlying index (tracking error), and the 
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potential drivers of tracking error in performance.  Prior work is non-existent in the 
Australian market and very little empirical work evaluating index funds has been 
undertaken internationally.  The most likely reasons for this absence are attributable to the 
relative infancy of the index fund market coupled with the increasing dissatisfaction of 
investors utilising active investment managers (i.e. investors having become aware that the 
majority of active managers/funds have been unable to outperform an appropriate market 
benchmark after expenses).  While the implementation of an index strategy is theoretically 
straightforward, the existence of market frictions faced by passive managers, who are 
subsequently measured against an index that cannot be replicated perfectly, will cause 
tracking error in performance.  While Australian equity index fund managers are shown to 
perform in line with their investment objectives over the long-run, that is the achievement 
of index performance before management expenses, this dissertation highlights three 
significant factors which cause managers index-mimicking difficulties.  The essay 
represents an original and significant contribution to the performance evaluation literature, 
and this essay provides the first empirical evidence evaluating index fund manager ability 
and their attempts to deliver index performance to investors. 
The third essay (Chapter 6) evaluates the performance of index mutual funds in the 
United States, benchmarked to the S&P 500 index.  Little empirical work exists with 
respect to U.S. index mutual funds.  This essay is similar in theoretical terms to the second 
essay (Chapter 5), however there are notable extensions to the Australian-oriented analysis.  
The focus of the essay concerns the documentation of tracking error magnitude, an analysis 
of the variation in tracking error over time as well as providing a direct performance 
comparison against large-capitalisation oriented active mutual funds.  The securities 
comprising the S&P 500 are highly liquid and the magnitude of tracking error exhibited by 
S&P 500 index mutual fund managers is significantly smaller on average compared with 
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Australian index managers benchmarked to the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index.  
The essay finds that despite the existence of tracking error in index mutual fund 
performance, index funds’ performance objectives are not compromised.  The essay also 
finds a seasonal pattern in tracking error magnitude over calendar months.  Tracking error 
is significantly higher in the months of January and May and lowest in June.  The existence 
of a strong quarterly pattern (trough) is also evident, suggesting S&P 500 index mutual 
funds experience improved replication ability in the months of March, June, September 
and December.  The empirical results indicate that a delay in the receipt of dividends by 
index funds is one explanation for the seasonality phenomenon.  The performance 
comparison between active mutual and index mutual funds indicates active funds, on 
average, significantly under-perform passive benchmarks.  S&P 500 index mutual funds 
earned higher risk-adjusted excess returns after expenses than large capitalisation-oriented 
active mutual funds in the period examined. 
The fourth essay (Chapter 7) presented in this dissertation examines the 
performance of Australian investment managers with respect to their characteristics and 
investment strategies.  In particular, the performance of active Australian investment 
managers in Australian equities, Australian bonds and diversified (or multi-sector) funds at 
the institutional level are considered.  The extent to which the investment performance of 
managed funds is related to investment manager attributes or characteristics is a largely 
unknown empirical issue.  This is despite the significant attention given to individual 
investment management organisations and their specific investment products offered by 
market regulators, the media, institutional and retail investors, institutional asset 
consultants and fund ratings agencies.  While academic research has largely concentrated 
on the measurement of portfolio performance and more recently the performance 
persistence phenomenon, research is sparse in evaluating fund performance with respect to 
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the investment strategy and the specific attributes that differentiate the returns achieved by 
fund managers.  Specifically, the essay examines the predictability of risk-adjusted returns, 
systematic risk and management expenses on the basis of investment managers’ 
characteristics, including the experience and loyalty of investment personnel, educational 
qualifications, and the effect of top management turnover on portfolio performance. 
The final essay in this dissertation (Chapter 8) provides an empirical examination 
of the performance of actively managed Australian bond funds in both the institutional and 
retail fund spheres.  This empirical study is the first study to evaluate the domestic fixed 
income sector and also represents an original study in the context of the international 
literature in the application of conditional performance evaluation techniques to active 
bond funds.  The conditional models represent an attractive alternative to unconditional 
approaches, as they are better able to account for the time-variation in fund risks as well as 
the ability to control for publicly available information accessible to active investment 
managers.  The study also considers the effect of investor flows on the investment 
manager’s ability to earn returns superior to the benchmark.  Edelen (1999) argues that 
active managers are required to engage in a material volume of uninformed, liquidity-
motivated trading, and as a result, performance models should account for the adverse 
effects of the liquidity function provided to investors.  Therefore, failure to account for 
exogenous fund flow shocks experienced by portfolio managers may adversely impact on 
market timing estimates.  Consequently, improved understanding of these factors enhances 
performance inferences concerning active bond fund managers in Australia. 
The dissertation concludes with the key findings presented in Chapter 9 as well as 
suggestions for future research. 
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1.5 Publications Arising From This Dissertation 
A number of publications in internationally refereed journals (either published or 
accepted for publication) have subsequently arisen as a consequence of the research 
undertaken while a doctoral candidate at The University of Sydney.  These include 
publications and acceptances for future publication as follows: 
• “Attribution of Investment Performance: An Analysis of Australian Pooled 
Superannuation Funds, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 41(1&2): pp41-62; 
• “Is Index Performance Achievable?: An Analysis of Australian Equity Index 
Funds”, Abacus, Forthcoming; 
• “Tracking S&P 500 Index Funds”, Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 28(1): 
pp44-55; 
These publications comprise empirical research that is presented in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 respectively.  These latter two chapters were subsequently published with Professor 
Alex Frino as a co-author.  The work comprising this dissertation is both original and a 
significant product of my own effort. 
1.6 Summary 
The research essays presented in this dissertation provide an analysis of investment 
performance for managed funds with active and passive investment strategies, as well as 
funds which invest in a variety of sector-specific securities and those that invest across the 
broad asset-class mix such as listed shares, fixed interest, property and cash.  Analysis is 
also performed in evaluating the performance of fund manager with reference to the unique 
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characteristics or attributes exhibited by institutional asset management firms.  In 
summary, this chapter articulated the objectives of the dissertation, outlined the motivation 
that supports an analysis of managed fund performance, and provided an overview of the 
dissertation’s structure and content. 
11 
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CHAPTER 2 – INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
2.1 The Australian Investment Market 
The Australian funds management market is a significant industry in terms of its 
size and importance in encouraging national savings as a vehicle to promoting economic 
growth.  The Reserve Bank of Australia at the turn of the millennium reported the gross 
national savings rate of Australia at approximately 21 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).  However, even more significant are national savings accumulated through the 
compulsory superannuation system.  Superannuation assets have increased by more than 
15 percent per annum since 1985, and currently exceed 70 percent of GDP.  The 
investment industry is a significant component of the national financial system and 
includes numerous participants such as government, regulatory bodies, bank and non-bank 
financial institutions, corporations, professional bodies, investment advisory firms, 
investment management and corporate finance firms and the main users of investment 
services – wholesale and retail investors. 
Australia’s financial system and national savings policy in the 1990s was further 
developed through the Commonwealth Government’s commissioning of two significant 
inquiries: the national savings inquiry of Fitzgerald (1993) and the Wallis (1997) inquiry 
into Australia’s financial system.1  The Wallis Report (1997) represented the first 
significant review since the initial financial system inquiry by the Campbell Committee 
                                                 
1 V. W. Fitzgerald (1993), National Saving: A Report to the Treasurer, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, Canberra. 
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(1981) that recommended deregulation of the financial system.2  Indeed, the 
Commonwealth Government’s principal regulatory emphasis to date has been through 
Superannuation legislation and the development of a retirement income system promoting 
self-provision.  In addition to superannuation, the household sector has also demonstrated 
an increasing interest in alternative investment options beyond the traditional retail 
banking products, including the participation in the equity market through large public 
floats.  As a result Australia now exhibits the highest percentage ownership of shares in 
any OECD economy.  Further, on-line stockbrokers have also grown significantly through 
private investors’ interest and activity in on-line share trading.  On-line brokers have also 
diversified their product offerings, including the availability of managed funds to their on-
line clients.  Both government policy and increasing private investor awareness of the 
importance of savings and investment will continue to ensure the investment industry 
grows rapidly. 
In terms of the size of the investment market in Australia, Rainmaker Information 
estimated the industry to be valued at $A717.4 billion as at 30 June 2001.  Of particular 
note is the significant increase of assets invested over the last five years, where the 
industry’s size has grown by $A369 billion, or a two-fold increase in only half a decade.  
                                                 
2 The Martin Review Group (1984) also provided a report to the Commonwealth Government examining 
further the Australian financial system and a review of the recommendations of the Campbell Committee. 
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Table 2.1 documents the market share statistics and funds under management for the 
largest 30 investment managers in Australia.  The data show that the Australian investment 
industry is highly concentrated.  The largest institutional investor alone, AMP Henderson 
Global Investors accounts for almost 10 percent of the entire Australian funds management 
industry.  In addition, the four largest investment managers represent more than one-
quarter of the market and the majority of Australian sourced funds under management are 
comprised of only the 10 largest investment entities.  Rainmaker Information, in a recent 
survey of superannuation funds, identified 150 individual fund managers providing 
investment services, which clearly indicates that less than 10 percent of investment 
providers control more than half of the industry’s assets.  The concentration of the market 
has only increased over the past few years, as a result of mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry. 
The Australian investment industry’s assets are comprised of both institutional and 
retail market segments.  While the total size of the industry is around $A717 billion, the 
majority of funds are sourced from institutional clients, where total assets are $A462 
billion (or 64 percent of the total industry).  Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 presents statistics 
showing the assets managed by the largest 20 investment managers servicing the 
institutional and retail market as at 30 June 2001. 
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Table 2.1 – Top 30 Australian Investment Managers by Assets Managed and Market Share Statistics 
as at 30 June 2001 
Australian-based Investment Manager Overall 
Rank 
Assets Managed* 
$A Billion 
Market Share % 
AMP Henderson Global Investors 1 70.48 9.82 
MLC Investment Management 2 51.40 7.16 
Colonial First State Investment Managers 3 46.53 6.49 
Deutsche Asset Management (Australia) Limited 4 36.54 5.09 
BT Funds Management Limited 5 31.58 4.40 
State Street Global Advisors Australia 6 30.83 4.30 
Macquarie Investment Management  7 30.72 4.28 
Commonwealth Investment Management 8 30.14 4.20 
ING Investment Management Limited 9 30.00 4.18 
Queensland Investment Corporation 10 27.80 3.88 
Westpac Financial Services 11 22.66 3.16 
Alliance Capital Management Australia Limited 12 22.60 3.15 
Credit Suisse Asset Management (Australia) Limited 13 21.11 2.94 
ANZ Investments 14 16.48 2.30 
Merrill Lynch Investment Managers Limited 15 15.94 2.22 
Perpetual Investments 16 15.63 2.18 
Barclays Global Investors Australia Ltd 17 14.92 2.08 
Maple-Brown Abbott Limited 18 14.55 2.03 
INVESCO Asset Management Australia Limited 19 13.51 1.88 
Vanguard Investments Australia Limited 20 12.66 1.77 
Lend Lease Real Estate Investments 21 11.00 1.53 
UBS Asset Management (Australia) Ltd 22 10.42 1.45 
Rothschild Australia Asset Management Limited 23 10.08 1.41 
NRMA Investment Management Pty Limited 24 9.86 1.37 
Portfolio Partners Limited 25 9.46 1.32 
Zurich Scudder Investments Australia Limited 26 8.86 1.23 
Suncorp-Metway Investment Management Limited 27 7.21 1.01 
Lazard Asset Management Pacific Co. 28 7.00 0.98 
Fidelity Investments Australia Limited 29 5.92 0.83 
Aberdeen Asset Management 30 5.49 0.76 
Other Investment Managers - 76.04 10.60 
TOTAL - 717.41 100.00 
*Australian sourced funds under management 
Source: Rainmaker Information 
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Figure 2.1 – Twenty Largest Australian Institutional Investment Managers at 30 June 2001 ($A 
Billion) 
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Figure 2.2 – Twenty Largest Australian Retail Investment Managers at 30 June 2001 ($A Billion) 
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2.2 Defining Asset Classes and Benchmark Indices 
An asset class represents a group of financial assets.  In theory there are numerous 
asset classes that may exist, however in investment markets, asset classes are typically 
defined in broad terms on the basis that the securities comprising the asset class have some 
degree of commonality in terms of their characteristics.  In the Australian investment 
markets, the six largest and easily identifiable asset classes are Australian Equities, 
International Equities, Australian Bonds, International Bonds, Property and Cash. 
Table 2.2 documents the size of the major asset classes that comprise the Australian 
investment industry. 
Table 2.2 – Size of Australian Asset Class Sectors Managed by Investment Managers at 30 June 2001 
Asset Class $A Billion Percentage (%) 
Panel A: Growth Asset Classes   
Australian Equities 211.16 29.43 
International Equities 140.22 19.55 
Property 77.51 10.80 
Panel B: Defensive Asset Classes   
Australian Bonds 123.81 17.26 
International Bonds 28.54 3.98 
Cash 85.37 11.90 
Panel C: Other Assets   
Other Investments3 50.78 7.08 
TOTAL 717.41 100.0 
Source: Rainmaker Information 
 
                                                 
3 Other assets include capital guaranteed assets, tactical asset allocation assets, life insurance policies and 
infrastructure investments. 
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The table shows that Australian investors have the highest exposure to domestic 
and international equities asset classes, with domestic bonds representing the third largest 
asset class in the market.  The category ‘other investments’ identified in Table 2.2 includes 
private equity or venture capital, tactical asset allocation investments and infrastructure-
type investments. 
Asset classes may be dichotomised into two broad categories – growth assets or 
defensive assets, and this classification is ultimately defined in terms of the asset class’ ex-
ante returns and volatility.  Given the centrality of modern portfolio theory, the mean-
variance framework identifies that investors are ultimately concerned about ex-ante returns 
and volatility trade-offs.  According to industry classifications of asset classes, growth 
assets are generally defined as including equity and property investments, where returns 
derived from such investments comprise income and changes in capital value.  Defensive 
assets on the other hand are generally defined as investments in bonds (government and 
corporates) and highly liquid securities yielding delivering income returns.  Defensive 
asset classes exhibit a degree of stability in the underlying value of an investor’s initial 
investment.  That is, highly liquid money market securities and bonds derive interest 
income from the underlying capital value, where the capital value remains of a fixed value.  
In the case of bonds held to maturity, the principal component or initial investment is 
redeemable at maturity.  Debt instruments provide the investor with a legal claim to 
repayment of the principal value at a future date. 
In addition, growth and defensive asset classes may be distinguished in terms of 
their historical returns, ex-post volatility and the level of asset class correlation existing 
between sectors.  Table 2.3 presents the returns, volatilities and correlations between asset 
classes using data provided by William M. Mercer Pty. Ltd.  All asset class returns are 
18 
defined as holding period returns and account for changes in capital values and 
reinvestment of income.  The asset class proxies used rely on the standard industry 
benchmarks widely referenced in the investment management industry and are presented in 
Table 2.4.  While future returns and the volatility of asset classes are unknown, historical 
data provides investors with some degree of insight into the level of returns derived and the 
risks associated with each of the asset classes.4  Considering historical data assists 
investors in being able to forecast what are the likely scenarios that may exist into the 
future. 
Table 2.3 – Historical Annual Returns, Volatility and Correlations: 13-Year Period January 1988 – 
December 2000 
   Correlation (%) 
Asset 
Class 
Return 
(% pa)* 
SD  
(% pa) 
AEQ IEQ DP LP AFI OFIH Cash 
AEQ 11.6 13.8 100.0 33.8 0.2 52.2 34.8 17.1 0.1 
IEQ 12.8 15.1 - 100.0 -3.9 27.8 17.6 31.1 -3.1 
DP 5.8 4.6 - - 100.0 -1.1 -12.6 -10.0 15.5 
LP 11.6 10.1 - - - 100.0 41.8 28.0 -0.7 
AFI 11.5 4.9 - - - - 100.0 58.6 26.0 
OFIH 11.3 3.3 - - - - - 100.0 27.2 
Cash 8.4 1.1 - - - - - - 100.0 
CPI 3.3 2.2 - - - - - - - 
AWE 3.9 2.5 - - - - - - - 
* All asset class returns are measured in Australian dollar terms and account for the total return accrued (i.e. 
capital changes and dividend/income reinvestment.) 
 
Table 2.3 reveals that international equities recorded both highest return and 
standard deviation in the 13-year period than any other asset class sector.  As expected, 
growth asset classes exhibit higher standard deviations (or risk) than is the case for 
defensive asset classes.  However the problems of evaluating returns and risk over static 
                                                 
4 For this reason the evaluation period does not include data from 1987, as the October equity market crash 
would potentially distort the analysis. 
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periods is two-fold.  First, such an approach does not provide for the analysis of returns 
and risks over different periods of time.  The second disadvantage is that all observations 
are treated equally and therefore there is no scaling effect that applies greater weights to 
the most recent data.  To better understand the relative returns and risks over varying time 
periods within the 13-year period evaluated, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the 5-year rolling 
returns and standard deviations for each of the major asset classes. 
Table 2.4 identifies the benchmark indices used as proxies in the measurement of 
total returns (capital changes and income reinvestment) and the risks of asset classes.  
These indices are widely referenced within the Australian investment industry as broad, 
representative measures of the performance of a portfolio of securities available to 
investors in the market.  Benchmark indices are defined as a statistical measure that 
enables changes in the value of a group of securities comprising a particular asset class to 
be calculated.  Benchmark indices therefore allow market participants to measure the 
returns and risks of a portfolio of securities to serve as a yardstick or reference point when 
comparing alternative portfolios.   
Table 2.4 – Benchmark Indices Employed as Asset Class Proxies 
Asset Class Code Benchmark Index 
Australian Equities AEQ S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index* 
International Equities IEQ MSCI World (ex-Australia) Index in $A (net dividends re-invested) 
Direct Property DP William M. Mercer Direct Property Index 
Listed Property LP S&P/ASX Listed Property Accumulation Index 
Australian Bonds AFI UBS Warburg Composite All Maturities Bond Index 
Overseas Bonds OFIH Salomon Smith Barney World Government Bond Index Hedged in $A 
Cash Cash UBS Warburg Bank Bill Index 
Inflation CPI ABS Consumer Price Index 
Average Weekly Earnings AWE ABS Average Weekly Earnings (All Males) 
*ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index was used prior to March 2000.  The difference in market 
capitalisation coverage between the S&P/ASX 300 and the S&P/ASX 200 is less than 3 percent. 
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Figure 2.3 – Five-Year Rolling Annual Returns (% per annum) 
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Figure 2.4 – Five-Year Rolling Annual Standard Deviations (% per annum) 
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The vast majority of benchmark indices across global markets are market-
capitalisation weighted – where in the case of equity securities for example, larger 
companies exhibit a higher weighting within the index relative to smaller firms.  Market-
capitalisation-weighted indices have two distinct differences compared with an index 
calculated as an average, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  First, larger securities 
should have a higher emphasis within an index by the very nature of their size.  Second, 
market-capitalisation-weighted indices ensure greater ease in replicability, where changes 
in the price of securities in the index do not require continual re-balancing. 
The provision of index-related services within the investment industry is performed 
by many organisations and across various asset class sectors.  Index providers allow 
participants to be able to objectively compare the performance of managed portfolios 
against a yardstick that is representative of a market-wide portfolio of securities.  Table 2.5 
documents the main providers of index-related services to the Australian investment 
industry. 
Table 2.5 – The Major Providers of Index-Related Services to the Australian Investment Industry 
Asset Class Index Provider 
Australian Shares Standard & Poor’s / Australian Stock Exchange 
Australian Shares Salomon Smith Barney 
International Shares Morgan Stanley Capital International 
International Shares IFC 
International Shares Standard & Poor’s 
Direct Property Towers Perrin 
Direct Property William M. Mercer 
Direct Property InTech  
Listed Property Standard & Poor’s / Australian Stock Exchange 
Australian Bonds UBS Warburg 
Australian Bonds Australian Debt 
International Bonds Salomon Smith Barney 
International Bonds Lehman 
Cash UBS Warburg 
22 
 The necessary characteristics in the construction of indices are that they are 
replicable.  That is, the indices require transparency and objectivity in terms of how they 
are constructed and the rules governing their operation.  In addition, the securities 
comprising the index must have sufficient liquidity.  The success of an index will therefore 
depend on the ease with which the index could be mirrored through the physical holdings 
of stocks in a portfolio.  If there exist great difficulties in replicating an index, an investor 
may deem the index to be inappropriate as a useful yardstick for comparison to other 
investment portfolios.  The major asset classes are described in the sections below. 
2.2.1 Australian Shares 
Australian equity investments typically refer to the ownership of shares in publicly 
listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).  Prior to 3 April 2000, the ASX 
All Ordinaries Index was the broad measure of equity performance, and included between 
229 and 330 companies on the basis of their market capitalisation size and the achievement 
of specific liquidity criteria.  The ASX and Standard and Poor’s have restructured the 
equity indices post April 2000, where the S&P/ASX 200 and S&P/ASX 300 have become 
the most widely tracked market indicators of equity performance.  In terms of the 
S&P/ASX 300, 300 companies are included and these are classified into one of 24 sectors 
listed on the ASX.  Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 show the summary statistics of the 
composition of the Australian S&P/ASX 300 Index in terms of market capitalisation as at 
31 January 2001. 
The Australian S&P/ASX 300 Index is highly concentrated across large 
capitalisation securities.  The largest 20 securities comprising the index account for more 
than 60 percent of the benchmark.  In addition, industrial stocks also dominate the 
23 
composition of the index, representing 86.9 percent of the benchmark by market 
capitalisation.  The banking and finance sector is the largest component of the Index, 
followed by Media and Telecommunications. 
Table 2.6 – S&P/ASX 300 Structure at 31 January 2001 
S&P/ASX 300 Index Composition Benchmark Weight (%) 
Top 20 Securities 65.2 
Next 30 Securities 17.1 
Next 50 Securities 9.7 
Top 100 Securities 92.0 
Top 200 Securities 98.4 
Remaining Small-Cap Securities 1.6 
All Industrials Securities 86.9 
All Resources Securities 13.2 
Total 100.0 
Source: Australian Stock Exchange and SIRCA 
 
Commencing 3 April 2000, the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Company restructured the 
ASX’s ‘old’ suite of indices, re-defining the new All Ordinaries Index to account for 500 
securities.5  In a survey of investment manager intentions conducted by William M. Mercer 
Pty Limited prior to the ASX indices change, the vast majority of active and index 
managers elected to benchmark their Australian share portfolios to either the S&P / ASX 
200 or S&P/ASX 300 indices rather than the ‘new’ S&P / ASX All Ordinaries Index.  The 
main reason for the fund manager retreat from the ‘new’ All Ordinaries Index included the 
relatively lower liquidity of the stocks ranked outside the largest 200 (and therefore the 
higher transaction costs) and the relatively small increase in market capitalisation to be 
gained as a result of investing outside the largest 300 stocks.  The S&P / ASX 200 was 
                                                 
5 The ‘old’ ASX All Ordinaries Index required companies to have a market capitalisation of at least $A130 
million.  The ‘new; S&P / ASX All Ordinaries Index is now much broader and includes 500 companies, 
where the minimum market capitalisation at 3 April 2000 was $A20 million.  The ‘new’ All Ordinaries now 
accounts for a further 5 percent market capitalisation of all listed companies on the ASX, where the new 
index accounts for 97 percent of the market. 
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further confirmed to be the unofficial successor to the ‘old’ All Ordinaries Index when the 
Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) announced the new Share Price Index (SPI) futures 
contract would be based on the S&P / ASX 200. 
Table 2.7 – S&P/ASX 300 by Industry Classification at 31 January 2001 
S&P/ASX 300 Index Composition Benchmark Weight (%) 
Panel A: All Resources 
Diversified Resources 8.9 
Energy 2.6 
Gold 0.8 
Other Metals 0.9 
All Resources Total 13.2 
Panel B: All Industrials 
Alcohol & Tobacco 2.0 
Banks  23.9 
Building Materials 1.3 
Chemicals 0.3 
Developers & Contractors 2.6 
Diversified Industrials 2.4 
Engineering 0.1 
Food & Household Goods 1.3 
Healthcare & Biotechnology 2.9 
Infrastructure & Utilities 1.7 
Insurance 5.5 
Investment & Financial Services 2.4 
Media 13.8 
Miscellaneous Industrials 1.9 
Paper & Packaging 0.9 
Property Trusts 5.6 
Retail 3.6 
Telecommunications 10.3 
Tourism & Leisure 1.7 
Transport 2.7 
All Industrials Total 86.9 
Source: Australian Stock Exchange and SIRCA 
 
25 
Later in the year 2001, S&P will re-classify the ASX industry classifications 
system in a way that ensures it is consistent with the Global Industry Classification System 
(GICS) developed jointly by S&P and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).  
Companies comprising the S&P / ASX 200 Index are now classified using the GICS 
system and comprise 12 sectors - S&P/ASX 200 Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, 
Telecommunication Services, Utilities, Financials (ex-Property Trusts) and Property 
Trusts.  The final two sectors listed differ from the standard GICS to more accurately 
reflect the Australian market’s significantly large property trust market. 
2.2.2 International Shares 
Australia’s capital market is very small in comparison to other industrialised 
economies.  In terms of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index, a 
widely referenced global index comprising equity securities around the world, the total 
market capitalisation of securities comprising the index exceeded $US21 trillion as at 
December 1999.  Market capitalisation values for each country comprising the index are 
exhibited in Figure 2.6.  The objective of MSCI indices is to provide benchmarks that best 
represent the opportunities available to institutional investors.6  Therefore, replicability of 
the indices is essential.  MSCI constructs the country indices by firstly considering the 
universe of listed securities and then filtering stocks on the basis of industry classification, 
liquidity and free float (percentage of shares freely traded).  MSCI aims to have 60 percent 
of listed securities within any industry included in country indices.  MSCI also seeks to 
avoid the indices being misrepresentative due to potential cross-ownership of stocks in the 
                                                 
6 On 10 December 2000, MSCI announced that it will refine all of its equity indices for (a) free float and (b) 
that it will increase the target market representation from 60 to 85 percent coverage.  These changes will be 
effective as at 1 December 2001 and as at 1 June, 2002, respectively.  These changes are designed to ensure 
broader coverage and a more ‘investable’ suite of indices. 
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indices.  After consideration of these factors, MSCI then weights all securities to be 
included in the indices in terms of each company’s market capitalisation, which helps to 
ensure objectivity.  The construction of the MSCI indices accounts for possible ownership 
restrictions imposed by some countries (e.g. foreign ownership).  All indices constructed 
by MSCI are considered ‘free’ in the sense they account for these restrictions to non-
domestic investors.  MSCI also calculates non-free versions of some indices. 
Figure 2.5 – MSCI World Index Country Market Capitalisations ($US billion) as at 31 December 1999 
1941
1061 1039
429 302 273 272 249 237 108 91 79 46 43 38 22 16
10149
2779
576 531 441
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
U
S
Ja
pa
n
U
K
G
er
m
an
y
Fr
an
ce
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
C
an
ad
a
Ita
ly
Fi
nl
an
d
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
A
us
tra
lia
H
on
g 
K
on
g
Si
ng
ap
or
e
B
el
gi
um
D
en
m
ar
k
Po
rtu
ga
l
Ir
el
an
d
N
or
w
ay
A
us
tri
a
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
MSCI Developed Countries
M
ar
ke
t C
ap
ita
lis
at
io
n 
($
U
S 
bi
lli
on
s)
Source: MSCI 
 
For Australian investors, the most widely referenced market index concerning the 
performance of the international equity market (excluding Australian equity securities) is 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International World (ex-Australia) Index with either gross or 
net dividends re-invested.7  This is a market capitalisation-weighted benchmark that 
comprises only developed countries (21 excluding Australia).  While some countries may 
27 
                                                 
7 The difference between gross and net dividends reinvested is whether or not withholding tax has been 
accounted for. 
be perceived to be ‘developed’ (e.g. Taiwan or Israel), MSCI considers them to be 
‘emerging’ economies due to either limits or bans on foreign ownership, inadequate 
securities market regulation, restrictions on capital flows or perceived political risks.  
The regional weights comprising the MSCI World Index are shown in Table 2.8.  
The 5 largest countries within the MSCI World Index and their respective index weights 
over the 11-year period are documented in Figure 2.6.  The North America region, which 
includes Canada and the U.S., dominates the MSCI World Index.  The U.S. accounted for 
49 percent of the total MSCI World Index at December 1999.  Japan and the UK are the 
second and third largest markets within the MSCI World Index and represent 13.4 percent 
and 9.4 percent respectively. 
Table 2.8 – MSCI World Index Regional Weights as at 31 December 1999 
MSCI World Index – Major Regions Weight (%) 
North America 51.1 
UK 9.4 
Europe (ex-UK) 23.2 
Japan 13.4 
Asia (ex-Japan)* 2.9 
Emerging Markets** 0.0 
Total 100.0 
Source: Barclays Global Investors and MSCI 
* Includes Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore. 
** Emerging Markets not included in the MSCI World Index 
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Figure 2.6 – The 5 Major Developed Countries Comprising the MSCI World Index and Respective 
Market Capitalisation Weights for the 11 Years to December 1999 
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2.2.3 Australian Bonds 
The Australian bond market is a significant industry in its own right, valued in 
excess of $A116 billion or 17 percent of the market as at 30 September 2000.  The most 
widely referenced market index by investment managers concerning the performance of 
the Australian debt market is the UBS Warburg Composite Bond Index (UBSWI).  This is 
a market capitalisation weighted benchmark that comprises Commonwealth Government 
bonds (CGB), Semi-Government bonds (SGB) and corporate issues, where the minimum 
credit rating issued by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) is at the minimum A-.8  The investment 
grade of fixed interest securities within the index is shown in Figure 2.7.  The UBSWI 
                                                 
8 The minimum market-cap of bond securities included within the UBSWI is $A100 million for all securities.  
The S&P ratings on the basis of credit quality are as follows (in descending order): AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, 
A+, A, A-.  The highest S&P rating indicates an issuer exhibiting an extremely strong capacity to meet their 
financial obligations.  An A rating represents an issuer holding a strong capacity to meet their financial 
commitments, however they may have a greater sensitivity to changing (adverse) economic conditions.  
BBB- is the lowest investment-grade rating, however these bonds are not included in the UBS Warburg 
Composite Bond Index. 
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comprised 128 issues at 30 September 1999, of which 15 securities were CGB, 35 SGB 
and 78 corporate stocks.  All CGB and the majority of SGB had credit ratings of AAA.  
Only 37 percent of corporate issues had an investment grade of AAA.  The second most 
common S&P rating (A) for corporate bonds accounted for 22 percent of the total 
corporate fixed income stocks within the UBSWI. 
Figure 2.7 – Investment Grade of Australian Bond Securities by Issuer Type  
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Table 2.9 presents the market capitalisation of Australian debt securities 
comprising the UBSWI according to maturity classification. 
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Table 2.9 – Market Capitalisation of UBS Warburg Australian Bond Indices at 30 September 1999 
(Market Value in $A million) 
 UBS Warburg Bond Indices 
Maturity  Composite  Government Semi-
Government 
Corporate 
0+YR 151,134 72,901 52,463 25,770 
1+YR 138,336 63,499 50,958 23,879 
0-3YR 43,657 22,328 13,012 8,317 
0-5YR 85,561 38,209 28,521 18,831 
3-5YR 41,904 15,881 15,509 10,514 
5-7YR 22,261 8,474 9,623 4,163 
7-10YR 38,684 22,939 12,969 2,776 
5-10YR 60,944 31,413 22,591 6,939 
10+YR 4,629 3,279 1,350 0 
Source: UBS Warburg 
 
The UBSWI had a market capitalisation value in 30 September 1989 of around 
$A61 billion, which had grown in size over the 10-year period by almost 150 percent to 
$A151 billion as at 30 September 1999.  The three component UBS Warburg indices are 
also represented.  While CGB, SGB and Corporate issues predominantly comprise 
Australian fixed interest portfolios, fund managers may also invest a small proportion of 
fund assets in cash and other securities including convertible notes, preference shares and 
index-linked bonds.  The data in Table 2.9 reveals that more than 50 percent of the total 
value of fixed income securities represented by the UBSWI have a maturity horizon within 
a 5-year period, and almost three quarters of the value of corporate issues mature over the 
same period.  In more specific terms, the duration (or weighted average term to maturity of 
cash flows derived from bonds) of the UBSWI as at 30 September 1999 was approximately 
3.90 years. 
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2.2.4 International Bonds 
International bond investments are typically made across government issued or 
‘sovereign’ debt securities in North America, Europe, Japan and Asia.  Security selection is 
predominantly made with reference to the country and regional weights that comprise an 
appropriate market index (usually defined as the Salomon Bros. World Government Bond 
Index), as well as the economic fundamentals that exist in each country. 
2.2.5 Property 
Property investments by Australian investment managers may occur through either 
ASX listed property trusts or direct ownership of commercial, industrial or residential 
property assets across the States and territories of Australia.  Table 2.10 shows the 
benchmark weights applicable for the William M. Mercer Direct Property Index and the 
ASX Listed Property Index as at 31 March 2000.   
Table 2.10 – Property Index Weights as at 31 March 2000 
Property Sector Category Direct Property 
Benchmark 
Weight (%)* 
Listed Property 
Benchmark 
Weight (%)** 
Diversified - 37.4 
Commercial 50 18.3 
Retail 40 35.0 
Industrial 10 6.9 
Other - 2.4 
Total 100 100 
Source: AMP Henderson* and BT Funds Management** 
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2.2.6 Cash 
Investment managers use short-term money market securities as a means of 
ensuring their managed funds have satisfactory liquidity to meet redemption requests as 
well as for the purposes of reducing the volatility of portfolios that also have exposure to 
growth or other defensive asset classes.  Generally, money managers invest in highly liquid 
assets with a maturity of less than 180 days, and usually an average maturity of less than 
90 days, however this will depend on the duration of the underlying index and the 
manager’s willingness to diverge significantly from the benchmark.  Investment managers 
observe cash as the most defensive investment strategy available to them in the portfolio 
management process.  Table 2.3 showed the UBS Warburg Bank Bill Index exhibited the 
lowest standard deviation of all mainstream asset classes coupled with extremely small 
correlations for the three growth asset classes presented (Australian shares, international 
shares and property).  Fund managers typically invest in a mixture of cash and highly rated 
money market instruments that provide benefits similar to those of at-call bank accounts 
(i.e. highly liquid and secure).  The types of money market securities typically comprising 
cash portfolios include treasury notes, bank accepted bills, bank term deposits, promissory 
notes, bills of exchange, floating rate notes, bank bill futures and options on bank bill 
futures.  The portfolio process for an active money market fund will be highly influenced 
by both the existing and expected stance of monetary policy.  The identification and 
selection of money market securities and the managed fund’s sensitivity to interest rate 
movements (or duration management) are the most important determinants in the delivery 
of active returns above the benchmark index. 
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2.2.7 Alternative Asset Classes 
A number of investment managers also offer their clients (predominantly 
institutional clients) access to alternative investments such as unlisted assets, including 
infrastructure assets, venture capital and other forms of private equity.  Investments in 
private equity and venture capital generally occur when smaller firms require access to 
new equity capital in order to further develop a company’s operations.  Examples of 
private equity investments by fund managers include exposures to information technology 
and biotechnology firms.  Private equity capital is most similar to listed share investments 
in terms of their risk-return nature, however their relative disadvantage is that they are 
generally not as liquid as listed equity securities and generally have a longer-term horizon 
associated with them.  Examples of portfolio holdings in infrastructure assets by fund 
managers include investments in the construction and operation of toll-roads (e.g. Hills 
Motorway in Sydney and Transurban in Melbourne), and the ownership of airports (e.g. 
Brisbane airport) and electricity assets (e.g. Hazelwood in Victoria). 
The Australian Venture Capital Association recently conducted an annual survey of 
institutional investor commitments.  Of the 30 institutions surveyed, total venture capital 
assets amounted to over $A4 billion and spread across 133 separate mandates.  These 
investors were reported as considering increasing their capital commitments to the venture 
capital sector by around $A1.35 billion in the financial year 2000/2001.  The survey data 
as at 30 June 2000 are reported in Table 2.11. 
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Table 2.11 – Survey of Australian Institutional Venture Capital Commitments at 30 June 2000 
Institutional Investor Australia Overseas Total 
 $M Managers $M Managers $M Managers 
AMP Life 128.0 2 389.0 7 517 9 
Australia Post Superannuation 
Scheme 95.0 11 165.0 20 260.0 31 
Australian Retirement Fund 168.5 5 91.0 1 259.5 6 
Bridges Financial Services / 
Questor 28.0 1 - - 28.0 1 
C+BUS 150.0 1 250.0 1 400.0 2 
CM Abbott Pty Ltd 0.7 2 2.8 3 3.5 5 
Deutsche Asset Management 60.0 5 110.0 5 170.0 10 
Emerald Capital - - 0.5 1 0.5 1 
Emergency Services 
Superannuation Scheme 20.0 2 - - 20.0 2 
Energy Industries 
Superannuation Fund 11.0 1 - - 11.0 1 
Equipsuper 5.8 2 - - 5.8 2 
Funds SA 85.0 8 70.0 2 155.0 10 
Government Superannuation 
Office 73.8 9 - - 73.8 9 
Local Government 
Superannuation Scheme 130.0 1 - - 130.0 1 
Macquarie Investment 
Management 78.0 11 30.0 1 108.0 12 
Mercantile Mutual / ING 67.5 3 95.0 4 162.5 7 
National Asset Management 36.7 2 642.9 8 679.6 10 
Retail Employees Super Trust 62.0 4 - - 62.0 4 
St. George Bank 40.0 1 - - 40.0 1 
Superannuation Trust of 
Australia 39.5 4 - - 39.5 4 
Tasplan 7.0 1 - - 7.0 1 
UBS Capital 15.0 1 - - 15.0 1 
UniSuper 204.0 12 37.0 1 241.0 13 
Victorian Funds Management 
Corporation 74.0 10 - - 74.0 10 
Westpac Investment 
Management 30.0 3 16.0 1 46.0 4 
Wilshire Australia 322.0 31 325.0 4 647.0 35 
TOTAL 1931.5 133 2224.2 59 4155.7 192 
Source: Australian Venture Capital Journal 4th Annual Survey 
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2.3 Australian Managed Funds 
2.3.1 What is a Managed Fund? 
A managed fund is an investment product made available to investors by 
professional investment managers.  It is through managed funds that investors are able to 
access the investment services offered by fund managers.  In Australia, managed funds are 
typically collective or pooled investment vehicles offered to investors as unit trusts (public 
portfolio), however investment managers may also provide investment services to large 
institutional clients through an individually managed (private) portfolio.  In other words, a 
managed fund represents the combined assets of investors who have subscribed to the 
fund.  With this pool of liquid assets, investment managers allocate funds across different 
securities and asset classes in accordance with the investment objective of the fund.  
Managed funds offered as unit trusts are established under a trust deed that governs the 
operation of the fund.  The trust deed also dictates the means by which the unit trust can 
receive and redeem investments made by investors. 
Morningstar, an international provider of managed fund information, listed 5,769 
managed fund products (both institutional and retail) available to Australian investors.  
Table 2.12 shows the number of Australian domiciled managed funds across the asset class 
spectrum available to investors in January 2001.  A description of the different types of 
managed fund products available to Australian investors is presented in section 2.3.2.  The 
managed fund categories identified by Morningstar in Table 2.12 differ in respect to the 
type of assets an investment manager invests in (e.g. Australian equity trusts, multi-sector 
funds) and to the product structures that differentiate the types of investors (e.g. the type of 
investor (e.g. retail or institutional) and their tax-paying status). 
36 
Table 2.12 – Managed Funds Offered in Australia at 31 January 2001 
Managed Fund Product Categories Number of Funds 
Percentage 
(%) 
Panel A: Funds by Asset Class   
Diversified (or Multi-Sector) 2207 38.3 
Australian Equities 1052 18.2 
International Equities 650 11.3 
Australian and International Equities 57 1.0 
Australian Fixed Interest and Mortgages 682 11.8 
International Fixed Interest 130 2.3 
Property 189 3.3 
Cash 445 7.7 
Other* 357 6.2 
TOTAL FUNDS 5,769 100.0 
Panel B: Funds by Product Structure and Investor Type   
General Unit Trusts 897 15.5 
Friendly Society Bonds 139 2.4 
Insurance Bonds 484 8.4 
International Funds 246 4.3 
Pension Funds 712 12.3 
Superannuation Funds 2270 39.3 
Institutional Wholesale Funds – Non-Tax Paying 685 11.9 
Institutional Wholesale Funds –Tax Paying 336 5.8 
TOTAL FUNDS 5,769 100.0 
Source: Morningstar 
* ‘Other’ includes annuities, reserve-backed investments, master trusts and other miscellaneous funds. 
 
Managed funds are attractive to investors, both institutional and retail, for many 
reasons.  These include: 
• diversification benefits – investments made in pooled investment vehicles provide 
greater ease to spread small monetary investments across a large number of asset 
classes and individual financial securities than would be possible without such a 
vehicle; 
• economies of scale – transaction costs incurred by managed funds in physical 
transaction securities are likely to be much lower through collective investments 
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than would be the case through smaller, private transactions.  In addition, dividend 
imputation may allow managed funds to more efficiently utilise franking credits on 
domestic shares;9 
• access to investment skill – investors may not have the necessary time or expertise 
(either locally or globally), to invest their capital in both a prudent and profitable 
manner; and 
• portfolio administration services – investors may find the administration services 
provided, including record keeping, accounting and taxation services to be a 
valuable additional service. 
2.3.2 Types of Managed Funds 
Investment managers provide investors with access to a multitude of different 
managed investment products.  These managed fund products can be differentiated on the 
basis of three main criteria: 
• the investment objective; 
• the spectrum of asset classes and securities comprising the managed fund; and 
• the type of investor to which the product is structured or designed. 
The investment objective or strategy to be implemented by a portfolio manager is 
the most significant differentiating feature of a managed fund.  The investment strategy 
documents how the funds invested will be managed, including the investment style that 
will be followed.  Managed fund assets are invested using (1) an active investment 
philosophy, (2) a passive or index approach or (3) an investment objective that is largely 
                                                 
9 Dividend imputation allows investors of Australian companies, paying profits out as franked dividends, to 
be entitled to a reduction in the amount of their personal income tax.  This is achieved by accounting for the 
corporate tax that has already been paid on profits.  In other words, an investor who is taxed at their top 
marginal tax rate is only assessed for tax on the difference between the corporate tax rate and their top 
marginal tax rate if the dividends are fully franked. 
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passive in structure, however also incorporates some active strategies (e.g. enhanced index 
or quantitative strategies). 
Essentially the active and passive investment philosophies are diametrically 
opposite to one another and their use will depend on investors’ preferences and beliefs as 
to whether capital markets are efficient. 
2.3.2.1 Actively Managed Funds 
Active investment managers on the other hand believe that returns in excess of 
the underlying benchmark index are achievable through the use of security-specific and 
macroeconomic information.  The identification of mispriced securities (security 
selection) and altering the portfolio’s asset allocation in anticipation of market 
movements (market timing) are the two most common methods active managers use in 
their attempts to outperform benchmark indices.  
2.3.2.2 Index Managed Funds 
Index fund managers subscribe to the view that markets are broadly efficient and 
that, over time, index-mimicking portfolios will outperform the average active fund.  
Index managers also cite potential advantages in their funds being offered at lower cost 
to investors than active funds as well as the passive strategy minimising the 
crystallisation of capital gains tax liabilities.  Index investment management in Australia 
accounted for 11 percent of total funds under management as at 31 December 2000.  The 
Australian investment managers offering index funds to investors are presented in Table 
2.13. 
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Table 2.13 – Index Investment Management Market Profile in Australia as at 31 December 2000 
Investment Manager Rank $A Billion % Total 
FUM 
Indexed 
Market 
Share % 
State Street Global Advisors 1 18.63 61.5 24.32 
AMP Henderson Global Investors 2 10.65 15.6 13.91 
Vanguard Investments Australia 3 10.43 100.0 13.62 
Barclays Global Investors Australia 4 9.38 66.2 12.25 
Commonwealth Investment Management 5 9.35 28.5 12.21 
Macquarie Investment Management 6 4.43 14.9 5.78 
County Investment Management 7 3.68 27.6 4.80 
Westpac Financial Services 8 2.54 11.5 3.32 
Alliance Capital Management Australia 9 2.06 51.0 2.69 
Queensland Investment Corporation 10 2.00 7.5 2.61 
Credit Suisse Asset Management Australia 11 1.16 6.2 1.51 
Colonial First State Investments 12 0.88 2.4 1.15 
Portfolio Partners 13 0.38 3.7 0.50 
Advance Asset Management 14 0.29 12.5 0.38 
Paradice Investment Management 15 0.16 100.0 0.21 
AM Corporation 16 0.15 5.0 0.20 
Tactical Global Management 17 0.15 1.0 0.20 
Suncorp-Metway Investment Management 18 0.10 1.6 0.13 
Merrill Lynch Investment Management 19 0.10 0.7 0.13 
BNP Paribas Asset Management 20 0.05 3.0 0.07 
SMF Funds Management 21 0.02 2.1 0.03 
Ausbil Dexia 22 0.01 0.6 0.01 
TOTAL - 76.59 11.14 100.00 
Source: Rainmaker Information 
2.3.2.3 Enhanced Index Funds 
Enhanced index funds attempt to earn returns above the benchmark index, 
however the achievement of active returns requires minimising the fund’s tracking error 
(standard deviation of the difference between the fund’s return and the target 
benchmark’s return).  Enhanced index funds represent a blended strategy between an 
active and index approach.  The enhanced-passive approach is predominantly structured 
40 
as an index strategy with small tilts relative to the underlying index.  The objective 
generally involves the following enhancement strategies: 
• investing in companies via initial public offerings (IPOs) ahead of an IPO’s 
inclusion in an index; 
• internal ‘crossings’ with other funds actively managed by the same investment 
manager.  Securities may be acquired at more favourable prices than may exist in 
the market; 
• receiving dividends in the form of shares by participating in dividend reinvestment 
plans (DRPs).  The attractive feature of DRPs is the issue of shares at a discount to 
the current market price.  DRPs can also provide cost benefits to the manager by 
minimising the required trading in index securities.  Hence, the costs of order 
execution are minimised; 
• very small sector bets within industries and stocks relative to the index; and 
• employing derivatives, such as futures and options contracts, to take advantage of 
short-term market movements. 
2.3.2.4 Exchange-Traded Funds 
Exchange-traded funds (or ETFs) are relatively new investment vehicles that 
trade as a listed security on a securities exchange.  ETFs are listed unit trusts or ‘shares’ 
representing investment in a basket of other listed securities.  An ETF’s market value is 
determined with respect to the market values of the individual securities comprising the 
basket.  Because ETFs are equivalent to the purchase or sale of a security linked directly 
to an underlying index, these products represent an alternative to investing in index 
funds managed by professional investment managers.  ETFs provide investors with an 
efficient and diversified security that tracks market indices.  Indeed, ETFs in the United 
States levy lower expenses than open-end mutual funds.  ETFs are also beginning to be 
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used by investment managers as substitutes for futures contracts or in addition to 
derivatives. 
The first ETF was launched in Canada and was listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) in 1989.  This Canadian ETF tracked the largest 35 TSE listed stocks.  
ETFs originated in the U.S. in 1993 with the introduction of the Standard & Poor’s 
Depository Receipts (SPDRs), or Spiders, traded on the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX).  Spiders represent an investment in a value-weighted portfolio of common 
shares comprising the S&P 500 index, with the objective of providing investors with 
identical returns to the S&P 500.  Spiders pay dividends equal to the proportional weight 
of stocks that actually declare dividends.  The launch of the Spider was quickly followed 
by other ETF issues, Diamonds based on the Dow Jones Industrial Average, World 
Equity Benchmark Shares (WEBS) and iShares issued by Barclays Global Investors, and 
the NASDAQ listed Cubes (derived from their ticker symbol QQQ) tracking technology 
stocks.  ETF assets offered in the U.S. have approximately doubled in the year to 
December 2000 to $US70 billion, which are invested across 80 ETF securities. 
In Australia, ETFs have only recently been issued and are traded on the ASX.  
Salomon Smith Barney were the first to introduce an ETF on 2 March 2001 (called the 
IndexShare 100), where this listed unit trust tracks the S&P/ASX 100 index.  State Street 
Global Advisors have announced the launch of their ETF product tied to the S&P/ASX 
50 index.  Barclays Global Investors are also expected to shortly announce their iShares 
ETF. 
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2.3.2.5 Hedge Funds 
A U.S.-based Australian, Alfred Winslow Jones, first devised hedge funds in 
1949.  However both their number and growth has been significant since the 1960s.10  
As at 30 June 2001, the global assets invested in the hedge fund industry are estimated to 
be around $US500 billion.11  Indeed, an estimated $US8 billion flowed into hedge funds 
in the second quarter of 2001, which was higher than the total inflows into hedge funds 
for the calendar year 2000.  In Australia, hedge funds are relatively small in both number 
and asset size compared with hedge funds available overseas.  The Colonial First State 
survey statistics presented in Table 2.14 provide estimates of the size of the Australian 
market.  These indicate that total funds invested in hedge fund vehicles, either as 
individual funds or fund-of-funds, exceed $A3.4 billion at 30 September 2001.  Fund-of-
fund hedge funds invest across a number of individual hedge funds such that investors 
have access to different management, styles and diversification. 
                                                 
10 For an excellent discussion on the history, growth, styles and challenges concerning estimates of the 
market size, see Brown et al. (1999). 
11 TASS Asset Flows Report, June 2001. 
43 
Table 2.14 – Hedge Fund Providers and Australian-sourced funds as at 30 September 2001. 
Investment Provider $A Million 
(Estimated) 
Panel A: Fund of Funds  
Absolute Capital 220 
Alliance Capital / AXA 5 
Coastal 15 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 200 
Derivative Fund Management 15 
Deutsche Strategic Investment Group 110 
Hedge Funds of Australia 50 
Macquarie Bank 114 
OM Strategic Investments 1300 
Rothschild 50 
Warakirri 50 
TOTAL 2079 
Panel B: Individual Funds  
Basis Capital 17 
Bluesky 25 
Fleet 25 
Grinham 800 
K2 Asset Management 44 
Optimal Funds Management 200 
PM Capital 250 
Triton 25 
Vertex 15 
TOTAL 1401 
Source: Colonial First State Investments 
 
Hedge funds may invest in both cash markets (physical holdings of securities) 
and derivative markets (synthetic instruments providing exposure to underlying assets) 
in such a manner that provides investors with leveraged exposure to various asset 
classes.  While not all hedge funds use derivative securities, those hedge funds that do 
invest in such instruments take both long and short positions, such that investors exhibit 
an amplified exposure to asset classes than would otherwise be possible through 
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physical holdings of actual securities.  The use of derivative securities also permits 
hedge funds to exploit arbitrage opportunities.  The marketable features used in ‘selling’ 
hedge funds includes: 
• the ability of private investors to utilise a pooled investment vehicle which enables 
exposure to alternative assets not generally offered through managed or mutual 
fund products; and 
• providing investors with different risk and return characteristics to those offered by 
managed funds.  Historically, alternative investment returns have moved 
independently of equity and bond returns.  This lack of correlation suggests that 
hedge funds utilising alternative investments provide additional diversification 
benefits to traditional portfolios. 
Hedge funds have attracted much attention in the 1990s from market 
commentators, particularly since the 1998 collapse of U.S. hedge fund Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM).  The demise of LTCM was attributable to the fund’s 
inability to properly understand the risks inherent in the investment strategy, lack of 
operational transparency and inadequate regulation.  Indeed, Schneeweis (1998) 
highlights many investors of LTCM acted in a manner contrary to modern portfolio 
theory – that is they held a large proportion of their total assets within LTCM.  While the 
literature documents a higher degree of attrition of hedge funds compared with mutual or 
managed funds, Schneeweis (1998) has addressed a number of common ‘myths’ 
concerning investments through hedge funds.  Schneeweis (1998) argues hedge funds 
have both an important and legitimate role in financial markets.  These include hedge 
funds: 
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• providing liquidity to capital markets and specific asset classes (e.g. private equity 
and emerging markets) which are relatively illiquid; 
• acting as a counter party to derivative security contracts, ensuring the availability 
and efficiency of risk transfer. 
2.3.2.6 Ethical and Socially Responsible Funds 
Socially responsible investing and/or ethical investment relates to the inclusion or 
exclusion of securities within investment portfolios based on social, environmental or 
ethical criteria.  Investment selection requires satisfying both financial and qualitative 
criteria.  Socially concerned and/or ethical investors formulate various ‘screens’ that satisfy 
core moral beliefs.  These include security selection filters related to: 
• general corporate behaviour; 
• employee relations (e.g. equality of opportunity and acceptable employment 
conditions); 
• environment policies and practices; 
• observance of basic human rights; and 
• the promotion of safe and community-desired products and services (e.g. avoidance 
of tobacco, alcohol, gambling, armaments/weapons manufacture, animal testing, 
the mining of uranium). 
The screening process applied by investors will differ with respect to the moral 
beliefs held.  For example, religious organisations may be expected to hold stronger views 
relative to other socially concerned investors in the avoidance of investment in companies 
producing alcohol and tobacco or gambling services.  This is intuitive given the Churches’ 
significant role in society through charitable work. 
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Table 2.15 shows the size of the ethical and socially responsible investment market 
in Australia.  These investments account for just over 1 percent of total assets in the 
Australian industry. 
Table 2.15 – Ethical and Socially Responsible Market Profile in Australia as at 31 December 2000 
Investment Manager $A Million Market Share % 
Hunter Hall Investment Management 145 20.1 
BT Funds Management 138 19.2 
Australian Ethical Investments 118 16.4 
Warakirri Asset Management 94 13.0 
BNP Paribas Asset Management 82 11.4 
Westpac Financial Services 47 6.5 
Tower Asset Management 43 6.0 
Portfolio Partners 23 3.2 
Maple-Brown Abbott 17 2.4 
Schroder Investment Management Australia 9 1.2 
Suncorp-Metway Investment Management 5 0.6 
TOTAL 721 100.0 
Source: Rainmaker Information 
2.3.3 Managed Fund Products 
There are many different types of managed funds available to retail and 
institutional investors.  The major distinction between retail managed funds and an 
institutional fund is the minimum initial investment and the fee structure applicable.  Retail 
funds require lower minimum investments at application than is the case for institutional 
products, however retail funds levy higher management expense ratios.  The fees levied 
will also be dependent upon the type of product being offered – the investment strategy 
(active or index) and the asset class sectors in which the fund will have exposure (for 
example, equity funds generally levy higher fees than bond funds).  Fund managers 
generally offer a suite of managed funds for investors, superannuants and retirees across 
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different asset classes.  These funds offered to Australian domiciled investors are 
highlighted in the next section. 
2.3.3.1 Domestic Equity Funds 
• Australian share fund – investing in stocks comprising the S&P/ASX 200, 300 or 
All Ordinaries Index; 
• 50 leaders fund – fund assets concentrated amongst the largest 50 securities listed 
on the ASX in terms of market capitalisation; 
• future leaders fund – oriented toward small listed companies with strong growth 
potential; 
• growth or value funds – stocks selected on the basis of their fundamental attributes; 
• industrial and resources funds – portfolios comprise investments in stocks 
providing services, manufacturing and production (industrials) or minerals, energy 
and exploration (resources); 
• imputation funds – portfolios configured to provide tax-effective income through 
investments in listed securities declaring dividends which attach high percentage 
franking credits; 
• developing company funds – stock holdings in listed, small market capitalisation 
securities exhibiting future growth potential; and 
• socially responsible or ethical funds – stocks are selected on the basis of 
environmental or social factors as well as prospective financial performance. 
2.3.3.2 International Equity Funds 
• MSCI World (ex-Australia) oriented funds – invest in stocks comprising developed 
economies, predominantly in the U.S., U.K., Japan and Europe; 
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• regional and country funds – investments in large international economies such as 
the U.S., U.K., Japan or regional funds in Asia, North America, Europe, Emerging 
economies; and 
• global resources funds – portfolio assets include multi-national mining and energy 
stocks such as Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, Anglo American, De Beers, Royal 
Dutch/Shell. 
2.3.3.3 Property Securities Funds  
• invest in ASX-listed (exchange listed) property trust securities with exposure to 
commercial, industrial and retail assets.  The listed property trust’s portfolio may 
differ from others in terms of the relative weights to the types of property asset 
exposure and their geographical location (e.g. Sydney Central Business District, 
Sydney suburban etc.) 
2.3.3.4 Diversified or Multi-Sector Funds 
• capital stable funds – invest in cash and fixed interest investments with the 
objective of protecting the capital value of the fund’s investments; 
• conservative funds – invest predominantly in cash and fixed income securities, 
however small allocations to equity investments are likely to occur; 
• balanced funds – invest in the broad spectrum of asset classes, both defensive and 
growth oriented securities.  More than half of the funds assets is generally allocated 
to equity and property securities; and 
• growth and high growth funds – portfolios significantly concentrated in growth 
asset classes, particularly domestic and international shares, with smaller 
allocations to cash and fixed income. 
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2.3.3.5 Domestic Bond/Fixed Income Funds 
• Australian bond funds – invest in Commonwealth government, semi-government 
and corporate debt (credit rating above Standard & Poor’s BBB-) securities, and 
small allocations invested across money market securities; 
• mortgage funds – investments in mortgage assets which earn income at either a 
fixed or floating rate; 
• diversified fixed income funds – invest in domestic and international fixed interest 
securities and floating rate notes; and 
• high yield corporate bond funds – invest in corporate issues and floating rate notes, 
where minimum investment grade varies from manager to manager depending on 
investment objective. 
2.3.3.6 Cash Management Trusts 
• cash management trusts – investments comprise highly liquid money market 
securities, including bank-accepted bills, bills of exchange, promissory notes, 
certificates of deposit, and treasury notes. 
2.3.3.7 Tactical Asset Allocation Trusts and Currency Overlays 
• Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA) trusts and overlays provide investors (commonly 
larger investors where total assets exceed $A100 million) with opportunities to 
allocate small proportions of portfolio’s assets to professional managers with the 
view to exploiting movements in asset class returns over time.  TAA trusts (pooled 
investment vehicles) are usually available to smaller investors whereas larger 
investors have greater access to specialist overlay mandates.  William M. Mercer 
indicated that larger funds utilising overlay strategies generally commit 3-4 percent 
of the portfolio’s total assets, whereas smaller investors accessing TAA trusts 
provide 15-20 percent of total portfolio assets.  In general, the process involves the 
TAA manager employing the funds committed by the investor to alter the 
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portfolio’s asset allocation from the strategic benchmark allocation.  The TAA 
overlay manager’s strategy is first implemented by passive rebalancing of the 
portfolio’s asset mix to its unique long-term or strategic benchmark weight.  
Secondly, the TAA overlay manager actively adjusts the portfolio’s asset allocation 
away from the strategic benchmark with the view to enhancing overall portfolio 
returns and/or reducing portfolio risk.  Asset allocation changes are achieved 
through the use of derivative instruments and do not impact upon the discretion of 
other fund managers charged with the responsibility of managing specialist 
mandates. 
• currency overlays provide investors with additional currency management related 
to international investments.  Specialist overlay managers attempt to exploit 
currency movements over time in a manner that improves overall portfolio returns.  
The currency overlay approach is managed separately from the underlying assets of 
the portfolio and involves the use of currency futures and forward foreign exchange 
contracts by overlay managers. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, investment managers generally offer their investment 
services through unit trust vehicles, where investors make a formal application for units in 
the trust at the prevailing market-linked entry price.  The pricing structure of a unit trust is 
determined with reference to the net asset value (NAV) of the fund (gross assets of the 
trust less expenses).  In addition, unit trusts report both an application price and a 
redemption price, where the difference between the two quoted prices equates to the 
buy/sell spread.  While the midpoint price (equidistant between the application and 
redemption prices) represents the actual market value of the fund’s units based on the 
securities held in the portfolio, the buy/sell spread is argued to be necessary in recovering 
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the trading and administrative costs in executing investor applications and redemptions.  
As such, the buy/sell spread helps to avoid existing investors continually bearing the cost 
of transactions that arise from new applications and redemptions.  For retail investors, a 
percentage of the buy/sell spread may also reflect a commission payable to the financial 
advisor who promoted the managed fund on behalf of the fund manager. 
Investors who own units in managed funds anticipate earning income from their 
unit trust, and in the case of managed funds investing across growth asset classes, capital 
gains as well.  Depending on the type of trust and the investments held by the fund, 
earnings are generally paid to unit holders at regular intervals.  For cash management 
trusts, this may be monthly or quarterly and for equity trusts, typically of a quarterly or 
semi-annual frequency.  Investors may elect to receive income distributions in the form of 
cash disbursements or re-invest distributions within the fund and be entitled to additional 
units at the prevailing entry price. 
2.3.4 Regulation 
While Australia’s financial system is regulated by three government authorities, 
namely the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), the 
latter two organisations have the most significant responsibility in terms of supervising the 
participants within the investment industry. 
APRA is the prudential regulator of a number of financial services entities – 
superannuation funds, insurance corporations, banks, credit unions, building societies and 
friendly societies.  Essentially APRA “sets standards (including capital requirements) for 
the prudent management of banks, other depositors, insurance companies and friendly 
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societies to maximise the likelihood that they remain financially sound and able to meet 
their obligations to depositors and policyholders. In the case of superannuation funds, 
APRA aims to ensure that trustees are aware of their obligations to members and manage 
the funds in their care prudently in the interests of members.”12 
The ASIC aims to promote confidence in the financial system through the 
protection of investors, depositors, superannuants and insurance policy holders.  One area 
of regulation is the requirement that participants providing investment or securities advice 
be licensed.  In terms of managed funds however, the ASIC is required to provide 
supervision of the investment offerings made by fund managers with respect to the 
prospectuses.  For example, a managed fund offered as a unit trust by an investment 
manager requires the issuance of a prospectus duly lodged with the ASIC and compliant 
with the rules outlined in the Australian Corporations Act 2001.  Overall, the prospectus 
must disclose sufficient information that reasonably allows investors to make informed 
decisions concerning the assets offered.  Typically, managed fund prospectuses contain up-
to-date information providing: 
• background information which profiles the issuing entity; 
• the stated investment objective of the fund offered; 
• the inherent risks and volatility associated with investments; 
• the rules governing how the fund will operate, including how the fund’s unit price 
is determined, the fees payable etc.; 
• past performance history of the pooled vehicle; and 
• instructions outlining how an application for investment in the fund can be made. 
                                                 
12 APRA website (http://www.apra.gov.au/corporateinfo/faq.htm#Q1) 
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The ASIC is also responsible for administering and ensuring compliance of the 
Managed Investments Act 1998.  This legislation is an amendment to the Corporations Act 
1989.  One of the most fundamental and controversial changes has been the removal of the 
requirement that a managed investment scheme have both a manager and a trustee. 
2.3.5 Managed Fund Ratings Companies 
The Australian financial industry also includes a number of organisations dedicated 
to providing rigorous and independent scrutiny of the providers of investment and financial 
products.  For example, full-service stockbrokers continue to provide their clients with 
recommendations concerning the prospects of listed entities and the investment potential of 
such securities.  Within the bond market, agencies including Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s Investor Services attach ratings to sovereign debt and corporate issues on the 
basis of the financial strength of the borrower and their capacity to service their debts.  
Similarly, there exist a number of investment ratings agencies that provide both qualitative 
and quantitative information to investors concerning the product offerings of investment 
managers.  The most well known providers of ratings for managed funds are typically 
oriented towards the retail market and include firms such as ASSIRT and Morningstar.  
While the institutional market is serviced by asset consulting firms, who provide 
investment advice on the suitability of investment managers, their individual ratings 
process tends to be proprietary and forms the basis of their manager search function 
requested by their clients. 
The purpose of a managed funds ratings company is to provide investors with 
independent information concerning the suitability and quality of investment manager 
products.  There are numerous criteria evaluated by investment ratings agencies, both 
qualitative and quantitative, with the end result being the provision of a ‘star’ rating which 
54 
summarises the investment credentials of managed fund products available.  Essentially, 
ratings agencies will consider three main areas in the analysis of managed fund products: 
the investment professionals who manage the fund’s assets, the investment process adopted 
by the fund and the past performance achieved by the investment vehicle.  In terms of the 
funds rated by ASSIRT and Morningstar, both entities rate Australian managed funds 
between one star (minimum rating) and five stars (maximum rating).  The greater the 
number of stars attached to a managed fund, the more attractive the fund is considered to 
be for investors on the basis of the fund’s adopted investment management strategy, 
portfolio managers implementing the fund’s objectives and past performance.  Table 2.16 
presents the definitions used by ASSIRT and Morningstar in the classification of 
Australian managed funds.   
Table 2.16 – Managed Fund Ratings in Australia 
Star Rating ASSIRT Definition Morningstar Definition 
***** Excellent fund, strong management, comprehensive investment strategy, strong 
past performance 
Excellent quality fund 
**** Very good fund, strong management, sound investment strategy and solid past 
performance 
Very good quality fund 
*** Competently managed fund, either an unimpressive or limited fund performance 
history 
Good quality fund 
** Weak fund in terms of management and strategy, poor or very limited data history 
Poor quality fund 
* Poor quality fund with problems in strategy, management and performance 
Very poor quality fund 
On Hold Temporary Suspension of Rating - 
RTS - Rating Temporarily Suspended 
NYR - Not Yet Rated 
Source: ASSIRT and Morningstar 
 
The managed fund ratings are very similar for both ASSIRT and Morningstar, 
however their approach differs in the assignment of a fund’s rating.  Indeed, Morningstar 
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reported in September 2000 that 77 percent of ratings assigned to managed funds by 
ASSIRT and Morningstar were not consistent.13  The primary reason for this is the 
different system attached to both qualitative and quantitative characteristics of managed 
funds evaluated by ASSIRT and Morningstar.  For example, ASSIRT does not rank 
managed funds relative to their competitors, as is the case with Morningstar.  Morningstar 
distributes ratings across funds so that 15 percent of funds are allocated a five-star rating, 
20 percent have four stars, 25 percent are awarded three stars, 25 percent exhibit two stars 
and the remaining 15 percent are considered to be ‘very poor’ managed funds.  The 
following sections 2.3.5.1 and 2.3.5.2 provide a brief description of the ratings process 
implemented by Morningstar and ASSIRT, respectively. 
2.3.5.1 The Morningstar Ratings Approach 
While the computational process required to determine a fund’s star rating is 
complex, Figure 2.8 provides an example of the process by which managed funds receive a 
star rating from Morningstar. 
Investment managers are invited to participate in the Morningstar ratings process, 
which first begins with a pre-ratings briefing with the senior personnel of the investment 
management organisation.14  When an investment manager agrees to participate in the 
ratings process, Morningstar conducts both a qualitative review (Ql) and a quantitative 
assessment (Qt) of the fund manager’s investment products.  The Ql component involves 
interviews with fund managers coupled with detailed reviews of investment manager 
questionnaires.   
                                                 
13 Position Paper, Attn Funds Management Industry, 1 September 2000 
14 Morningstar Star Ratings 
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Figure 2.8 – The Morningstar Star Rating Process 
Morningstar invites fund manager to participate
Pre-ratings briefing
Qualitative ratings process (Ql) Quantitative ratings process (Qt)
Ql rating questionnaire
Ql ratings agreement
Ql rating interview
Ql rating report produced
Ql ratings calculated for 5 components
Quantitative requirements confirmed
Quantitative requirements met
Monthly performance calculations
Qt component ratings calculated
Q2 ratings calculated
Morningstar ratings calculated
Source: Morningstar 
 
Ql ratings are essentially ‘forward-looking’ and are computed with respect to the: 
(1) corporate strength of the fund manager; 
(2) administration, technological and operational procedures, 
(3) the experience, stability and expertise of the investment professionals in the 
organisation; 
(4) sector strength of the portfolio managers who oversee the investment process; and 
(5) product features available to investors utilising the fund manager’s products. 
The Qt ratings process is ‘backward-looking’ and involves assessment of five 
quantitative features of managed funds – the first four components are measured relative to 
other managed funds and the final category is assessed in absolute terms, independent of 
other funds.  The Qt rating is determined with respect to a fund’s: 
57 
(1) return rating – evaluates the average quarterly rates of return or time; 
(2) average risk rating – volatility of returns (standard deviation); 
(3) downside risk rating – average minimum returns over a period; 
(4) risk/return rating – adjusts returns for the risks incurred by the fund; and 
(5) age rating – the longer the life of the fund, the more stable the fund and the 
increased reliability in statistical tests associated with performance measurement.  
Morningstar rates the age of a fund up to a period of five years. 
The Morningstar Ql and Qt ratings are then combined by multiplying both ratings 
to achieve a Q2 rating which then allows for the star rating to be issued. 
2.3.5.2 The ASSIRT Ratings Approach 
ASSIRT also provides investors with a star rating system that, in broad terms, 
concentrates on similar characteristics to those identified in section 2.3.5.1.  However, 
ASSIRT classifies these investment manager and fund attributes using a different 
framework to Morningstar.  According to ASSIRT’s ratings methodology, both the fund 
and funds managers are rated on the basis of their ability to manage funds in a manner that 
is consistent with their stated investment strategy.15  An important difference to 
Morningstar’s rating system is ASSIRT’s focus on the strengths and weaknesses of 
individual managers and funds’ investment process, rather than assessing investment 
organisations relative to their competitors.  ASSIRT fund ratings apply for a period of one 
year, subject to significant changes in the investment organisation’s stability, structure or 
performance. 
                                                 
15 ASSIRT Ratings 
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Figure 2.9 demonstrates ASSIRT’s broad ratings structure used to classify 
investment managers and managed funds. 
Figure 2.9 – The ASSIRT Ratings Process 
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Source: ASSIRT 
The three components used by ASSIRT account for both the investment manager 
and the individual managed fund: 
• corporate capability – the extent to which the fund manager is capable of operating a 
successful business, including their stability of ownership, capital adequacy, market 
strength, compliance regime, delivery of customer service and internal management 
structures; 
• sector capability – the manager’s ability to deliver investors with consistent and 
competitive performance in each asset class relative to appropriate benchmark indices, 
in a manner that accurately reflects the pre-determined investment strategy.  ASSIRT 
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uses an 80 percent qualitative ‘bottom-up’ approach and the remaining 20 percent 
sector capability component accounts for past performance; and 
• fund rating – the overall quality of the managed funds operated by an investment 
manager across specific asset classes.  ASSIRT awards a rating for managed funds 
based on the criteria defined in Table 2.16.  A fund’s rating is determined with respect 
to the investment manager’s capability (55 percent), the fund’s past performance (25 
percent) and the fund’s product structure, including fee structure, disclosure of 
information and investment objectives (20 percent). 
2.4 Primary Users of Investment Manager Services 
2.4.1 Superannuation Funds 
2.4.1.1 Superannuation Industry Overview 
The Australian superannuation industry has grown significantly since June 1983.  
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), which acts as regulator on behalf 
of the Commonwealth Government, reported the size of the industry at $A32 billion in 
1983, however total assets to September 2000 have grown 15-fold to around $A489 
billion.  This increase can be attributed to greater level of Commonwealth Government 
activism in response to the nation’s aging population and the potential future strains on 
fiscal policy arising from the provision of aged pensions to retirees.16  Successive 
governments have also highlighted the need to increase national savings through 
superannuation vehicles to improve Australia’s productivity and economic growth (see 
                                                 
16 The provision of retirement benefits through contributory superannuation schemes is further required due 
to the government pension being unfunded – pensions are expenditures from general revenue.  Government 
pensions are means-tested, paid at a flat-rate and are generally indexed to around 25 percent of Australia’s 
Average Weekly Earnings (AWE).  See Edey and Simon (1996) for further information. 
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Fitzgerald report 1993).  This has been achieved through increases in the Superannuation 
Guarantee Levy (SGL), requiring compulsory contributions by employers on an 
employee’s behalf equivalent to 8 percent of salary (forecast to increase to 9 percent by 
2002-2003).  Approximately 80 percent of all Australian workers have superannuation 
coverage, whereas superannuation coverage for permanent full-time workers is around 98 
percent. 
2.4.1.2 Institutional Funds, Asset Consultants and Investment Manager Statistics 
Table 2.17 presents summary statistics on the size and characteristics of 
superannuation fund assets, structures, investment approach and membership.  In 
September 2000, APRA reported 217,158 superannuation funds were in existence in 
Australia, of which 98 percent are small superannuation funds containing fewer than five 
members.  In terms of the number of member accounts, the large superannuation funds (or 
non-excluded funds) dominate the industry, where 2,312 funds account for 98 percent of 
total accounts. 
The total size of institutional superannuation funds (corporate, government and 
industry funds) reported by APRA as at 30 September 2000 was approximately $A229 
billion, or 47 percent of the total industry (see Panel A).  Corporate funds are defined as 
those sponsored by a one or more non-government employers.  Industry funds are those 
formed by sponsors linked to an industrial award.  Public sector or government funds, on 
the other hand, are initiated by government employers and/or public-controlled entities.  
The remaining fund classifications are retail-oriented.  Retail funds are either publicly 
offered unit trusts or policies.  Small funds refer to self-managed superannuation funds 
containing fewer than five members. 
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Table 2.17 – The Australian Superannuation Industry – Descriptive Statistics as at 30th September 
2000 
 Number of 
Funds 
Members 
(000's) 
Assets 
($A million) 
Assets 
(%) 
Panel A: Superannuation Funds By Type 
Corporate 2,296 1,489 79,541 16.3 
Industry 70 6,863 41,263 8.4 
Government 38 2,547 108,697 22.2 
Retail 168 10,999 142,329 29.1 
Small Funds (less than 5 members) 211,175 423 70,562 14.4 
Annuities, Life Office Reserves, RSAs - - 49,468 10.1 
TOTAL 213,747 22,321 488,944 100.0 
Panel B: Superannuation Funds By Benefit Structure 
Accumulation 213,084 19,034 199,427 40.8 
Defined Benefit 352 506 24,736 5.1 
Hybrid 311 2,358 147,667 30.2 
Unallocated (annuities/life office etc.) - - 117,114 24.0 
TOTAL 213,747 22,321 488,944 100.0 
Panel C: Superannuation Funds By Investment Implementation 
Directly Invested - - 146,133 29.9 
Delegated to Investment Manager - - 191,353 39.1 
Invested in Life Office Statutory Funds - - 151,458 31.0 
TOTAL - - 488,944 100.0 
Source: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
 
In terms of Australian superannuation structures, funds exhibit one of the three 
following types – defined benefit, accumulation and a hybrid between defined benefit and 
accumulation structures.  A defined benefit structure exists when benefits are determined 
on the basis of a calculation pertaining to a member’s current salary, average salary over a 
period of time, or some other specified amount.  Alternatively, an accumulation fund 
structure deems that each member’s entitlement can be assessed with direct reference to 
fund contributions (both employer and employee) as well as fund earnings over the period 
of membership.  Panel B of Table 2.17 indicates that the majority of superannuation funds 
in Australia are accumulation-type funds.  In comparison, hybrid fund structures account 
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for just over 30 percent of all assets in the superannuation industry, whereas defined 
benefit funds are insignificant in terms of the proportion of total superannuation assets. 
A recent study of mandates in the institutional superannuation fund market by 
Rainmaker Information over the 1999-2000 financial year provides a comprehensive 
summary of the institutional investment market comprising asset consulting firms, 
superannuation investment managers and superannuation funds.  Rainmaker’s database 
was compiled using 365 wholesale superannuation funds each with assets of at least $A50 
million.  Total mandates for these institutional funds was approximately $A170 billion or 
around 80 percent of total institutional assets.17  Table 2.18 presents descriptive statistics of 
the 30 largest institutional superannuation funds comprising the Rainmaker Information 
analysis. 
Rainmaker identified more than 100 fund managers and 39 asset-consulting firms 
that provide investment services to the institutional superannuation fund industry.  The 
investment consulting market to institutional clients is extremely concentrated.  In terms of 
total institutional funds under advice, Table 2.19 shows that the 10 largest asset-consulting 
firms account for almost 95 percent of the entire industry.  Indeed, the concentration is 
even more pronounced for the five largest asset consultants, who provide advice to clients 
representing 71 percent of the industry.  These statistics for the investment consulting 
industry are particularly significant when comparisons are made to the size and diversity of 
participants in the investment management market.  Table 2.20 indicates that the 10 largest 
investment managers to institutional clients account for 52 percent of wholesale 
superannuation fund assets.  While there is a high degree of concentration across fund 
managers, concentration levels are even more pronounced in the asset consulting industry. 
                                                 
17 Rainmaker collected data pertaining to the institutional superannuation fund market through various 
sources including fund reports, quarterly and annual surveys and propriety information. 
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Table 2.18 – Thirty Largest Institutional Superannuation Funds in Australia for Financial Year 1999-2000 
 Funds Under Advice  Mandates 
Superannuation Funds $A Million Market Share (%) Rank  Number 
Proportion 
(%) Rank 
Average 
$A Million Rank 
State Superannuation Scheme          17,414 10.26 1 6 0.21 150 2,902 3
The State Superannuation Fund 7,362 4.34 2  14 0.48 33 526 9 
QSuper Defined Benefit Plan 6,600 3.89 3  1 0.03 243 6,600 1 
Superannuation Scheme for Australian 
Universities 6,038         
          
          
         
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
3.56 4 27 0.92 7 224 14
State Authorities Superannuation Scheme 5,707 3.36 5 1 0.03 243 5,707 2
CSS Fund 5,618 3.31 6 28 0.96 5 201 17
Commonwealth Bank Officer's Superannuation 
Corporation 5,237 3.09 7 12 0.41 36 436 10
Telstra Superannuation Scheme 4,290 2.53 8 25 0.85 10 172 21
PSS Fund 3,473 2.05 9 29 0.99 4 120 31
Qantas Superannuation Plan 3,469 2.04 10 18 0.62 26 193 18
BHP Superannuation Fund 3,302 1.95 11 26 0.89 8 127 28
Emergency Services Superannuation Scheme 3,042 1.79 12 17 0.58 29 179 20
Australia Post Superannuation Scheme 3,000 1.77 13 12 0.41 36 250 13
Local Government Superannuation Scheme 2,901 1.71 14 14 0.48 33 207 16
Construction & Building Unions Superannuation 2,883 1.70 15 32 1.09 2 90 42
First State Superannuation Scheme 2,640 1.56 16 18 0.62 26 147 23
Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Limited 2,607 1.54 17  23 0.79 17 113 34 
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 Funds Under Advice cont.  Mandates cont. 
Superannuation Funds cont.  
          
$A Million Market Share (%) Rank  Number 
Proportion 
(%) Rank 
Average 
$A Million Rank 
Australian Retirement Fund 2,303 1.36 18 31 1.06 3 74 54
Health Super Fund          
          
          
          
          
          
          
         
           
         
         
         
2,287 1.35 19 20 0.68 20 114 33
Westpac Staff Superannuation Fund 2,240 1.32 20  1 0.03 243 2,240 4 
Health Employees Superannuation Trust Australia 2,224 1.31 21 26 0.89 8 86 45
Superannuation Trust of Australia 2,120 1.25 22 28 0.96 5 76 52
Local Authorities Superannuation Fund 1,852 1.09 23 18 0.62 26 103 38
Sunsuper Pty Limited 1,846 1.09 24 34 1.16 1 54 67
South Australian State Pension Scheme 1,797 1.06 25 24 0.82 11 75 53
Government Employees Superannuation Board 1,715 1.01 26 12 0.41 36 143 26
National Australia Bank Group Superannuation 
Fund "A" 1,650 0.97 27 15 0.51 31 110 37
State Super Personal Retirement Plan 1,464 0.86 28  10 0.34 94 146 24 
COSAF Superannuation Plan 1,444 0.85 29 10 0.34 94 144 25
Queensland Local Government Superannuation 
Board 1,390 0.82 30 12 0.41 36 116 32
Other Funds 59,835 35.25 - 2,382 81.41 - 25 -
TOTAL 169,750 100.00 - 2,926 100.00 - 58 -
Source: Rainmaker Information 
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 Table 2.19 – Ten Largest Institutional Asset Consultants in Australia for Financial Year 1999-2000 
 Funds Under Advice  Mandates 
Asset Consulting Company $A Million Market Share (%) Rank  Number 
Proportion 
(%) Rank 
Average 
$A Million Rank 
InTech          26,267 17.3 1 38 1.4 10 691 1
William M. Mercer 23,371 15.4        
          
          
          
          
          
         
2 33.7 1 26 15
Frank Russell 19,978 13.2 3 242 9.1 5 83 7
Towers Perrin 19,675 13.0 4 303 11.4 2 65 8
John A. Nolan & Associates 18,702 12.4 5  297 11.2 3 63 9 
Frontier Investment Consulting / IFS 16,531 10.9 6  297 11.2 3 56 10 
Total Risk Management 9,091 6.0 7 57 2.1 8 159 3
Frank Russell / Chifley 4,047 2.7 8  28 1.1 13 145 4 
Towers Perrin / Quentin Ayers 4,015 2.7 9  33 1.2 12 122 5 
PlanPerform 1,390 0.9 10 12 0.5 18 116 6
Other Consultants 8,348 5.5 - 410 15.4 - 18 -
TOTAL 151,415 100.0 - 2,663 100.0 - 57 -
897
Source: Rainmaker Information 
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Table 2.20 – Ten Largest Superannuation Investment Managers in Australia for Financial Year 1999-2000 
 Funds Under Advice  Mandates 
Superannuation Investment Managers $A Million Market Share (%) Rank  Number 
Proportion 
(%) Rank 
Average 
$A Million Rank 
Deutsche Asset Management          24,383 15.48 1 28 1.04 25 871 3
Queensland Investment Corporation 9,746 6.19 2  8 0.30 55 1,218 2 
State Street Global Advisors 9,129 5.80 3  77 2.86 10 119 20 
Commonwealth Investment Management 8,670 5.50 4  37 1.38 23 234 7 
AMP Asset Management 7,914 5.02 5  240 8.93 1 33 80 
Credit Suisse Asset Management 5,011 3.18 6  133 4.95 4 38 71 
Maple-Brown Abbott          
          
         
4,482 2.85 7 116 4.31 6 39 70
BT Funds Management 4,370 2.77 8  171 6.36 2 26 97 
Vanguard Investments 4,341 2.76 9 39 1.45 22 111 21
Lend Lease Investment Management 4,050 2.57 10  155 5.76 3 26 96 
Other Investment Managers 75,410 47.88 -  1,685 62.66 - 45 - 
TOTAL 157,506 100.00 - 2,689 100.00 - 59 -
Source: Rainmaker Information 
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2.4.1.3 Superannuation Funds, Trustees and Asset Consulting Advice 
Superannuation funds are savings vehicles used by employers and employees with 
the objective of providing members with retirement benefits at a future date.  These 
benefits arise through contributions provided by the member’s employer and the 
employee’s own contributions.  In Australia, government legislation ensures member 
benefits remain preserved until (1) after the member’s 55th birthday and (2) the member’s 
cessation of full-time employment.  Alternatively, the preservation of benefits ceases when 
the member reaches the age of 65, has died, leaves Australia permanently or is totally and 
permanently disabled.18  Superannuation fund trustees are legally responsible for the 
management of the fund as well as ensuring all assets are prudently invested.  Trustees 
must ensure the fund remains compliant with all rules (contained in a fund’s trust deed) 
and government legislation. 
The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SISA) is the legislation 
governing the operation of Australian superannuation funds.  SISA details how 
superannuation funds are to operate and the fiduciary obligations that must be satisfied by 
fund trustees towards members.  APRA reported the number of institutional 
superannuation fund trustees in Australia to be around 28,000 as at August 2000.  SISA 
requires fund trustees to define the investment strategy to be implemented.  Such an 
investment strategy must be consistent with the fund’s own objectives and will be 
determined with reference to the long-term risks and returns across the spectrum of asset 
classes, diversification, inflation expectations and economic cycles.  Further, SISA requires 
trustees to maintain appropriate records and accounts as well as the provision of accurate 
                                                 
18 Where benefits remain preserved beyond the member’s 65th birthday, the benefit must be paid as a cash 
lump-sum, pension or annuity when either of the following occurs; (a) the member ceases being gainfully 
employed for at least 10 hours per week and is less than 70 years of age (b) the member attains 70 years of 
age and is not gainfully employed for at least 30 hours per week (c) the member dies. 
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and timely information to members concerning the management of the fund’s assets.  If the 
fund is deemed to be ‘compliant’ with SISA’s regulations, the fund will then become 
eligible to receive concessional tax treatment.19 
The asset consulting industry provides superannuation trustees with a number of 
advisory services, and as a result, direct performance measurement and/or comparisons 
across asset consultants can be both extremely difficult and controversial.  The asset 
consulting services performed for wholesale superannuation fund clients include the 
formulation and development of a fund’s investment objectives, the selection of investment 
managers to implement the fund’s strategy and on-going review of the investment process, 
including performance monitoring and research into the investment management industry.  
Once the investment strategy has been formulated, trustees must then decide how the 
strategy will be implemented.  These include whether fund assets will be managed 
internally or be delegated to an external investment manager.  Secondly, the configuration 
of fund assets must be consistent with achievement of a fund’s goals, where trustees must 
decide on whether to implement an active or passive management style (or some 
combination of the two).  Third, where trustees elect to use external managers, the 
appointment of either balanced and/or specialist fund managers requires consideration.  
Implementation of a specialist strategy may provide trustees with additional managerial 
and style diversification benefits.  Further, sector specialisation may appear attractive in 
terms of the argument that it is extremely unlikely that a balanced manager will have the 
highest competitive strength across all asset class sectors.  Other roles consultants typically 
perform for the fund include advice relating to legal and taxation issues facing trustees, 
risk management assessments as well as transition management advice which encompasses 
                                                 
19 The taxation system is quite complex, and the concessional nature of taxation applying to Superannuation 
fund assets have been gradually scaled back, particularly from 1983.  The most recent amendment was the 
1996 introduction of the Superannuation Surcharge, which reduced the concessional tax benefits of 
superannuation contributions from higher-income earners. 
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the transfer of fund assets between investment managers.  The appointment of an asset 
consulting company is attractive to fund trustees to help ensure compliance with the 
legislative requirements and to ensure the fund receives expert and independent advice that 
will help ensure the fund’s own investment objectives are achieved. 
2.4.2 Private Investors 
Retail investors are primarily classified as private individuals who invest across 
assets in significantly smaller parcels than institutional investors.  Retail investors typically 
include ‘mum and dad’ type investors (or household investors) and small self-managed 
superannuation funds.  Throughout the 1990s the retail sector has become more significant, 
particularly in terms of the size of assets invested and participation rates in the investment 
industry.  In terms of the Australian equity market, retail investors have increased their 
participation in initial public offerings (floats), privatisations (particularly the large issues 
such as the Commonwealth Bank and Telstra) and demutualisations (e.g. AMP and 
NRMA).  The Australian Stock Exchange’s (ASX) 2000 Australian Shareownership Study 
revealed that 54 percent (or 7.6 million) of the adult population owned shares either 
directly or indirectly.20  The ASX study also found that Australia exhibited the highest per 
capita share ownership level compared with the U.S., U.K., Germany, Canada and New 
Zealand. 
This high level of participation may be partly explained due to the nature of 
Australia’s demography.  Government policies have attempted to promote self-provision in 
retirement, particularly in response to Australia’s aging population and the ‘baby boomer’ 
                                                 
20 Direct share ownership in 2000 represented 41 percent of the adult population, equivalent to 5.7 million 
people.  While Australia has the highest per capita share ownership levels, investors have high levels of 
shareholdings concentrated in only one or two stocks. 
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generation fast approaching retirement age.21  As at June 2000, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) reported the median age of Australia’s population to be 35.2 years and 
continues to increase as a result of continued low fertility rates.  As a result, government 
policies have been directed towards increasing national savings and encouraging self-
provision in retirement through compulsory superannuation. 
2.5 Australian Investment Manager Characteristics 
Investment management organisations operate in a highly competitive market.  As 
the providers of investment services, fund managers attempt to differentiate themselves by 
highlighting what they believe are their strengths relative to their competitors.  There are 
numerous characteristics investment managers may exhibit which makes them unique, 
including: 
• the investment strategy adopted; 
• the past success of the investment process; 
• the calibre of the staff they employ in terms of their qualifications and experience; 
• the pricing structure of their products; and  
• the manager’s ability to provide client service and technical support. 
This section discusses the principal differences, both qualitative and quantitative, 
existing across the largest investment management organisations in Australia.  The 
                                                 
21 The ‘baby boomer’ generation includes people born between the years 1946 and 1964 inclusive.  In 2001, 
the age range for this generation is now 37 and 55. 
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information was collected in the form of Investment Manager Questionnaires, issued by 
the Investment and Financial Services Association Limited (IFSA) to fund managers on an 
annual basis for the benefit of asset consulting firms and managed fund ratings houses.  
The information provided by the investment managers is current for the 1999-2000 
financial year, where the sample includes more than 30 Australian-based investment 
managers. 
2.5.1 Organisational Structure 
Figure 2.10 presents a general organisational structure of an Australian investment 
manager.  Essentially investment management entities have the same standard corporate 
governance structure as any other corporation, where shareholders elect directors to the 
board of the company.  The chief executive officer (CEO) of an investment management 
company is typically also a director and is accountable to other company directors for the 
stewardship of the firm.  The CEO is also responsible for: 
• the appointment of personnel to executive positions, in particular the chief investment 
officer (CIO) as well as a continual review of management’s performance; 
• ensuring the company’s administrative requirements are maintained, such as human 
resources and information technology (in consultation with the firm’s chief operating 
officer (COO)), and managing the company’s financial position (with the assistance of 
the chief financial officer (CFO)); 
• business development and marketing, including reviewing and giving approval to new 
products (in consultation with the head of business development); 
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• compliance with legislation and rules relating to the provision of investment products 
and the management of investment portfolios; and 
• investment policy review and overseeing risk management controls. 
While the CEO exhibits ultimate operational control of the investment management 
company, it is generally the CIO’s sole responsibility to execute the company’s investment 
strategy.  The head of asset allocation also assists in this task, and may be directly 
accountable to the CIO in the company’s organisational structure.  The CIO’s role may 
include: 
• participating in the asset allocation committee along with the head of asset allocation, 
decision making concerning portfolio construction across various asset classes 
(domestic versus international equities, fixed interest, property and cash), and the 
strategy with respect to currency hedging; and22 
• maintaining close contact with the investment sector heads and ensuring that all senior 
investment personnel implement fund manager’s investment philosophy in a consistent 
manner. 
The asset allocation committee meets regularly (usually weekly) and typically 
includes the head of asset allocation, CIO, chief economist, sector heads or strategists 
across the mainstream asset classes, and the head of business development (generally as an 
observer as well as facilitating accurate information dissemination to current and 
prospective clients).  The committee is ultimately responsible for setting the investment 
                                                 
22 In some investment management firms, the CIO does not chair the asset allocation committee, in which 
case the committee is chaired by the head of asset allocation. 
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manager’s investment strategy and the portfolio weights to be adopted across multiple 
asset classes. 
The asset class sector heads manage a number of portfolio managers and 
investment analysts across various sub-asset classes.  For example, in Australian equities, 
the research function is divided into industrial and resources analysts who each specialise 
in sub-sectors including telecommunications, transport, tourism and leisure, banking and 
financial services.  In the international equities sector, staff analyse securities in different 
regions around the globe and in specific sectors. 
The head of business development is responsible for the expansion of the 
investment manager’s services to new and existing clients.  This function also includes 
managing the firm’s communication’s strategy to the market and the promotion of 
traditional and new managed investment products. 
Figure 2.10 – General Organisational Structure for Australian Investment Management Companies 
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2.5.2 Investment Manager Philosophy 
The investment philosophy of an investment manager represents the core beliefs 
and ideas that specific managers have concerning how capital markets work and the means 
by which investment strategies can be implemented to potentially earn superior returns to 
passive benchmark indices.  For an active manager, the investment philosophy will be 
founded upon the belief that financial markets are inefficient, such that the collation and 
analysis of price-sensitive information represents an opportunity for the active fund 
manager to exploit securities that are mispriced.  On the other hand, passive or index 
managers believe (a) capital markets are largely efficient, and while some inefficiencies do 
exist, they cannot be exploited in an economically significant manner or (b) an index 
approach may represent an attractive, lower cost strategy.  Enhanced index strategies 
involve a combination of active and index philosophies, where the manager attempts to add 
small amounts of value above an index while simultaneously operating within tight risk-
control parameters. 
The investment strategies undertaken by asset managers also extend beyond market 
efficiency.  In addition, investment managers will implement their investment process in a 
way that is consistent with their considered time horizon, style (value or growth stocks), 
market-capitalisation preferences (small or large) and risk-profile across the asset classes 
available to investors.  Investment managers may also distinguish themselves on the basis 
of social and/or ethical concerns, the management of their investment team, and the 
manager’s commitment to employing disciplined processes (i.e. methodical/systematic 
procedures) consistent with the overall strategy. 
Portfolio managers also differentiate themselves with respect to portfolio 
construction, in that they either favour a ‘top-down’ approach or a ‘bottom-up’ 
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methodology.  In some cases it may be difficult to partition managers as either wholly top-
down or bottom-up, however it is likely that where both approaches are incorporated, the 
manager will give preference to one of these strategies over the other.  The top-down 
approach is implemented with respect to economic and capital market forecasts at a macro 
level, and investment managers allocate portfolio assets in a manner that ensures that 
changes in the economic cycle deliver the best possible returns for clients.  For example, 
investment managers may foresee increased demand for raw materials together with 
economic conditions pointing toward increasing industrial production, rising consumer 
confidence and retail sales, and increasing corporate profitability.  In such a scenario for a 
balanced or diversified portfolio, the investment manager may elect to overweight their 
portfolio toward equity securities.  In cases where the investment manager is managing an 
Australian equities mandate, securities would be selected in such a manner which 
overweighted securities in those industries which are expected to perform well with respect 
to the current economic climate (consistent with the current example, this may include 
resource stocks, retail, tourism and leisure, developers and contractors, and banks).  The 
bottom-up strategy on the other hand considers the available universe of securities on the 
basis of their individual fundamentals, and is less concerned with a macroeconomic 
perspective.  That is, bottom-up managers are more concerned with an entity’s balance 
sheet, competitive strength, market share and profitability. 
2.5.3 Active Portfolio Management Strategies 
The portfolio management of different asset classes is in most cases very unique.  
The following section describes the common investment strategies emphasised by 
Australian fund managers in the portfolio management process as well as their expected 
contribution to returns above the benchmark indices (or value-added).  The sample 
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comprises 31 Australian investment managers using survey data in the 2000 financial year 
from the Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA).  Each manager was asked 
to indicate the percentage weight each of the specific categories in the survey represented 
in their portfolio management strategy.  However some fund managers do not offer to their 
client’s specialist or balanced products across the entire asset class spectrum (e.g. 
international bonds), therefore survey data were not available.  In addition, a small number 
of managers were unable to provide survey responses, for either confidentiality reasons or 
due to their organisation operating as a manager-of-managers.  The asset-weighted 
averages are based on funds under management as at 31 December 1999 across each 
respective asset class.  Tactical asset allocation is weighted by the manager’s total funds 
under management at 31 December 1999.  The size of asset managed by the 31 institutions 
comprising the sample at 31 December 1999 was around $A504.8 billion. 
2.5.3.1 Tactical Asset Allocation 
A diversified portfolio of assets comprising multiple asset classes renders the asset 
allocation decision of the investment manager as the most significant determinant of total 
risk and return for a fund.  Indeed the founder of the Vanguard Group of Investment 
Companies, John C. Bogle, argues that “the most fundamental decision of investing is the 
allocation of your assets: How much should you own in stocks?  How much should you 
own in bonds?  How much should you own in cash reserves?  According to a recent study, 
that decision has accounted for an astonishing 94% of the differences in total returns 
achieved by institutionally managed [U.S.] pension funds.”23  Blake et al. (1999) also 
confirmed the importance of the asset allocation decision using U.K. data.  Accordingly, 
the investment strategy adopted by an active manager is significant and involves detailed 
                                                 
23 Bogle (1994), page 235 in Bogle on Mutual Funds, McGraw-Hill. 
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research across all asset class sectors.  Investment managers rely on the use of quantitative 
programs to determine the efficient frontier, representing the strategic long-term multiple 
asset class benchmark which reflects the highest expected total return for a given level of 
expected risk.  Once the strategic benchmark allocation has been set, active managers 
implement tactical bets by adjusting the portfolio’s weights across the asset classes on the 
basis of expected returns to those classes.  Managers will overweight (underweight) those 
asset classes that appear undervalued (overvalued) and represent the most attractive 
(unattractive) expected returns.  Investment managers will generally impose upper and 
lower bounds for each asset class, which restricts the portfolio from moving significantly 
from the stated strategic benchmark allocation.  This may be achieved initially through the 
use of derivative instruments (where permitted by the fund) ensuring rapid exposure to an 
asset class in the short-term.24  These synthetic exposures are then progressively equitised.  
The frequency of portfolio re-balancing required by the manager (due to market returns 
moving the portfolio weights away from strategic positions) is usually dependent on the 
manager’s asset allocation ranges and expectations of economic and financial market 
conditions.  The use of economic and capital market research by investment managers in 
adjusting the portfolio’s asset allocation over time is an important element in the portfolio 
management process, as depicted by Table 2.21.  Quantitative modelling and 
considerations concerning valuation of assets are also extremely important for active 
managers. 
                                                 
24 Derivative instruments such as options and futures contracts can only be utilised where products in the 
market are available, such as equity and bond markets.  For example, the property asset class does not have a 
derivative instrument. 
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Table 2.21 – Components of the Investment Strategy for Active Australian Investment Managers at the 
Millennium (Sample size = 23 Managers) 
 Average 
Manager 
(%) 
Median 
Manager 
(%) 
Asset-
Weighted 
Average 
(%) 
Economic / Capital Market Forecasts 42.9  40.0  36.9  
Market Psychology, Investor expectations 22.2  20.0  14.7  
Historical Relative Value Relationships 30.5  25.0  24.6  
Quantitative Modelling 31.5  20.0  20.1  
Passive (minimal variation around long-term 
benchmark) 
20.0  20.0  0.7  
Other 9.2  10.0  3.0  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
 
2.5.3.2 Australian Equities 
The Australian equities sector represents the largest single allocation to any asset 
class for balanced or diversified portfolios (see Table 4.1).  Therefore, active managers 
view the domestic equities sector as critical in delivering active returns to balanced or 
multi-sector funds.  Table 2.22 presents the IFSA survey data for the 2000 financial year, 
indicating the most important factors nominated by active managers in the management of 
active Australian share portfolios.  Panel A indicates that valuation, projected growth and 
quality of the executive team of listed corporations are the most significant issues in the 
portfolio construction and management process.  In addition, Panel B highlights the critical 
component of stock selection as the most fundamental determinant in the delivery of active 
returns to investors. 
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Table 2.22 – Components of the Investment Strategy for Active Australian Equity Managers at the 
Millennium (Sample size = 27 Managers (Panel A) and 28 Managers (Panel B)) 
 Average 
Manager 
(%) 
Median 
Manager 
(%) 
Asset-
Weighted 
Average 
(%) 
Panel A: Investment Strategy       
Valuation 35.5  30.0  29.5  
Past Growth History 10.5  10.0  7.5  
Projected Growth 28.0  30.0  28.5  
Technical Analysis 3.5  3.5  0.1  
Quality Management 17.7  15.0  14.5  
Quantitative Methods 29.2  17.5  8.4  
Index Weights 7.9  5.0  2.5  
Other 28.3  20.0  9.1  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
Panel B: Expected Contribution to Performance       
Market Segment Focus (e.g. resources / industrials) 8.8  10.0  3.8  
Industry / Sector Selection 18.1  17.5  10.4  
Factor Tilts (value/growth, small/large capitalisation, 
yield) 
20.3  13.8  9.1  
Stock Selection 70.7  70.0  70.3  
Cash Allocation 4.3  5.0  1.0  
Other 17.0  15.0  5.4  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
 
2.5.3.3 International Equities 
The international equity market’s significant size generally requires investment 
managers to have access to a larger number of security analysts than is the case for the 
domestic equities sector.  Due to the global nature of the investment activities, it is highly 
likely that investment managers will require dedicated investment professionals located 
within the major capital markets of the world to contribute to the investment process.  The 
IFSA survey data for the 2000 financial year, presented in Table 2.23, indicate the 
importance of security valuations and quantitative models as the key factors required in the 
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management of international equity portfolios.  Capital market and economic forecasts are 
also reasonably important.  The MSCI World (ex-Australia) benchmark index is the 
traditional market proxy measuring international equity performance, and the country 
weights comprising this index would represent an important reference point for 
international equity managers.  Panel B suggests that individual stock selection is the most 
critical in earning active returns for the sample group of managers.  In addition, deviations 
from the benchmark index’s country weights and exposure to currencies also represent 
important sources of returns. 
Table 2.23 – Components of the Investment Strategy for Active International Equity Managers at the 
Millennium (Sample size = 24 Managers (Panel A) and 23 Managers (Panel B)) 
 Average 
Manager 
(%) 
Median 
Manager 
(%) 
Asset-
Weighted 
Average 
(%) 
Panel A: Investment Strategy       
Economic and Capital Market Forecasts 26.1  20.0  14.0  
Market Psychology / Investor Expectations 12.7  10.0  6.1  
Judgmental Assessment of Relative Value 41.6  37.5  32.5  
Quantitative Models 35.3  25.0  41.6  
Passive (adjustments around long-term country 
allocation) 
33.8  25.0  2.9  
Technical Analysis 8.3  10.0  0.7  
Other 30.0  30.0  2.1  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
Panel B: Expected Contribution to Performance       
Long-term Country Tilts 18.6  10.0  7.9  
Shifts in Country Allocations 18.2  15.0  13.2  
Industry Allocations 18.7  10.0  5.1  
Currency Allocation 11.8  10.0  12.2  
Individual Security Selection 56.8  60.0  58.6  
Other 30.0  30.0  3.0  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
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2.5.3.4 Australian Bonds 
Investments in coupon bonds exhibit three risks facing investors – price risk, 
reinvestment risk and credit risk. 
• price risk relates to changes in interest rates, where increases in interest rates cause 
devaluation in the bond’s value.  Bond prices are inversely related to interest rates.  
Further, price risk can only be eliminated when the bond is held until maturity; 
• reinvestment risk occurs when interest payments accruing from bond securities 
cannot be reinvested at the equivalent or higher interest rates.  If interest rates fall, 
although the bond price appreciates, interest payments will have to be reinvested at 
lower rates, reducing the potential yield to maturity.  Holding the bond security to 
maturity cannot mitigate against reinvestment risk.  Reinvestment risk exists 
because the calculation of yield to maturity assumes all coupon payments are 
reinvested at the same rate as prevailing yield to maturity at the acquisition date of 
the bond; 
• credit risk refers to the chance the bond issuer will default in meeting coupon 
payments and/or the redemption of the bond at maturity; 
The return on an Australian Commonwealth Government bond security has two 
components: the income received from semi-annual coupon payments (interest income) 
and the capital appreciation or depreciation in the bond’s price.  While the coupon 
payment remains fixed throughout the term of the bond’s life, the market price of the 
bond deviates from the bond’s par value (redemption value) until maturity (i.e. when 
the issuer redeems the bond).  The price of the bond is determined with respect to the 
82 
bond’s yield-to-maturity, which represents a market determined interest rate rendering 
the bond’s price equal to the present value of the future coupon payments derived from 
the bond.  Shifts in the yield curve (or term structure of interest rates) result in changes 
to the price of the bond, such that, ceteris paribus, an upward (downward) sloping 
yield curve reduces (increases) the bond’s market value. 
Active Australian bond fund managers predominantly manage their portfolios 
with respect to duration management (See Table 2.25 below).  Duration is a measure 
indicating the length of time (in years) until the bond’s cash flows summate to equal 
the bond’s face value.  However, duration management is ultimately concerned with 
the sensitivity of a bond security’s price given the potential change in interest rates.  
This sensitivity is considered by calculating the bond’s percentage change in price 
given an expected 1 percent increase or decrease in interest rates (see Sherris (1991) 
and Elton and Gruber (1995)).  Duration is measured as the weighted average of the 
bond’s cash flows when they are received (comprising both coupon (or interest) 
payments and the principal).  The applicable weights are the amounts of the payments 
discounted by the yield-to-maturity of the bond.  Alternatively, the weights are the 
present values of the payments, using the bond's yield-to-maturity as the discount rate.  
The duration of a bond is expressed in terms of the number of years from the purchase 
date until the cash flows equate to the principal value of the bond.  The duration 
measure for bonds allows bonds of different maturities and coupon rates to be 
compared directly, thereby overcoming the limitations inherent in making comparisons 
between bonds that differ on the basis of maturity and coupon rate.  Table 2.24 
summarises the effect on duration subject to differences in coupons, yield and bond 
maturity. 
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Table 2.24 – The Effects on the Duration of Bonds 
 Higher Duration Lower Duration 
Higher Coupon Payments - YES 
Lower Coupons Payments YES - 
More Frequent Coupon Payments - YES 
Less Frequent Coupon Payments YES - 
Higher Yields - YES 
Lower Yields YES - 
Greater the Term to Maturity YES - 
Lesser the Term to Maturity - YES 
 
The management of bond portfolios also requires consideration of convexity of the 
yield curve (Sherris (1991)).  While duration is a good measure of a bond’s sensitivity to 
changes in interest rates, an additional and more accurate measure is concerned with the 
convexity of the yield curve.  The yield curve is not linear therefore duration may not 
represent the most accurate means of analysis of a bond’s true sensitivity to changes in 
interest rates.  The convex nature of the yield curve means that for a given change in yield 
down or up, the gain in price for a drop in yield will be greater than the fall in price due to 
an equal rise in yields.  Mathematically, duration is the first derivative of a bond’s price 
with respect to yield, whereas convexity is the second derivative price with respect to 
yield. Alternatively, convexity is the rate of change of duration with yield, and accounts for 
the fact that as the yield decreases (increases), the slope of the price/yield curve (and 
duration) will increase (decrease). 
Table 2.25 presents the aggregated IFSA survey results of Australian investment 
managers in the 1999-2000 financial year indicating the relative importance of each factor 
considered in the implementation and management of domestic bond portfolios.  Duration 
management is the single most important concern to portfolio managers in the sector, 
followed by yield curve positioning, sector selection and credit analysis.  Bond managers 
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therefore rely heavily on forecasts concerning economic activity and the outlook for 
interest rates.  While the duration and composition of the bond index represents a reference 
point for active managers, bond portfolios will be structured in a way that deviates from an 
index-mimicking strategy with the view of earning active returns above the benchmark. 
Table 2.25 – Components of the Investment Strategy for Active Australian Bond Managers at the 
Millennium (Sample size = 27 Managers) 
 Average 
Manager 
(%) 
Median 
Manager 
(%) 
Asset-
Weighted 
Average 
(%) 
Asset Allocation -Bonds/Cash/Index-linked bonds 5.0  5.0  0.1  
Duration Management 49.1  50.0  54.1  
Yield Curve Analysis (maturity distribution based on 
shape of yield curve) 
18.9  15.0  16.9  
Sector Selection (government, semis, corporate) 15.3  13.8  12.2  
Issue Selection (including credit analysis) 14.7  10.0  11.7  
Arbitrage, Spread anomalies using Forwards, Swaps. 8.5  5.0  3.8  
Technical Analysis 5.0  5.0  0.0  
Other 25.0  20.0  1.1  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
 
2.5.3.5 International Bonds 
The international bonds asset class is typically the smallest component of a 
balanced fund’s strategic asset allocation.  Investment managers are primarily concerned 
with the outlook for the global economy, particularly the interest rates, economic 
fundamentals and equity valuations in the larger industrialised nations.  The relative value 
of bond securities and interest rate differentials across countries are significant.  
Investment managers predominantly invest in quality sovereign debt securities 
denominated in North America, Japan, European Monetary Union nations, and other non-
Euro countries in Europe.  Investment managers generally hedge their global bond 
portfolios back into Australian dollars, which is the converse for international shares.  
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Table 2.26 documents the survey responses of the sample of investment managers offering 
international bond exposures.  Country and currency exposures as well as duration 
management represent the most significant factors influencing the investment strategy 
adopted by fund managers. 
Table 2.26 – Components of the Investment Strategy for Active International Bond Managers at the 
Millennium (Sample size = 19 Managers) 
 Average 
Manager 
(%) 
Median 
Manager 
(%) 
Asset-
Weighted 
Average 
(%) 
Asset Allocation -Bonds/Cash/Index-linked bonds 6.3  6.3  0.3  
Duration Management 23.3  20.0  20.0  
Yield Curve Analysis (maturity distribution based on 
shape of yield curve) 
15.0  12.5  5.0  
Sector Selection (government, semis, corporate) 10.4  7.5  7.8  
Issue Selection (including credit analysis) 13.3  5.0  10.2  
Arbitrage, Spread anomalies using Forwards, Swaps. 0.0  0.0  0.0  
Country Allocation 32.4  30.0  26.8  
Currency Exposure 26.2  25.0  26.2  
Technical Analysis 10.0  10.0  0.5  
Other 30.0  30.0  3.2  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
 
2.5.3.6 Listed Property 
Table 2.27 presents the aggregated IFSA survey results of active listed property 
managers.  The most important criteria in the management of property portfolios are 
distribution growth rates and the quality of the property assets.  Investment managers rely 
on market forecasts concerning property values across the sectors (industrial, retail, 
commercial etc.) as well as regions across Australia.  The most important issues inherent in 
managing successful listed property portfolios require the selection of securities which 
exhibit strong fundamentals, rental income streams which are relatively secure, attractive 
yields and excellent distribution growth prospects.  The level of supply, vacancy rates and 
future demand is also important together with the expected economic conditions. 
Table 2.27 – Components of the Investment Strategy for Active Australian Listed Property Managers 
at the Millennium (Sample size = 21 Managers) 
 Average 
Manager 
(%) 
Median 
Manager 
(%) 
Asset-
Weighted 
Average 
(%) 
Quality of Tenants 8.4  7.5  7.3  
Quality of Lease 11.0  10.0  7.9  
Security Selection (Quality of Property) 21.2  15.0  17.1  
Sector Selection 12.9  10.0  12.9  
Geographic Selection 8.1  5.0  6.0  
Price-to-Book Ratio 11.2  10.0  4.3  
Economic Views 13.2  10.0  14.8  
Net Market Flows 6.8  5.0  4.1  
Distribution Growth Rates 22.1  20.0  23.3  
Other 45.0  45.0  2.3  
TOTAL -  -  100.0  
 
2.5.3.7 Derivatives Use 
It is common that investment managers use derivative instruments including futures 
contracts, options, forwards, swaps and warrants when permitted to do so by the 
investment mandate.  A derivative instrument is defined as a financial contract whose 
value is derived from an underlying asset.  The principal uses of derivatives by investment 
managers in the portfolio management process includes risk management, execution of the 
investment strategy and adding value to the portfolio that is otherwise not available 
through the acquisition or disposal of physical assets.  The use of derivatives however 
requires a comprehensive set of guidelines and controls such that synthetic instruments do 
not undermine the investment process or confidence of investors.  In particular, derivatives 
should not be used by investment managers in a manner that gives rise to a leveraged (or 
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geared) position or an effective exposure that is not covered by cash holdings or physical 
securities within the portfolio.  Derivatives use is governed by APRA, which regulates 
professional investment managers through the Risk Management Statement (RMS).  This 
is particularly important for Australian superannuation funds.  In the case of fund 
managers, the RMS must detail the types of derivatives used, how they are implemented in 
the investment strategy and the risk controls governing their use. 
2.5.4 Australian Investment Management Personnel 
This section profiles the types of investment management personnel who are 
involved directly in the management of investment portfolios or who provide support 
services to the investment management organisation.  The number of investment 
professionals will vary depending on the spectrum of asset classes in which the investment 
manager provides investment products and the emphasis given to servicing retail-oriented 
investors. 
Investment professionals are defined in this survey as having a direct role in the 
strategic management of investment portfolios.  The firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) 
does not usually have a significant responsibility for the day-to-day management of the 
investment process.  Rather, the firm’s chief investment officer (CIO) is responsible for 
how the funds under management are invested.  For the purposes of this analysis, the 
senior personnel of an investment organisation are defined as including the CEO, the CIO, 
and those who are directly responsible to the CIO – including the firm’s sector heads, chief 
economist, head of investment research and head of asset allocation (where appropriate).  
Other investment professionals comprise those employees who are either portfolio 
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managers or analysts across the various sectors providing direct research support to the 
money management process. 
The survey data provided through the IFSA questionnaire contain the tertiary 
qualifications held by the individuals comprising the investment management team and 
their years of experience in the investment management industry and the years of service 
provided to their funds management employer since joining the company.  As there is no 
deadline for submission of the completed questionnaire, fund managers returned the 
information to IFSA at varying stages throughout the year.  In terms of the calculation of 
the number of years loyalty to the investment manager and the total experience in the 
industry, the statistics were calculated to 30 June 2000.25 
Table 2.28 shows the cross sectional sample statistics related to type of degrees 
held by the personnel employed using an industry sample of 33 Australian fund managers.  
According to Rainmaker data concerning the size of the Australian investment industry as 
at 30 June 2000, these 33 investment managers controlled approximately $A508 billion in 
assets or 76 percent of the domestic investment management industry’s assets.  Table 2.28 
presents the proportion of the total academic and industry accredited qualifications of all 
investment staff using sample data provided in the IFSA questionnaire.  In a small number 
of cases, investment managers completing the IFSA survey only listed the master’s 
qualifications of their staff and did not record the employee’s bachelor degree.  For 
example, if an employee is listed with a postgraduate degree in commerce (i.e. M. Com.), 
it is highly likely that the employee attained a bachelors degree in the same academic 
                                                 
25 The IFSA questionnaires are dated by the investment managers.  Because the end dates are not perfectly 
synchronous, the end of June 2000 was selected as the common date to evaluate investment manager’s 
average employee experience and loyalty.  This requires an assumption that no employee turnover occurs in 
the six months either side of the event window of 30 June 2000.  Given the annual frequency of reporting by 
investment managers through the IFSA questionnaire, this is the best means by which comparisons can be 
made.  The statistics presented in Table 2.7 indicate that the level of potential bias is likely to be small, as 
staff turnover is well above one year’s duration on average. 
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discipline previously (i.e. B. Com.).  The same argument can be applied to employees 
being listed by the IFSA questionnaire with a postgraduate arts degree (i.e. M.A.), where it 
is also highly likely the employee also holds an undergraduate arts degree (i.e. B.A.).  This 
deduction can be made due to the standard academic progression through university 
requiring the fulfilment of an undergraduate degree as a prerequisite to commencing a 
postgraduate degree.  Where the fund manager does not list the undergraduate degree, an 
assumption must be made that the employee holds a joint bachelors and masters degree in 
the same academic discipline.26  If the data in Table 2.28 ignored this issue, the academic 
qualifications represented within the organisation would be distorted.  Further, Table 2.28 
concentrates on only the most important qualifications directly related to the management 
of investment funds by investment professionals.27  Commerce, economics, business, 
management and science-oriented degrees are not only the most common qualifications 
conferred by academic institutions, they can be argued to be the most related and necessary 
skills required by investment management employees.  The ‘other bachelor’ and ‘other 
master’ degree categories are principally law, engineering, education and arts degrees. 
Table 2.28 presents the industry sample statistics based on 903 investment 
personnel whose degree qualifications are listed in each individual manager’s IFSA 
questionnaire.  The results are intuitive; particularly with respect to findings in Panel A, 
indicating the majority of investment management personnel (by percentage of personnel) 
hold an economics, commerce or business-related undergraduate degree.  In terms of the 
percentage of undergraduate business degrees, almost half of fund manager employees 
hold a bachelors degree in an economic, finance, commerce or business-oriented 
discipline.  These types of degrees are completed over three or four years full-time.  Just 
                                                 
26 The questionnaire data indicate that this assumption does not need to be made too frequently.  Indeed, 
consultation with a few of the managers indicated this assumption was required. 
27 For this reason, diplomas and industry qualifications obtained outside and not closely related to the 
investment management industry were ignored. 
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under one quarter of investment management personnel hold an honours qualification and 
one-fifth hold a masters degree in commerce, economics, business administration or 
finance.  The rapid decline in the number and proportion of investment management staff 
holding higher degrees suggests that: 
• undergraduate qualifications in themselves are an appropriate minimum level of entry 
to the profession; and 
• the additional years of investment in human capital may be outweighed by opportunity 
costs associated with their desire for career advancement in the short-term, desire to 
obtain industry-recognised qualifications and the amount of available leisure time 
outside of employment. 
The number of investment professionals holding a Doctor of Philosophy degree is 
very small and represents only 2.5 percent of all academic degrees and 3.2 percent by 
investment personnel.  This possibly suggests that research degrees may not be an 
important prerequisite to be employed by an investment manager, there may exist a lack of 
supply in the labour market, or alternatively, an investment manager may only require a 
small number of Ph.D.s within their investment operation.  While most employees hold 
only one academic degree, just less than one-third of investment manager employees hold 
at least two academic degrees and only 4.3 percent of all employees hold at least three 
degrees. 
Panel B of Table 2.28 presents the industry statistics for the sample of investment 
personnel who exhibit an industry-awarded qualification.  The statistics show around 38 
percent of employees hold at least one industry certification.  The Securities Institute of 
Australia’s A.S.I.A. (associate membership) and F.S.I.A. (fellow membership) 
91 
qualification, awarded through the completion of a graduate diploma in applied finance 
and investment, represents 53.3 percent of all non-degree qualifications held, or 20.4 
percent of all personnel in the sample.  Accounting accreditations, such as the Australian 
Chartered Accountant (A.C.A.) and Certified Practising Accountant (C.P.A.) awards, and 
the internationally renowned Chartered Financial Analysts (C.F.A.) are held by 8.7 and 6.1 
percent of personnel respectively. 
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Table 2.28 – Cross-Sectional Statistics of 33 Australian Investment Managers –Qualifications of 903 Investment Personnel 
Qualifications Number of Qualifications Percentage by Qualification Percentage by Personnel 
Panel A: Academic Degrees    
B.Ec./B.Com./B.Bus. (Or Equivalent)    
  
  
     
  
    
    
    
  
   
557 47.4 61.7
B.Sc. (Or Equivalent) 139 11.8 15.4 
Honours degrees* 216 N/A 23.9 
Other Bachelor Degrees 199 16.9 22.0 
M.Com/M.Ec./M.B.A./M.App Fin. (Or Equivalent) 183 15.6 20.3 
M.Sc. (Or Equivalent) 27 2.3 3.0 
Other Masters Degrees 41 3.5 4.5 
Ph.D. 29 2.5 3.2
TOTAL 1175 100.0 N/A
Panel B: Non-Degrees/Industry Qualifications
CFA 55 15.9 6.1
FSIA/ASIA 184 53.0 20.4
FCA/ACA/FCPA/CPA 79 22.8 8.7
FIAA/AIAA 29 8.4 3.2
TOTAL 347 100.0 N/A
Panel C: Multiple Degrees Held 
More than 2 Degrees 287 N/A 31.8 
More than 3 Degrees 39 N/A 4.3 
*An honours degree is awarded in conjunction with an undergraduate bachelors degree or postgraduate masters degree.  Accordingly, the percentage by degree column 
(column 3) is not applicable. 
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Table 2.29 presents the cross-sectional statistics relating to the period of 
employment by investment personnel with their current investment manager and their total 
years of experience within the investment management industry.  Panel A presents the 
statistics for the senior personnel of the investment management organisation, defined as 
the CEO, CIO, sector heads, head of asset allocation (if applicable) and other staff required 
to attend the fund manager’s asset allocation or investment committee.  Panel B on the 
other hand shows the results for the remaining staff who are responsible in the investment 
management process.  Senior staff on average across managers had around 16 years of 
investment experience, of which around 8 years has been served with their current 
employer.  The remaining investment personnel have approximately 9 years investment 
experience and 4.8 years service had been provided with their current employer. 
Table 2.29 – Cross-Sectional Averages for 33 Australian Investment Manager Entities – Experience of 
Personnel to 30 June 2000 
 Average (in Years) 
Panel A: Senior Investment Personnel  
Total Investment Experience - Average 16.2 
Total Investment Experience – Standard Deviation 6.7 
Total Years of Service to Current Employer – Average 8.1 
Total Years of Service to Current Employer – Standard Deviation 5.1 
Panel B: Other Investment Personnel  
Total Investment Experience - Average 9.2 
Total Investment Experience – Standard Deviation 5.7 
Total Years of Service to Current Employer – Average 4.8 
Total Years of Service to Current Employer – Standard Deviation 3.3 
 
 94 
2.5.5 Top Management Changes 
Investment management organisations, as with other firms in different sectors, 
experience turnover in their human capital.  The extent to which senior management 
turnover improves or detracts from investment performance is likely to be of significant 
interest to investors.  However, this will be dependent upon why the change occurred (e.g. 
merger-related or otherwise), the nature of the investment team (experience and ability), the 
succession plans that exist and the extent to which the senior manager departing the firm 
exercised significant control in the execution of the investment process or was an important 
team-leader. 
Studies by Khorana (1996, 2001) evaluating U.S. mutual fund performance and top 
management changes indicated that past performance (measured with respect to portfolio 
returns and asset growth) was reasonably able to predict the eventual replacement of 
managers.  Further, Khorana (2001) found that subsequent poor performance prior to the 
change in management resulted in significantly improved performance for the fund.  On the 
other hand, the strong returns attributable to overperforming managers could not be 
sustained after their departure. 
In Australia, recent industry studies by Frank Russell Company and van Eyk 
suggest turnover by senior investment managers (CIOs and sector heads) is reasonably 
high.  Their estimates range from between 20 and 50 percent in any given year.  In the 6-
year period from January 1994 to December 1999, Frank Russell Company identified 66 
departures of Australian equities and fixed interest sector heads, and in more than half of 
these cases, performance in the post-replacement period was higher than previously.  For 
heads of Australian equities and Australian fixed income, the average performance 
differentials before fees were 1.3 percent and 0.30 percent per annum, respectively.  
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Investment managers rarely disclosed the true reason behind a departure, however poor 
performance in the past is likely to become a contributing factor to the replacement of a 
manager.  In some cases senior personnel have departed to commence operations as a 
boutique entity, including the commencement of Maple-Brown Abbott, Portfolio Partners, 
Platinum, Contango and Perennial.  These departures may also have been partly caused due 
to remuneration or compensation issues. 
One of the issues of turnover in senior investment staff is the likelihood of a ‘ripple-
effect’ when one or more managers depart.  Depending on the management structure of the 
funds management company and their succession planning, the departure of the CEO or 
managing director (who also provides significant input into the investment strategy) may 
result in the promotion of the CIO to fill the CEO vacancy.  Where this occurs, a new CIO 
is subsequently appointed.  In general, the new CIO is usually a prior CIO, managing 
director or a sector head in equities or bonds, either already employed by the incumbent 
manager or from a competitor.  If there is an internal promotion to CIO, and where the new 
CIO does not combine their new role with their previous responsibilities, a new 
appointment will be required to fill the sector head’s vacancy.  Therefore, one change in 
senior management can induce changes in roles for the remaining senior managers.  The 
stability of the investment team (professionals) in such a scenario is reasonably protected. 
An analysis of senior staff departures for a sample of 177 positions over the period 
January 1989 to October 2001 was performed.  The sample was compiled from investment 
manager surveys and media reports covering 52 Australian investment management firms.  
Three senior positions were analysed: CIO, heads of Australian equities and heads of 
Australian bonds.  The sample statistics are presented in Table 2.30. 
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Table 2.30 – Top Management Changes in Australian Investment Management Firms in the Period 
January1989 to October 2001 
 CIO Head AEQ Head AFI 
Panel A: Actual Tenure Periods of Professionals    
Number of Staff Departures 39 41 16 
Average Tenure (Arrival to Departure) (years) 3.47 3.13 3.48 
Median Tenure (years) 3.01 2.92 3.00 
Standard Deviation (years) 2.28 1.50 1.98 
Panel B: Tenure of Existing Professionals (Not Departing)    
Number of Staff 34 26 21 
Average Tenure Since Arrival to October 2001 (years) 3.20 2.97 3.79 
Median Tenure Since Arrival (years) 2.79 2.04 4.25 
Standard Deviation Since Arrival (years) 2.31 2.64 1.82 
 
The statistics concerning tenure periods of senior staff (Panel A) suggest the length 
of time served in the roles of CIO, equities or fixed income director is around 3 years.  
Australian equities heads exhibited the shortest tenure, however the variability (standard 
deviation) for these managers is the lowest of all senior personnel classes.  Panel B presents 
the survey results of top management who are currently employed in their role and have not 
departed as at 31 October 2001.  Analysis of these individuals is important as it provides an 
indication of the general length of time senior executives have served their current 
employers.  The tenure periods are generally similar to Panel A, however it is apparent that 
fixed income directors have served longer periods with their existing employers than is the 
case for CIOs or equities directors. 
2.5.6 Compensation Arrangements for Investment Manager Personnel 
Australian investment managers generally remunerate their staff in addition to their 
base salary.  Depending on the investment manager and whether investment professionals 
meet their performance objectives – defined in terms of satisfying management within their 
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role (subjective assessment) as well as portfolio performance relative to appropriate market 
indices (objective assessment).  In the review process (where performance appraisal is 
generally considered over annual periods), money managers may also be eligible for:28 
• fixed bonuses – where employees earn a percentage of their salary as a bonus; 
• discretionary bonuses – awarded to employees as a ‘once-off’ when performance is 
deemed to be exceptional; 
• deferred bonuses – where deferred compensation in the form of investment units in the 
funds directly managed by investment professionals vests after a minimum period of 
three years or a period of time equivalent to the medium term objective of the funds 
concerned; 
• profit-sharing agreements; and 
• equity in the organisation – through the use of options over the investment manager’s 
stock or discounts to the current market share price.  Fund managers may elect to allow 
for the provision of equity in the firm which vests over either medium or long-term time 
horizons. 
In some cases, the use of variable elements of remuneration by investment 
managers such as bonuses and equity options can represent a significant proportion of an 
employee’s total remuneration.  The variable component of an investment manager’s 
remuneration is typically between zero and 40 percent of the total remuneration package, 
however, in some cases the upper bound may be 60 percent.  This is due to the highly 
                                                 
28 Investment managers may also use review periods greater than one-year to encourage long-term 
performance and employee stability. 
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competitive nature of the investment industry.  As a result, fund managers therefore need to 
both attract and retain high-calibre staff through the use of such incentive schemes to 
encourage and reward excellence.  In addition to direct remuneration, staff may also be 
eligible to receive financial assistance towards the education costs associated with the 
completion of higher degrees offered through universities, or studies associated with the 
attainment of relevant industry qualifications. 
Table 2.31 presents the distribution of total remuneration (in per annum terms) of 
professional money management staff employed in Australia in October 2000.  The 
Financial and Remuneration Group (FIRG) and W. M. Mercer survey is an industry-wide 
analysis of remuneration across various financial services sectors.  The survey relies on the 
partitioning of remuneration by job category, in a manner that also accounts for the 
differences in employee responsibility, job function and seniority.  The employment levels 
1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) represent levels of seniority, responsibility and required skills to 
undertake the role.  In some cases, use of the entire five levels is not appropriate to define 
the specific role surveyed.  The table below indicates that remuneration increases rapidly 
beyond the first tier.  In particular, money managers employed in the International equities 
and Australian equities asset classes are the most highly remunerated of all investment 
management categories surveyed by FIRG. 
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Table 2.31 – Investment Management Total Remuneration Per Annum (Expressed in Thousands of 
Australian Dollars) - October 2000 Survey 
Classification Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Panel A1: Research Analysis 
1st Quartile 28.5 55.0 69.5 162.8 194.0 
Median 60.0 99.5 114.4 240.5 276.8 
3rd Quartile 63.8 187.5 242.4 355.5 370.4 
Panel A2: Research Analysis (Economics) 
1st Quartile N/A N/A N/A N/A 145.9 
Median N/A N/A N/A N/A 164.8 
3rd Quartile N/A N/A N/A N/A 223.8 
Panel B: Risk/Quantitative Analysis 
1st Quartile 73.9 135.0 N/A N/A N/A 
Median 100.4 162.0 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd Quartile 136.5 203.7 N/A N/A N/A 
Panel C: Asset Allocation (Strategy) 
1st Quartile 64.1 107.9 205.9 N/A N/A 
Median 84.0 143.3 319.3 N/A N/A 
3rd Quartile 134.1 166.3 398.3 N/A N/A 
Panel D: Australian Equities (Portfolio Management) 
1st Quartile 79.8 109.7 184.6 283.2 N/A 
Median 117.7 163.7 221.0 399.4 N/A 
3rd Quartile 166.8 185.9 333.3 567.5 N/A 
Panel E: International Equities (Portfolio Management) 
1st Quartile 69.8 109.5 201.7 292.5 N/A 
Median 79.7 130.2 260.0 508.8 N/A 
3rd Quartile 162.5 205.5 395.0 824.2 N/A 
Panel F: Fixed Interest/Bonds/Cash (Portfolio Management) 
1st Quartile N/A 80.0 114.9 176.3 302.8 
Median N/A 99.8 156.4 200.0 358.3 
3rd Quartile N/A 120.0 210.9 282.5 501.4 
Panel G: Property Investment 
1st Quartile 44.8 N/A N/A 191.3 202.3 
Median 81.0 N/A 115.0 234.9 323.7 
3rd Quartile 114.5 N/A N/A 255.8 385.1 
Panel H: Dealing - Equities 
1st Quartile 59.5 92.5 187.0 N/A N/A 
Median 70.3 112.3 310.0 N/A N/A 
3rd Quartile 88.8 152.4 385.0 N/A N/A 
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Classification cont. Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Panel I: Dealing – Fixed Interest/Bonds/Cash 
1st Quartile 64.7 86.1 N/A N/A N/A 
Median 70.0 109.7 N/A N/A N/A 
3rd Quartile 84.3 159.3 N/A N/A N/A 
Panel J: Investment Analytics 
1st Quartile 39.0 48.1 82.7 115.3 N/A 
Median 44.0 56.0 85.8 132.2 N/A 
3rd Quartile 55.1 68.3 95.9 150.9 N/A 
Source: William M. Mercer & Financial and Insurance Remuneration Group (FIRG) 
2.5.7 Management Fees 
Historically, investment management companies have been remunerated for the 
provision of their services through the levying of an asset-based fee, based on the size of 
the assets invested with the manager.  The per annum percentage management fees 
applicable are typically inversely related to the size of assets invested with the fund 
manager.  The sliding scale nature of fees levied by investment managers recognises that 
mandates have both fixed and variable cost components, and as asset size increases, the 
proportional fixed costs of investment decline.  However over the last decade, investment 
managers have also offered institutional investors the opportunity of paying fees, which 
directly relates to stated performance objectives that can be measured.  In addition to fixed 
asset-based fees, some managers also levy performance-based fees equal to a pre-defined 
percentage of the outperformance from an appropriate market benchmark over a period of 
time.  Where an investment manager has identified and agreed to a baseline performance 
level, the contract may include a ‘claw-back’ clause enabling underperformance relative to 
the benchmark to be returned to the client before performance fees are payable.  It is also 
prudent that clients place upper limits or maximum bounds on performance-based 
incentives to ensure the objectives of the investor are not potentially compromised. 
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A recent survey by Towers Perrin presented in Table 2.32, which included 43 
institutional investment managers offering products in Australia found: 
• performance-based fees are more commonplace in the growth asset class sectors, 
namely equities and property; and 
• the majority of managers are willing to levy performance-based fees for individually 
managed accounts than is the case for pooled vehicles. 
Table 2.32 – Towers Perrin Performance-Based Fee Survey - 28 February 2001 
Asset Class 
Currently 
Offered 
(%) 
Willing to 
Offer (%) 
Not 
Willing to 
Offer (%) 
Panel A: Individual Mandates 
Australian Equities 49 49 2 
International Equities 14 62 24 
Property 18 68 14 
Australian Bonds 27 50 23 
Overseas Bonds 14 64 22 
Panel B: Pooled Investment Vehicles 
Australian Equities 27 33 40 
International Equities 4 39 57 
Property 9 50 41 
Australian Bonds 4 40 56 
Overseas Bonds 4 42 54 
Source: Towers Perrin 
 
William M. Mercer conducted a survey of Australian investment managers and 
reported median institutional management fees as at 30 September 1999.  Table 2.33 shows 
the sliding scale of fees as the size of the investment mandate increases.  Those managers 
who apply fixed fees, which are independent of the asset size invested, are represented in 
 102 
the M.E.R. column.  The percentages of fund managers in each sample group who charge 
institutional clients a performance-based fee are also shown. 
Table 2.33 – Median Institutional Management Fees (in Percent Per Annum) as at 30 September 1999 
MER (Management Expense Ratio), OPF (Offer Performance Fees). 
$A Million    Investment 
Strategy & 
Product Type $5 $10 $25 $50 $100 $150 $200 MER (%) 
OPF 
(%) 
Sample 
Size 
Panel A: Balanced/Growth 
Active/Pooled 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.79 12.9 56 
Active/Individual   0.60 0.55 0.49 0.48 0.47  50.0 28 
Passive/Pooled 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.34 None 5 
Panel B: Capital Stable 
Active/Pooled 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.75 9.7 26 
Active/Individual   0.52 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.38  50.0 8 
Passive/Pooled 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15  None 2 
Panel C: High Growth 
Active/Pooled 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.60  40.0 5 
Panel D: Australian Equities 
Active/Pooled 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.74 22.0 54 
Active/Individual   0.58 0.54 0.48 0.47 0.48  60.0 35 
Enhanced 
Passive/Pooled 
0.30 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.22  16.7 6 
Enhanced 
Passive/Individ. 
   0.29 0.23 0.22 0.21  60.0 5 
Passive/Pooled 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.24 None 6 
Passive/Individ.    0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07  None 3 
Panel E: Australian Small Companies 
Active/Pooled 0.72 0.70 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.77 None 10 
Active/Individual   0.60 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.52  37.5 8 
Panel F: Global Equities 
Active/Pooled 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.95 8.2 46 
Active/Individual   0.67 0.66 0.60 0.57 0.53  46.9 29 
Passive/Pooled 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.22 None 7 
Passive/Individ.    0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08  None 4 
Panel G: Emerging Markets 
Active/Pooled 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.02 1.02 1.38 None 8 
Active/Individual   1.00 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.88  33.3 9 
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$ Million cont.    Investment 
Strategy & 
Product Type 
cont. 
$5 $10 $25 $50 $100 $150 $200 MER (%) 
OPF 
(%) 
Sample 
Size 
Panel H: Direct Property 
Active/Pooled 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.82 12.5 7 
Panel I: Listed Property 
Active/Pooled 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.76 10.3 24 
Active/Individual   0.58 0.54 0.48 0.46 0.45  43.8 16 
Passive/Pooled 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.24 None 4 
Panel J: Diversified Property 
Active/Pooled 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.52  None 3 
Panel K: Australian Bonds 
Active/Pooled 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.45 13.5 34 
Active/Individual   0.30 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.22  59.1 22 
Enhanced 
Passive/Pooled 
0.25 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.24 None 6 
Enhanced 
Passive/Individ. 
   0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08  50.0 4 
Passive/Pooled 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05  None 3 
Passive/Individ.    0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06  None 4 
Panel L: Australian Index Bonds 
Active/Pooled 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.28 12.5 8 
Active/Individual    0.19 0.16 0.15 0.15  75.0 4 
Panel M: Global Bonds 
Active/Pooled 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65 11.1 23 
Active/Individual   0.47 0.44 0.35 0.31 0.30  34.8 22 
Panel N: Diversified Fixed Interest 
Active/Pooled 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.44 None 6 
Active/Individual   0.35 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.28  37.5 7 
Panel O: Cash 
Active/Pooled 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.35 8.0 48 
Active/Individual   0.20 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16  50.0 18 
Passive/Pooled 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.19 None 2 
Panel P: TAA Trust 
Active/Pooled 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.65 None 7 
Panel Q: TAA Overlay 
Active/Pooled     0.25 0.21 0.20  50.0 5 
Panel R: Currency Overlay 
Active/Individual    0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23  33.3 3 
Source: Mercer Wholesale Investment Management Fee Survey 1999, pp. 5-6 
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Table 2.34 – Retail Management Expense Ratios (MER) for Managed Funds as at 30 June 1999 
Managed Fund Category 
Average % 
MER per 
annum 
Australian Equity Trusts – Diversified 1.86 
Australian Equity Trusts – Property 1.68 
Australian Equity Trusts – Small Companies 2.00 
Australian Equity Trusts – Resources 1.87 
Cash Management Trusts 1.01 
Fixed Interest Trusts – Diversified 1.56 
International Equity Trusts – Asia 2.17 
International Equity Trusts – Asia Ex Japan 2.29 
International Equity Trusts – Diversified 2.11 
International Equity Trusts – Japan 2.30 
International Equity Trusts – North America 2.14 
International Equity Trusts – Western Europe 2.06 
International Fixed Interest Trusts – Diversified 1.80 
Mortgage Trusts – Diversified 1.09 
Multi-Sector Trusts – Aggressive 2.10 
Multi-Sector Trusts – Balanced 1.94 
Multi-Sector Trusts – Defensive 1.82 
Multi-Sector Trusts – Growth 1.88 
Multi-Sector Trusts – Moderate 1.79 
Unlisted Property Trusts – Diversified 1.78 
Source: Morningstar 
2.5.8 Merger and Acquisition Activity and New Start-Ups in the Australian Investment 
Industry 
Mergers and acquisitions in competitive markets occur for a variety of reasons.  The 
most significant benefits accruing to a larger entity include improved cost efficiencies, 
potentially reduced competition, as well as access to skills, talents not currently available to 
the fund manager. 
The mergers and acquisition activity in the investment management industry has 
gathered pace over the last decade.  Table 2.35 provides a brief summary of the merger and 
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acquisition activity in the last 14 years to 30 September 2001.  The industry has changed 
significantly in the last decade.  These changes include: 
• Life insurance companies and friendly societies having less significance in terms of 
their assets under management compared with the late 1980s; 
• the major banks have all sought to diversify their businesses in the financial services 
industry, with greater emphasis on investment management services.  This strategy has 
been in response to growing the bank’s revenue through improved utilisation of the 
significant customer bases enjoyed by banks.  This leads to the bank cross-selling 
managed funds to existing banking customers and diversifying the product range 
available to new and existing clients.  Of the four major banks in Australia, 
Commonwealth and National Australia have been the most active acquirers of 
investment management firms.  These include recent acquisitions of MLC, Colonial 
First State and Commonwealth Funds Management.  Colonial has been significantly 
active in acquisitions prior to the Commonwealth merger; 
• increased presence of international asset management domiciled organisations through 
the acquisition of local investment management companies.  This is consistent with 
their globalisation strategy, achievement of economies of scale and increased 
competition in global financial services. 
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Table 2.35 – Mergers and Acquisitions Impacting on the Australian Investment Management Industry 
(Direct and Indirect) (1988-2001) 
Date Acquirer Target (where applicable) 
April 1988 McIntosh Asset Management SPAL Management 
September 1988 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC) 
Wardley Australia (Wardley Investment 
Management) 
December 1988 Prudential Aetna Casualty and Life 
January 1989 Prudential Investors Life (Inlife) 
August 1989 Security Pacific Australia Kleinwort Benson Australia 
December 1989 Citicorp Investment Management PNC International Financial Services 
February 1990 Macquarie Bank Risk Averse Money Managers 
April 1990 Potter Warburg Asset Management Hambros Australia 
December 1990 Commonwealth Bank State Bank of Victoria 
June 1992 Lend Lease Australian Eagle 
October 1992 Sun Alliance Group Royal Insurance Australia 
November 1993 Tower Corporation Friends Provident Life Assurance Co Ltd  
(Friends Investment Management) 
December 1993 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society 
Limited (Colonial Mutual Investment 
Management) 
Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society 
April 1994 Tyndall Australia NZ Guardian Trust Co 
October 1994 Pacific Mutual Australia (Armstrong Jones) Pyrford International 
November 1994 Colonial Mutual Life State Bank of NSW (First State Fund 
Managers) 
May 1995 Tyndall Global Funds Management Australia Ltd. 
November 1995 Legal & General SGIC Life/Superannuation 
November 1995 Mercury Asset Management Potter Warburg Asset Management 
August 1996 CBA CFM 
September 1996 Mercantile Mutual Pacific Mutual Australia (Armstrong Jones)** 
October 1996 AXA National Mutual Funds Management 
December 1996 Suncorp Metway Bank and Queensland Industry 
Development Corporation (QIDC) 
December 1996 Commonwealth Investment Management Commonwealth Funds Management 
January 1997 St. George Bank Advance Bank (SealCorp/Advance Asset 
Management) 
May 1997 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Axiom Funds Management 
July 1997 Zurich Scudder Kemper Investments 
October 1997 National Australia Bank County Investment Management 
October 1997 Tower Life Advance Life 
December 1997 ABN AMRO BZW (Australia & New Zealand) 
December 1997 Royal Sun Alliance Connelly Temple 
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Date cont. Acquirer cont. Target (where applicable) cont. 
January 1998 Merrill Lynch Mercury Asset Management 
February 1998 AMVESCAP LGT Asset Management 
February 1998 AMP Henderson  
March 1998 Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC)**** 
April 1998 Challenger International Poynton Asset Management 
May 1998 Colonial Legal & General Australia  ##
June 1998 Salomon Smith Barney JP Morgan Investment Management Australia 
July 1998 Challenger International Howard Financial Holdings (Howard Funds 
Management) 
August 1998 Colonial Prudential Corporation of Australia 
September 1998 Norwich Union Australia Portfolio Partners 
September 1998 Salomon Smith Barney*** Citicorp 
December 1998 Perpetual Wilson Dilworth 
February 1999 Royal Sun Alliance Tyndall Australia 
June 1999 Principal BT Funds Management 
June 1999 Tower FAI Life 
August 1999 Perennial Investment Partners IOOF 
August 1999 Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) Paribas 
September 1999 Mercantile Mutual Heine Management Limited 
November 1999 SMF Funds Management United Funds Management 
February 2000 AMP GIO Australia 
March 2000 Commonwealth Bank Colonial Group 
March 2000 CGU plc Norwich Union Australia 
April 2000 National Australia Bank MLC 
May 2000 BNP Paribas Investment Management Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) 
October 2000 Aberdeen Asset Management EquitiLink Investment Management 
December 2000 AXA Asia-Pacific 
December 2000 Challenger International Integrated Equity 
December 2000 INVESCO County Investment Management 
September 2001 Deutsche Zurich Scudder 
Alliance Capital Management 
Source: Publicly available information in the financial press and Macquarie Research (Equities). # = 
remaining 50 percent acquired by Mercury Asset Management plc, † = takeover of GIO Australia included 
acquisition of GIO Asset Management. ** Includes MMI Insurance’s 30 percent divestiture of Pacific Mutual 
to Mercantile Mutual. ## Tactical Global Management created as a stand-alone funds management business 
in 1998. *** Arises from Travelers Group’s ownership of SSB and the merger with Citicorp (U.S.)  ^ HSBC 
acquired the remaining 49 percent it did not own of Wardley Australia.  N/A = undisclosed or not applicable. 
**** merged entity renamed Warburg Dillon Read (included SBC Brinson as the funds management arm) 
 
In addition to mergers and acquisitions, a number of newly formed investment 
managers have commenced.  These ‘boutique’ investment managers have now begun to 
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rival their larger institutional competitors.  In the year 2000, the Australian Financial 
Review reported boutique managers in Australia had captured more than $1 billion from 
traditional asset managers.  At present there exist around 30 boutique managers.   The most 
notable boutique entities include Portfolio Partners (commenced 1994) and Maple-Brown 
Abbott (commenced 1984).  Portfolio Partners was formed by a number of senior 
investment professionals departing County Natwest Investment Management in 1994.  
Portfolio Partners was later sold to Norwich Union in 1998.  Boutique managers generally 
aim to offer investors higher returns than traditional managers as well as providing a higher 
level of client service. 
However, the actual definition of a ‘boutique’ manager varies within the industry.  
Classifications of boutique managers are typically made with respect to the firm’s 
ownership structure, their specialisation within a specific asset class and the size of funds 
under management.  In classifying Australian boutique managers, Rainmaker Information 
has proposed a definition that includes small wholesale funds managers and where the 
owners of the firm directly manage the client’s investments.  In a recent survey, and 
employing the above definition, Rainmaker reported the largest 10 Australian boutique 
managers controlled in excess of $A10 billion or 86 percent of total boutique assets.  These 
statistics are presented in Table 2.36. 
 109 
Table 2.36 – Australian Boutique Investment Managers as at 31 March 2001 
Rank Boutique Investment Managers $A Billion 
1 Balanced Equity Management 2.86 
2 Hastings Funds Management 2.00 
3 Ausbil Dexia Limited 1.34 
4 Jardine Fleming Capital Partners 1.13 
5 Concord Capital Limited 0.90 
6 Bell Asset Management 0.81 
7 Hopkins Partners Funds Management 0.55 
8 Wallara Asset Management 0.47 
9 Warakirri Asset Management 0.37 
10 Perennial Investment Partners 0.33 
- Total Top 10 10.18 
- Total Boutique Market 11.80 
Source: Rainmaker Information 
 
2.6 Future Directions for the Australian Managed Funds Industry 
The size of the Australian funds management industry, in terms of the total assets 
managed by professional investment managers, will continue to grow – principally as a 
result of increases in superannuation, accelerated by legislated increases in the 
superannuation guarantee levy.  However there are a number of further areas in which the 
industry is likely to change in the future: 
• increasing globalisation of investment markets that will continue to be facilitated 
through advances in technology and improvements in the speed and quality (e.g. 
granularity) of information dissemination.  Australian investors are likely to seek an 
increase in their portfolio allocations to international investments at the expense of 
domestic asset classes (i.e. movement away from home country bias); 
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• the continuing competition in the industry, particularly through the relaxation of 
restrictions preventing foreign investment managers offering Australian investors 
access to their suite of mutual funds at a lower cost than is the case at the present time;  
• increased merger and acquisition activity in the investment management industry, 
particularly as global firms continue to seek a presence in the Australian market place.  
This would then allow large investment managers to benefit from global economies of 
scale through their provision of capital, labour, distribution, technology and services; 
• increasing competition from ‘boutique’ investment managers and new start-up entities 
(formed by talented fund managers) and offering highly specialised investment 
products.  This has partly been encouraged by asset consulting firms favouring the ‘core 
plus satellite’ model in the awarding of mandates.  Thus, even greater emphasis should 
be placed on sector specialisation rather than selecting diversified managers.  This also 
provides investors with increased diversification of manager risk and style; 
• greater specialisation across asset classes, dichotomised into sub-group categories.  
Investors may also exhibit greater acceptance of alternative investment classes such as 
absolute return strategies (including hedge funds), emerging markets equity and debt 
instruments, venture capital (or private equity) and infrastructure assets.  For 
performance reporting purposes, investors may demand a higher degree of information 
in understanding the true source of performance (e.g. international equities classified 
into countries, regions and industries rather than aggregated); 
• as a result of the Commonwealth Government’s policy of debt reduction and improved 
fiscal management, investment managers will respond by focusing more on non-
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government debt instruments such as corporate issues and international fixed income 
securities; 
• direct property investments are likely to decrease as a proportion of the total portfolio 
as investors reduce their allocation toward assets with relative lower liquidity 
(compared with exchange-listed securities); 
• continued reliance on outsourcing of international assets exposure by the majority of 
domestic managers.  This is mainly due to scale issues; 
• retail fund managers continuing to maintain their concentration of retail assets due to 
the necessity of scale economies by providers and their established networks of 
distribution and ability to cross-sell products.  Large retail managers also appear to 
receive preferential treatment by ratings agencies on the basis of their size or 
‘branding’, which further ensures such concentration; 
• increased competition in the pricing structures of institutional managed funds and 
greater flexibility in the compensation arrangements of investment managers which ties 
remuneration to direct performance outcomes rather than being completely derived 
from fixed asset-based fees; 
• increasing attention given to passively managed index and enhanced-index funds in 
combination with active fund investments.  This includes possible participation in 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs), where managed funds are bought and sold through a 
licensed stockbroker.  A few investment managers, including Salomon Smith Barney 
Asset Management and Barclays Global Investors, have recently launched a series of 
ASX-listed equity funds.  The ASX has also signalled their intention to offer existing 
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retail managed funds (as an exchange-listed vehicle) to be transacted through the Stock 
Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS);29 
• changing role for asset consulting firms, where asset consultants provide more 
specialised services including direct management through a fund-of-funds approach.  
Also, potentially greater value placed on consultants that have a global presence; 
• due to increasing investor education and participation in markets (primarily through 
superannuation) it is probable that a higher level of consumer awareness will lead to 
additional requests for information, commentaries on markets and strategic issues, and 
ultimately investment performance.  With advances in information technology, 
investors are most likely to have greater interaction (e.g. web-based) with fund 
managers and superannuation fund administrators as well as the provision of more 
frequent and comprehensive reporting; 
• the consolidation of superannuation funds into larger industry funds and master trusts 
should continue into the future.  This process will result in further consolidation in 
decision-making power among fewer trustees and asset consultants.  The trend for 
company funds to move to master trusts is likely to arise due to the complexity of 
superannuation legislation, legal liabilities faced by trustees, the increasingly generic 
nature of super funds (in that they all offer the same benefits and simultaneously makes 
it difficult to establish branding or differentiation) and the need for companies to focus 
on their primary business activities.  Superannuation members are also likely to have 
greater choice (known as Member Investment Choice) in the types of options available 
                                                 
29 Australian Financial Review, 21 March 2001, page 24 
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to them in terms of the aggressiveness or otherwise of how their retirement assets are 
managed; 
• increased regulation of the Australian investment industry, particularly with respect to 
improved information disclosure and risk management procedures.  This may 
ultimately arise in the form of a new industry body that is independent of both the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA). 
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CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
The empirical literature evaluating managed funds (or in the U.S., mutual funds and 
pension funds) has overwhelmingly been concerned with assessing the performance of 
actively managed investment portfolios.30  Further, published research has been highly 
concentrated on the evaluation of U.S. mutual fund performance, however, the literature’s 
coverage and analysis of mutual funds offered in other capital markets around the world 
has only until recently began to gather momentum. 
According to the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis’s special issue on 
performance measurement (Volume 35, 2000), the origins of the performance evaluation 
literature date back to the early work of Alfred Cowles.  Cowles’ (1933) publication in 
Econometrica evaluated the forecasting (or market timing) skills of money managers in the 
United States.  His general finding indicated an inability of money managers to provide 
superior returns to the general market of common stocks.  While the empirical work since 
Cowles (1933) has gathered momentum, including the use of more sophisticated 
performance evaluation techniques, the general conclusions reported by Cowles (1933) 
have seldom been contradicted.  In essence the empirical evidence overwhelmingly finds 
                                                 
30 In the U.S., mutual funds are comparable to retail managed funds in Australia.  That is, mutual or retail 
funds are open to private investors generally allocating smaller monetary denominations to investment 
managers in return for units (or shares) in the pooled investment vehicle.  Institutional or wholesale managed 
funds differ from retail products in the sense that they are open to investors who are able to allocate larger 
investment parcels, usually in the vicinity of a minimum $100-250 million.  In Australia, such investors are 
typically high net-worth individuals, institutions or pension funds. 
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that actively managed mutual funds on average have been unable to earn superior returns to 
an appropriate benchmark proxy portfolio or index.  The review of the empirical literature 
examining the performance evaluation of managed portfolios is presented in Section 3.2. 
The evaluation of asset managers, and mutual funds in particular, has been 
significant since the 1960s.  In the United States, from whence most of the literature has 
emanated, the increased attention to mutual funds and pension funds has arisen due to 
significant growth in the financial assets managed by institutions, the wide availability of 
ratings information by firms including Morningstar Inc., Lipper Inc., Wiesenberger Inc., the 
Investment Company Institute Inc. as well as the strict regulation of mutual funds by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Accordingly, this supervision of mutual 
funds has ensured the data available to investors are of a sufficient granularity and in 
standardised format that permits appropriate comparisons across funds.  Similar to the U.S., 
data availability in Australia for managed funds has improved significantly, and the 
attention afforded to the industry has increased markedly.  This can be explained due to the 
demographic structure of Australia’s population (ageing population), the widening of 
superannuation coverage and the asset size pool of superannuation funds, as well as the 
increased competition, product availability and existence of investment services offered to 
institutional and retail investors. 
The performance evaluation literature has been firmly grounded in the theoretical 
underpinnings of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), and more specifically the theory of how 
capital assets are priced.  Nobel Laureates, specifically Harry Markowitz’s (1952) and 
William F. Sharpe’s (1964) contributions are of critical importance, as their theoretical 
work has provided an understanding of how investors should construct portfolios – with 
respect to expected return and risk. 
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The work of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) led to the 
development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which is a two-parameter model 
that assumes investors are only concerned with mean and variance of asset returns.  The 
traditional portfolio performance techniques developed by Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966) 
and Jensen (1968, 1969) have all been extended from MPT and the theory of capital asset 
pricing.  In particular, the Jensen (1969) and Sharpe (1966) methodologies have been the 
most influential techniques adopted by empiricists in the last three-and-a-half decades since 
their formulation.  These metrics are discussed below in Section 3.2. 
Shukla and Trzcinka (1992) have provided a comprehensive synthesis of the 
evolution of the performance evaluation literature.  These authors offer a three-part 
decomposition of the history of developments in the evaluation of investment portfolios 
and mutual fund managers.  According to their overview, the three generations have 
become further fragmented in terms of the scope of scientific work in the field over time.  
The generalised evolution can be seen as follows: 
understanding and accurately quantifying portfolio risk.  The CAPM’s influence in the 
derivation of risk models in the evaluation of investment performance has been 
critically important in the first generation of the literature, in particular Jensen’s alpha 
(1968) and Sharpe’s (1966) reward-to-variability ratio; 
• 
• closer scrutiny of the CAPM assumptions, both theoretically and empirically.  Roll’s 
(1977, 1978) critique of the CAPM, highlighting the problems associated with mean-
variance inefficiency of the benchmark as well as specification of the reference 
portfolio are particular cases in point.  Significant contributors to this branch of work 
extend to Admati and Ross (1985), Dybvig and Ross (1985a), and Lehmann and 
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Modest (1987).  The second generation of the literature also led to finer decompositions 
of portfolio performance into market timing and security selection components.  The 
work of Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Fama (1972), Jensen (1972), Merton (1981) and 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) are of significant importance; and 
extensions of portfolio performance beyond the sole reliance on benchmark portfolio 
proxies (Grinblatt and Titman (1989b, 1993) as well as improvements in the definitions 
of benchmark indices (for example, Elton et al. (1993), Elton et al. (1996a), Carhart 
(1997) and Daniel et al. (1997)).  These extensions account for the types of securities 
included in portfolios as well as controlling for factor risks (market capitalisation, book-
to-market equity and momentum) in addition to the common market factor.  The 
findings of Fama and French (1993) concerning risk factors explaining common stock 
and bond returns represent a significant contribution to the literature.  Shukla and 
Trzcinka (1992) also consider the performance persistence literature as belonging to the 
third generation.  This includes the work of Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks, 
Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Elton et al. (1996a). 
• 
• 
However, in the nine years since Shukla and Trzcinka’s (1992) synthesis was 
published, an additional generation of performance evaluation literature has evolved.  The 
areas of research belonging to the present era of literature include: 
wider scope of analysis to different asset class sectors beyond equity-oriented funds, 
specifically bond funds (Blake et al. (1993, 1995), Detzler (1999)), hedge funds 
(Ackermann et al. (1999), Agarwal and Naik (2000), Brown et al. (1999)), and real 
estate investment trusts or REITs (Kallberg et al. (2000)); 
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conditional performance evaluation models that account for public information 
available to active managers and the time-variation in risk and risk premiums (Ferson 
and Schadt (1996), Christopherson et al. (1998) and Becker et al. (1999)) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
consideration of the influence of survivorship bias in performance evaluation studies 
(Brown et al. (1992), Elton et al. (1996b)); 
performance attribution of diversified or multi-sector portfolios and the tactical asset 
allocation ability of investment managers (Brinson et al. (1986), Brinson et al. (1991), 
Blake et al. (1999)); 
increased attention and scrutiny of index mutual fund performance (Gruber (1996), 
Keim (1999), Frino and Gallagher (2001)); 
the liquidity service provided by mutual fund managers and explanations behind the 
inability of active mutual fund managers to outperform benchmark indices (Edelen 
(1999)). 
cash flows, predictability and fund performance (Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), Carhart 
(1997)); 
manager compensation arrangements/tournaments (Brown et al. (1996), Busse (2001)); 
the effect of top management changes on mutual fund performance (Khorana (1996), 
Khorana (2001)); and 
manager characteristics as a predictor of performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), 
Golec (1996)). 
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3.2 Empirical Evidence Concerning Managed Fund Performance 
Table 3.1 to Table 3.4 provide summarised information of empirical studies 
evaluating the performance of managed portfolios.  The literature concentrating on 
Australian, U.S. and U.K investment vehicles are evaluated individually.  The concluding 
table includes a synthesis of other markets including France, Japan, Spain and Sweden.  
The literature widely confirms the inability of active investment managers to earn superior 
risk-adjusted excess returns to appropriate market indices, both before and after 
consideration of management expenses.  While there have been some studies which have 
documented superior performance, in most cases, the typical explanations supporting these 
propositions have concerned misspecification of the model, misspecification of the 
benchmark or survivor-biased samples of funds (for example, see Elton et al. (1993)).  
However, some dissenting studies have recently emerged in the literature, arguing that a 
Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) view of market efficiency is in existence (e.g. Wermers (2000)).  
These issues are further discussed in Section 3.4. 
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Table 3.1 – Published Empirical Evidence Concerning Australian Fund Performance 
The journal abbreviations are reconciled in the Appendix.  ‘Sector’ classifies studies on the basis of the securities comprising portfolios (diversified accounts for funds which 
invest in the broad spectrum of asset classes, namely equities, bonds, property and cash).  ‘Returns Basis’ classifies studies on the basis of whether returns are before 
investment expenses or after costs.  ‘Super’ refers to funds that are designated pension funds, ‘Non-Super’ refers to other funds which are not classified as pension vehicles 
and used for general investment.  Data frequency indicates whether the returns were daily (D), weekly (W), monthly (M) or yearly (Y).  Fund structure differentiates between 
funds that are open to new money or funds that have a fixed number of shares/units and do not experience capital movements (i.e. closed).  The remaining categories are self-
explanatory. 
 
Year    Author(s) Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1983          Bird, Chin, 
McCrae 
AJM Diversified 1973-1981 104 Q Net Super Open Yes Sharpe, Treynor,
Jensen 
Funds do not outperform 
1986            
           
            
          
           
          
           
Robson A&F Equities,
Diversified 
1969-1978 76 M Net Non-Super Open Yes Sharpe, Treynor,
Jensen 
Funds do not outperform 
1990 Sinclair A&F Diversified 1981-1987 16 M Net Super Open Yes Jensen, Henriksson-
Merton, Brown-
Durbin-Evans 
Funds do not outperform, market timing 
particularly perverse 
1999 Hallahan A&F Diversified,
Fixed Income 
1989-1993 224 M Net Super Open Yes Jensen, Sharpe Performance persistence strong for fixed 
income funds 
1999 Hallahan, Faff JMFM Equities 1988-1997 65 M Net Non-Super Open Yes Jensen, Treynor-
Mazuy, Cubic Model 
General absence of market timing and stock 
selection ability 
2000 Sawicki AJM Diversified,
Equities, 
Property 
1981-1995 124 M Net Super/Non
-Super 
Open Yes Jensen Fund flows positively related to past 
performance 
2000 Sawicki, Ong PBFJ Diversified,
Equities 
1983-1995 97 M Net Super/Non
-Super 
Open Yes Jensen, Ferson-Schadt,
Treynor-Mazuy 
 Funds do not outperform 
2001 Gallagher A&F Diversified,
Equities, 
Bonds 
1991-1998 16 M Gross Super Open Yes Jensen, Treynor-
Mazuy, Henriksson-
Merton, Performance 
Attribution 
Funds do not exhibit superior timing or 
selection ability 
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Table 3.2 – Published Empirical Evidence Concerning U.S. Fund Performance  
‘Equities’ denotes funds investing entirely in equities or those funds that predominantly invest in equities.  ‘Sector’ refers to the author’s predominant focus on equity funds 
and/or funds investing mainly in equity securities.  Other categories are defined as above in Table 3.1.  N/A indicates the study does not provide the necessary information 
with which to make a conclusive classification, or else the information is not applicable. 
Year    Author(s) Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1933 Cowles III ECON Equities 1928-1932 45 W N/A N/A N/A Yes Raw measure Inability of investment companies to successfully 
predict market movements or specific stocks 
1962          
            
          
            
            
            
           
   Diversified    Net  Yes Risk is not stationary through time 
    1960-1971   
            
         Yes 
Friend,
Brown, 
Herman, 
Vickers 
U.S. 
S.E.C. 
Equities 1953-1958 152 Y Net Mutual Open Yes Quasi-risk adjusted Funds do not outperform 
1966 Sharpe JB Equities 1954-1963 34 Y Net Mutual Open Yes Sharpe Results consistent with capital market efficiency 
1966 Treynor,
Mazuy 
HBR Equities 1953-1962 57 N/A Net Mutual Open Yes Treynor-Mazuy No evidence of market timing ability by funds 
1968 Jensen JF Equities 1945-1964 115 Y Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen Inability of funds to outperform 
1970 Carlson JFQA Equities 1948-1967 122 Y Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Sharpe Performance sensitive to benchmark used; past 
performance lacked predictive ability; Good 
performers experience high cash inflow; Size and 
expense ratio is unrelated to performance. 
1974 McDonald JFQA Equities
and Bonds 
1960-1969 123 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Sharpe,
Treynor 
Overall, an inability of funds to earn significantly 
positive risk-adjusted returns.  Systematic risk 
related to investment objectives 
1978 Kim JFQA Equities 1969-1975 138 Q Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Sharpe Performance of mutual funds consistent with 
capital market efficiency 
1978 Kon, Jen JF 1960-1971 49 M Mutual Open Jensen 
1979 Kon, Jen JB Equities 49 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, 2 & 3 
regime model 
specification 
(Quandt) 
Mixed findings concerning performance and 
funds’ ability to outperform 
1983 Kon JB Equities 1960-1976 37 M Net Mutual Open Yes Kon-Jen approach
based on switching 
regression model 
Mutual fund managers have no market timing 
ability 
1984 Chang,
Llewellen 
JB Equities 1971-1979 67 M Net Mutual Open Henriksson-Merton Funds overall did not outperform the market, 
indicating a lack of ability in timing and 
selectivity 
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Year Author(s)   Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1984    1968-1980 116    Open  Henriksson JB Diversified,
Equities 
M Net Mutual Yes Henriksson-Merton Inability of mutual fund managers to derive 
superior returns attributable to market timing.  
Negative correlation between timing and 
selectivity coefficients 
Elton,
Gruber, 
Rentzler 
JB Commodity
/Futures 
1979-1985 M Net Pool Open Sharpe Commodity funds are not necessarily superior to 
mutual funds.  Persistence in performance was 
weak 
1987 Ippolito,
Turner 
FAJ Diversified
stock and 
bond 
 1977-1983 1526 Y Net Pension Open Yes Jensen Funds underperformed the S&P 500 but 
outperformed a weighted stock and bond index 
1987 Lehmann,
Modest 
Equities 1968-1982 130 M Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Treynor-
Black, Arbitrage-
based risk model 
1988 Edwards,
Ma 
JFM Commodity
/Futures 
1976-1987 55 M Net Open Yes Risk-adjusted
metrics 
Information disclosure in prospectuses are not 
good guides to future returns 
1989 Grinblatt,
Titman 
JB Equities 1975-1984 274
157 
M,Q Net Mutual Open Yes & 
No 
Raw Returns, Jensen  Aggressive growth funds earn superior returns pre 
costs but not after costs 
1989 Ippolito QJE Equities 1965-1984 143 M Net Mutual No Jensen Active funds earn risk-adjusted returns equivalent 
to fees and expenses 
1990 Cumby,
Glen 
JF Internationa
l Equities 
1982-1988 15 M Net Mutual Open Jensen, Positive
Period Weighting 
Measure (PPW) 
Inability to provide investors of funds with 
superior returns to an international index 
1990 FAJ Commodity
/Futures 
1980-1988 130 Net Pool Open No Raw Returns Performance is not attractive and there are high 
risks; dissolution rates are high 
1990 Lee,
Rahman 
Equity-
oriented 
1977-1984 93 M Net Mutual Open Yes Bhattacharya-
Pfleiderer 
Some funds earn abnormal returns, however in 
general, most funds do not outperform the market 
in either timing or selectivity 
1991 Connor,
Korajczyk 
RQFA Equities 1968-1982 130 M Net al Open Yes Jensen, APT,
Henriksson-Merton 
Funds underperform.  Demonstrate sensitivity of 
results to risk factors employed 
1991 Cornell,
Green 
JF Low-Grade
Bonds 
Net Publicly
traded 
Closed Yes Raw Returns,
Multifactor risk 
model 
Low-grade bonds exhibit higher systematic risk 
than high-grade bonds, are less sensitive to 
interest rate movements and exhibit higher returns 
than high-grade bond funds 
Table 3.2 continued…
1987    85     Yes  
   
  JF    Net    Empirically demonstrates the importance of 
benchmark specification in tests of mutual fund 
performance.  Abnormal performance of mutual 
funds exists in the study 
       Pool    
         
         Open  
         Yes  
 Elton, 
Gruber, 
Rentzler 
 M 
  JB        
        Mutu   
    1960-1989 >90 M      
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   Fund Type Year Author(s) Journal Sector
Period 
Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1991         Yes  Eun,
Kolodny, 
Resnick 
JPM Internationa
l Equities 
1977-1986 19 M Net Mutual Open Sharpe, Jensen,
Treynor, 
Henriksson-Merton 
Funds failed to outperform MSCI World Index 
1991  FAJ  Q      
1992 Brown, 
Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson, 
Ross 
RFS         
    Funds are poor market timers; minority of funds 
have positive selectivity 
        
           
           
1993  
       Mutual   
     165       
  JFM 1979-1990 186       
Brinson,
Singer, 
Beebower 
Diversified 1977-1987 82 Net Pension Open Yes Performance
attribution approach 
Inability to earn active returns above strategic 
benchmarks of funds 
Equities 1976-1987 153 M Net Mutual Open No Jensen Existence of survivorship bias gives rise to 
apparent persistence in performance.  Thus biased 
inferences arise 
1992 Chen, Lee,
Rahman, 
Chan 
JBFA Equities,
Diversified 
1977-1984 93 M Net Mutual Open Yes Treynor-Mazuy 
1992 Grinblatt,
Titman 
JF Equities 1975-1984 279 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen Measure with 
additional 
benchmarks 
Positive performance persistence exists 
1993 Blake,
Elton, 
Gruber 
JB Bonds 1979-1988 46 M Net Mutual Open No Jensen, Multiple
index model 
Bond funds underperform market indices after 
expenses 
1993 Coggin,
Fabozzi, 
Rahman 
JF Equities 1983-1990 71 M Gross Pension Open Yes Treynor-Mazuy,
Bhattacharya-
Pfleiderer 
Security selection estimates are positive and 
market timing is negative on average.  Negative 
correlation between timing and selectivity 
confirmed 
Elton,
Gruber, 
Das, 
Hlavka 
RFS Equities 1965-1984 143 M Net Mutual Open No Jensen, 3 Factor 
model 
Active funds perform in line with appropriate 
indices 
1993 Grinblatt,
Titman 
JB Equities 1975-1984 155 Q Gross  Open Yes Portfolio Holdings
Measures 
Some evidence of funds outperforming 
(aggressive growth funds predominantly); some 
evidence of performance persistence 
1993 Hendricks,
Patel, 
Zeckhauser 
JF Equities 1975-1988 Q Net Mutual Open No Jensen, multi-index
benchmark 
Evidence of performance persistence for growth-
oriented funds over one-year evaluation periods  
1993 Irwin,
Krukemyer, 
Zulauf 
Commodity
/Futures 
M Net Pool Open No Raw Returns,
Sharpe 
Portfolio of commodity pools outperforms a 
passive buy and hold strategy after costs 
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Year Author(s)   Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1994   Internationa
l Equities 
   Net    Raw Returns, 
Sharpe, Treynor, 
Jensen 
Droms,
Walker 
JFR 1971-1990 108 Y Mutual Open Yes Alphas insignificantly different from zero, 
consistent with an efficient global capital market.  
Performance is not related to expense ratios 
levied, asset size or portfolio turnover 
1994 Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson 
728 
     279   Mutual   Jensen, PPW, 
Treynor-Mazuy 
       Open 
 Elton, 
Gruber, 
Blake 
1986-1991 Net 
   Equities       Multi-Factor Jensen 
Model 
1995         Open  Performance persistence found in bond funds 
only and not equity funds 
          No  
    1980-1989       Performance persistence is documented.  In 
particular persistence is positively (negatively) 
related to maximum capital gains funds (income 
funds).  Persistence is positively (negatively) 
related to funds with low (high) management 
fees.  No relationship in persistence between fund 
size and performance 
    1991-1993 80  Net    U.K. emerging equity funds provide 
diversification benefits to investors, however U.S. 
funds do not 
 Brown, 
Harlow, 
Starks 
1980-1991 
JPM Equities 1976-1988 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Raw Returns Past returns and rankings have predictive ability 
1994 Grinblatt,
Titman 
JFQA Equities 1975-1984 M Net Open Yes Performance can be highly sensitive to 
benchmarks used; market timing ability absent 
from mutual funds 
1995 Brown,
Goetzmann 
JF Equities 1976-1988 829 M Net Mutual Yes Raw, Jensen, 3-
index model 
Evidence of performance persistence 
1995 JF Bonds 123 M Mutual Open Yes Jensen, 4 index 
model, 2 other  
multiple factor 
models 
Bond funds underperform the market 
1995 Grinblatt,
Titman, 
Wermers 
AER 1975-1984 274 Q Gross Mutual Open Yes Funds tend to hold past winners, indicating 
momentum preferences; Momentum strategies 
outperformed contrarian strategies 
Kahn, Rudd FAJ Equities &
Bonds 
1983-1994 300 M Net Mutual Yes Jensen, Sharpe-
based Information 
Ratio 
1995 Malkiel JF Equities 1971-1991 724 Q Gross &
Net 
Mutual Open  Jensen, Total
Returns 
Funds underperformed on average both before 
and after expenses.  Evidence of performance 
persistence in the 1970s but not in 1980s 
1995 Volkman,
Wohar 
JFR Equities 332 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen 
1996 Bekaert,
Urias 
JF Emerging
Equities 
W Listed Closed Yes Sharpe, Mean-
Variance Spanning 
Tests  
1996 JF Equities 334 M Net Mutual Open Yes Raw Return, Risk 
adjustment 
procedure 
Mid-year ‘losing’ funds tend to increase volatility 
in latter six-months compared with ‘winning’ 
mid-year funds 
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Year Author(s) Journal  Fund Type 
Performance 
Approach/Model Sector
Period 
Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? Main Finding(s) 
1996 Performance measurement can be arbitrary.  The 
authors demonstrate the need for evaluation 
techniques to encompass four minimal conditions 
Chen, Knez RFS Equities 1968-1989 68 M Net Mutual Open Yes Conditional and 
Unconditional 
measures 
independent of asset 
pricing models 
1996         
  RFS        Three index model 
         Yes 
          Conditional and 
Unconditional 
Jensen, Treynor-
Mazuy and 
Henriksson-Merton 
           Performance was consistent with market index, 
however some conjecture exists from other 
models 
      M     
    1984-1994        
        Mutual 
     M     
             
Elton,
Gruber, 
Blake 
JB Equities 1977-1993 188 M Net Mutual Open No Four index model Performance persistence arises for mutual funds 
using 1 and 3 year evaluation periods 
1996 Elton,
Gruber, 
Blake 
Equities 1977-1993 361 M Net Mutual Open No Demonstrates the importance of controlling for 
survivor bias in mutual fund studies – excluding 
non-survivors improves performance 
1996 Ferson,
Warther 
FAJ Equities 1968-1990 63 M Net Mutual Open Jensen, Treynor-
Mazuy, Conditional 
model 
Conditional models improve mutual fund 
performance, however, mutual funds do not 
outperform.  Fund flows may explain why betas 
indicate perverse timing ability 
1996 Ferson,
Schadt 
JF Equities 1968-1990 67 M Net Mutual Open Yes Conditional evaluation models improve 
performance estimates compared to unconditional 
models.  Conditional models correct for perverse 
timing estimates when unconditional models used 
1996 Gallo,
Swanson 
JBF Foreign
Equities 
1985-1993 37 M Net Mutual Open Yes Sharpe, Treynor-
Mazuy, Multi-factor 
model 
1996 Gruber JF Equities 1985-1994 270 Net Mutual Open & 
Closed 
No Raw Returns,
Jensen, 4 index 
model 
Active funds do earn superior returns to an index 
fund 
1997 Bello,
Janjigian 
FAJ Equities  633 M Net Mutual Open Yes Treynor-Mazuy
(including additional 
variables) 
Negative correlation between timing and 
selectivity; evidence of superior timing and 
selection ability 
1997 Carhart JF Equities 1962-1993 1892 M Net Open No Jensen, Carhart 4-
factor model 
Persistence in performance is explained by 
common factors (e.g. momentum) in equities and 
mutual fund expenses.  Persistence remains 
among poor performing funds 
1997 Chevalier,
Ellison 
JPE Equities 1982-1992 449 Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Semi-
parametric model. 
The flow-performance relation provides 
incentives for fund companies to alter the fund’s 
risk level 
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Year Author(s) Journal  Data Freq Sector
Period 
Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1997          Daniel,
Grinblatt, 
Titman, 
Wermers 
JF Equities 1975-1994 >2500 Q Gross Mutual Open No Characteristic-based
measures, GT 
measure, Carhart, 
Jensen 
Aggressive growth funds exhibit security 
selection skill, however no market timing ability 
exists for the sample of funds 
1997    35       
     M      
1997           
          
           
        
           
            
             
Detzler,
Wiggins 
RQFA Internationa
l Equities 
1985-1994 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Positive
Period Weighting 
Measure 
International equity index found to be inefficient 
and outperformance arises.  Performance 
persistence is also evident 
1997 Fung, Hsieh RFS Hedge/Com
modity 
1991-1995 409 Net Private
vehicle 
Open Yes Extended Sharpe
(1992) style analysis 
Hedge funds exhibit low correlation with mutual 
funds and also the standard asset classes 
identified and invested within by mutual funds.  
In addition to considering the asset mix (location 
of assets), additional style factors for hedge funds 
must also account for the trading strategy adopted 
and how leverage is used 
Shukla,
Singh 
GFJ U.S. &
Global 
Equities 
 1988-1995 104 M Net Mutual Open Yes Sharpe, Treynor,
Jensen 
Global equity funds outperform.  However U.S. 
funds superior to global equities 
1998 Christopher
son, Ferson, 
Glassman 
RFS Equities 1979-1990 273 M Gross Pension Open Yes Ferson-Schadt
Conditional model, 
Jensen 
Performance persistence is strongly evident, 
particularly for conditional models 
1998 Horan JFR Equities 1979-1993 1273 Q Gross Pension
& Non-
Pension 
Open Yes Jensen, Fama-
French 
Pension assets more likely to be indexed and 
exhibit index attributes (beta close to unity and 
alpha zero).  Around a third of institutional funds 
earned significantly positive alpha 
1998 Sirri,
Tufano 
JF Equities 1971-1990 690 M Net Mutual Open Yes Raw Returns, Total 
Returns, Jensen 
Investors chase past winners, but remain with 
poor performers.  Flows are positively related to 
the size of the investment provider and attention 
received by the fund  through the media.  Such 
funds levy higher expenses 
1999 Ackermann,
McEnally, 
Ravenscraft 
JF Hedge 1988-1995 906 M Net Private
vehicle 
Open No Raw Returns,
Sharpe  
Hedge funds outperform mutual funds but not 
market indices.  Hedge funds exhibit higher risks 
than mutual funds 
1999 Becker,
Ferson, 
Myers, 
Schill 
JFE Equity,
Balanced 
and Asset 
Allocation 
1976-1994 >400 M Net Mutual Open Yes Conditional Jensen
model, Conditional 
Treynor-Mazuy 
Little evidence of market timing ability; 
performance closely aligned to appropriate 
benchmarks 
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Year Author(s)   Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1999           Brown,
Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson 
JB Hedge 1989-1995 399 Y Net Private
vehicle 
Open Yes Raw Returns,
Sharpe, Jensen 
Positive risk-adjusted returns and high attrition 
rates of funds.  Low correlation with U.S. equities 
market 
1999        
    1966-1993     Yes  
          
          
1999        Mutual    
           
      Net 
 Keim        
            
             
             
Busse RFS Equities 1985-1995 230 D Net Mutual Open Yes 3 and 4 index 
volatility timing 
models 
Volatility timing demonstrated as another 
performance measure.  Funds decrease their 
market exposure during periods of high volatility 
1999 Chay,
Trzcinka 
JFE Equities &
Bonds 
1974-1990 
94 
22 
M Net NYSE,
AMEX 
listed 
Closed Jensen, Carhart,
APT, Ferson-Schadt 
Conditional model 
Managerial performance of stock funds 
predictable based on the premium but not for 
bond funds 
1999 Chevalier,
Ellison 
JF Equities 1988-1995 492 Y Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Carhart Manager age and educational background 
significantly affects performance outcomes 
1999 Chevalier,
Ellison 
QJE Equities 1992-1994 N/A M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen Younger managers tend to avoid unsystematic 
risk more than older managers 
Detzler JBF Global
Bonds 
1988-1995 19 M Net Open Yes Jensen, Positive
Period Weighting 
Measure, Multiple 
index models 
Active funds did not outperform the benchmark 
indices 
1999 Edelen JFE Equities 1985-1990 166 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Treynor-
Mazuy, Henriksson-
Merton, Edelen flow 
adjustment 
Liquidity-motivated trading by mutual funds is 
equivalent to the underperformance of the index, 
flow explains negative market timing coefficients 
1999 Edwards,
Liew 
JFM Commoditi
es/Futures 
1982-1996 619 M Pools & 
Public 
Funds 
Open No Sharpe Commodity funds have diversification benefits in 
portfolios comprising traditional assets; Extent to 
which skill exists in performance is open to 
empirical investigation 
1999 JFE Equities 1982-1995 1 M Net 9-10
Mutual 
Open - Fama-French Case study on a small-cap index fund tracking the 
9-10 deciles of CRSP.  With constraints of 
minimizing trading and stock illiquidity, the 
passive fund outperforms by 2.2% p.a. 
1999 Liang FAJ Hedge 1992-1996 1162 M Net Private
Vehicles 
Open No Sharpe, multiple
index Jensen 
Hedge funds outperformed mutual funds on a 
risk-adjusted basis, which cannot be explained by 
survivorship bias.  Incentive fees on hedge funds, 
where losses must be recovered first, outperform 
other hedge funds where the hurdle rates are high 
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Year Author(s)   Fund Structure Journal Sector
Period 
Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1999  Equities         Lynch-
Koski, 
Pontiff 
JF 1992-1994 679 M Net Mutual Open Yes Moments of
distribution, Jensen, 
Henriksson-Merton 
Fund performance attributes similar irrespective 
of whether derivatives are used by mutual funds 
or not.  Derivatives users (21% of sample) exhibit 
less sensitivity to changes in risk over time 
1999            
            Funds receiving fund inflows outperform funds 
experiencing cash outflows.  Fund flows have 
information content for investors 
          No  
            
  
        No 
        Mutual Open    
         
          
             
Volkman JFR Equities 1980-1990 332 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, merged
Carhart & 
Bhattacharya-
Pfleiderer model 
No ability to outperform through stock selection 
and market timing.  Large funds outperform small 
funds and a negative relationship exists between 
selectivity and investment manager compensation 
1999 Zheng JF Equities 1970-1993 1196 Q Net Mutual Open No Raw Returns,
Jensen, Fama-
French, Conditional 
models 
2000 Agarwal,
Naik 
JFQA Hedge 1982-1998 746 Q Net Private
vehicles 
Open Jensen, Appraisal
ratio 
Persistence among hedge funds exists, but only 
over short-term (quarterly) periods 
2000 Bers,
Madura 
JFSR Multiple
sectors 
1976-1996 506 M Net Listed Closed Yes Multi-index Jensen
approach 
Performance persistence influenced by its 
expense ratio, history, part of a stable of funds 
and if traded on NYSE 
2000 Blake,
Morey 
JFQA Equities 1983-1997 635 M Net Mutual Open No Sharpe, Jensen, 4-
index model 
Morningstar ratings a good predictor of poor out-
of-sample performance for funds rated less than 3 
stars.  Weak evidence of 5-star funds 
outperforming 3 and 4-star funds 
2000 Chen,
Jegadeesh, 
Wermers 
JFQA Equities 1975-1995 2424 Q Gross Mutual Open Raw returns, DGTW 
model 
Funds do not outperform the market; some 
evidence of superior stock selection; persistence 
attributable to momentum effect 
2000 Davis FAJ Equities 1962-1998 4686 M Net No Fama-French 3
factor model 
Funds do not earn superior returns.  Short-run 
performance persistence evident in growth funds 
and small-cap funds 
2000 Fant,
O’Neal 
JFR Equities 1976-1997 1423 M Net Mutual Open Yes Raw Returns, Jensen Confirms performance-flow relation from prior 
studies.  However, the flow-performance relation 
is driven more by increases in aggregate flows to 
the industry rather than investors ‘chasing’ 
winning funds 
2000 Fung, Hsieh JFQA Hedge/Com
modity 
1989-1998 322 M Net Fund-of-
Fund 
Open No Raw Returns
(annual) 
Highlights the differences in origins of biases for 
hedge funds compared to mutual funds.  Funds-
of-hedge-funds represent a good proxy of the 
market for hedge funds 
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Year Author(s)   Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
2000   1987-1998 558       Goetzmann,
Ingersoll, 
Ivkovic 
JFQA Equity-
oriented 
M Net Mutual Open Yes Treynor-Mazuy,
Henriksson-Merton 
(including 
adjustment), Fama 
French with HM 
model 
Little evidence of successful market timing 
2000           Jensen, Carhart 
  
            
    
         Open   
        
           
          
Jain, Wu JF Equities 1994-1996 294 M Net Mutual Open Yes Performance is superior to the market in the pre-
advertised period but not superior in the post 
period 
2000 Kallberg,
Lui, 
Trzcinka 
JFQA Real Estate 1987-1998 68 M Net Mutual Open No Jensen, 4-index 
model, 5-index 
model 
REITs earn positive and statistically significant 
alphas, and perform best in down-markets.  Fund 
performance is positively related to size and 
turnover 
2000 Liang JFQA Hedge 1994-1998 1162 /
1627 
M Net Private
vehicles 
Open No Total Return Survivorship is a critical issue, particularly for 
hedge fund analysis.  Hedge fund attrition rates 
are high.  Poor performance is shown to be a 
significant determinant of hedge fund closure 
2000 Statman FAJ Socially
Responsibl
e Equities 
1990-1998 31 M Net Mutual Open Yes Raw Returns, Jensen SRI Funds outperform other (conventional) funds 
but the difference is not statistically significant.  
SRI funds underperform the S&P 500 index 
2000 Wermers JF Equities 1962-1997 1788 M Net Mutual No DGTW Measures,
Carhart 
Mutual funds perform in a manner consistent with 
Grossman-Stiglitz (1980).  Before expenses, 
active funds outperform by 1.3% p.a.; after fees 
they underperform by 1% p.a. 
2001 Busse JFQA Equities 1995 230 D Net Mutual Open No Single and Four 
factor models, 
Volatility ratios 
Daily data dispel the hypothesis that poor 
performing funds increase risk in their attempts to 
improve portfolio performance.  Instead, the 
change in risk is driven by common stock risk 
factors 
2001 Bollen,
Busse 
JF Equities 1985-1995 230 D,
M 
Net Mutual Open No Treynor-Mazuy,
Henriksson-Merton, 
Carhart (includes 
timing) 
Timing ability more easily detected using daily 
data rather than using monthly data.  No evidence 
however of widespread superior timing ability 
2001 Patro JBF Internationa
l Equities 
1991-1997 45 M Net Listed Closed Yes Jensen, Treynor-
Mazuy, Conditional 
measures 
Fund performance largely equivalent to passive 
funds in terms of timing and selectivity 
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Table 3.3 – Published Empirical Evidence Concerning U.K. Fund Performance 
    Performance Approach/Model Year Author(s) Journal Sector
Period 
Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? Main Finding(s) 
1977       Firth JMCB Equities 1965-1975 72 Y Net Unit Trust Open Yes Jensen Funds do not outperform 
1978        
            
  
           
        Yes 
          
        
   
   
             
   Diversified     
Guy JF Equities 1960-1970 47 M Gross Unit Trust Closed Yes Jensen, Sharpe, Treynor Funds do not outperform 
1980 Saunders,
Ward, 
Woodward 
JFQA Equities 1975-1977 30 M Net Unit Trust Open Yes Stochastic Dominance Outperformance
1992 Black, Fraser,
Power 
JBF Equity 1980-1989 30 M Net Unit Trust Open Yes Jensen Majority of funds outperformed 
1992 Luther,
Matatko, 
Corner 
AAAJ Equities 1972-1990 15 M Net Unit Trust Open Yes Jensen Weak evidence of some outperformance by 
funds 
1995 Fletcher JBFA Diversified 1980-1989 101 M Not
Stated 
Unit Trust Open Jensen, Henriksson-
Merton, Treynor-
Mazuy 
Overall funds underperform, market timing 
negative and stock selection positive 
1995 Shukla, van 
Inwegen 
JEB Internationa
l Equities 
1981-1993 126 M Gross Mutual Open Yes Sharpe, Jensen,
Treynor, Treynor-
Mazuy 
U.K. funds investing in U.S. underperform U.S. 
funds 
1997 Leger AEL Equities 1973-1993 72 M Not
Stated 
Unit Trust Open Yes Treynor-Mazuy, 
Pfleiderer-Bhattacharya 
General absence of stock selection or market 
timing ability 
1998 Blake,
Timmermann 
EFR Multi-
sector 
1972-1995 2300 M Gross Unit Trust Open No Conditional and 
Unconditional Jensen-
type 
Performance persistence and funds overall 
underperforming on average 
1998 Klumpes JBFA Internationa
l Equities 
1982-1995 25 M Net Mutual Open Yes & No Jensen,  A number of U.S.-based international equity 
funds outperformed, of which, such cases arose 
where a manager’s incentives where most 
aligned with an investor’s interests.  U.K. and 
Australian-based international equity funds 
generally not able to outperform.  Small sample 
inhibits study 
1999 Allen, Tan JBFA Diversified 1989-1995 131 W Net Unit Trust Open Yes Jensen Performance persistence
1999 Bangassa JBFA 1980-1994 79 M Net Unit Trust Open Yes Jensen-type, Treynor-
Mazuy, Henriksson-
Merton, Connor-
Korajcyzk 
Perverse timing ability and non-existent 
selectivity skill 
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Table 3.3 continued…
Year Author(s)   Journal Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1999          Blake,
Lehmann, 
Timmermann 
JB Diversified 1986-1994 306 M Net Pension Open Yes Brinson, Hood,
Beebower 
Decomposition 
Asset allocation did not add value above a 
passive strategy 
2000           
     M   UK equity managers unable to outperform 
market indices.  Poor performance appears to 
persist over time when using net returns data 
Thomas,
Tonks 
JAM Equities 1983-1997 2175 Q Net Pension Open No Treynor-Mazuy,
Henriksson-Merton 
Funds unable to earn superior returns 
attributable to timing or stock selection 
2000 Quigley,
Sinquefield 
JAM Equities 1978-1997 752 Net Unit
Trusts 
Open No Jensen, Fama-French 
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Table 3.4 – Published Empirical Evidence Concerning Mutual Fund Performance From Other Markets 
Year  Journal  Author(s) Sector Period Evaluated 
No. 
Funds 
Data 
Freq 
Returns 
Basis 
Fund 
Type 
Fund 
Structure 
Survivor 
Biased? 
Performance 
Approach/Model Main Finding(s) 
1974    SICAV McDonald JF French
Diversified 
1964-1969 8 M Net Open Yes Jensen Funds earned superior risk-adjusted returns 
1995 Rubio RQFA         
    64      
   
          No  
    
    
Spanish
Equities and 
Fixed 
Income 
1970-1990 50 M Net Mutual Open Yes Jensen, Connor-
Korajczyk, 
Funds underperform 
1997 Cai, Chan, 
Yamada 
RFS Japanese
Equities 
1981-1992 M Net Mutual Open No Jensen, Grinblatt-
Titman, Ferson-Schadt 
Funds underperform 
1999 Cheng, Pi, 
Wort 
JBFA Various
asset classes  
1986-1995 387 M Net Mutual Open Yes Raw Returns, Sharpe Absence of performance persistence across 
mutual fund industry 
2000 Dahlquist,
Engstrom, 
Soderlind 
JFQA Swedish
Equity, 
Bond and 
Diversified 
funds 
1993-1997 210 W Net Mutual Open Jensen, Conditional
models, Henriksson-
Merton, Treynor-
Mazuy 
Mixed findings – some evidence of superior 
ability for equity funds, however bond and 
money market funds underperform.  Large 
equity funds underperform smaller funds, 
however the reverse is the case for bond funds.  
Performance persistence evident in money 
market funds only 
2000 Matallin
Saez, 
Fernandez 
Izquierdo 
JAM Spanish
Diversified 
1992-1998 254 W Net Mutual Open Yes Multiple index Jensen Funds perform in line with market indices 
2001 Brown,
Goetzmann, 
Hiraki, 
Otsuki, 
Shiraishi 
JB Japanese
Equities 
1978-1995 1275 M Net Unit Trust Open No Multiple index model Confirms Cai, Chan and Yamada (1997) that 
equity funds earn significantly negative risk-
adjusted returns 
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3.3 The Evolution of Traditional Performance Measures 
The theoretical CAPM, where investors construct portfolios comprising both the 
riskless asset and risky assets within a mean-variance framework, is the cornerstone of the 
traditional performance evaluation metrics.  The early performance evaluation techniques 
proposed adjusting portfolio returns with respect to the risks borne by investors. 
Treynor (1965) proposed the first metric, where portfolio returns accounted for risk 
with specific reference to systematic or non-diversifiable market risk.  Systematic risk is 
represented by beta (β) in the CAPM.  The Treynor Index is computed as the average 
portfolio return in excess of the risk-free return, relative to the portfolio’s systematic risk: 
p
fp
p
RR
exTreynorInd β
−=  
where: 
2
m
pm
p σ
σβ =  
The Sharpe Ratio (1966) was the second metric proposed to adjust portfolio returns 
according to risk.  The Sharpe (1994) measure, also known as the reward-to-variability 
ratio, is calculated by dividing a portfolio’s average excess return by the portfolio’s risk, 
where risk is measured as the standard deviation of the portfolio’s returns. 
p
fp
p
RR
oSharpeRati σ
−=  
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
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Risk-averse, return maximising investors prefer portfolio performance exhibiting 
higher rather than lower Sharpe Ratios.  In particular, the Information Ratio, where the 
numerator in equation 3.3 is defined as the difference between the return of a portfolio and 
the market, has become widely used in addition to the Sharpe ratio in terms of quantifying 
portfolio performance. 
The third performance metric, and the measure that has been cited and employed 
most in empirical studies, has been termed ‘Jensen’s Alpha’.  The Jensen metric (1968, 
1969) is measured as the intercept of a regression of fund returns on the market return, 
where returns are measured in excess of the risk-free rate. 
pfmppfp RRRR εβα +−+=− )(  
The portfolio’s performance (alpha) is determined with respect to systematic risk, 
which captures the portfolio’s return sensitivity to the market return.  The Jensen approach 
also assumes the CAPM is the appropriate asset pricing model. 
3.3.1 Market Timing Models 
There have been a number of extensions to the Jensen approach since the late 
1960s.  Fama (1972) and Jensen (1972) identify two dimensions of investment 
performance, where portfolio managers differentiate between selection decisions and 
forecasting decisions.  However the literature has also highlighted the potential bias that 
occurs when market timing ability is present, while simultaneously performance models 
exclude empirical tests of timing.  For example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989b) demonstrate 
that successful market timers cause the estimate of systematic risk (β) to be biased upwards 
and the intercept term (alpha) to be biased downwards.  In these scenarios, performance 
(3.4) 
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models to exclude market timing could lead to erroneous conclusions of performance.  The 
first significant extension to the Jensen approach involved differentiating between these 
two components of investment performance, namely security selection and market timing.  
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) proposed an additional term to capture market timing ability, 
arguing that linear models were not entirely appropriate where investment managers 
attempted to forecast changes in market conditions.  This was implemented using a 
quadratic term to account for managers who hold a greater (lower) proportion of their 
portfolios in risky securities where market movements were forecast to rise (fall).  Other 
market timing approaches proposed in the literature include: 
• the Henriksson and Merton (1981) model (where market timing is considered with 
respect to an investment manager’s use of put option strategies).  However, 
Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) have demonstrated the problems of empirical 
tests of market timing ability where funds hold option-like (or leveraged) securities; 
• Fama (1972) proposed the measurement of market timing relative to a fund’s 
specific target level of systematic risk.  This was empirically tested by Kon (1983); 
• Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1983) present a market timing approach that extends 
the theoretical approach of Jensen (1972).  Their model relies on an investment 
manager who forecasts the market return, attempts to minimise the variance of their 
forecast error; 
• Brinson et al. (1986) and Brinson, Singer and Beebower (1991) propose a simple 
decomposition of portfolio performance into market timing and stock selection 
components using portfolio asset allocation data with respect to a fund’s strategic 
benchmark weights to the various asset classes; 
 136 
• Grinblatt and Titman’s (1989b) Positive Period Weighting (PPW) Measure, which 
attempts to correct for biases in the Jensen’s alpha.  The PPW approach avoids 
negative performance being assigned to mutual fund managers who exhibit true 
timing ability; and 
• Edelen (1999) proposes an adjustment to the market timing models of Henriksson 
and Merton (1981) and Treynor and Mazuy (1966) that accounts for the liquidity 
motivated trading experienced by mutual funds.  Ferson and Schadt (1996) and 
Ferson and Warther (1996) highlight the empirical issue of negative covariance 
between beta and market returns, and specifically the effect of fund flows on beta.  
The Edelen (1999) method shows mutual fund flows are the source of negative 
market timing. 
Mutual fund studies involving tests of market timing ability, employing the 
Treynor-Mazuy, Henriksson-Merton and Bhattacharya-Pfleiderer approaches should also 
control for the influence of heteroskedasticity.  Breen et al. (1986) highlight the problems 
associated with detecting market timing skill where heteroskedasticity is ignored.  Their 
study shows ignoring heteroskedasticity results in a rejection of the null-hypothesis of no 
timing ability more frequently than should otherwise be the case. 
There have also been studies in the literature evaluating the extent to which 
systematic risk is not stationary across time.  These include the switching regression 
techniques of Kon and Jen (1978, 1979), and assessment of the performance of mutual 
funds in both bull and bear markets (Fabozzi and Francis (1979) and Viet and Chaney 
(1982)), however their results do not suggest any significant difference between such 
periods. 
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3.3.2 Other Performance Models 
The traditional Jensen (1969) approach used in performance evaluation studies has 
been extended in different ways in order to accommodate additional factors that explain 
security market returns.  Fama and French’s (1992) paper is one distinguished study that 
casts doubt on the CAPM’s ability to explain the cross-section of U.S. equity market 
returns.  Performance evaluation models developed in the literature have been extended to 
include additional variables that control for specific market anomalies and hence improve 
the quantification of portfolio risk.  The literature includes many studies of mutual fund 
performance that employ extended Jensen models: 
• multi-factor or Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) approaches, including the studies of 
Lehmann and Modest (1987), Chang and Llewellen (1985) and Connor and 
Korajczyk (1986); 
• Grinblatt and Titman’s (1989a, 1989b) P8 benchmark, where portfolio returns are 
adjusted for risk using eight factors.  This approach is similar in its objectives to the 
Lehmann and Modest (1987) 10-factor model; 
• Elton et al. (1993) who reverse the conclusions of Ippolito (1989) by accounting for 
portfolio holdings of mutual funds beyond S&P 500 securities.  An extension to 
their three-index model is encapsulated in Elton et al. (1996) four-index model, 
where the factors are defined as the broad market index, market capitalisation (small 
versus large stocks), growth and value biases and a bond market factor; 
• Fama and French (1993) document common factors in stock returns can be 
explained by three factors; the broad market factor, market capitalisation and book-
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to-market equity.  Carhart (1997) extends this three factor model with an additional 
factor that accounts for the one-year momentum anomaly in stock returns cited by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); 
• Elton et al. (1995) evaluate bond mutual fund performance with respect to market 
factors including default risk, term risk, unexpected changes in inflation and Gross 
National Product (GNP); 
• Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate the use of conditional models that control for 
time-variation in risk.  The conditional performance evaluation approach accounts 
for lagged public information variables, namely dividend yield, the treasury note 
yield, term structure of interest rates, quality spread in corporate bonds and dummy 
variable for the month of January.  The empirical findings suggest conditional 
models improve mutual fund performance compared with unconditional models; 
• Daniel et al. (1997) employ a characteristic-based performance methodology that 
decomposes fund performance into characteristic timing, characteristic selectivity 
and average style; and 
• Busse’s (1999) volatility timing approach using more frequent data, namely daily 
returns. 
3.4 Capital Market Efficiency 
The investment strategy adopted by an investment manager should be influenced by 
the degree of market efficiency in capital markets.  Fama (1965a) states that: 
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"an efficient market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational, 
profit-maximisers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of 
securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants.  
In an efficient market, competition among many intelligent participants leads to a situation 
where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, 
the market expects to take place in the future.  In other words, in an efficient market at any point 
in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value." (p.34). 
 
Therefore, the extent to which market participants factor into securities prices all 
available information will influence the types of strategies implemented by investment 
managers.  Fama (1970) extended the empirical tests for capital market efficiency by 
classifying three forms or degrees of efficiency: 
• weak form efficiency – where the security's price reflects all past time series 
data concerning the security's price; 
• semi-strong form efficiency – where a security's price reflects the past time 
series of price as well as all publicly available information; and 
• strong form efficiency – where a security's price reflects fully all past prices, 
publicly available information and monopolistic forms (private) of information. 
Fama (1970) concluded that weak form tests did support market efficiency.  
Although problems did arise with the serial correlation tests and filter tests, they in 
themselves were not able to render a market inefficient.  Fama (1970) postulated that 
although positive dependence exists, the serial correlations were consistently close to zero 
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and could not be used to outperform the buy-and-hold approach.  Likewise the filter tests 
are impracticable due to transaction costs eliminating any gains over the passive approach.  
Tests for semi-strong market efficiency also provided evidence that markets were efficient. 
Strong form efficiency tests were also used by Fama (1970) to see whether 
abnormal returns could be derived from the use of private or monopolistic information.  
Fama (1970) used tests of the strong-form efficiency by evaluating whether professional 
investment managers are able to out-perform a buy-and-hold strategy on the basis of 
different subsets of information held between them and other investors.  In light of Jensen's 
(1968) empirical investigation of 115 mutual funds in the period 1955-64, 89 out of 115 
funds in the study did not outperform the S&P 500 market index after investment 
management fees were deducted.  Even when investment management fees were ignored, 
72 out of 115 funds were unable to out-perform the market index.  Thus it could be argued 
that the information sets of professional investment managers do not differ from ordinary 
investors in their abilities to outperform other investors. 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) argue that market efficiency in a strict sense cannot 
occur without accounting for informed investors holding costly information (where costly 
information represents these investors becoming informed).  Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
argued that “assumptions that all markets, including that for information, are always in 
equilibrium and always perfectly arbitraged are inconsistent when arbitrage is costly” 
(p.393).  Hence, active investment managers will only incur expenses in obtaining 
information to become informed when they can be compensated for acquiring price 
sensitive information.  Therefore, extrapolating the reasoning of Grossman & Stiglitz 
(1980) to the expenses charged by managers of active portfolios, these managers should be 
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able to at least earn excess returns equal to the fees levied on the actively managed 
portfolio in order for capital market efficiency to be in equilibrium. 
Ippolito (1989) reported consistent findings with respect to the Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) hypothesis, where active mutual fund managers earned risk-adjusted excess 
returns commensurate with their fees charged.  However Elton et al. (1993), employing the 
same dataset as Ippolito (1989), contradicted the Ippolito (1989) conclusions.  The Elton et 
al. (1993) findings highlight the importance of accounting for non-S&P 500 assets in 
performance measurement, which in essence reverse the findings of Ippolito (1989).  A 
recent and comprehensive study by Wermers (2000) suggests the Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) proposition has some merit.  Wermers reported the average active mutual fund 
outperformed the market by 1.3 percent per annum before costs, however the level of 
underperformance relative to the market was equivalent to –1 percent per annum.  The 
difference of 2.3 percent was represented in two components: 1.6 percent being attributable 
to management expenses and transaction costs and the remaining 0.7 percent due to lower 
returns derived from non-stock holdings held by mutual funds.  Wermers (2000) argues the 
level of outperformance before costs is roughly equivalent to the costs incurred in active 
management, and provides some confirmation of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
proposition.  The Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) hypothesis is also supported empirically by the 
findings of Daniel et al. (1997), where their study reports the average mutual fund 
outperforms by a similar magnitude to the average management fee levied.  Carhart (1997) 
also concludes that the top-decile of funds is the only category that delivers returns 
commensurate with their expenses, whereas other funds in the sample underperform on 
average by a magnitude roughly equivalent to the expense ratio. 
 142 
Edelen (1999) also argues that the liquidity service provided to investors by active 
mutual funds must be considered in performance evaluation models, where the market is 
assumed to be in Grossman-Stiglitz informational equilibrium.  Edelen (1999) postulates 
that uninformed liquidity-motivated trading activity is likely to have an adverse effect on 
fund performance.  Uninformed liquidity traders (acting on behalf of the open-end mutual 
funds) will incur losses to informed traders due to informed traders recovering their costs 
arising from the costly acquisition of information.  Hence, the Grossman-Stiglitz 
proposition appears to have merit where mutual funds experience exogenous fund flow 
shocks, and the necessity of incorporating flow variables in performance evaluation 
models.  These issues will certainly be addressed in greater detail empirically in the future. 
3.5 Criticisms of Performance Evaluation Techniques and Survivorship Bias 
3.5.1 
The criticisms of Roll (1977, 1978) concerning the CAPM market portfolio have 
been well documented in the literature.  Indeed, the extent to which the market portfolio 
can be empirically tested as mean-variance efficient has been argued by Roll to be 
impossible.  This issue is critical as the Jensen approach may attribute actively managed 
funds as earning superior risk-adjusted excess returns, when in reality such returns have 
arisen from the manager’s ability to exploit inefficiencies in the market index.  While tests 
of benchmark efficiency are difficult to perform, in that they require specific assumptions, 
two studies have evaluated the extent to which market indices are ex-ante mean-variance 
efficient.  These tests have relied on the theoretical work of Gibbons et al. (1989).
Grinold (1992) found that four out of the five international indices tested were not mean-
                                                
Benchmark Specification and Inefficiency 
31  
 
31 Green (1986) also provides a theoretical discussion on problems of benchmark portfolio inefficiencies. 
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variance efficient.  In Australia, Finn and Koivurinne (2000) considered Australian equity 
indices and found some evidence of mean-variance inefficiencies in some benchmarks.  
However, Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) suggest one way of overcoming the potential 
problem of benchmark inefficiency may include computing the performance of an equally 
weighted portfolio of all managed investments in the sample as an alternative benchmark 
proxy. 
The problem of survivorship bias, inherent in studies of mutual fund performance 
that do not evaluate all funds in existence in the observation period, has been shown by 
numerous studies to bias upwards the overall performance of the sample group.  Elton et al. 
(1996b) show that survivorship bias arises due to poorly performing funds having a higher 
probability of attrition, ceteris paribus.  In addition, the longer the horizon period 
evaluated, the greater the probability of survivorship bias in performance studies (Elton et 
Dybvig and Ross (1985a, 1985b), Jensen (1972) and Admati and Ross (1985) also 
criticise the Jensen’s alpha approach where active mutual fund managers engage in market 
timing strategies.  Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) demonstrate the negative bias in the Jensen 
Measure when market timing is indeed present. 
Elton et al. (1993) have also demonstrated the importance of correctly specifying 
the benchmark proxy that accounts for the investible universe of securities held in mutual 
fund portfolios.  As a consequence, their findings contradict the results of Ippolito (1989) 
who documents active funds performing in a manner consistent with Grossman and 
Stiglitz’s (1980) information equilibrium. 
3.5.2 Survivorship Bias Issues 
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al. (1996b)).  Eliminating survivorship bias from studies of mutual fund performance can 
be difficult as data vendors including Morningstar Inc., Lipper Inc., Wiesenberger Inc. are 
generally only interested in tracking existing funds which meet the needs of investors and 
advisors making current investment decisions.  Closed or terminated funds are therefore 
irrelevant to new investors.  However researchers attempting to construct reliable and bias-
free datasets comprising both surviving and non-surviving performance can experience 
significant difficulties in compiling the entire universe of funds.  Most studies in the early 
literature evaluating the performance of mutual funds contain survivorship bias, and 
therefore the likelihood of positively biased findings (or the distribution of fund alphas 
skewed more to the right than would otherwise be the case). 
                                                
There have been a number of studies in the last decade-and-a-half that directly 
consider the impact of survivorship bias on the performance estimates of mutual funds.  
These studies are documented in Tables 3.1 to 3.4.  The general finding is that where 
survivorship bias is present, performance at the aggregate level will be overstated.  A 
number of studies evaluating hedge funds and CTAs document that such investment 
vehicles have higher attrition rates than mutual fund studies.32  For example, Grinblatt and 
Titman (1989b) found mutual funds in the period 1974-84 exhibited an average 4.3 percent 
attrition rate per year, Brown et al. (1992) documented an annual attrition rate of 4.8 
percent per year in the period 1977-85.  Further, Elton et al. (1996b) found that 
survivorship bias in mutual funds was not related to investment objective.  In the case of 
CTAs, Fung and Hsieh (1997b) document an annual attrition rate on average of 19 percent 
in the period 1989-1995.  For hedge funds, Fung and Hsieh (2000) document the drop out 
 
32 Estimates of survivorship bias in hedge fund studies can be extremely difficult as their operation and 
governance is largely unregulated. 
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rate at between 15 and 20 percent depending on the dataset used.  Brown et al. (1999) in 
the period 1989-95 find an attrition rate for hedge funds of 20 percent per annum. 
In performance terms, the extent of survivorship-biased performance estimates for 
mutual funds, CTAs and hedge funds indicates the exclusion of non-surviving funds 
positively biases performance for the sample.  Fung and Hsieh (1997b) indicate the extent 
of bias for CTAs is around 3.6 percent per annum (raw returns), whereas Schneeweis et al. 
(1996) reports a lower level of bias in performance at 1.4 percent per annum.  For hedge 
funds, Brown et al. (1999) estimates the bias in terms of raw returns at around 3 percent per 
year.  In the case of U.S. mutual funds, the bias is up to 1.5 percent per annum depending 
on the study, mutual fund type, whether performance is measured in raw or risk-adjusted 
terms as well as the period examined.  A number of studies document the magnitude of 
survivorship bias where mutual fund studies exclude terminated funds, and these include 
Blake et al. (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1989b), Brown and Goetzmann (1993), Malkiel 
(1995), and Elton et al. (1996b).  According to Dahlquist et al. (2000), Swedish mutual 
funds exhibit a bias of between 0.1 and 0.7 percent per year depending on the fund type.  
Swedish equity funds are shown to record the highest level of bias.  In the U.K., Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) report survivorship bias using a sample of funds with different 
investment objectives.  Overall, the survivorship bias premium was equivalent to 2.4 
percent per annum.  Further, international funds offered in the U.K. exhibited higher 
survivorship bias than domestic equity funds. 
3.6 Performance and Investment Strategy 
The performance evaluation literature has generally considered both equity funds as 
well as funds that predominantly invest in stocks.  However a number of empirical studies 
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have evaluated the performance of mutual funds with respect to the predominant 
investment objective implemented by active investment managers.  In the U.S., the 
literature has generally involved an analysis of mutual funds using the following general 
classifications (ranked in descending order by aggressiveness of the strategy); ‘aggressive 
growth’, ‘growth’, ‘growth and income’, ‘income’, ‘balanced’, and ‘special purpose’.  
Brown and Goetzmann (1997) have also reviewed funds’ self-reported mutual fund 
objectives as well as having explored alternative classifications related to fund styles.  They 
find that funds’ self-reported classification does not always serve as a reliable indicator of 
their actual style on the basis of monthly return time-series. 
The general conclusions of most empirical studies have documented self-reported 
aggressive growth funds outperforming other mutual funds with alternative investment 
objectives.  The general findings of a sample of relatively recent studies specifically 
comparing funds by investment objective are presented in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 – Mutual Fund Performance and Investment Objective 
Year Author(s) Main Findings 
1989b Grinblatt, Titman Aggressive growth funds and growth funds exhibit superior ability 
compared with other investment objective categories. 
1993 Grinblatt, Titman Aggressive growth funds exhibit the highest level of outperformance 
compared with other investment objective categories.  Growth and income 
funds also exhibit superior performance, but underperform aggressive 
growth funds. 
1995 Grinblatt, Titman, Wermers Mutual funds generally exhibit herding behaviour, where funds 
implementing momentum strategies outperform other funds.  Aggressive 
growth and growth funds had the highest reliance on momentum investing 
compared with other fund categories.  
1997 Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, 
Wermers 
Aggressive growth funds exhibit the highest returns, followed by growth 
funds.  Evidence supporting informational equilibrium in the Grossman-
Stiglitz (1980) style. 
2000 Davis No investment style exhibited superior performance relative to the market.  
Evidence of performance persistence among some growth funds. 
2000 Chen, Jegadeesh, Wermers Growth-oriented funds exhibit superior stock selection skills compared to 
income-oriented funds.  Funds with higher trading activity (or turnover) 
have slightly improved stock picking skills than low turnover funds. 
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3.7 Summary 
The literature concerning the evaluation of mutual funds, pension funds and other 
investment products has been widely evaluated internationally by academics and 
practitioners spanning a number of decades.  The general findings of such studies 
overwhelmingly conclude that actively managed mutual funds on average do not earn 
superior risk-adjusted excess returns when measured against appropriately specified 
benchmark indices, either before or after expenses.  Such conclusions appear consistent 
with the efficient markets hypothesis.  In Australia, the literature indicates findings 
consistent with the international evidence, however the topic area has lacked sufficient 
analysis, particular with respect to funds that invest beyond exclusive holdings of 
Australian equity securities.  The literature also indicates that a gap exists with respect to 
managed funds with the investment strategy of closely tracking underlying benchmark 
indices (i.e. index funds). 
The following chapters in this dissertation extend the performance evaluation 
literature with respect to the two most identifiable investment strategies available to 
investors; namely actively managed as well as index funds.  Each chapter outlines the 
motivation in considering the specific topic area addressed in the chapter as well as the 
inclusion of literature-specific reviews. 
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4 
 
CHAPTER 4 – ATTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT 
PERFORMANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN 
POOLED SUPERANNUATION FUNDS 
4.1 Introduction 
                                                
The performance of investment managers has long been of interest to practitioners 
and investors, and in academia the performance evaluation literature spans at least four 
decades.  Indeed the debate within industry between active and passive investment 
management continues, despite the overwhelming empirical evidence that active funds, on 
average, do not earn superior risk-adjusted excess returns.  This can perhaps be considered 
as paradoxical when consideration is given to the relative magnitude of assets actively 
managed in Australia.  Rainmaker Information reports the size of the investment industry at 
September 2000 was around $A687 billion, of which the overwhelming majority 
(approximately 88.9 percent) of funds were actively invested.33  In light of the active versus 
passive debate, this essay evaluates the market timing and security selection components of 
abnormal returns earned by active Australian pooled superannuation funds in the period 
1991-1998.  
Most performance evaluation studies have employed the Jensen (1968) approach 
where risk-adjusted performance measures the ability of funds to outperform the market 
(Jensen (1972); Lee and Rahman (1990)).  However, the Jensen Measure ignores the 
potential market timing strategies employed by active portfolio managers as the model does 
 
33 Rainmaker Information Roundup, December Quarter 1999. 
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not partition the quality of information a manager holds from the aggressiveness of the 
investment strategy.  Indeed, active investment managers commonly distinguish between 
both market timing and stock selection performance in the context of their investment 
objectives.  Therefore, performance evaluation models ignoring market timing strategies 
assume that risk levels for managed funds remain stationary through time, causing the 
estimate of abnormal return to be downward biased where market timing ability is present 
(Dybvig and Ross (1985a) and Grinblatt and Titman (1989a)).  As a result, models that fail 
to measure market timing and security selection simultaneously could lead to inaccurate 
inferences being made concerning the source of portfolio performance.  Accordingly, this 
essay evaluates both components of investment performance – timing and selectivity. 
Empirical evidence in the U.S. widely documents that active funds do not 
outperform the market (for example Jensen (1968); Grinblatt and Titman (1989b); Elton et 
al. (1993); Malkiel (1995); and Gruber (1996)).  The literature also confirms that funds do 
not successfully ‘time’ the market (Treynor and Mazuy (1966); Kon (1983); Chang and 
Llewellen (1984); Henriksson (1984); Lee and Rahman (1990); Coggin et al. (1993); 
Ferson and Schadt (1996); Daniel et al. (1997); and Becker et al. (1999).  Blake et al. 
(1999) present evidence from the U.K. indicating pension funds would have been better 
served through the use of passive index funds than active funds.  Australian research 
supports the U.S. and U.K. evidence that funds do not earn significantly positive risk-
adjusted returns attributable to security selection (Bird et al. (1983); Robson (1986) and 
Gallagher (2001)).  Sinclair (1990) was the first Australian study to evaluate both market 
timing and security selection performance, finding that adverse market timing by funds 
eroded the gains attributable to stock selection.  More recently, Hallahan and Faff (1999) 
examined selectivity and timing ability of Australian equity trusts, documenting that little 
evidence existed to support the view that such funds were successful market timers.  
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Sawicki and Ong (2000) also document the inability of funds to outperform market indices 
where a conditional performance evaluation methodology was adopted. 
The essay makes the following contributions to the Australian performance 
evaluation literature.  First, the market timing and security selection abilities of active 
pooled superannuation funds are evaluated at both the total portfolio level and across the 
three largest asset classes that comprise diversified superannuation portfolios; namely 
Australian equities, international equities and Australian fixed interest.  Second, the essay 
demonstrates the importance of using correctly specified benchmarks in the measurement 
of performance where funds also hold non-Australian equity assets in their portfolios.  This 
is important as performance benchmarks must account for the type of assets held in 
investment manager portfolios and the investment strategy adopted.  Sinclair’s (1990) 
finding that pooled superannuation funds exhibit both positive and significant selectivity 
skill coupled with significantly poor timing is shown to arise when the market portfolio 
proxy is misspecified.  Specifically, Sinclair’s (1990) analysis of multi-asset class 
superannuation funds was measured against an Australian equities benchmark only, and 
therefore excludes non-equity assets from the underlying benchmark.  This essay also 
evaluates the potential bias in performance measurement resulting from the use of 
inefficient benchmark proxies.  Finally, the study utilises a unique data set comprising 
pooled superannuation fund asset allocations relative to strategic benchmark weights and 
the performance of funds across individual asset classes.  This detailed level of information 
provides insight into the tactical investment strategies that fund managers have used in their 
quest for active returns.   
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows.  Section 4.2 outlines the 
empirical tests for market timing and security selection.  Section 4.3 describes the data and 
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this is followed by the empirical results.  The final section concludes and provides 
suggestions for future research. 
4.2 Empirical Framework 
4.2.1 Risk-Adjusted Performance Evaluation Models 
Security selection represents the ability of an investment manager to identify and 
exploit mispriced securities (micro forecasting).  On the other hand, market timing 
represents the ability of portfolio managers to position their portfolios to take advantage of 
predicted market movements (macro forecasting).  Successful market timing occurs when 
portfolio risk is increased in anticipation of market rises.  Extending Jensen’s (1968) model 
(based on Sharpe’s (1964) CAPM framework), Henriksson and Merton (1981) decompose 
performance into selectivity and timing as follows: 
pttptpppt yxR εββα +++= 21  (4.1) 
where: 
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2pβ
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ty =
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 = the portfolio return in period t in excess of the risk free return; 
 = the abnormal return attributable to security selection; 
= the coefficient estimating timing ability; 
 = the market return in excess of the risk free rate in period t; 
; 
 = the random error term with expected mean of zero. 
],0max[ tx−
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The term (βp2) is used by Henriksson and Merton (1981) to capture the market 
timing component of investment performance following Jensen (1972), Grant (1977), 
Dybvig and Ross (1985) and Grinblatt and Titman’s (1989a) demonstration of potential 
bias in the estimates.  These authors argue that for market timers, the unconditional Jensen 
measure is based on an upwardly biased estimate of systematic risk (βp1), and as a result 
this effect can bias downward the estimate for market timing (βp2).  The Henriksson-
Merton model assumes fund managers target two systematic risk levels; one where the 
manager forecasts the riskless asset to outperform the market portfolio (βp1) and the other 
where the market return is expected to outperform the risk-free rate (βp2).34  Successful 
market timing exists where the estimate of βp2 in (4.1) is significantly positive.  The model 
does not predict the magnitude of the return differential between risky assets and the 
riskless asset, but rather considers the direction of the forecast that a portfolio manager uses 
to re-weight the portfolio between risky assets and the riskless asset.35 
An alternative test for market timing ability is the Treynor-Mazuy model.  Treynor 
and Mazuy (1966) propose the use of a quadratic term to capture market timing ability 
(compared with Henriksson-Merton’s βp2 measure), arguing that funds with market timing 
ability will hold a greater (smaller) proportion of their portfolios in the market portfolio of 
risky assets when they expect the market to rise (fall).  The Treynor-Mazuy approach 
indicates successful market timing where the coefficient γ is significantly positive. 
                                                 
34 Henriksson and Merton’s (1981) βp2 accounts for market timing on the basis of a fund manager engaging in 
a protective put option investment strategy.  See Henriksson and Merton (1981) for a detailed description. 
35 The Henriksson-Merton model requires corrections for heteroskedasticity and this paper employs White’s 
(1980) method of adjustment.  The ordinary least squares estimates in the model are inefficient given 
systematic risk is not stationary.  Henriksson and Merton (1981) show that the standard deviation of the error 
term is an increasing function of the absolute value of xt.  While Henriksson (1984) found that adjustments for 
heteroskedasticity did not affect the general conclusions made, other studies including Breen et al. (1986) and 
Lee and Rahman (1990) suggest that the presence of non-homoskedastic residuals significantly affects the 
power of tests for market timing.  Breen et al. (1986) find that ignoring heteroskedasticity often leads to 
rejection of the null hypothesis for no market timing too often when in fact the null is true.  The converse is 
also the case.  The Treynor-Mazuy model also requires corrections for heteroskedasticity (Coggin et al. 
(1993). 
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pttptpppt xxR εγβα +++= 2  (4.2) 
Given the Henriksson-Merton and Treynor-Mazuy models both rely on the CAPM 
framework, empirical tests using these models assume the market portfolio proxy is mean-
variance efficient.  Roll’s (1977, 1978) criticisms of the CAPM are well documented in the 
literature.  Dybvig and Ross (1985) also warn of the potential dangers of an inefficient 
market portfolio proxy, where abnormal returns reflect these inefficiencies rather than 
being derived using superior investment skill.  For example, Grinold (1992) found in tests 
of benchmark efficiency that the Australian All Ordinaries Index is ex-ante inefficient.  
Finn and Koivurinne (2000) also find evidence of benchmark inefficiency for Australian 
stock market indices.  Measuring active performance relative to a passive benchmark index 
that is independent of private information and mean-variance inefficient can overstate 
performance.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) suggest an alternative benchmark proxy that 
employs the average return earned by managed funds as a group may alleviate some of the 
problems of benchmark inefficiency in performance evaluation studies, and this approach is 
considered in the empirical results section. 
4.2.2 Performance Attribution Framework 
Performance attribution measures the effect of the portfolio manager’s active 
investment decisions across asset sectors and their respective contribution to portfolio 
performance (Burnie et al. 1998).  The monthly average asset allocations for each fund 
across each asset class within the portfolio are used, where the attribution framework 
decomposes the raw active return (fund return less return of the benchmark) into security 
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selection and market timing components.36  Attribution of investment performance can be 
performed using either an arithmetic approach (Karnosky and Singer (1995) and Singer et 
al. (1998)) or the geometric approach outlined by Burnie et al. (1998).  In terms of the 
arithmetic approach, the methodology assumes the fund manager’s portfolio management 
objective is to outperform using both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ investment strategies.  
The active raw return of a portfolio in period t can be represented in arithmetic form by: 
rtatstbtpt RRRRR ++=−  
where Rpt is the portfolio return at time t, Rbt is the return on the market proxy or 
benchmark, Rst is the return attributable to security selection, Rat is the market timing (or 
tactical asset allocation) component and Rrt is the interaction effect or residual term.  The 
residual of active performance is not strictly attributable to either stock selection or asset 
allocation, representing the interaction between both sources of active management 
decision-making.  Market timing, security selection and interaction components, 
respectively, of active performance for the portfolio over a single time period can be 
represented in arithmetic form (4.4 - 4.6) as: 
∑ −−=
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36 This study evaluates the components of performance in single currency terms.  Where the portfolio 
manager makes active decisions with respect to currencies, additional terms must be added to the attribution 
framework. 
(4.6) 
(4.5) 
(4.4) 
(4.3) 
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where: 
iω = average actual weight in asset class i; 
iω
ir
= benchmark weight in asset class i; 
= return earned by the fund in asset class i; 
ir = benchmark return representing a passive investment strategy in asset class i; 
br = benchmark return for the total portfolio. 
The approach outlined above assumes the fund manager’s portfolio management 
objective is to outperform using both top-down and bottom-up investment strategies.  
While this assumption has merit, given managers are likely to use elements of both styles, 
the attribution framework above leads to the necessity of a residual term which is 
potentially ambiguous (see Karnosky and Singer (1995) and Singer et al. (1998)).  
Excluding the residual term requires differentiation between top-down and bottom up 
portfolio management strategies adopted by investment managers.  In order to eliminate 
this residual or interaction term, Burnie et al. (1998) develop a general framework for 
geometric attribution designed to decompose the active return into security selection and 
market timing components only.  The geometric framework measures investment 
performance given a portfolio manager’s predominant style and assumes fund managers 
prioritise their portfolio management strategies between top-down and bottom-up styles.  
This methodology therefore renders the residual term obsolete.37  This chapter concentrates 
on the geometric approach, which more accurately attributes performance on the basis of an 
investment manager’s strategy.  The empirical results for arithmetic and geometric 
approaches derive very similar conclusions, hence, the arithmetic results are not presented. 
                                                 
37 The goal of partitioning managers on the basis of predominant style used is aimed at eliminating the 
interaction effect or residual term. 
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4.2.3  Top-Down Portfolio Management
Burnie, Knowles and Teder’s (1998) geometric methodology assumes fund 
managers prioritise their portfolio management strategies between top-down and bottom-up 
styles, thereby rendering the residual term obsolete.38  Top-down portfolio management 
assumes that investment managers’ primary emphasis is asset allocation whereas the 
bottom-up strategy identifies security selection as taking precedence.  The top-down asset 
allocation component (4.4) measures the portfolio manager’s ability to underweight or 
overweight the asset classes within the portfolio relative to each fund’s unique strategic 
benchmark.  The security selection component (4.5) for a top-down portfolio manager 
measures the stock selection effect using the portfolio’s actual asset class weights.  
Employing what has been termed by Burnie et al. (1998) as a ‘geometric’ framework, the 
total portfolio’s active return (Tot), and the two components of total performance for a top-
down investment strategy (asset allocation (Ra) and security selection (Rs)), can be 
expressed as: 
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38 The goal of partitioning managers on the basis of predominant style used is aimed at eliminating the 
interaction effect or residual term.  However, the dichotomy may appear overly simplistic, as some managers 
may not see themselves as clearly belonging to a single group, but a blend of the two. 
(4.9) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
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where: 
= average actual weight in asset class i; iω
iω
ir
pr
= benchmark weight in asset class i; 
= return earned by the fund in asset class i; 
= fund return for the total portfolio; 
ir = benchmark return representing a passive investment strategy in asset class i; 
br = benchmark return for the total portfolio. 
The individual asset class contributions for a top-down portfolio manager can be 
expressed geometrically as: 
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4.2.4 Bottom-Up Portfolio Management 
Portfolio management decisions that are predominantly bottom-up assume stock 
picking is of higher priority than asset allocation.  Given that managers select securities 
across asset classes on the basis of fundamental value, bottom-up strategies are not limited 
by asset allocation weights in the portfolio.  Accordingly, the security selection component 
for a bottom-up portfolio manager relies on a fund’s benchmark weight in each of the asset 
classes.  The bottom-up asset allocation component measures the impact of the portfolio’s 
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actual asset allocation divergence from the strategic benchmark based on the fund’s 
portfolio returns rather than the performance of the benchmark.  The bottom-up attribution 
framework at the total portfolio level, using the Burnie et al. (1998) geometric approach, 
can be expressed as: 
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The individual asset class contributions for a bottom-up portfolio manager can be 
expressed geometrically as: 
(4.16) 
(4.15) 
(4.14) 
(4.13) 
(4.12) 
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The performance methodology outlined above is used to evaluate the extent to 
which fund managers exhibit superior market timing and security selection skills with 
reference to their predominant portfolio management strategy (top-down versus bottom-
up), individual asset allocation decisions, strategic benchmarks and portfolio returns. 
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4.3 Data 
                                                
This study uses monthly Australian pooled superannuation fund returns for 16 
average and above average volatility funds over the period January 1991-December 1998 
using a unique data set provided by Towers Perrin Australia.39  Average and above average 
volatility funds invest broadly across the entire asset class spectrum and include domestic 
and international holdings in equities, bonds, property and cash.  Towers Perrin provided 
the data on the understanding both the names of the investment managers and the funds 
would remain anonymous.  The Towers Perrin Pooled Superannuation Funds database 
monitors fund performance across the entire Australian market and is therefore a 
representation of fund manager performance across multiple asset class sectors.  Funds 
comprising the sample were included where Towers Perrin had complete historical 
information concerning performance, asset allocations and strategic benchmark weights 
provided by the investment managers over the entire 96-month period.   
Towers Perrin classifies pooled superannuation funds on the basis of historic 
volatility in fund returns as well as fund investment style.  Two of the funds in the sample 
(denoted fund A and B) are managed by the same investment organisation.  Fund B has 
therefore been removed from Table 4.4 in the results section reporting the sector 
performances.40  The period of evaluation is the 8-year period January 1991-December 
1998.  The total assets under management for these 16 funds at December 1998 were 
 
39 While the sample size is relatively small compared with U.S. studies, the Australian market is considerably 
smaller.  Given the criteria for including funds, a number of funds were not included as they were either (1) 
not in existence at January 1991 and/or (2) did not have sufficient data (returns and asset allocations) to 
perform the analysis over the entire 8-year period.  Therefore 10 funds (accounting for $A5.7 billion at 
December 1998 or 16 percent of the total eligible market size) could not be included because they did not 
exist for the entire 8-year period being evaluated (i.e. they were younger funds).  Another valid point 
concerning the sample size is due to Australian fund managers (generally) not offering multiple pooled 
superannuation vehicles to investors (which may be contrary to sector specialist funds).  Overall, these factors 
contribute to the relatively small number of funds included in the study. 
40 While funds A and B have identical sector performances in Australian equities, international equities and 
Australian fixed interest, these funds have different investment objectives.  These include different weights 
across investment sectors and different total fund returns. 
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around $A29.9 billion and the investment performance of funds comprising the sample is 
measured in gross terms (i.e. before management fees and tax) and measure capital changes 
and income reinvestment.  The market indices, outlined in Table 4.1, represent passive 
investment strategies across each asset sector and are measured as total returns (capital 
changes and dividend reinvestment).41  The risk free rate used in the study is the 13-week 
RBA Treasury note converted to a monthly rate. 
Table 4.1 – Market indices by asset class.  Statistics are reported as at 31 December 1998.   
All funds have exposures to Australian and international equities, property (either direct, listed or both), 
Australian fixed interest and cash.  Not all funds in the sample, however, invest in International fixed interest 
or Australian inflation-linked bonds.  For this reason, the sum of the Benchmark Weight column exceeds 100 
percent.  The mean strategic benchmark weight column is calculated by dividing the sum of weights to the 
respective sectors by the number of funds that have benchmark exposures to those specific asset classes.  The 
Value-Weighted measure calculates the strategic benchmarks weights by fund value across the respective 
asset classes.  The Morgan Stanley Capital International Index includes gross dividends reinvested and is 
converted back into Australian dollars.  The Salomon Brothers World Government Bond Index (ex-Australia) 
is hedged back into Australian dollars. 
Asset Class Market Index Benchmark Weight (%) 
Value-Weighted 
Benchmark 
Weight (%) 
Australian Equities ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index 36.5 35.6 
International Equities MSCI World (ex-Australia) Accumulation Index 20.9 20.9 
Australian Direct 
Property Towers Perrin Direct Property Index 8.2 6.7 
Australian Listed 
Property 
ASX Listed Property Accumulation 
Index 7.1 4.8 
Australian Fixed 
Interest 
Warburg Dillon Read Composite Bond 
Index 20.1 18.6 
International Fixed 
Interest 
Salomon Bros. World Bond Index (ex-
Australia) 6.6 6.5 
Australian Inflation-
Linked Bonds 
Warburg Dillon Read Inflation-Linked 
Bond Index 5.7 3.0 
Cash Warburg Dillon Read Bank Bill Index 7.0 4.0 
 
                                                
The Towers Perrin Pooled Superannuation Funds database includes monthly fund 
performance across individual sectors and the total portfolio.42  Average asset allocations of 
 
41 These market proxies are the most commonly used/cited indexes in the Australian investment industry 
during the period evaluated. 
42The sample group of superannuation funds in the study contains the standard survivorship bias problems 
faced by most performance evaluation studies in the literature, where funds included in the sample remain in 
existence at the end-date of the performance evaluation period.  Studies including Brown et al. (1992) and 
Elton et al. (1996a) highlight the problems performance evaluation studies face where survivorship bias 
exists.  The extent to which the results in the paper are biased is not known, however, analysis of Towers 
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each fund and across each month are also recorded, which allows inferences to be made 
concerning the asset allocation positions of investment managers relative to each fund’s 
unique strategic benchmark.  The investment managers provide these strategic benchmark 
weights for each of their pooled funds to asset consulting firms such as Towers Perrin in 
order to better understand the investment strategy.43  Strategic benchmarks are generally 
fixed across time and represent a fund’s long-term investment objective.  Over the short-
term, managers may adopt strategies of under or overweighting fund asset allocations 
relative to their own strategic benchmark in an attempt to enhance portfolio performance.  
The funds included in the sample are also classified, where possible, according to the two 
distinct investment management styles – top-down and bottom-up.  The partitioning of 
funds was performed based on information provided to Towers Perrin by the fund 
managers.  Half of the funds in the sample predominantly used top-down strategies; six 
funds managed their portfolios using a bottom-up approach.  The other two funds could not 
be classified. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Overall Portfolio Performance 
The empirical results derived from both the Henriksson-Merton and Treynor-Mazuy 
models and presented in Table 4.2 do not support the hypothesis that funds collectively 
have security selection or market timing skill at the total fund level. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Perrin’s historical performance surveys indicate that it is likely to be small.  Given the major source of bias 
generally arises due to poor performing funds having higher attrition probabilities, survivor biased studies are 
likely to positively overstate performance than may otherwise be the case. 
43 These independent strategic benchmark weights provided by the investment managers have been used in 
the attribution analysis performed below. 
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Panel A of Table 4.2 (employing the Henriksson-Merton approach) reveals that a 
majority of funds exhibit security selection and market timing coefficients insignificant 
from zero.  Three funds have selectivity estimates significantly different from zero, where 
two funds are significantly positive.  Approximately half of the funds record negative stock 
selection estimates.  The market timing performance of funds provides even greater 
evidence of an inability of fund managers to outperform.  The results show that while a 
significant majority of funds (15 out of 16) have insignificant timing coefficients, the 
majority of funds (11 out of 16) have negative βp2 estimates.  Further, the solitary fund 
exhibiting significantly positive market timing underperforms in security selection.  Panel 
B of Table 4.2, reports the security selection and market timing estimates using the 
Treynor-Mazuy approach, and the findings are largely consistent with those in Panel A. 
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Table 4.2 – Pooled superannuation fund performance at the total portfolio level before expenses using 
the Henriksson-Merton model (Panel A) and Treynor-Mazuy model (Panel B) over the period January 
1991 to December 1998. 
Each fund’s performance is measured against their unique strategic benchmark that accounts for all asset 
classes consistent with their stated investment objective (i.e. a multi-sector benchmark).  Risk-adjusted 
performance due to security selection (α ) is expressed in percentage terms per month.  The Henriksson-
Merton model and Treynor-Mazuy model have their coefficients estimated from models 4.1 and 4.2 
respectively. 
p
Panel A: Henriksson-Merton Model 
Fund   
A -0.014 -0.20  0.985 -0.022 -0.34  0.971 
B -0.026 -0.45 
0.924 
-0.039 
0.106 
0.219 -0.125 
0.001 
-0.255 
-0.74 
0.966 0.006 0.09 0.968 
C -0.022 -0.22 1.039 -0.082 -0.64 
D 0.050 0.39 0.889 -0.130 -1.18 0.868 
E 0.000 0.00 0.947 -0.58 0.967 
F 0.005 0.06 1.004 0.041 0.54 0.959 
G 1.02 0.920 0.091 1.20 0.927 
H 0.168 2.40 ** 0.933 -0.129 -1.63 0.963 
I 2.32 ** 0.933 -1.36 0.952 
J 0.131 1.63 1.096 -0.011 -0.14 0.954 
K -0.024 -0.30 1.065 -0.069 -0.77 0.955 
L 0.009 0.09 0.974 -0.65 0.933 
M -0.058 -0.59 1.043 0.01 0.956 
N -2.47 ** 1.065 0.208 2.07 ** 0.938 
O -0.091 1.048 -0.021 -0.21 0.928 
P 0.063 0.55 0.966 -0.055 -0.52 0.926 
α 9+ 7-      
β2 5+ 11-      
α, β2  2+ 4-      
α, β2 +/- 10       
Panel B: Treynor-Mazuy Model 
Fund αp t(αp)  βp γp t(γp)  2R  
A -0.021 -0.40 0.996 -0.003 -0.37 0.971 
B -0.023 -0.54 0.963 0.001 0.06 0.968 
C -0.024 -0.33 1.078 -0.015 -1.09 0.924 
D 0.019 0.18 0.952 -0.017 -1.43 0.869 
E -0.015 -0.27 0.965 -0.004 -0.68 0.967 
F 0.031 0.56 0.984 0.002 0.31 0.959 
G 0.154 1.90 * 0.877 0.007 1.03 0.927 
H 0.139 2.75 *** 0.997 -0.019 -2.09 ** 0.964 
I 0.190 2.79 *** 0.993 -0.016 -1.76 * 0.953 
J 0.169 2.03 ** 0.980 0.000 0.00 0.928 
K -0.037 -0.58 1.099 -0.010 -0.96 0.956 
L -0.015 -0.20 1.004 -0.007 -0.57 0.933 
M -0.061 -0.86 1.043 0.001 0.08 0.956 
N -0.164 -2.21 ** 0.965 0.020 1.91 * 0.938 
O -0.097 -1.07 1.058 -0.003 -0.31 0.928 
P 0.033 0.38 0.992 -0.004 -0.37 0.926 
α 7+ 9-      
γ 6+ 10-      
α, γ 3+ 6-      
α, γ +/- 7       
2R αp t(α ) p1 p2 t(β ) β βp p2
-0.065 
 
*Significant at 0.10 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
***Significant at 0.01 level 
  
 The t-statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors.  The coefficient of determination is the
adjusted R2.164 
An interesting finding documented in Table 4.2 is existence of strong negative 
correlation (cross-sectional) between the selectivity and timing estimates.44  Around two 
thirds of funds exhibit either positive selectivity coupled with negative timing or positive 
timing and negative security selection coefficients.  Both the Pearson (-0.635) and 
Spearman (-0.435) correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels 
respectively.  Other studies, including Henriksson (1984) and Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman 
(1993) find evidence of a strong negative relationship between timing and selectivity, 
indicating that perceived skill in one component of portfolio management activity does not 
necessarily imply skill in the other.  Henriksson (1984) hypothesises the existence of a 
negative relationship due to the market proxy being misspecified or the model omitting 
relevant factors explaining the derivation of fund returns.  While the former argument may 
appear to have little merit in this study, due to the tests for timing and selectivity relying on 
the use of a more appropriate benchmark, the issue remains an empirical question. 
An alternative explanation for the negative correlation between timing and security 
selection may be due to performance models omitting important risk factors.  In particular, 
Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) hypothesise that the negative correlation may occur as a 
result of portfolio managers holding options or option-like securities such as listed 
securities with high leverage.  Coggin et al. (1993) indicate that the phenomenon of a 
negative relationship between timing and security selection is derived due to sampling 
errors of the two estimates being negatively correlated.  However, while not reported 
directly in this essay, evidence of negative correlation (time series) between timing and 
selectivity is statistically weak when consideration is given to the geometric performance 
attribution approach.  One problem of testing this phenomenon in this essay is the small 
                                                 
44 Similar to the results in Table 2, Table 4 also shows a strong negative relationship (cross-sectional) between 
timing and selectivity estimates across Australian equities, international equities and Australian fixed interest. 
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sample size.  Future research on the correlation between timing and selectivity is therefore 
warranted. 
4.4.2 Performance Sensitivity to Choice of Benchmark 
Previous performance evaluation studies in both Australia and the U.S. have relied 
on the use of an equity market proxy as the benchmark, even where funds have non-equity 
assets as some proportion of the total portfolio.  Henriksson (1984) states the use of such a 
benchmark is a sufficient market proxy where fund performance is highly correlated with 
the true market proxy.  However, in response to Ippolito’s (1989) conclusion that U.S. 
mutual funds earned sufficient risk-adjusted returns to recover expenses, Elton et al. (1993) 
demonstrate that performance can be sensitive to the choice of benchmark used.  These 
authors show that Ippolito’s (1989) results were due to the benchmark proxy excluding the 
performance of non-S&P 500 securities. 
In view of Elton et al.’s finding (1993), performance in this study is also analysed 
using the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index as the market proxy (following Sinclair’s 
(1990) method) to evaluate the extent of possible bias generated for pooled superannuation 
funds.45  As outlined in Table 4.1, pooled superannuation funds, on average, have less than 
40 percent of their strategic benchmark allocations to the Australian equities asset class.  
Sinclair (1990) reports that 15 of the 16 funds examined in the period 1981-1987 exhibited 
significantly positive security selection estimates at the 0.05 level for the Henriksson-
Merton model.  In contrast to the results presented in Table 4.2, Table 4.3 clearly 
demonstrates the problems that arise where a benchmark is used for diversified funds that 
                                                 
45 Fund returns in the sample, on average, had a correlation coefficient of 0.92 with the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index.  This compares with a correlation coefficient of investment performance relative to each 
fund’s specific strategic benchmark asset allocation of approximately 0.97. 
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ignore other asset class exposures beyond Australian equities.  Funds in the sample exhibit 
significantly higher security selection estimates while simultaneously recording 
significantly worse market timing.  While the results in both Table 4.2 (Panel A) and Table 
.3 provide consistent evidence that funds do not exhibit superior timing ability under the 
Henriksson-Merton approach, the use of an equity market proxy overstates both pooled 
superannuation funds’ poor timing ability and successful security selection.  These findings 
support Elton et al.’s (1993) correction of Ippolito’s (1989) finding that mutual funds 
outperform. 
4
 R
Table 4.3 – Pooled superannuation fund performance at the total portfolio level before expenses using 
the Henriksson-Merton model over the period January 1991 to December 1998. 
Performance is measured using the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index as the market proxy or benchmark 
index.  Risk-adjusted performance due to security selection (αp) is expressed in percentage terms per month 
and market timing estimates are represented in βp2. 
Fund αp t(αp) βp1 βp2 t(βp2) 2 
A 0.254 1.95 * 0.518 -0.107 -1.74 * 0.903 
B 0.150 1.22 0.427 -0.061 -1.01  0.882 
C 0.398 2.52 ** 0.475 -0.213 -2.82 *** 0.851 
D 0.444 2.00 ** 0.436 -0.208 -2.26 ** 0.801 
E 0.424 2.49 ** 0.514 -0.155 -1.66  0.836 
F 0.380 -0.088 0.849 
G 0.418 -0.73 
K 
1.96  
0.68 
1.79 
2.36 ** 0.483 -1.14  
3.77 *** 0.510 -0.041  0.895 
H 0.486 3.24 *** 0.411 -0.164 -2.30 ** 0.840 
I 0.580 3.51 *** 0.466 -0.223 -2.68 *** 0.848 
J 0.521 2.90 *** 0.505 -0.144 -1.54  0.852 
0.350 2.06 ** 0.532 -0.146 -1.73 * 0.867 
L 0.178 1.38 0.519 -0.070 -1.08  0.888 
M 0.324 * 0.544 -0.126 -1.84 * 0.858 
N 0.104 0.577 0.008 0.11  0.863 
O 0.282 * 0.524 -0.129 -1.58  0.874 
P 0.569 3.37 *** 0.457 -0.207 -2.68 *** 0.807 
*Significant at 0.10 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
***Significant at 0.01 level 
The t-statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. 
The coefficient of determination is the adjusted R2. 
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4.4.3 Performance of Individual Sectors 
                                                
Table 4.4 presents the security selection and market timing results (using the 
Henriksson-Merton model) for pooled superannuation funds for the three largest asset 
classes in which these pooled vehicles invest – Australian equities, international equities 
and Australian fixed interest.46  The pooled superannuation funds comprising the sample 
invest across multiple asset classes, of which domestic equities, international equities and 
domestic fixed interest represent the three largest asset classes for all funds.  The analysis 
presented involves using the sector specific benchmarks outlined in Table 4.1.  Given these 
sectors are the most significant in terms of each fund’s portfolio size, the performance 
across these individual sectors will be influential in terms of a pooled fund’s overall 
portfolio return.  In general, the results indicate that as a group, actively managed pooled 
superannuation funds were unable to outperform the relevant market indices.47  Security 
selection performance is the most attractive for funds in the Australian equities asset class 
compared to other sectors (6 funds both positive and statistically significant), however 
around three-quarters of funds in Australian equities (2 funds significant) have negative 
timing coefficients.  In Australian fixed interest 14 of 15 funds (1 fund significant) record 
negative timing estimates.  International equities performance on the basis of security 
selection is the worst across all sectors, however only one manager recorded significantly 
negative selectivity.  Market timing ability in the international shares sector is shown to be 
non-existent. 
 
46 The Treynor-Mazuy model was also evaluated and the results were consistent with the Henriksson-Merton 
approach, and as a result are not reported directly in the paper. 
47 Tests for market timing and selectivity were also performed to assess the potential bias in results arising 
from benchmark inefficiency following the approach outlined by Admati and Pfleiderer (1997).  These 
alternative market proxies are more difficult yardsticks for funds to outperform as they represent the average 
performance of potentially informed investment managers.  The security selection estimates were generally 
lower across all sectors for all funds and independent of the model used.  Overall, the results indicated that 
funds do not exhibit superior selectivity or timing skill. 
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4.4.4 Geometric Performance Attribution 
An alternative test for security selection and market timing ability used in this essay 
relies on a performance attribution methodology (discussed in section 4.2.2) decomposing 
the active raw return (not adjusted for risk) across asset sectors given the active decisions 
employed by investment managers.  The relatively high granularity of data provides 
analysis of a fund’s performance with direct reference to an investment manager’s changes 
to the portfolio’s asset allocation (relative to the fund’s strategic benchmark allocation) and 
their selection of stocks in an attempt to outperform the fund’s benchmark.  The results 
presented in Table 4.5 report the average active returns above the benchmark, which are 
attributable to either market timing or stock selection.  Market timing and stock selection 
ability is reported at the total portfolio level and across the three largest asset classes 
comprising these multi-sector pooled superannuation vehicles.  Table 4.5 indicates that 2 
funds exhibit positive and significant active returns at the total fund level, and only one 
fund is successful in both timing and stock selection. 
                                                
The empirical results across the individual asset classes also indicate the majority of 
funds did not exhibit superior performance.48  Stock selection in Australian equities was 
generally the most successful asset class for the funds in the sample, however no evidence 
exists of superior market timing ability.  Four of the five funds with significantly positive 
selection record positive timing however none is statistically significant.  The results 
concerning fund performance in the international equities and Australian fixed interest 
sectors also support the general finding that funds overall do not outperform benchmark 
 
48 Performance attribution was also performed using what has been termed an arithmetic methodology (see 
Singer, Gonzalo and Lederman (1998) and Burnie, Knowles and Teder (1998)), which assumes investment 
managers emphasise both security selection and market timing.  The results were consistent with the evidence 
presented using the geometric performance attribution approach.  Further, only 14 funds are evaluated as a 
result of 2 fund managers (C and M) not being easily partitioned into top-down or bottom-up styles. 
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indices – therefore timing and selection skill is absent.  In international equities, 12 funds 
have negative mean security selection values (4 significant) and 8 of the 14 funds exhibit 
negative timing.  Little evidence supports collective timing and selection skill by managers 
in the Australian fixed interest sector.  Analysis of the performance of funds predominantly 
top-down or bottom-up does not indicate that funds exhibit superior skill in asset allocation 
or stock selection respectively. 
Further tests of performance are contained in Table 4.6, evaluating the consistency 
of timing and selection skill for pooled superannuation funds.  This is performed by 
analysing the number of periods (months) where investment managers make correct 
forecasts.  Table 4.6 partitions managers into either top-down or bottom-up portfolio 
management strategies.  These two categories account for whether the investment 
manager’s portfolio strategy is predominantly asset allocation (top-down) or stock selection 
(bottom-up) driven.  A correct forecast is defined as occurring when an investment 
manager outperforms their benchmark (i.e. an active return) in the particular month 
evaluated.  Analysis is performed by calculating the proportion of months over the 8-year 
period in which the investment manager earns positive active returns. 
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Table 4.4 – The performance of pooled superannuation funds before expenses across the three major investment sectors using the Henriksson-Merton model.  The 
period of evaluation is January 1991 to December 1998. 
Risk-adjusted performance due to security selection (αp) is expressed in percentage terms per month and market timing estimates are represented in βp2.  All funds in the 
sample invest in Australian equities, International equities and Australian fixed interest asset classes.  Fund performance is measured across individual sectors using the 
market indices defined in Table 4.1.  At the bottom of the table, summary measures indicate the number of funds exhibiting positive (negative) alphas, positive (negative) 
market timing coefficients (βp2) and those funds which have alternate signs for both stock selection and market timing. 
    Australian Equities International Equities Australian Fixed Interest 
Fund      
              27  
αp t(αp)   β2 t(β2) αp t(αp)   β2 t(β2) αp t(αp)   β2 t(β2) 
-0.
 
A -0.009 -0.10 -0.042 -1.03 -0.063 -0.30 -0.084 -0.78 0.033 1.02 -0.024
C                
              -1.81  
             
               
               
H 0.191 2.51     0.42  -0.071       
                
               
                
                
                
    0.013         
0.032 0.28 -0.055 -0.92 -0.374 -0.86 0.013 0.05 0.050 0.73 -0.091 -0.74
D 0.086 0.49 -0.086
 -0.075
-1.05 0.069 0.19 0.069 0.34 0.100 1.44 -0.270
E 0.306 2.37 ** -1.16 -0.481 -2.80 ***
 
 0.073 0.83 0.041 0.44
0.22
-0.002 -0.02
F -0.029 -0.25 0.067 1.12 0.067 0.44 -0.088
0.093 
-0.95 0.010 -0.016
-0.069
-0.19
G 0.403 2.23 ** 0.030 0.33 0.218 0.48 0.44 0.030 0.38 -0.45
** -0.034 -0.93 0.085 -0.60 0.049 1.40
1.59
-0.075 -1.13
I 0.198 2.57 ** -0.040 -1.13 0.103 0.47 -0.075 -0.61 0.083 -0.153 -1.29
J 0.488 2.77 ***
 
 -0.062 -0.68 -0.281 -0.86 0.035 0.17 0.099 1.92 -0.164 -1.54
K 0.230 2.04 ** -0.129 -2.25** -0.006 -0.03 -0.128 -1.11 0.023 0.60 0.051 0.65
L
M
0.026 0.22 -0.041 -0.68 0.024 0.07 -0.091 -0.51
0.73
0.002 0.02 -0.045 -0.41
0.033 0.29
0.12
0.002 0.03 -0.165 -0.72 0.081 0.079 1.03 -0.227 -1.62
N 0.014 0.19 -0.280 -1.43 0.139 1.55 0.171 2.61** -0.327 -2.26 ** 
         -0.15      
       0.343          
   α        
O 0.055 0.44 -0.038 -0.57 -0.103 -0.43 -0.018 -0.017 -0.33 -0.074 -1.15
P 0.088 0.91
13+ 2- 
-0.101 -1.84* 0.93 0.060 0.30 0.000 -0.01 -0.006 -0.11
 α 7+ 8- α 14+ 1-
β2 4+     β          
             
     9        
11- 2 8+ 7- β2 1+ 14-
α, β2  3+ 1- α, β2  3+ 3- α, β2  1+ 1-
α, β2 +/- 11 α, β2 +/- α, β2 +/- 13
*Significant at 0.10 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
***Significant at 0.01 level 
The t-statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. 
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Table .  – Pooled superannuation fund performance at the total portfolio level and individual sector level (before expenses) using the geometric attribution 
framework. 
4 5
  
Performance is expressed as the mean active return per month in percentage terms over the period January 1991 to December 1998.  Funds are partitioned on the basis of 
their predominant portfolio management style (top-down or bottom-up).  A fund’s active return at the total portfolio level is measured with respect to the strategic benchmark 
applicable to the fund.  Each fund’s sector performance is measured with respect to the market benchmarks defined in Table 4.1.  At the bottom of the table, summary 
measures indicate the number of funds exhibiting positive (negative) stock selection, positive (negative) market timing, and those funds which have alternate signs for both 
stock selection and market timing. 
Total Portfolio Australian Equities International Equities Australian Fixed Interest 
 R   s a R   R  s a R   R  s a R   R  s a
Panel A: Top-Down Portfolio Management 
A   --0.036 -0.034 0.002    -0.029 -0.005 -0.043*   -0.017 0.006*  
       
0.007
B -0.035 -0.004 -0.030 -0.022 -0.004 -0.033**    
         
     
-0.014 0.006 0.013
D
E
-0.101 -0.091 -0.010 -0.007 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 0.011
-0.061 -0.039 -0.022 0.071**  0.003 -0.070 ***    
 
-0.002 0.006 0.018
J 0.167 *** 0.109 **  0.059** 0.159 ***
 
 0.012     
     
-0.033 0.000 0.005 0.002
K -0.038 -0.057 0.020 0.027 0.011 -0.055**  -0.022**  0.011***
 
  
         
  
0.003
L -0.047 -0.054 0.007 -0.001 0.005 -0.046 0.001 -0.001 0.004
P 0.004 0.045 -0.041*       -0.013 -0.003 0.066 -0.004 -0.001 0.002
Panel B: Bottom-Up Portfolio Management 
   F 0.034 -0.013 0.047  0.023 -0.001     
  
-0.025 -0.001 -0.005 0.016
G 0.128* 0.195 *** -0.067 ** 0.180 ***    -0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.006 0.024 ** 
H    0.054 0.034 0.021 0.030 ** 0.003 -0.019  0.010**   
   
-0.002 -0.001
I 0.092 0.081*   0.011 0.036**    0.002 -0.025 0.009**   
          
   
-0.005 0.003
N -0.064 -0.025 -0.039 0.028 0.012 -0.029 0.009 -0.003 0.002
O -0.081 -0.112*        0.031 0.012 0.010 -0.061 0.002 -0.003 0.021* 
SS          5+  9-  9+ 5- 2+ 12- 5+ 9-
MT           
             
 7+ 7- 9+ 5- 6+ 8- 13+ 1-
SS, MT   3+  5-  7+ 3- 0+ 6- 5+ 1- 
SS, MT +/- 6 4 8 8
Fund Tot R      
 *
*Significant at 0.10 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
***Significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 4.6 – Evaluation of the ability of portfolio managers to make correct forecasts in their investment decision-making over the period January 1991 to December 
1998. 
A correct forecast is defined as the manager outperforming the relevant benchmark in the month.  The benchmark at the total portfolio level relates to the each fund’s 
strategic benchmark encompassing all asset classes comprising the fund’s investment strategy.  The individual asset classes are evaluated with respect to the benchmarks 
identified in Table 4.1.  Funds are dichotomised between top-down and bottom-up portfolio management strategies with respect to whether the investment manager places 
greater precedence on asset allocation (top-down) or stock selection (bottom-up). 
 Total Portfolio (%) Australian Equities (%) International Equities (%) Australian Fixed Interest (%) 
Fund      Rs  Ra R   R  s a R   R  s a R   R  s a
Panel A: Top-Down Portfolio Management 
A  40.6* 50.0 47.9 45.8  37.5 46.9 **  61.5**  
       
55.2
B 47.9 42.7 47.9 47.9 46.9 37.5**  61.5**  
  
58.3
D 37.5** 56.3 38.5 **      52.1 53.1 54.2 50.0 62.5** 
E    46.9 45.8 60.4*   49.0 32.3***    46.9 47.9 61.5** 
J    55.2 58.3 63.5***     55.2 45.8 46.9 59.4* 53.1 
K      43.8 47.9 58.3 53.1 40.6*    
         
   
43.8 58.3 46.9
L 43.8 53.1 49.0 57.3 49.0 49.0 52.1 57.3
P 55.2 37.5**    47.9 55.2 61.5**    46.9 49.0 54.2
Panel B: Bottom-Up Portfolio Management 
  F 47.9 55.2   47.9 44.8 42.7  
  
52.1 42.7 57.3
G 67.7***  36.5***  68.8***  37.5**     47.9 45.8 49.0 61.5** 
H    55.2 55.2 59.4*  61.5**   43.8 63.5***   
    
53.1 50.0
I 55.2 47.9 59.4*  59.4*   42.7 65.6***   49.0 60.4* 
N         
  
45.8 45.8 52.1 47.9 44.8 55.2 53.1 56.3
O 40.6*  57.3*   53.1 57.3*     41.7 52.1 47.9 60.4* 
*Significant at 0.10 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
***Significant at 0.01 level 
 173 
The analysis is performed at the total portfolio level and across three 
individual asset classes – Australian equities, international equities and Australian 
fixed interest.  Consideration of the frequency of successful monthly forecasts, rather 
than the actual magnitude of the forecasts, provides information regarding the relative 
success of the portfolio management process over time.  Hypothesis tests are 
conducted over the 96-month period to identify the ability of investment managers to 
successfully anticipate market movements.  The null hypothesis assumes the 
proportion of successful forecasts made by portfolio managers equates to 50 percent 
(H0: p=0.5).  Rejection of the null hypothesis concludes the portfolio manager exhibits 
evidence of positive skill where the proportion exceeds 0.5 for both market timing and 
stock selection (H1: p 0.5).  In Australian equities, 5 funds record positive security 
selection significantly greater than 50 percent of months and 5 funds show significant 
consistency in market timing forecasts in the Australian fixed interest sector.  
However, the results provide further evidence that funds collectively did not exhibit 
successful security selection or timing skills. 
≠
4.5 Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
This essay evaluates the market timing and security selection capabilities of 
Australian pooled superannuation funds.  The empirical evidence confirms that funds 
overall did not exhibit superior selectivity or timing skill in the period evaluated at 
either the total portfolio level, or in the Australian equities, international equities and 
Australian fixed interest sectors.  These findings are consistent with the evidence 
presented in the literature that funds are unable to earn superior risk-adjusted excess 
returns relative to appropriately specified market indices.  While funds are generally 
more successful in their security selection strategies than market timing, both 
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components of performance do not provide investors with both positive and 
statistically significant risk-adjusted performance. 
An interesting finding is the strong negative cross-sectional correlation 
between selectivity and timing using both the Henriksson-Merton and Treynor-Mazuy 
models, supporting U.S. studies as well as Sawicki and Ong (2000), however the 
phenomenon is not supported using the geometric performance attribution 
methodology.  The negative correlation phenomenon requires further research, using 
an expanded data set and alternative evaluation models.  Indeed Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) employ conditional models incorporating lagged public information variables 
and report strong negative covariance between fund betas and market returns, 
suggesting managers reduce (increase) their market betas when market returns are 
expected to be high (low).  Ferson and Warther (1996) find that this result is in part 
driven by mutual fund cash flows, however further research should investigate the 
other factors causing such a relationship between beta and market return. 
The essay also demonstrates the importance of using appropriate benchmarks 
that are consistent with the investment strategies and assets held in diversified or 
multi-sector portfolios such as pooled superannuation funds.  Sinclair’s (1990) finding 
that funds exhibit superior security selection skill and significantly perverse timing is 
shown to arise through the use of a misspecified market proxy that excludes assets 
other than Australian equities.  Therefore alternative benchmarks that reflect each 
fund’s unique investment strategy lead to more accurate inferences concerning 
portfolio performance.  An extension of this research should include an investigation 
of the market timing and stock selection capabilities of funds using a conditional 
performance evaluation framework that accounts for public information and time 
variation in risk. 
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5 
 
CHAPTER 5 – THE PERFORMANCE OF AUSTRALIAN 
EQUITY INDEX FUNDS 
5.1 Introduction 
Literature based on U.S. markets widely confirms the inability of active 
mutual funds to outperform passive benchmarks or indices such as the S&P 500 
(Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989b), Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), 
Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997) and Edelen (1999)).  The findings of Australian studies 
are consistent with the U.S. evidence (Bird et al. (1983), Robson (1986), Hallahan and 
Faff (1999), Sawicki and Ong (2000)).  Unlike active funds, which aim to outperform 
their benchmark index, passive or index funds aim to replicate the performance of the 
benchmark.   
While prior research on the performance of active investment funds is 
extensive, there exists a critical gap in the literature with respect to the performance of 
passive funds.  Such literature is limited to Gruber (1996) and Frino and Gallagher 
(2001).49  Gruber (1996) examines the performance of a sample of U.S. index funds 
between 1 January, 1990 and 30 December, 1994, and documents that they 
underperform the index by approximately 20.2 basis points per annum on an after-
cost and risk-adjusted basis.  Frino and Gallagher (2001) extend the analysis to a 
sample of 42 U.S. index equity funds between 1 March, 1994 and 28 February, 1999, 
                                                 
49While evidence on the performance of index funds is limited to Gruber (1996) and Frino and 
Gallagher (2001), Sinquefield (1991) and Keim (1999) examine the design of small-capitalisation 
index funds, while Horan (1998) examines the types of fund assets likely to use index investment 
products. 
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and document that they underperform the index by approximately 29.0 basis points 
per annum on an after-cost and risk-adjusted basis, and the magnitude of the 
difference between index fund performance and their benchmark averages between 
3.9 and 11.0 basis points per month before costs.  The main objective of this essay is 
to extend previous research by documenting the performance of Australian equity 
index funds.  This is achieved by evaluating both the magnitude and determinants of 
index fund tracking error.  An analysis of index fund performance is important as it 
provides investors with direct evidence concerning the ability of managers to exactly 
replicate the index as well as determining the success or otherwise of passive 
managers in meeting their performance objectives. 
Since the aim of index funds is to replicate the performance of an index, then 
the difference between the return on a benchmark index and return on an index funds’ 
portfolio (or tracking error) can be used to evaluate their performance.  Tracking error 
in the performance of index funds is likely to arise from the difficulties inherent in 
management of passive portfolios.  Theoretically, the management of an index 
portfolio is straightforward, requiring passive fund managers to hold each constituent 
index security in the same proportion to the benchmark (known as a ‘full replication’ 
strategy).  In reality, index funds will experience considerable difficulty in replicating 
the target index, because the index represents a mathematical calculation that does not 
take into account market frictions.  For example, index funds must physically transact 
in index securities in order to replicate the returns of the benchmark thereby incurring 
transaction costs and imparting price pressure.  However, the calculation underlying 
the index assumes costless re-balancing may occur at any time at prevailing market 
prices. 
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Chiang (1998) identifies that transaction costs, index composition changes, 
corporate activity, fund cash flows, index volatility and the reinvestment of dividends 
are the main factors which give rise to tracking error in index fund performance. The 
existence of these factors is the main motivation for the research reported in this 
essay.  The primary aim of this essay is to document the magnitude of tracking error 
in the returns generated by Australian equity index funds as a consequence of these 
factors.  This essay also extends previous U.S.-based research by assessing the 
significance of these factors in explaining the magnitude of tracking error. 
In the U.S. the first index mutual fund was launched in 1976 by Vanguard 
Group Inc., however it has only been in the last decade that indexing has grown 
significantly (Gruber (1996); Frino and Gallagher (2001)).  In Australia, indexing has 
also grown substantially in terms of the size of funds under management.  The amount 
of assets passively managed by Australian institutions as at September 2000 was 
reported by Rainmaker Information to be around $A75.9 billion, or 11 percent of the 
Australian investment management industry.  In addition, an April 2000 survey by 
one of the Australian superannuation industry’s journals, Superfunds, reported total 
assets indexed was around $A57.4 billion, representing an increase of 42 percent 
since the previous year.50  Therefore, the research reported in this essay is also 
motivated by the significance and growth of index funds in Australia. 
While the primary aim of this essay is to provide an understanding of the 
difficulties and performance of a relatively new and increasingly popular type of 
investment fund per se, the analysis also provides evidence relevant to two other 
issues in the funds management performance evaluation literature.  To date, the 
                                                 
50 Superfunds, August 2000, Volume 239, pp13-18.  The percentage increase in the year to 1999 was 
65 percent, and 90 percent of all indexed assets were invested in the Australian and international equity 
asset classes. 
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literature widely documents that active funds do not outperform appropriate 
benchmark indices, and suggests passive funds represent an appropriate alternative 
(e.g. Malkiel (1995); Elton et al. (1996b)).  However, this argument implies that index 
funds are able to achieve their performance objectives.  Given the difficulties faced by 
index funds, and the likelihood of tracking error, this essay provides new evidence 
relevant to assessing the merits of an active versus passive investment strategy. 
The performance evaluation literature also identifies the importance of 
employing appropriate benchmark indices in the evaluation of fund performance.  For 
example, Elton et al. (1993) show Ippolito's (1989) findings of superior performance 
for active U.S. mutual funds is attributable to an incorrectly specified benchmark.  If 
index funds exhibit significant tracking error, then this implies that replication of 
index returns is problematic.  This in turn may cast doubt on the appropriateness of an 
index as a technical benchmark in performance evaluation.  The results of this essay 
are also relevant to this issue.  The following section discusses the difficulties faced 
by passive fund managers in achieving their objective (index returns), and identifies a 
number of variables that are likely to be related to tracking error in passive fund 
performance. 
This essay proceeds as follows.  The next section provides a theoretical 
discussion of why tracking error in index fund performance arises as well as 
identifying a number of potential factors that cause passive fund managers difficulties 
in replicating the benchmark.  This is followed by a description of the data used and 
the methodology employed in quantifying tracking error.  The empirical results are 
then presented in Section 5.5.  The final section concludes the paper and makes 
suggestions for future research. 
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5.2 Theoretical Discussion 
The objective of a passive or index fund is to replicate the return on a 
benchmark index.  This is typically achieved by an investor holding all securities 
comprising the benchmark index in their exact same proportion (full replication 
strategy) or holding a portion of the theoretical portfolio of securities underlying the 
benchmark index that mimics the returns on the index (i.e. a stratified sampling or 
optimisation strategy).  An index is an arithmetic calculation measuring changes in 
the value of a group of securities within a particular asset class.  The calculation of an 
index ignores market frictions in the sense that when the security weights within the 
index change, the index implicitly assumes that re-balancing of securities to reflect 
the new market weights can occur costlessly, instantaneously, and at prevailing 
market prices.  However, index funds face a number of market frictions in attempting 
to mimic the index portfolio, or more specifically, returns on the index.  These 
frictions can ultimately result in tracking error.  Chiang (1998) identifies that 
transaction costs, client related cash flows, the treatment of dividends by the index, 
the volatility of the benchmark and changes in the composition of the index may all 
contribute to tracking error.  Tracking error may also differ across index funds as a 
consequence of the portfolio strategy adopted in attempting to replicate the 
performance of the index.  Each of these factors is discussed below. 
Explicit costs associated with trading in securities markets, including 
brokerage fees and stamp duty, can influence the ability of passive funds to replicate 
index performance.  The index itself is calculated as a ‘paper’ portfolio, which 
assumes transactions can occur costlessly (see Perold (1988)).  In reality, passive 
funds incur explicit costs associated with transactions relating to client capital flows.  
For example, cash flow movements cause flow-induced trading for passive funds, 
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requiring new cash to be invested across index securities or part of the portfolio to be 
liquidated.  Apart from cash-flow induced trading, index funds also trade regularly for 
a variety of other reasons, associated with strategy implementation.  Because index 
funds are required to trade, explicit transaction costs are incurred.  These costs erode 
the value of the index fund by the amount of the explicit costs and lead to tracking 
error in performance measured after management expenses.51 
Funds also incur implicit transaction costs in trading, including bid-ask 
spreads and the price impact of trading  (Perold and Sirri (1994)).  These will also 
cause tracking error in performance measured before management expenses.  
Transactions by passive funds can cause temporary demand and supply imbalances, 
which implies that they are not able to trade instantaneously at prevailing market 
prices (Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Perold and Sirri (1994)).  Overall, this implies 
that client related cash-flow movements and the implicit costs of trading, such as bid 
ask spreads, are likely to be related to the magnitude of tracking error. 
Another factor likely to be related to tracking error is the volatility of the 
underlying benchmark index.  If the composition and weighting of stocks held by an 
index fund perfectly match those of the index, changes in the value of the index fund 
portfolio should match changes in the benchmark index.  However, at any point in 
time, the composition of the portfolio of a passive fund is unlikely to be perfectly 
aligned with the index portfolio for a number of reasons.  For example, most index 
fund managers are likely to use some form of proxy portfolio because the smaller, less 
liquid, stocks in the underlying index are more difficult to acquire.  Other funds 
explicitly aim to hold an imperfect proxy portfolio with the objective of minimising 
                                                 
51 Management expenses cover costs incurred by the fund manager associated with custodian services, 
trading and administration.  They also include the profit earned by the fund manager. 
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the costs of assembling a portfolio to track the underlying index.  New client cash 
inflows may also take time to be invested in the funds’ desired portfolio, especially 
those involving less liquid stocks.  As a result, unsystematic movements in the stocks 
underlying an index that are not in a passive fund managers portfolio will result in 
tracking error.  Similarly, unsystematic movements in the overweight stocks in a fund 
manager’s portfolio relative to the index portfolio will also cause tracking error. 
Consequently, higher benchmark index volatility is likely to be associated with higher 
tracking error. 
Tracking error can also arise from dividends paid by stocks in the index.  
When a listed company in an index goes ex-dividend, the index effectively assumes 
that the dividend is re-invested in the stock from which it is derived on the ex-
dividend date.  However, investors (including passive funds) experience a significant 
time delay, which normally extends into weeks, in receiving cash in relation to a 
dividend.  As a consequence, tracking error can occur for two reasons.  First, there are 
transaction costs associated with re-investing the dividends once received, and these 
erode the value of the passive funds portfolio.  In contrast, the index assumes that the 
proceeds from the dividend payment are re-invested costlessly at the prevailing 
market price.  Second, the fund manager must wait for receipt of cash in relation to 
dividends prior to being able to re-invest it.  Hence, there is likely to be a positive 
relationship between the level of dividends paid by stocks in an index and passive 
fund tracking error. 
Tracking error may also be related to changes in the composition of the 
benchmark index.  These include periodical index adjustments related to company 
additions and deletions, capitalisation changes and corporate restructuring.  Fund 
managers may need to trade in order to adjust their portfolios to properly track the 
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index following such changes.  Transaction costs are also incurred in this trading 
which can also increase tracking error.  Depending on the relative size of the stocks 
entering and exiting the index (in terms of market capitalisation), these changes may 
also require a number of costly odd-lot transactions in order to match the rebalanced 
index.  The index manager also faces the additional challenge of executing orders at 
the best possible prices and in such a manner that minimises the crystallisation of 
capital gains tax liabilities to avoid significant erosion of returns.  In the case of 
corporate restructuring, tracking error can also arise when index securities are 
involved in a merger or takeover by another company outside the index (Chiang 
(1998)).  For example, a timing delay may exist between the date on which the index 
fund receives the cash settlement and the date when the target firm is removed from 
the index. 
Periodical changes to the index can also make it difficult (and costly) for a 
passive fund to replicate the benchmark index.52  Beneish and Whaley (1996) and 
Chiang (1998) identify that ‘front-running’ by market participants, who acquire index 
securities ahead of their inclusion in a benchmark, can have an undesirable impact on 
index funds.53  Ultimately, changes in the composition of the index require passive 
funds to trade, which can result in transaction costs and tracking error.  Overall, 
changes in the composition of the index are also expected to cause tracking error. 
                                                 
52 The ASX rules governing the inclusion and exclusion of securities from the All Ordinaries Index are 
made with regard to a stock’s liquidity and market capitalisation.  Full replication funds may 
experience increased difficulties as a result of index changes, given that smaller capitalised securities 
have a higher probability of not meeting the All Ordinaries Index liquidity rules 
53 For example in the U.S. from October 1989, Standard and Poor’s pre-announced changes to the S&P 
500 Index, where the index change became effective five days after the announcement.  This 
amendment was designed to provide index funds with greater ease in acquiring the new securities 
ahead of their inclusion in the index.  However, because index funds rebalance portfolios on the day the 
change becomes effective, this allows risk arbitrageurs the opportunity to sell the stock to index funds 
at a premium.  The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), in a similar manner to Standard and Poor’s, pre-
announces changes to the All Ordinaries Index, however the length of time between the announcement 
of the change and the actual index amendment depends on the size of the stock. 
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The magnitude of tracking error may differ across index managers depending 
on the portfolio management approach used to replicate returns on the index.  The 
different approaches can be classified into ‘full replication’, ‘stratified sampling’ and 
‘optimisation’ strategies.54  Full replication strategies require that index funds hold all 
securities in the basket index in the same proportion as represented in the index.  
Stratified sampling and optimised portfolios on the other hand are non-replication 
strategies designed to mimic the index through investment in a subset of index 
securities, while at the same time ensuring the portfolio has similar risk and return 
characteristics as the index.55  Non-replication strategies aim to minimise transaction 
costs compared with full replication strategies, however, the trade-off is potentially 
higher tracking error arising from the performance of excluded securities which 
comprise the underlying index (Olma (1998)).  Optimised portfolios are constructed 
using highly quantitative, multi-factor risk models aimed at minimising tracking error 
through an understanding of the covariance between factors driving asset returns (Liu 
et al. (1998) and Olma (1998)).  The expectation, ceteris paribus, is that tracking error 
will be systematically lower for full replication index funds compared with non-
replication index funds. 
The theoretical discussion above implies tracking error is likely to be related 
to cash flows and implicit transaction costs, index volatility, dividend distributions, 
changes in the composition of the benchmark index and the portfolio management 
strategy adopted by index managers.  This essay empirically documents the 
magnitude of tracking error experienced by index funds, as well as assessing the 
significance of these factors in explaining the magnitude of tracking error. 
                                                 
54 Olma (1998) suggests that the choice of portfolio management technique used to replicate the returns 
of an index is influenced by the liquidity of the constituent securities comprising that index. 
55 These characteristics include size, industry and dividend yield and other risk attributes such as those 
identified by BARRA. 
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5.3 Data 
                                                
This research analyses the tracking error of all Australian equity index fund 
managers with at least one index fund benchmarked to the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index over the period July 1989 to March 1999.  The monthly 
Australian equity index fund returns were initially obtained from asset consultant 
William M. Mercer Pty Ltd. and were subsequently checked against the returns 
supplied directly by the investment managers.56  Performance of the funds includes 
both income returns and capital changes and are measured in gross terms (i.e. before 
the deduction of investment management fees and tax).  The investment objective of 
the seven pure index funds examined involves replicating the performance of the All 
Ordinaries Accumulation Index.  The investment managers also provided monthly 
cash flow data, fund size data and information concerning the portfolio strategy 
adopted by the fund (i.e. full replication, stratified sampling and optimisation).  The 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) provided market bid-ask 
quote data for all stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, as well as a database 
of stocks included and excluded from the All Ordinaries Index over the period 
evaluated.   
There are seven index funds examined in this essay.  Of these, three use full 
replication portfolio management strategies and the remaining four passive funds use 
stratified sampling and/or optimisation methods in order to mimic index returns.  The 
 
56 Other fund managers were also surveyed to ensure that the Mercer database included all managers 
offering passive equity funds.  The Australian index fund market is particularly small compared with 
the universe of active equity managers that exist in Australia.  In order to evaluate each manager’s 
performance, we collected data for each manager’s first Australian equity index fund.  This ensures the 
maximum evaluation period possible.  While some managers have more than one index portfolio, the 
approach used in this paper provides a representation of each index manager’s ability to replicate the 
All Ordinaries Accumulation Index.  Enhanced index funds and ‘quant’ funds were excluded from the 
analysis as they do not represent pure index strategies. 
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combined assets of the index funds in this essay are approximately $A5.0 billion as at 
31 March 1999.  The essay is free of survivorship bias.57 
5.4 Methodology 
The performance evaluation literature has predominantly evaluated the risk-
adjusted performance of actively managed funds in assessing their ability to 
outperform market indices.  The three classical performance evaluation techniques 
typically employed by prior studies have involved the Sharpe Ratio (1966), Jensen 
Measure (1968) and Treynor Index (1965).  These approaches are consistent with 
attempting to determine whether active funds meet their investment objective, which 
is to outperform the benchmark. 
Index fund strategies differ from actively managed funds in that passive funds 
aim to replicate the return and risk of the underlying benchmark index (Keim (1999)).  
If an index manager is unable to perfectly replicate the returns on a benchmark index 
(i.e. it experiences tracking error), then this is prima facie evidence that an index fund 
is not meeting its investment objective.  Roll (1992) also argues that the level of 
tracking error in performance is an important criterion for assessing fund manager’s 
(both active and passive) performance.  This is because the variability of a fund’s 
differential returns provides the performance analyst with a level of statistical 
confidence that the manager’s investment process has been implemented successfully.  
For these reasons, this essay investigates the ability of index funds to exactly mirror 
                                                 
57 The Mercer database covering wholesale funds includes both surviving and non-surviving funds.  
For the index fund category, no funds ceased to exist.  Correspondence with the portfolio managers 
concerning their competitors and discussions with William M. Mercer Pty. Ltd. indicated that this 
study includes the population of Australian equity index fund managers over the period examined.  The 
infancy of the passive funds market also helps to mitigate problems of survivorship.  However, given 
the study uses only one fund for each manager, the study may have selection bias. 
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the performance of the underlying index to which they are benchmarked – their 
tracking error. 
5.4.1 Measures of the Magnitude of Tracking Error 
Tracking error represents the extent to which the performance of a fund differs 
from the underlying benchmark index (Roll (1992)).  Pope and Yadav (1994) identify 
a number of different ways tracking error may be measured.  These are (1) the 
average of the absolute difference in returns between the fund and benchmark index, 
(2) the standard deviation of return differences between the fund and index, and (3) 
the standard error of a regression of fund returns on benchmark returns.  All of these 
measures are applied in this essay. 
Tracking error measured as the average absolute difference in returns (TE1,p) is 
calculated as follows: 
    TE1,p n
e
n
t
p∑
=1=   (5.1) 
where: 
btptpt RRe −=  
Rpt = the return of index portfolio p in period t; 
Rbt = the return of the benchmark index b in period t; and 
n = the number of observations in the period. 
This definition of tracking error provides a measure of the extent to which the 
returns on portfolio p differ from the returns on the underlying benchmark index b 
 187 
over the sample period.  This definition treats any deviation in returns 
(outperformance or underperformance of the index portfolio) as tracking error.  
Tracking error measured as the standard deviation of return differences 
between the fund and index is measured as follows: 
   TE2,p ∑
=
−−
n
t
ppt een 1
2)(
1
1=    
 
It is important to note, however, if an index fund consistently underperforms 
the index by x percent per month, then the use of this method will result in zero 
tracking error over the period (Roll (1992)).  The converse is also the case and would 
provide different conclusions concerning tracking error relative to (TE1,p).  The well-
known market model can also be used to generate an estimate of tracking error 
(TE3,p).  If the returns on the index funds portfolio p are regressed on the returns on 
the benchmark index b, as follows:  
       ptbtiipt
RR εβα ++= (5.3) 
(5.2) 
The standard error of the regression equation (the volatility of residuals (εpt) 
around the regression line) represents an estimate of tracking error.  While this 
method should provide similar results to (2), Pope and Yadav (1994) identify that if 
the beta of a portfolio is not exactly equal to one, then the regression residuals will 
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differ from the tracking error metric TE2,p.  If the relationship between the two sets of 
returns is non-linear, then this approach will overstate tracking error.58 
5.4.2 
                                                
Measures of Bias in Tracking Error 
The tracking error metrics above are concerned with the efficiency with which 
funds are able to track the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index, however, they do not 
indicate if there is a bias in performance.  That is, they do not determine whether 
passive funds systematically underperform (or indeed outperform) the index.  This 
essay assesses whether there is any bias in the performance of passive funds using two 
measures.  First, the variance or standard deviation statistic is a traditional measure of 
the efficiency of an estimate, while the expected or mean value can be used to assess 
bias (Gujarati (1995), p. 781).  Analogously, in addition to examining the standard 
deviation of return differences (TE2,p) to assess the efficiency of passive fund 
performance in tracking the index, the average difference in the return on the index 
fund and return on the index is examined to assess bias.  Second, given that the 
objective of pure index funds is to mimic the performance of the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index, the coefficient α in the market model (equation 5.3) is expected 
to be zero and β = 1.  Hence, the significance of the α coefficient is also examined for 
evidence of bias in tracking error. 
5.4.3 Determinants of Tracking Error 
The theory section identifies cash flows, transaction costs, index volatility, 
dividends, changes to the composition of the index and the index replication strategy 
 
 58 In addition to the market model, the parameters of the Capital Asset Pricing Model were also 
estimated.  The parameters for the CAPM were virtually identical to those reported for the market 
model. 
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employed by index equity funds (i.e. full replication and non-replication approach) as 
potential determinants of tracking error.  To test the significance of these variables in 
explaining tracking error, the following model is estimated: 
itpttptttptipt FRDINOUTDIVVOLSPRCFe εβββββα +++++++= 654321  
where pte  is the absolute value of tracking error in period t for fund p, CF represents 
the absolute value of the funds net monthly cash flow scaled by the index fund’s size 
(or normalised cash flow as per Gruber (1996)) and SPR is the market capitalisation-
weighted and time-weighted average bid-ask spread across securities in the index in 
percent (see McInish and Wood (1992)). VOL measures the volatility of the All 
Ordinaries Index and DIV is the dividend yield of securities comprising the index.59  
INOUT measures the percentage market capitalisation of stocks included and 
excluded from the All Ordinaries Index each month.60  FR is a dummy variable taking 
on a value of 1 if observation t is drawn from a full replication fund, otherwise 0. 
5.5 Empirical Results 
The tracking error and risk-adjusted performance of index equity managers 
evaluated in this essay are reported in Table 5.1 together with a number of other 
descriptive statistics.  Panel A of Table 5.1 reports the magnitude of tracking error for 
the entire sample period available for each fund. 
                                                 
59 DIV is measured as the difference in returns of the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index and All 
Ordinaries Price Index.  Volatility was measured using the standard deviation of daily returns for the 
All Ordinaries Price Index each month.  Alternative measures of volatility, including the Parkinson 
(1980) estimator (also outlined in Wiggins (1991)) were also evaluated, however these methods also 
provided consistent findings.  
60 The ASX amends the All Ordinaries Index at the close of trading each month.  This could be inferred 
as the change occurring at t-1.  However the change affects the market in period t. 
(5.4) 
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Based on TE1,p the magnitude of monthly tracking error ranges from an 
average of 3.0 basis points to 24.2 basis points across funds.  There is also evidence of 
considerable variability in tracking error for each fund through time.  For example, 
tracking error for fund VI ranges between 0.1 and 106.9 basis points across months.  
Given that differences in average tracking error are likely to be driven by time 
specific factors, the tracking error metrics in Panel A are not strictly comparable 
across funds because of the differences in sample periods.  Panel B reports tracking 
error metrics for the 4 funds with 60 months (5 years) of continuous data to March 
1999.  The magnitude of monthly tracking error based on TE1,p still exhibits 
considerable variability across funds ranging from an average of 7.4 basis points for 
fund III to 22.3 basis points for fund VI.  Monthly tracking error based on TE2,p is 
similar in magnitude ranging from 9.7 basis points for fund III to 28.5 basis points for 
the funds with 60 months of continuous data in Panel B.  Finally, measures of 
tracking error based on TE3,p are almost identical to those based on TE2,p. 
While the magnitude of the tracking error documented in Table 5.1 is small, a 
number of observations can be drawn.  First, Frino and Gallagher (2001) find that the 
tracking error for a sample of U.S. index funds averages between 3.9 and 11.0 basis 
points per month.  The comparable figures for Australian Index funds documented in 
this essay are substantially higher, ranging between 7.4 and 22.4 basis points.  Hence, 
passive funds in Australia appear to have greater difficulty in achieving index returns.  
This reflects, in part, the higher cost of trading the underlying portfolio of stocks in 
Australia.61   Second, a recent survey of Australian pooled index equity funds suggests 
that management fees range from approximately 0.5 basis points to 1.7 basis points 
                                                 
61For example, Aitken and Frino (1996) estimate that the average bid-ask spread of the largest 429 
stocks listed on the ASX in the second half of 1992 averaged 4.4 percent, while Jang and Venkatesh 
(1991) estimate that the average bid ask spread of all stocks trading on the NYSE averaged 1.4 percent 
in an earlier sample period. 
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per month (William M. Mercer, (1999)).  Hence, the tracking error documented in this 
essay, which is an implicit cost of investing in index funds, is many times greater than 
the explicit cost charged by the fund manager to investors (i.e. the management fee).  
Third, the average magnitude of the monthly movement in the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index over the five-year period examined in this essay was 2.93 
percent.  Hence, tracking error ranging between 7.4 and 22.3 basis points (TE1,p) 
represents between 2.5 percent and 7.6 percent, respectively, of the average 
magnitude of the movement in the benchmark. 
While there is evidence of significant tracking error in Table 5.1, there is no 
evidence of significant bias in performance.  For example, the mean difference in 
returns documented in Table 5.1 is negligible, and not significant based on standard t 
tests.  Further, the estimated α coefficients are also negligible in magnitude and not 
significant for any of the funds or sample periods.  This confirms that passive funds 
neither systematically outperformed nor underperformed the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index over the sample period.  In turn, this implies that investors with a 
long-term investment horizon will achieve investment returns that are similar to index 
returns.  However, investors with shorter investment horizons (e.g. 1 month) are likely 
to experience significant under or overperformance relative to the index. 
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Table 5.1 – Australian Equity Index Funds – Tracking Error And Risk Adjusted Performance 
   Absolute Difference in Returns  Differences in Returns  Market Model Parameters 
Fund Strategy  Mean             N SD Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max  Mean t-stat SD S.E. Reg. α t-stat β R2 
 (TE1,p) (TE2,p) (TE3,p)  
Panel A: All Index Funds Since Inception to March 1999 (Monthly Data)* 
I         0.041     
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
     0.001               
                    
                    
FR 10 0.030 0.024 0.003 0.010 0.026 0.052 0.071 -0.002 -0.18 0.040 -0.001 -0.05 0.998 1.000
II FR 117 0.120 0.113 0.000 0.046 0.104 0.163 0.781 0.006 0.36 0.165 0.167 0.006 0.37 1.000 0.998
III FR 80 0.112 0.122 0.001 0.030 0.076 0.152 0.797 -0.023 -1.24 0.164 0.165 -0.025 -1.35 1.004 0.998
IV O,S 36 0.122 0.122 0.000 0.036 0.086 0.173 0.556 0.036 1.27 0.170 0.172 0.034 1.16 1.003 0.998
V O,S 60 0.103 0.094 0.003 0.039 0.085 0.135 0.480 0.017 0.96 0.139 0.137 0.014 0.79 1.006 0.999
VI O 63 0.242 0.205 0.001 0.079 0.210 0.374 1.069 0.000 -0.01 0.319 0.315 0.007 0.17 0.982 0.993
VII O 21 0.104 0.111 0.001 0.042 0.071 0.157 0.466 0.018 0.53 0.153 0.157 0.019 0.55 0.997 0.999
Panel B: 5 Years to March 1999 (Monthly Data)* 
II FR 60 0.099 0.087 0.000 0.047 0.077 0.142 0.455 -0.016 -0.91 0.132 0.128 -0.011 -0.64 0.991 0.999
III FR 60 0.074 0.063 0.028 0.065 0.103 0.267 -0.012 -0.96 0.097 0.095 -0.009 -0.73 0.994 0.999
V O,S 60 0.103 0.094 0.003 0.039 0.085 0.134 0.480 0.017 0.96 0.139 0.137 0.014 0.79 1.006 0.999
VI O 60 0.223 0.175 0.001 0.078 0.170 0.368 0.648 0.012 0.34 0.285 0.285 0.017 0.46 0.990 0.994
              
* Panels A and B document tracking error metrics for All Ordinaries Accumulation Index funds.  Index funds are partitioned on the basis of portfolio strategy adopted in 
replicating the performance of the index where FR = full replication, S = stratified sampling and O = optimisation.  Panel A reports tracking error metrics from the inception of 
index funds to March 1999 using monthly data.  Panel B documents tracking error for index funds with continuous 5-year performance history to March 1999 using monthly data.  
All metrics are expressed in percentage terms.  N represents the number of observations for each index fund used in the analysis. 
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Table 5.2 reports the results of regression analysis testing the significance of the 
determinants of tracking error.  All t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using procedures developed by Newey and West (1987).  The F-statistic 
tests the joint significant of coefficients, and is significant at the 0.001 level.  This confirms 
that the overall model is significant. 
Table 5.2 – Determinants Of Tracking Error In Index Fund Performance 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 0.034  1.28 
CF 0.005  1.76 * 
SPR 0.147  2.14 ** 
VOL 0.034  1.68 * 
DIV 0.028
0.005
  0.77 
INOUT   0.61 
FR -0.045  -2.94 *** 
R2 Adjusted 0.089   
F-statistic 3.67 **  
Condition Index 6.316   
* significant at 0.10 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
t-statistics have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey-
West (1987b) method. 
The coefficients are expressed in percentage terms (i.e. 102) 
Consistent with expectations, the table documents the coefficients on CF, SPR and 
VOL are all positive and statistically significant.  This confirms that tracking error is 
positively and significantly related to fund cash-flows, the cost of trading stocks in the 
index portfolio and the volatility of the benchmark.  While the coefficients on DIV and 
INOUT are both positive, as expected, they are not statistically significant.  Hence, 
dividend payments and the entry and exit of stocks in the index are not significantly related 
to tracking error.  One explanation for the insignificance of dividend payments may lie in 
the use of dividend re-investment plans.  Dividend re-investment plans (DRPs) allow 
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investors to elect to receive stock to the value of the dividends paid in place of cash 
dividends.  DRPs can be used by fund managers to eliminate the costs of re-investing the 
dividends in the index portfolio, as well as differences in the actual time between the day 
the dividend is paid and re-invested and that assumed in constructing the index.  In 
Australia, index managers are likely to elect to use DRPs where possible to minimise 
tracking error in performance. 
Apart from suggesting that index funds experience significant (but unbiased) and 
time-varying tracking error per se, the results above also have at least two other 
implications.  First, in relation to the merits of an active versus passive investment strategy.  
The result that passive funds perform in line with the benchmark over a long-term period 
on a before expenses basis implies that they necessarily systematically underperform their 
benchmark on an after expenses basis.  In contrast, previous research has found that 
although active funds do not outperform the benchmark index, they perform roughly in line 
with the benchmark on an after expenses basis.  For example, Sawicki and Ong (2000) 
report an alpha for a sample of active Australian equity funds comparable with the index 
funds examined in this essay.  The alpha is close to zero and statistically insignificant.62  
Consistent with Gruber (1996) we interpret this as evidence that passive funds are not 
necessarily an unambiguous alternative to active funds.  Second, the results also have 
implications for the appropriateness of an index as a technical benchmark for measuring 
the performance of active funds.  The finding that passive fund performance is unbiased 
over the long term implies that the benchmark is achievable, and hence appropriate for use 
in performance assessment over a long sample period.  However, the tracking error 
experienced by passive funds over short term periods (i.e. one month) casts doubt over the 
                                                 
62  The most comparable result for active funds relative to the sample of passive funds examined in this study 
is the performance of NPST Australian Equities reported in Table 2 of Sawicki and Ong (2000).  Lines 7 and 
8 of Panel A in Table 2 report the results for active funds where performance estimates are based on before 
tax (and after expense) returns and a traditional Jensen model. 
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use of the technical benchmark in performance evaluation over short time intervals.63  The 
results imply that underperformance/overperformance in any month may simply be a 
function of a fund manager’s exposure to the factors that cause tracking error in the 
performance of passive funds, and cannot be attributed to the skill of a particular manager.  
Perhaps a more appropriate benchmark of performance over shorter periods is the 
performance of a comparable passive fund. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This is the first Australian study to examine the ability of Australian equity index 
funds to exactly mimic the underlying All Ordinaries Accumulation Index, and the first 
study to provide evidence on the determinants of tracking error in passive fund 
performance.  This essay confirms that Australian equity index funds do indeed exhibit 
tracking error in their performance, and there is considerable variability in performance 
both across funds and through time.  The magnitude of tracking error is significantly 
related to fund cash-flows, the cost of trading stocks in the index portfolio, the volatility of 
the benchmark and the investment strategy used by the fund manager.  This tracking error 
reflects the difficulties facing index equity managers in approximating the performance of 
a frictionless index, and represents an additional risk to investors in passive funds. 
While this essay provides evidence of tracking error in index fund performance, 
there is little evidence of a bias in fund performance over the sample period.  This implies 
that investors who engage the services of index managers with long investment horizons 
ultimately achieve returns that are commensurate with those of the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index before expenses. 
                                                 
63  Asset consultants regularly compare the performance of specific active funds on a monthly basis and draw 
conclusions regarding changes in their performance (e.g. performance surveys).  
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The results reported in this essay also have implications for the debate on whether 
passive funds represent a better investment than active funds, and the appropriateness of an 
index as a benchmark in performance evaluation.  First, a comparison of results to previous 
research on active funds (e.g. Sawicki and Ong (2000)) suggests, after taking into account 
costs, that passive funds are not necessarily a superior alternative to active funds.  Second, 
the results also imply that while the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index is suitable for 
estimating performance over a long sample period, the degree of tracking error 
experienced by passive funds on a monthly basis casts doubt on the appropriateness of 
using an index as a benchmark for assessing performance over short-term periods.  
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6 
 
CHAPTER 6 – TRACKING S&P 500 INDEX FUNDS 
6.1 Introduction 
“When we buy an actively managed fund, we are like gamblers in Vegas.  We know 
it is likely to be a losing proposition, yet somehow we feel we are getting our money's 
worth." 
 
The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2001 
 
This recent quote from The Wall Street Journal highlights both investors’ and 
gamblers’ psychology in their attempt to maximise the returns attributable to their 
respective activities.  However, the implication of this statement is that both agents are 
rational with respect to the likely outcome – an acceptance of the economic and statistical 
laws that ensure the strategy cannot be ‘successful’ for all participants.  Indeed, Gruber 
(1996) highlights the apparent ‘puzzle’ surrounding the growth in actively managed mutual 
funds, where investors have directed significant mutual fund flows into the sector.  In 
addition, the Investment Company Institute reported significant growth in U.S. stock 
mutual funds over the last calendar year.  Net new cash flows increased to a record 
$US309 billion as at December 2000, with the vast majority of net new money allocated to 
active funds.  This preference in favour of active funds has continued despite the large 
volume of empirical evidence indicating active funds do not earn abnormal returns.  While 
Zheng (1999) documents evidence of a ‘smart-money’ effect in the short-term, where new 
money flows predict future performance, in aggregate active funds with positive new 
money flows do not beat the market.  In addition, despite performance persistence being 
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well documented in the literature, Carhart (1997) finds the phenomenon is almost 
completely attributable to common factors in stock returns and investment expenses rather 
than superior portfolio management ability. 
The rationale behind the average investor allocating capital to active funds appears 
to make little economic sense, especially when one considers the definition of a benchmark 
index and the implications an index has for performance measurement.  Sharpe (1991) 
asserts in the ‘Arithmetic of Active Management’ that on average, active managers cannot 
outperform the returns derived from passive investment strategies.  The reasoning is that 
the performance of the index equals the weighted-average return of both active and passive 
investors before investment expenses.  Therefore by definition, active management is a 
zero-sum game.64 
Despite the significant attention received by active funds in the performance 
evaluation literature, empirical research evaluating index funds is surprisingly scarce.  This 
is even more perplexing when one considers U.S. stock-index mutual funds and other 
index portfolios accounted for more than $US1.5 trillion in assets at December 2000.  
Significant growth has occurred in both the proportion of indexed assets invested in 
diversified U.S. stock funds and the number of index mutual funds available.  Lipper Inc. 
reports that indexed assets represented about 12 percent of total assets at December 2000, 
compared to around 5 percent in 1995.  In terms of index mutual fund offerings, 
Morningstar Inc. tracked 190 index mutual funds at December 2000, or more than double 
the number five years ago.  Approximately half of these funds (94 funds) track the S&P 
                                                 
64 If index assets as a proportion of the total index increases, ceteris paribus, the average active investor must 
still earn the return on the underlying index, such that active management remains a zero sum game.  The 
assumption is active and passive investors select stocks from the same basket of securities, with the only 
difference being their relative weighting. 
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500 and are valued in excess of $US272 billion.65  Indexing also has increased in 
significance with respect to the growth in exchange-traded funds (ETFs).  Since the 
introduction of the first ETF in 1993 (the Standard & Poor’s 500 Depository Receipt 
(SPDR) or ‘Spider’), total ETF assets have approximately doubled in the past year to 
$US70 billion at December 2000. 
While the ‘theory’ and objectives of an index strategy are both simple and well 
known, potential difficulties arise for index managers attempting to exactly replicate the 
returns of the target benchmark.  There are a number of factors that are likely to influence 
the magnitude of index fund tracking error, however the primary source of the problem is 
due to the underlying index being measured as a ‘paper’ portfolio, which assumes 
transactions may occur at any time without cost.  Tracking error in index fund performance 
is therefore unavoidable given the existence of market frictions facing index managers.  
Therefore, the secondary objective for index managers involves managing these constraints 
so as to minimise the divergence in performance from the underlying benchmark index. 
This essay highlights the difficulties faced by index funds, examines both the 
magnitude and variation of tracking error over time for a sample of S&P 500 index mutual 
funds, and provides a direct performance comparison between index and active mutual 
funds.  Consistent with the empirical evidence, S&P 500 index mutual funds are found to 
outperform active funds, on average, after expenses in the period examined. 
                                                 
65 Another specific example of the growth in indexing is the total assets invested in the Vanguard 500 Index 
Fund.  The Vanguard 500 grew from around $US2 billion to over $US100 billion in the period 1990-2000 to 
become the second largest U.S. mutual fund. 
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6.2 
                                                
The Challenge Facing Index Managers 
Index funds aim to deliver the returns and the risk of the underlying benchmark 
index.  Theoretically, the management of index portfolios is straightforward, requiring 
investment in all constituent index securities in the exact same proportion as the underlying 
benchmark (known as a ‘full replication’ strategy).66  However in reality, fund managers 
adopting an indexing approach cannot guarantee their portfolios’ performance will be 
identical to the benchmark index.  This is due to the fact that an index represents a 
mathematical calculation derived from a portfolio of securities that are not subject to the 
same market frictions faced by index mutual funds.  If the composition of the underlying 
index changes, the index assumes the theoretical portfolio’s new weights to each security 
can be achieved automatically.  However, index fund managers cannot make the same 
assumptions, as physical trading in index stocks will be required in order to re-align the 
portfolio to mimic the underlying benchmark.  Market frictions in the management of 
passive portfolios ensure that tracking error, measuring the differences in returns between 
the portfolio and the index, must be minimised in order that an index fund’s objectives are 
not significantly compromised.67 
Chiang (1998) identifies the main factors driving index fund tracking error as 
transaction costs, fund cash flows, the treatment of dividends by the index, the volatility of 
the benchmark, corporate activity and index composition changes.  The liquidity of the 
underlying index will also have implications for transaction costs and hence the tracking 
 
66 Alternative approaches to full replication involve either ‘stratified sampling’ and ‘optimization’ portfolio 
strategies. Stratified sampling and optimized portfolios on the other hand are non-replication strategies 
designed to mimic the index through investment in a subset of index securities, while at the same time 
ensuring that the portfolio has similar risk and return characteristics as the index (e.g. risk attributes 
pertaining to size, industry and dividend yield).  The portfolio technique employed by index managers will in 
part be dependent upon the liquidity of the underlying index.  S&P 500 index mutual funds predominantly 
adopt a full replication approach. 
67 Tracking error is also commonly expressed in terms of the volatility (standard deviation) of return 
differences between the fund and the index (see Roll (1992)). 
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error incurred by index funds (Keim (1999)).  Consequently, tracking error in performance 
will be inherent in the management of index portfolios, leaving index managers with the 
dual objective of minimising tracking error in performance as well as minimising the costs 
incurred in tracking the index as closely as possible.  Therefore a trade-off exists between 
tracking error minimisation and transaction costs. 
Transaction costs associated with trading in securities markets influence the ability 
of index mutual funds to replicate the performance of the index.  The index itself is 
calculated as a ‘paper’ portfolio that assumes transactions can occur instantaneously, in 
unlimited quantities and without cost (Perold (1988)).  In reality, index funds incur 
transaction costs that are associated with portfolio implementation, rebalancing and client 
capital flows.68  For example, cash flow movements cause flow-induced trading for open-
end index mutual funds, requiring the new cash to be rapidly invested across index 
securities.  The size and timing of the cash flows, as well as the index manager’s use or 
otherwise of derivative instruments, may also be related to tracking error in performance.  
Since index funds are required to trade securities in order to mimic the underlying 
benchmark index, transaction costs (both explicit and implicit) ensure index funds exhibit 
tracking error.  The liquidity of stocks comprising the index also has implications for 
transaction costs, as full replication index funds require some proportion of fund assets to 
be invested in less liquid securities (Keim (1999)). 
Tracking error may also be related to changes in the composition of the index.  
These include index adjustments related to company additions and deletions, share changes 
and corporate restructuring.  Periodical changes to the index can make it difficult for an 
                                                 
68 Transaction costs for index mutual funds include both explicit costs (brokerage and taxes) and implicit 
costs (market impact and market bid-ask spreads).  Opportunity costs are non-existent for index funds, as 
passive funds do not engage in information-motivated trading (see Keim and Madhavan (1998)). 
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index fund to exactly replicate the target benchmark return.  Again, additional transaction 
costs are incurred, as changes in the composition of the index require passive funds to trade 
index securities in order to re-align their portfolios with the ‘new’ index.  Depending on 
the relative size of the stocks entering and exiting the index (in terms of market 
capitalisation), changes will require a number of odd-lot transactions in order to match the 
rebalanced index.  The index manager also faces the additional challenge of executing 
orders at the best possible prices and in such a manner that minimises the crystallisation of 
capital gains tax liabilities to avoid significant erosion of returns.  In the case of securities, 
which are subject to corporate restructuring, such as a merger or takeover by another 
company outside the index, a timing delay may exist between the date when the index fund 
receives the cash settlement and when the target firm is ultimately removed from the index.  
In addition, ‘front-running’ by ‘risk arbitrageurs’ (who acquire securities ahead of their 
inclusion in the index) may also have an undesirable impact (Beneish and Whaley (1996)). 
If an index fund is perfectly aligned with the index, ceteris paribus, index volatility 
should not result in tracking error.  However, where index portfolios do not exactly mirror 
the benchmark, volatility of the index will induce tracking error for index funds.  Indeed, 
the magnitude of tracking error should be directly related to the extent of volatility of the 
underlying securities comprising the index.  Dividends may also cause tracking error in 
performance where there is a timing delay in their receipt as well as the index rules 
governing the treatment of dividends in the index.  For example, if there is a timing delay 
between when the index incorporates the dividend (at the ex-dividend date) and the actual 
receipt of the dividend by the index fund (after the ex-dividend date), tracking error will be 
unavoidable.  In the case of S&P 500 constituent securities, actual receipt of dividends can 
take as long as several weeks.  This ‘dividend effect’ may be minimised by index managers 
through participation in dividend reinvestment plans, however it is generally uncommon 
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for S&P 500 constituent securities to distribute dividends in the form of new securities.  
Where an index assumes that dividends are ‘smoothed’, the dividend effect may cause 
index managers to incur tracking error in their performance. 
While tracking error will be inherent in index fund performance, investors 
reasonably expect index fund returns will only underperform the underlying index by a 
similar magnitude to the management fees charged by mutual funds.  Indeed, investors 
may consider index performance net of index fund charges to be a more optimal 
investment strategy than active management.  There are a number of sound reasons why 
this philosophy may exist.  Firstly, the overwhelming majority of performance evaluation 
studies over the last three-and-a-half decades has confirmed empirically the inability of 
active mutual funds to outperform market indices (for example, Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel 
(1995) and Gruber (1996)).  Secondly, if active management incurs significantly higher 
transaction costs in executing the strategy (compared with passive management), then the 
higher expense ratios charged by active mutual funds will translate into lower after 
expenses returns to investors (see Keim and Madhavan (1998)).  In the third instance, the 
higher turnover exhibited by active funds has a potentially larger effect on future capital 
gains tax liabilities, which further diminishes after expenses and after tax performance. 
6.3 
                                                
Analysis of S&P 500 Index Fund Tracking Error 
The essay uses a sample of 42 S&P 500 index mutual funds contained on the 
Morningstar Principia Pro CD-ROM in measuring tracking error.69  The analysis period 
 
69 The Morningstar data set has the standard survivorship-bias problem contained in the vast majority of 
performance evaluation studies. Funds ceasing to exist typically have their performance records removed 
from the database, as subscribing clients would find historical records of prior funds irrelevant.  However, in 
terms of survivorship bias for index mutual funds, the bias is expected to be small for two reasons; (1) the 
limited evaluation period arising from the relative infancy of the index mutual fund market and (2) by virtue 
of the strategy employed by index funds. 
 204 
spans the five years to February 1999, and while relatively short, is limited due to data 
availability arising from the relative infancy of the index mutual fund market.70  The five-
year time-frame maximises both the number of funds included in the sample and the length 
of the evaluation horizon.  Morningstar reports total monthly fund returns data (income and 
capital gains) after expenses.  In order to estimate tracking error before expenses, the index 
fund returns have been adjusted with reference to the reported historical fund expenses 
ratios in order to approximate gross returns (i.e. expenses are added back to net returns).71  
All S&P 500 index funds are classified by Morningstar as exhibiting a growth-and-income 
prospectus objective, which is consistent with a passive, style-neutral strategy.  Funds 
under management for the sample grew from $US18.0 billion as at December 1993 to 
more than $US161 billion as at February 1999, representing an approximate nine-fold 
increase.  The two Vanguard index mutual funds included in the sample account for 
approximately $US102 billion of total sample assets indexed to the S&P 500 at February 
1999. 
Roll (1992), Pope and Yadav (1994) and Larsen and Resnick (1998) identify a 
number of ways in which tracking error can be measured.  In this essay, tracking error is 
measured using three methods.  First, tracking error in month t is calculated as the absolute 
difference in returns of the index portfolio and benchmark index (ept = Rpt - Rbt), where the 
monthly average absolute tracking error over n months (TE ) is defined as follows: p,1
                                                 
70 While the Vanguard 500 index mutual fund was the first passively managed product offered to investors in 
1976, the availability of these types of funds was extremely limited until the 1990s.  The sample period 
adopted both maximized the number of funds included in the sample as well as providing a reasonable 
performance horizon for analysis.  The criterion for inclusion of index mutual funds in the sample required 
availability of 60 continuous months of performance data in the five-year period.  Gruber’s (1996) evaluation 
of index fund performance was similarly constrained due to index funds having relatively short performance 
histories.  Gruber’s evaluation period for index mutual funds was the five years 1990-1994. 
71 Morningstar Inc. reports returns after expenses, which account for management fees, administration and 
12b-1 fees and other asset-based costs, but excludes brokerage costs. Morningstar reports that mutual fund 
expense ratios are accrued on a daily basis, ensuring minimal daily effects to a fund’s net asset value (NAV). 
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An alternative test for tracking error, and the standard methodology used in 
industry, measures the month-to-month variability (standard deviation) of the difference in 
returns between the index portfolio and the underlying benchmark index return (TE ) and 
is expressed as:
p,2
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Tracking error may also be quantified as the standard error of the residuals of a 
returns regression (TE ).  If the return on the index portfolio p is regressed on the return 
of the benchmark index b, the standard error of the regression equation provides an 
estimate of tracking error.  The model is as follows: 
p,3
ptbtiipt RR εβα ++=  
While this method should provide similar results to (2), Pope and Yadav (1994) 
note that if the beta is not exactly equal to one, then the regression residuals will differ 
from .  That is, if the relationship between the index portfolio and benchmark index 
returns is non-linear, then this approach will overstate tracking error. 
pTE ,2
                                                 
72 Roll (1992) notes, however, that if an index fund consistently outperforms the index by x percent per 
month, then the use of this method will result in zero tracking error.  The converse is also the case.  Pope and 
Yadav (1994) also warn of potential estimation bias in tracking error arising from the use of high frequency 
data (i.e. daily or weekly data).  They show that negative serial correlation in tracking error can bias upwards 
the estimate of tracking error.  The use of less frequent data (i.e. monthly) does not lead to significantly 
negative serial correlation in our analysis. 
(6.1) 
(6.3) 
(6.2) 
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6.4 Tests for Seasonality in Tracking Error 
This essay evaluates the potential existence of seasonality in index fund tracking 
error.  The financial economics literature has documented the existence of seasonality in 
both stock returns and market bid-ask spreads, particularly the infamous ‘January effect’.  
The existence of seasonality in tracking error of S&P 500 index mutual funds would then 
require identification of the drivers explaining the time variation in tracking error.  For 
example, seasonality may be shown to exist in months where stocks go ex-dividend or in 
months of abnormal volatility.  Seasonality in mean monthly tracking error is tested using 
the following dummy variable OLS regression: 
ept  = π1 +  +ε∑
=
12
2t
iti Dπ pt (6.4) 
where: 
π1 = the intercept of the regression model measuring the average absolute tracking error in 
month of January; 
Dit = seasonal dummy variable for calendar month i; 
i = February,…, December; 
εpt = random error term with expected mean of zero. 
The dummy variable coefficients indicate the mean difference in index fund 
tracking error between January and each respective month.  If tracking error is not 
significantly different across calendar months, the coefficients on the dummy variables will 
be close to zero and the F-statistic (measuring the joint significance of the dummy variable 
coefficients) will be statistically insignificant. 
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6.5 S&P 500 Mutual Fund Raw and Risk-Adjusted Performance 
Mutual fund performance for active mutual funds is evaluated using a raw returns 
approach (method A) and three risk-adjusted performance models (methods B, C and D) 
where returns are measured in excess of the risk free rate (or return in excess of T-bills).  
These methodologies are described below:  
(A) the raw returns approach (ignoring risk adjustment in performance), which 
measures the contribution of value added or lost by the fund relative to the S&P 
500; 
(B) the single index model, where fund risk-adjusted excess returns (in excess of 
Treasury bills) are estimated using the S&P 500 index as the market portfolio (i.e. 
equation 3, where returns are measured in excess of the risk free rate); 
(C) the Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996a) four-index model: 
ptBtpBGVtpGVSLtpSLtSPSPpppt RRRRR εββββα +++++= 4  
 
                                                
where α4 measures a fund’s risk-adjusted excess return with respect to the set of 
risk factors, defined as the S&P 500 (βSP), two Prudential Bache indices controlling 
for market capitalisation (βSL) and growth-value strategies (βGV), and a proxy for 
bond returns (βB) using the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index.73  Elton et al. 
(1993) and Elton et al. (1996a) advocate the use of additional indices due to 
potential sensitivity of fund performance to the choice of benchmark used.  The 
 
73 See Elton et al. (1996a) for an extensive description of the market capitalization, growth-value and bond 
indices used in their model.  Our bond factor did not account for high-yield bonds.  The four-index model has 
similar proxies (albeit with an additional factor) to the Fama-French three-factor model. 
(6.5) 
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additional indices also capture risk characteristics with respect to mutual fund 
investment style as well as accounting for non-S&P 500 securities that may 
comprise part of an active fund’s portfolio.  These additional benchmarks improve 
the quantification of portfolio risk. 
(D) a performance attribution model combining the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) market 
timing model and Elton-Gruber-Blake (1996a) four-index model.  The TMEGB 
model decomposes fund performance into security selection (α ) and market 
timing (γSP) components.   The TMEGB model is defined as follows for portfolio p: 
SS
p4
ptBtpBGVtpGVSLtpSLtSPSPptSPpSP
SS
ppt RRRRRR εβββγβα ++++++= 24  (6.6) 
The coefficient on the quadratic term is used to determine the market timing ability 
of an active mutual fund.  The TMEGB model therefore provides a direct 
comparison between the security selection performances of index and active mutual 
funds. 
 
Index mutual fund performance is measured using methods A and B only, as these 
methods represent the most appropriate performance methodologies with respect to an 
index fund’s investment objectives.  S&P 500 index funds attempt to replicate the 
performance of the S&P 500 and, as a consequence, do not exhibit style biases.  In 
addition, index funds do not engage in market timing activities.  Therefore, methodologies 
C and D are not appropriate performance models to assess index fund performance and are 
therefore not considered in the analysis. 
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The performance of active and index mutual funds are evaluated after expenses.  
The study evaluates active funds classified by Morningstar within the large-capitalisation 
category, as these funds are the most appropriate for directly comparing active fund 
performance relative to S&P 500 index funds. prising the sample were 
required to have continuous performance histories over the respective observation periods.  
Performance is analysed using two sample periods: the first evaluation horizon is the eight-
year period to February 1999 and the second period is the five years to February 1999.  
The eight-year horizon contains a sample of 343 active and 15 index mutual funds while 
the five-year sample evaluates 607 active and 42 index mutual funds.  The shorter five-
year period was included in an attempt to increase the sample of index funds and hence aid 
performance comparisons against active funds.  Overall, both evaluation periods are 
somewhat constrained due to the limited number of index mutual funds available in the 
Morningstar database, however the analysis permits sufficient comparison between active 
and passive portfolio management. 
                                                
74  All funds com
The analysis was also performed with reference to the Morningstar prospectus 
descriptions over time, which permitted funds to be partitioned on the basis of the portfolio 
management approach adopted (full replication or non-replication) and the investment 
 
74 Morningstar classifies equity mutual funds on the basis of a fund’s self-reported investment objective 
(aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, income) and according to investment style.  In terms of 
investment style, Morningstar ranks funds on the basis of market capitalization and valuation relative to the 
S&P 500 index.  Investment style is then classified into a three-by-three matrix where market capitalization is 
represented on the vertical axis and valuation on the horizontal axis.  Market capitalization is dichotomized 
into large, medium and small and the valuation category is split into value, growth and ‘blend’ (where blend 
is a combination of value and growth).  The first criteria for inclusion in the sample required equity funds to 
be classified within the large-capitalization category.  All S&P 500 index funds are categorized within 
Morningstar’s large-blend category, hence it is most appropriate that active funds are also selected from the 
large-cap category.  This is due to active funds in the large-cap category being more likely to hold a larger 
proportion of S&P 500 stocks in their portfolios.  Second, each active fund’s investment objective was 
evaluated to determine the appropriateness of applying the S&P 500 Index as a performance benchmark.  
Third, active funds were removed where security selection limitations existed (for example, if the fund was 
required to meet ethical and/or environmental criteria). 
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strategy adopted by active funds (aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, 
income).75 
The Morningstar data set has the standard survivorship-bias problem contained in 
the vast majority of performance evaluation studies, where funds ceasing are excluded 
from the data records.  Survivorship bias skews the results toward the more successful 
funds, as there is generally a higher attrition rate among the poor performers.76 
6.6 
                                                
Empirical Results 
Table 6.1 documents the magnitude of tracking error and risk-adjusted performance 
of index mutual funds comprising the sample.  The cross-sectional average TE  is equal 
to 5.9 basis points per month and is in the range of 3.9 and 11.0 basis points per month 
before expenses.  In other words, market frictions induce tracking error in S&P 500 index 
fund performance.  Tracking error estimates using TE  or TE  methods, as expected, 
provide very similar results.  The cross-sectional average S&P 500 index mutual fund’s 
tracking error (TE ) in the sample period is 8.0 basis points per month or 27.6 basis 
points per annum.  TE  across funds ranges between 5.1 and 20.8 basis points per month, 
equivalent to 17.7 and 72.1 basis points annualised.
p,1
p,2 p,3
p,2
p,2
77  In light of Pope and Yadav’s (1994) 
warning of potential tracking error estimation bias, the serial correlation results (presented 
in the S.C.C. column) indicate the use of monthly data is not problematic.  In terms of the 
risk-adjusted performance of index mutual funds, all alphas are equal to or very close to 
zero and systematic risk (β) is in line with the S&P 500.  In summary, these results 
 
75 The majority of S&P 500 Index mutual funds in our sample employ a full replication approach, which is 
not surprising as stocks comprising the S&P 500 are highly liquid. 
76 See Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) and Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996b). 
77 Consistent with Pope and Yadav (1994), the annualized TE2 metric is calculated by multiplying the 
standard deviation (employing monthly data) by √12. 
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demonstrate tracking error over time is inherent in performance, however, the overall 
performance objectives of index funds are not compromised. 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 present the results of tracking error variation over time for 
index funds in the sample.  The evidence clearly indicates the presence of a seasonal 
pattern in S&P 500 index mutual fund tracking.  Tracking error is significantly higher in 
the months of January and May and lowest in June.  The existence of a strong quarterly 
pattern (trough) is also evident, suggesting S&P 500 index mutual funds experience 
improved replication ability in the months of March, June, September and December.  
These quarterly troughs are followed by sharp reversals in each of the subsequent months, 
with the exception of October, although the month of October still exhibits higher tracking 
error post-September.  Further analysis of individual calendar years (not directly reported 
in this essay) also appears to support the quarterly seasonal pattern of a trough in tracking 
error in the months of March to December as well as significantly higher tracking error for 
index funds in January compared with other months. 
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Table .  – S&P 500 Index Mutual Fund Tracking Error And Risk-Adjusted Performance 
R  2
(TE ) 1  (TE ) 2 (TE ) 3
6 1
 
Tracking error and risk-adjusted returns are expressed in percentage terms per month, where expenses have been added back to index mutual fund returns to approximate 
gross returns. 
Absolute Difference in Returns   S.C.C.  S.E.R.  S.I.M. Parameters 
S&P 500 Index Mutual Fund Mean SD Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max  Mean   SD  ρ (1)*    Error α* β
 
BlackRock Index Equity Instl                   0.073 0.058 0.002 0.028 0.057 0.096 0.230 -0.015 0.093 -0.092 0.092 -0.009 0.996 0.999
BlackRock Index Equity Inv A 0.110 0.176 0.002 0.025 0.051 0.116       -0.087    -0.004 0.993  
BlackRock Index Equity Svc                   
0.000              1.000 
              
0.044 
DFA U.S. Large Company               
0.465 
               1.000 
              
             -0.092    0.002   
              
         0.058     
Fidelity Spartan U.S. Eq Idx      0.062         
              
              
              
             
              
1.035 -0.014 0.208 0.208 0.997
0.079 0.060 0.000 0.026 0.078 0.122 0.254 -0.014 0.099 -0.090 0.097 -0.006 0.994 0.999
BT Instl Equity 500 Index 0.048 0.054 0.006 0.039 0.073 0.331 0.005 0.072 -0.089 0.072 0.009 0.997
BT Investment Equity 500 Idx 0.060 0.060 0.000 0.014 0.039 0.103 0.323 0.005 0.086 -0.086 0.085 0.011 0.996 1.000
California Invmt S&P 500 Idx 0.059 0.050 0.004 0.020 0.094 0.220  0.005  0.078  -0.088  0.075  0.014 0.994 1.000 
0.056 0.047 0.002 0.018 0.045 0.083 0.174 0.003 0.073 -0.090 0.071 0.011 0.995 1.000
Dreyfus Basic S&P 500 Stock 0.054 0.068 0.000 0.016 0.036 0.062  -0.001  0.087  -0.089  0.087  -0.001 1.000 1.000 
Dreyfus S&P 500 Index 0.049 0.043 0.001 0.016 0.030 0.085 0.156 -0.002 0.065 -0.089 0.066 -0.001 0.999
Evergreen Sel Equity Idx Is 0.092 0.077 0.002 0.034 0.068 0.136 0.438 -0.012 0.120 -0.081 0.117 -0.001 0.993 0.999
Federated Max-Cap Instl 0.059 0.048 0.001 0.018 0.051 0.081 0.198 -0.003 0.076 0.075 0.996 1.000
Federated Max-Cap Instl Svc 0.059 0.047 0.002 0.022 0.055 0.077 0.223 -0.006 0.076 -0.092 0.075 -0.001 0.997 1.000
Fidelity Spartan Market Idx 0.046 0.035 0.001 0.019 0.064 0.162 0.009 0.058 -0.091 0.010 0.999 1.000
0.049 0.037 0.000 0.023 0.040 0.075 0.158 0.002 -0.091 0.062 0.004 0.999 1.000
First American Equity Indx A 0.049 0.037 0.000 0.018 0.040 0.074 0.177  0.005  0.061  -0.092  0.061  0.008 0.998 1.000 
First American Equity Indx Y 0.049 0.040 0.002 0.019 0.038 0.073 0.158  0.006  0.063  -0.089  0.062  0.012 0.996 1.000 
Firstar Equity Index Instl 0.051 0.036 0.005 0.020 0.046 0.076 0.188 0.013 0.061 -0.092 0.062 0.014 1.000 1.000
Galaxy II Large Co Index Ret 0.052 0.041 0.001 0.018 0.045 0.074 0.197 0.004 0.066 -0.090 0.065 0.010 0.996 1.000
Kent Index Equity Instl 0.058 0.042 0.001 0.024 0.052 0.082 0.167 -0.008 0.071 -0.089 0.066 0.002 0.993 1.000
Kent Index Equity Invmt 0.049 0.042 0.000 0.016 0.035 0.072 0.167 -0.009 0.064 -0.090 0.061 -0.001 0.995 1.000
MainStay Equity Index A 0.071 0.054 0.000 0.029 0.065 0.102 0.280 -0.007 0.090 -0.087 0.084 0.005 0.992 1.000
  Return Differences
 
               
0.041 
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Table 6.1 Continued… Absolute Difference in Returns  Return Differences  S.C.C.  S.E.R.  S.I.M. Parameters 
S&P 500 Index Mutual Fund Mean SD Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max  Mean   SD  ρ (1)*    Error α* β R2 
(TE1)  (TE2)  (TE3) 
MainStay Inst Indx Eq Inst 0.057 0.046 0.001 0.022 0.050 0.077 0.201  0.009  0.073  -0.088  0.072  0.013 0.997 1.000 
MasterWorks S&P 500 Stock                   
                    
                    
                    
              
           -0.004 0.998  
One Group Equity Index A 0.003 0.052 0.081     0.078         
              
0.005               
0.022    0.015          0.999 
0.001               
0.071  0.333          
0.055               
                    
    0.014     -0.004           
0.000               
    0.133          
       0.155             
               0.996  
0.001 0.256        0.087  -0.001 0.998  
0.060 0.060 0.003 0.024 0.045 0.076 0.366 -0.009 0.085 -0.090 0.085 -0.006 0.998 1.000
Munder Index 500 A 0.052 0.043 0.001 0.014 0.050 0.075 0.192 -0.007 0.067 -0.093 0.067 -0.004 0.998 1.000
Munder Index 500 K 0.051 0.044 0.000 0.019 0.041 0.064 0.190 -0.007 0.068 -0.091 0.067 -0.001 0.996 1.000
Munder Index 500 Y 0.050 0.038 0.002 0.020 0.042 0.078 0.148 -0.004 0.063 -0.090 0.062 0.001 0.997 1.000
Nations Equity-Index Prim A 0.058 0.047 0.001 0.017 0.047 0.089 0.212 0.002 0.076 -0.090 0.072 0.012 0.994 1.000
Northern Instl Equity Idx A 0.044 0.038 0.002 0.015 0.031 0.059 0.163 -0.007 0.058 -0.091 0.058 1.000
0.060 0.049 0.021 0.255 0.000 -0.087 0.074 0.010 0.993 1.000
One Group Equity Index B 0.070 0.098 0.000 0.021 0.043 0.069 0.517 0.001 0.121 -0.089 0.111 0.018 0.988 0.999
One Group Equity Index I 0.057 0.049 0.021 0.044 0.081 0.252 0.003 0.075 -0.085 0.067 0.016 0.991 1.000
Pegasus Equity Index A 0.066 0.069 0.001 0.046 0.108 0.445 0.095 -0.095 0.094 0.021 0.995
Pegasus Equity Index I 0.068 0.072 0.015 0.049 0.104 0.456 0.008 0.099 -0.096 0.098 0.013 0.996 0.999
Prudential Stock Index Z 0.070 0.003 0.023 0.055 0.083 0.004 0.100  -0.083  0.094 0.017 0.991 0.999
SEI Index S&P 500 Index E 0.048 0.000 0.025 0.044 0.074 0.283 0.001 0.074 -0.088 0.074 0.005 0.998 1.000
SSgA S&P 500 Index 0.054 0.053 0.000 0.013 0.030 0.093 0.257 -0.010 0.075 -0.093 0.076 -0.010 1.000 1.000
Stagecoach Equity Index A 0.051 0.039 0.001 0.043 0.074 0.138 0.065 -0.090 0.060 0.005 0.994 1.000
T. Rowe Price Equity Idx 500 0.039 0.035 0.012 0.028 0.052 0.165 0.012 0.051 -0.090 0.051 0.014 0.999 1.000
Vanguard 500 Index 0.042 0.030 0.002 0.019 0.033 0.067 0.010 0.051  -0.091  0.051 0.010 1.000 1.000
Vanguard Instl Index 0.045 0.034 0.002 0.019 0.040 0.072 0.010 0.056 -0.091 0.056 0.010 1.000 1.000
Victory Stock Index 0.103 0.146 0.006 0.034 0.061 0.115 0.860 -0.011 0.097 -0.094 0.179 -0.003 0.998
Wachovia Equity Index A 0.063 0.060 0.020 0.050 0.087 -0.005 0.087 -0.090 1.000
               
* The returns difference method (TE2), serial correlation coefficient (S.C.C.) and risk-adjusted excess returns for S&P 500 index funds are all statistically insignificant.  The 
performance results are consistent with the expectations of an index investment management strategy, where alpha (α) is statistically indistinguishable from zero before costs 
and systematic risk (β) is equal to or approximates unity. 
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Table 6.2 – Dummy Variable OLS Regression Model Evaluating Seasonality In S&P 500 Index Mutual 
Fund Tracking Error (TE ) p,1
 Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept (January) 0.081 21.71 *** 
February -0.029 -5.53 *** 
March -0.034 -6.58 
-0.033 
*** 
April -0.010 -1.82 * 
May 0.003 0.59 
June -0.041 -7.89 *** 
July -0.017 -3.27 *** 
August -0.021 -4.01 *** 
September -0.036 -6.83 *** 
October -0.031 -5.94 *** 
November -0.018 -3.53 *** 
December -6.25 *** 
F-statistic - 15.07 *** 
DW-statistic - 1.43 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
Figure 6.1 – Average S&P 500 Index Mutual Fund Tracking Error (TE1) And Average Dividend 
Component Return On The S&P 500 Over Calendar Months: 1994 – 1999 (In Percentage Terms Per 
Month) 
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There are a number of factors that may explain the seasonality phenomenon of 
tracking error for index mutual funds.78  In particular, a ‘dividend effect’ may explain the 
sharp rises in tracking error for S&P 500 index funds immediately following the quarters 
ending March-June-September-December (although October’s reversal is not as dramatic).  
An evaluation of the return component attributable to dividends over the sample period 
reveals quarterly peaks for the months preceding the quarter ends, namely February, May, 
August and November.79  The month of May is particularly pronounced, followed by 
November, August and February respectively.  Constituent dividend-paying securities in 
the S&P 500 are assumed to reinvest dividends at the ex-dividend date, however there is 
likely to be a time lag between the ex-dividend date and actual receipt of the dividend.  
Mutual funds may not receive dividend disbursements until several weeks later and 
potentially in the month following the ex-dividend date.  Timing delays in the receipt of 
dividends makes perfect replication of the S&P 500 unachievable, and consequently 
tracking error arises. 
An empirical examination of the role of dividend payments reveals strong statistical 
evidence of a dividend effect driving the sharp increases in index mutual fund tracking 
error.  The dividend effect is particularly pronounced in May.  This coincides with the 
same month exhibiting the highest dividend component of return encapsulated in the S&P 
500 total return index.  The Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between 
tracking error (TE ) and the return attributable to dividends are both positive and 
statistically significant (ρ = 0.138 and 0.101 respectively at the 0.01 level).  Figure 6.1 can 
p,1
                                                 
78 Exhibit 1 indicates that some index funds exhibited abnormal or extreme monthly absolute tracking errors 
in the period.  Our seasonality analysis excluded an extremely small number of observations for three funds 
to help ensure seasonality was not significantly influenced by such outliers. 
79 The dividend component of returns is measured as the arithmetic difference between the S&P 500 
Composite index accounting for dividend and capital value changes (total return index) and capital value 
changes only (price index). 
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therefore be interpreted as index mutual fund managers experiencing tracking error when 
stocks go ex-dividend, however improved replication of the S&P 500 is achieved as 
dividends are received in the following month. 
Additional explanations for index mutual fund tracking error may be related to S&P 
500 index changes.  These include company additions and deletions as well as quarterly 
Index Divisor adjustments required to update all common shares outstanding for 
constituent S&P 500 stocks.  Standard & Poor’s pre-announces amendments to the S&P 
500, and index changes generally become effective up to five business days after the 
announcement.  While this policy is aimed at easing order imbalances, index managers 
typically wait until the effective date before portfolio adjustments are made to reflect the 
‘new’ S&P 500.  Index additions and deletions are unlikely to follow a consistent seasonal 
pattern, as amendments are generally not predictable.  Theoretically, tracking error may be 
related to S&P 500 index changes.  The magnitude of tracking error is likely to be 
dependent on the relative market capitalisation weights of stocks added or removed from 
the S&P 500 in the period. 
Tracking error for index mutual funds may also be significantly higher in January 
due to mutual fund flows.  Large net cash flows require the index manager to rapidly 
engage in securities trading to avoid ‘cash-drag’, or tracking error induced by holding 
liquid assets and not stocks.  Further, the existence of tax-related selling in December 
could also potentially drive the high tracking error recorded in the month of January.
Indeed, further research is warranted with respect to the determinants of tracking error in 
S&P 500 index fund performance. 
                                                
80  
 
80 Index managers not permitted to use derivatives may use S&P 500 ‘Spiders’, an exchange-traded security 
listed on AMEX, to equitise cash and improve index tracking. 
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Table 6.3 presents the after expenses performance of active and index mutual 
funds.  As expected, index funds earn significantly negative raw and risk-adjusted excess 
returns, where the margin of underperformance is roughly equivalent to the average 
expense ratio.  This is consistent with an index fund’s performance objective net of 
expenses.  In terms of performance comparison relative to active funds, Table 6.3 indicates 
index mutual funds outperformed active mutual funds.  The most appropriate performance 
measure for active funds is the Elton-Gruber-Blake (1996a) four-index model and the 
TMEGB performance attribution model.  Systematic risk (βSP) and the growth-value risk 
factor sensitivities (βGV) are consistent with the investment strategies adopted by active 
mutual funds.  In terms of risk-adjusted performance, the alphas estimated from the single 
index model (α1) and the four-index model (α4) both indicate the average active mutual 
fund significantly underperforms.  While index mutual funds also have significantly 
negative alpha (α1), the magnitude of underperformance is approximately equal to the 
average expense ratio levied by index mutual funds (2.9 and 3.4 basis points per month for 
the eight-year and five-year periods respectively).  Interestingly, active funds with growth-
and-income investment objectives (the same investment objective as S&P 500 index funds) 
record the worst performance of all active funds, and this result is consistent with Gruber’s 
(1996) findings.  Davis’ (2001) recent study corroborates the conclusions reported in this 
essay, where the performance of active equity mutual funds was evaluated with respect to 
the Fama-French three-factor model.  After controlling for factor sensitivities related to the 
market portfolio, market capitalisation and the ratio of book-to-market equity (or 
value/growth tilts), Davis (2001) also documents the inability of active funds to generate 
significantly positive risk-adjusted excess returns.  These findings were consistent across 
all investment styles. 
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Table 6.3 – Performance Comparison Between Active And Index S&P 500 Mutual Funds 
Returns are expressed in percentage terms per month after expenses. 
 R  bp RR −   1α   4α   SPβ  SLβ  GVβ  Bβ  2  
Panel A: 8-Year Period              
All Index Funds - Replication -0.036 *** -0.031 *** - -  
*** *** 0.048 
0.302 0.844 
0.876 
*** -0.121 0.139 
-0.045 0.891 
             
- 
-0.034 - 
Index – Non Replication -0.036 - 0.999 
0.916 
-0.115 *** 1.043 
*** 
0.937 
-0.555 
 0.996 - - 0.999 - 
All Active Funds -0.198 -0.125 *** -0.072 0.917 0.161 0.038 0.884 -0.074 *** 
Active - Aggressive Growth# -0.097  -0.188 *** -0.032  0.947 0.367 0.129 -0.014  
Active - Growth -0.119 *** -0.120 *** -0.037 ** 0.943 0.176 0.157 0.047 -0.035 ** 
Active - Growth and Income -0.255 -0.149 *** *** 0.920 -0.055 0.030 0.901 -0.135 *** 
Active - Income -0.311 *** ** -0.052 ** 0.824 0.161 -0.208 0.097 -0.019  
Panel B: 5-Year Period 
All Index Funds -0.035 *** -0.029 *** -  0.996 - - 0.999 -  
Index – Replication *** -0.027 *** -  0.995 - - 0.999 -  
-0.041 *** *** -  0.997 - - -  
All Active Funds -0.355 *** -0.293 *** -0.162 *** 0.944 0.131 0.041 -0.044 -0.170 *** 
Active - Aggressive Growth#  -0.379 -0.083  0.219 0.403 -0.040 0.893 -0.112  
Active - Growth -0.300 *** -0.312 -0.174 *** 0.969 0.121 0.134 -0.066 0.910 -0.178 *** 
Active - Growth and Income -0.389 *** -0.280 *** -0.162 *** 0.134 -0.052 -0.028 0.928 -0.181 *** 
Active - Income *** -0.216 *** -0.116 *** 0.833 0.155 -0.236 0.023 0.922 -0.105 *** 
SS
4α  
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
# Statistical significance affected due to small sample size 
In the case of index funds, R2 is the coefficient of determination.  For active funds, R2 represents the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
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In terms of the security selection performance of active mutual funds derived from 
the TMEGB model (α ), additional evidence is presented showing active funds 
underperform index funds.  While income-oriented active funds in the eight-year period 
show evidence of risk-adjusted performance after costs, approximating the return 
attributable to an index strategy, income equity funds are found to significantly 
underperform over the five-year horizon.  The potential influence of survivorship bias can 
also be observed for the active mutual fund sample by comparing the average eight-year 
and five-year risk-adjusted excess returns.  Active funds over the eight-year period 
outperformed the sample of active funds comprising the five-year period, indicating the 
likelihood of positive bias in fund alphas (or fund alphas having shifted to the right of the 
distribution) represented in the eight-year sample period. 
SS
4
6.7 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
This essay highlights the reasons why tracking error is inherent in index fund 
performance, empirically evaluates the magnitude of S&P 500 index fund tracking error 
and compares the performance of active funds relative to index mutual funds.  Index funds 
experience difficulties replicating the returns of the target index due to market frictions 
faced by index managers compared with an index that has no frictions and is calculated on 
the basis of holding a ‘paper’ portfolio of index securities.  Seasonality in S&P 500 index 
mutual fund tracking error is demonstrated, where tracking error is significantly higher in 
the months of January and May, together with a seasonal trough in the quarters ending 
March-June-September-December.  Statistical evidence indicates tracking error is both 
positively and significantly correlated with the dividend payments arising from constituent 
S&P 500 securities.  There are also likely to be other determinants that explain tracking 
error variation, including the size and timing of adjustments to the S&P 500 Index Divisor.  
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Future research is already well under way with respect to tracking error determinants and 
the existence of seasonality. 
The results of this essay concerning the performance of active mutual funds are 
consistent with the evidence presented in the literature.  Active funds on average 
significantly underperform passive benchmarks.  S&P 500 index mutual funds, on the basis 
of this research, earned higher risk-adjusted excess returns after expenses than large 
capitalisation-oriented active mutual funds in the period examined.  One may therefore 
conclude the S&P 500 is consistent with capital market efficiency.  These findings strongly 
suggest an absence of economic benefit accruing to the average investor utilising actively 
managed U.S. equity mutual funds investing in large-capitalisation stocks. 
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CHAPTER 7 - INVESTMENT MANAGER 
CHARACTERISTICS, STRATEGY, TOP MANAGEMENT 
CHANGES AND FUND PERFORMANCE 
7.1 Introduction 
The extent to which the investment performance of managed funds is related to 
investment manager attributes or characteristics is a largely unknown empirical question.  
This is despite the significant attention given to investment management organisations and 
their specific investment products by market regulators, the media, institutional and retail 
investors, institutional asset consultants (including William M. Mercer, Towers Perrin and 
Frank Russell Company) and fund ratings agencies and data providers such as 
Morningstar, ASSIRT and Rainmaker Information. 
While academic research to date has largely concentrated on the measurement of 
portfolio performance and the persistence phenomenon, research is sparse with respect to 
the determinants of investment performance and the specific characteristics or attributes 
differentiating the returns achieved by managers.  This study is motivated by the lack of 
empirical investigation, particularly due to the absence of Australian evidence, and 
evaluates performance differences on the basis of fund manager characteristics and 
strategy.  In particular, this essay examines whether a relationship exists between fund 
performance and an investment manager’s specific attributes.  In other words, this study 
considers the extent to which investment manager ‘ability’ or ‘skill’ is related to 
observable characteristics. 
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An examination of investment manager characteristics and fund performance is 
warranted on the basis of a number of institutionally motivated criteria.  First, the 
significant size of assets delegated by investors to professional fund managers in Australia 
ensures the issue is of great importance.  Rainmaker Information reported the total size of 
funds directly managed by asset managers at December 2000 was around $A692 billion, 
and has increased in the last year by 9.9 percent. 
Second, the aggressive marketing of investment managers, particularly in the retail 
market, results in significant advertising resources being expended to promote the 
investment manager’s brand name, track record of past success and educational 
propaganda highlighting the prospective advantages of future investments within their 
existing product offerings.  The marketing effort undertaken by an investment manager is 
typically geared around differentiating the investment strategy and performance of the 
institution relative to competing organisations.  The implication at the very least is that 
investment managers engage the public to believe that performance is indeed related to the 
‘quality’ of the investment manager, their staff, and the past performance success of their 
managed funds.81  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) must 
also ensure investment managers issue prospectuses outlining the investment activities and 
objectives of managed fund products in a manner that complies with the Corporations Law. 
Third, the reliance of institutional and retail investors on independent financial and 
investment advice is an additional motivating factor in the consideration of investment 
performance and manager characteristics.  Institutional superannuation funds typically 
employ the services of asset consultants in both the formulation and implementation of a 
                                                 
81 Fund managers are generally prudent in their advertising, where they use a variety of legal disclaimers 
mitigating their risk of loss through litigation by investors.  These disclaimers refer to the uncertainty of the 
future and the possibility that past performance is not a guide to future performance.  In addition, 
advertisements also encourage investors to seek professional advice before making investment decisions. 
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Plan’s investment strategy.  A recent study by Rainmaker as at 30 June 2000 indicated total 
institutional assets under the advice of asset consultants was in excess of A$150 billion.  
The selection of investment managers is a significant requirement of Plan trustees in the 
execution of their responsibilities to other Plan members.  Board trustee meetings 
involving a prospective investment manager generally proceed with a rigorous interview of 
short-listed candidates.  The actual short-list of investment managers is heavily reliant on 
both the qualitative and quantitative research undertaken by the asset consulting entity.  
The awarding of a new investment mandate by institutional investors therefore requires the 
differentiation of an asset manager’s product offerings, skills and organisational stability 
from competitors. 
In addition to institutional advice, retail investors are also served by financial 
planning organisations that rely on both internal and external research of investment 
manager products.  For example, ASSIRT and Morningstar have published fund manager 
and product ratings in the form of a ‘star’ rating, which attempts to provide investors with 
independent information concerning the suitability and quality of investment manager 
products.  There are numerous criteria evaluated by investment ratings agencies, both 
qualitative and quantitative, with the end result being the provision of a ‘star’ rating which 
summarises the investment credentials of managed fund products available.  Essentially, 
ratings agencies give consideration to three main issues – the investment professionals who 
manage the fund’s assets, the investment process adopted and the past performance 
achieved by the fund.  The extent to which one, two or a small number of investment 
professionals exercise significant control or direction over the implementation of an 
investment manager’s philosophy will also be a significant factor in determining the rating 
of a fund manager and the possible risks associated with departures of these key 
individuals. 
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Fourth, the financial media provide investors with regular commentaries 
concerning managed funds, their current unit prices, quarterly performance against an 
industry ‘peer’ group, new product offerings and significant personnel changes to the 
investment team or investment strategy adopted by the manager.  Investments in managed 
funds may therefore be seen to have similarities in the selection criteria applied to direct 
investments traded on securities exchanges, such that rational, risk-averse investors use all 
available information to determine whether a shareholding in the entity is an attractive 
investment strategy. 
This study makes a number of important contributions to the literature.  While 
managed fund performance measurement has received significant attention in the 
literature, there remains a significant gap concerning whether Australian managed fund 
performance can be explained by specific manager characteristics.  Primarily, this study 
evaluates the extent to which investors can use past information and events surrounding the 
operation of investment management organisations to predict investment performance.  In 
other words, this is the first Australian study to examine whether investment performance 
can be differentiated on the basis of investment manager attributes, and provides an 
Australian perspective to the work undertaken by Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) and Golec 
(1996) for U.S. mutual fund managers.  The study considers the years of tertiary education 
represented within the investment organisation, the investment management experience 
(and staff loyalty) exhibited by their personnel, the expenses charged by the manager, the 
size of assets under management, and the sensitivity of performance to changes in the 
senior management of the investment team.  The research also evaluates the mismatch 
between the period of tenure served by senior portfolio managers implementing the 
investment process and the actual operational life of managed funds.  In cases where the 
senior staff departs the firm, the study examines the extent to which senior individuals are 
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responsible for the manager’s performance and the extent to which mean reversion occurs 
in managed fund performance due to senior staff changes. 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows.  Section 7.2 provides further 
background concerning the importance of investment manager attributes and managed 
fund performance as well as a review of the literature.  Section 7.3 outlines the 
methodology used in evaluating whether investment manager performance can be 
differentiated on the basis of investment strategy, institutional size, quality of investment 
team and years of funds management experience.  The essay also considers the extent to 
which performance is affected due to significant changes in a fund manager’s senior 
investment personnel.  Section 7.4 describes the institutional environment in the Australian 
investment management industry and the data employed in the analysis.  Section 7.5 
presents the empirical results.  The final section concludes the study and makes 
suggestions for future research. 
7.2 Background and Literature Review 
7.2.1 Performance Evaluation 
The literature evaluating the performance of actively managed funds is extensive 
and the overall conclusions have been remarkably consistent, indicating that the average 
active fund is unable to earn significantly superior risk-adjusted excess returns to 
appropriate market or benchmark indices.  These findings have been largely consistent 
over almost 70 years, originating with the early work of Cowles (1933) through to the 
seminal studies of Sharpe (1966), Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Jensen (1968).  The 
empirical evidence over the last decade further supports the notion of capital market 
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efficiency, including Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Ferson and Schadt 
(1996), Cai et al. (1997), Blake and Timmermann (1998), Edelen (1999), Dahlquist et al. 
(2000) and Brown et al. (2001). 
However more recently, Wermers (2000) and Edelen (1999) have both questioned 
the finding that active managers underperform the index.  In the case of Edelen (1999), 
liquidity motivated trading by active mutual funds is documented as a significant 
explanation of why active funds underperform the benchmark, and in particular, that flow 
is an important determinant of poor market timing ability.  Meanwhile, Wermers (2000) 
finds that active mutual funds operate in an environment consistent with Grossman and 
Stiglitz’s (1980) informational efficiency hypothesis, where the average active fund selects 
stocks in a manner that delivers superior returns before costs, however after transaction 
costs and expenses, funds underperform.  Daniel et al. (1997) also present evidence 
consistent with the Grossman-Stiglitz hypothesis. 
The Australian evidence concerning managed fund performance is broadly 
consistent with other markets in the U.S., U.K., Japan and Sweden (for example, Robson 
(1986), Sinclair (1990), Hallahan and Faff (1999), Sawicki and Ong (2000), Gallagher 
(2001)).  However, the extent to which performance is predictable based on investment 
manager characteristics or attributes remains an important empirical question.  While the 
Australian literature documents active managers underperform market indices on average, 
the literature is almost non-existent in determining whether some managers exhibit better 
skills, investment philosophies, or are better able to earn superior returns through the 
implementation of their investment processes.  Indeed, the funds themselves are likely to 
be in existence for longer periods than the individuals comprising the investment team; 
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hence an evaluation of managed funds without reference to the investment team managing 
the fund represents an area of evaluation yet to be considered by the mainstream literature. 
7.2.2 Performance, Manager Characteristics and Strategy 
                                                
There exists a number of criteria likely to be considered by share investors, 
including the corporate strategy adopted, the profitability of the organisation (or likelihood 
of the firm continuing to operate into the future), the skills embodied by the firm’s senior 
executives and the overall corporate governance structure.  The selection of an investment 
manager should be similar, where the products offered to investors are scrutinised on the 
basis of the past success of the manager, stability, skills and experience of the investment 
team, acceptance of the investment philosophy implemented, and costs involved in 
utilising the manager’s services.  While there exists a large body of literature devoted to 
the measurement of mutual fund performance, the empirical work investigating the factors 
differentiating performance, and fund manager characteristics and incentives remains an 
emerging area of research. 
In the U.S., Chevalier and Ellison (1997, 1999a, 1999b) have been significant 
contributors, specifically evaluating portfolio manager incentives, mutual fund risk, and 
the relationship between performance and the education and experience of investment 
personnel.82  They find cross-sectional evidence indicating that fund managers attending 
more selective undergraduate universities or colleges exhibit higher risk-adjusted excess 
returns.  In addition, Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) find evidence that younger managers 
outperform those with more years of experience.83  Golec (1996) has also evaluated mutual 
 
82 Brown et al. (2001) have also evaluated career concerns pertaining to hedge fund managers, performance, 
risk and survival. 
83 Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) suggest this phenomenon may be attributable to older managers being 
comparatively less educated than younger managers, younger managers showing a stronger work ethic as a 
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fund manager characteristics and their performance, finding younger managers holding 
M.B.A. degrees and with longer tenure deliver investors superior risk-adjusted excess 
returns. 
The literature has also sought to disaggregate performance on the basis of the 
investment style or objective exhibited by mutual fund managers.  These studies have been 
motivated by an attempt to identify whether managers implementing different styles or 
investment objectives deliver investors superior returns to other strategies (including 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Elton et al. (1993), Gruber (1996), and Becker et al. 
(1999)).  Daniel et al. (1997) also analyse performance with benchmarks that account for 
differences in characteristics across mutual fund managers.  They find that aggressive 
growth and growth funds are able to deliver superior returns to investors after expenses, 
even though their investment expenses are the highest of all fund categories evaluated.  
Grinblatt and Titman (1993) also report that aggressive growth funds earned significantly 
positive risk-adjusted returns.  While Ippolito (1989) reports mutual fund performance 
consistent with Grossman-Stiglitz information efficiency, Elton et al. (1993) demonstrate 
that this conclusion is entirely attributable to the performance of non-S&P 500 assets held 
by mutual funds, and that adjustments to the benchmark reverse Ippolito’s (1989) findings.  
This essay also goes beyond the traditional investment objective and style classifications 
by considering the investment managers’ investment process and the implementation of 
their strategy. 
                                                                                                                                                    
means for rapid career advancement or due to the successful older managers retiring earlier or moving across 
to institutional funds management. 
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7.2.3 Performance Predictability 
Investors who rely on the advice of their stockbroker concerning the 
recommendations on equity securities may also rely on information from their financial 
adviser (retail investor) or asset consultant (institutional and superannuation investors) 
concerning the ‘rated’ managed funds offered by professional fund managers.  Indeed, a 
number of intermediaries including ASSIRT and Morningstar provide investment-related 
information in the form of a ‘rating’ across various asset classes for investment managers 
and the products offered to investors.  These recommendations rely on qualitative 
information based on the investment management team as well as quantitative data based 
on past returns to determine how well the investment manager’s strategy has been 
implemented and the track record of a manager’s investment performance. 
While past performance is one of the criteria considered in the ratings process, 
disclaimers are commonly used in the industry by both fund managers and ratings agencies 
expressing that “past performance is not necessarily indicative of future performance”.  
However, while these disclaimer clauses may be legally prudent, there have been a number 
of empirical studies citing a strong relation between performance in a prior period and 
subsequent performance (for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Elton et al. (1996a), Christopherson et al. (1998), and Allen and Tan 
(1999)).  In Australia, Hallahan (1999) also found past performance was a good predictor 
of future fund performance.  However Carhart (1997) found the persistence effect in U.S. 
mutual fund data was almost entirely attributable to the common factors in stock returns 
and management expense ratios levied by mutual funds.  In terms of predictive ability of 
ratings and U.S. mutual fund performance, Blake and Morey (1999) consider the role of 
out-of-sample Morningstar ratings and their predictive power concerning future mutual 
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fund performance.  They find evidence of high predictive ability among low-performing 
funds.  However, there is weak evidence of superior predictive power for 5-star rated 
funds.
                                                
84 
The literature also documents a performance-flow relation, where investors allocate 
funds on the basis of past performance, with the expectation of such funds outperforming 
in a subsequent period (for example, Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Zheng (1999) 
and Sawicki (2000)).  Jain and Wu (2000) investigate U.S. mutual fund advertising and 
find that while superior performance is detected in the pre-advertised period, funds do not 
earn superior returns in the post-advertising period.  In other words, advertising appears to 
be significantly related to superior performance prior to publication. 
7.2.4 Top Management Turnover and Performance 
Khorana (1996) examines the relationship between top management turnover for 
mutual fund managers and their prior performance.  Khorana (1996) finds evidence of an 
inverse relationship between manager replacements and performance (where performance 
is measured according to portfolio returns and the growth rate in assets).  The study also 
reports the replacement of mutual fund managers can be predicted up to two years prior to 
the eventual management change, and that replaced managers tend to exhibit higher 
portfolio turnover rates, higher expenses and greater systematic risk than non-replaced 
managers.  In a later study concerning the changes in management staff of equity and bond 
mutual funds and their effects on performance and asset inflows, Khorana (2001) reports a 
significant improvement (deterioration) in post-replacement performance for 
underperforming (overperforming) managers in prior periods, however the changes did not 
 
84 Sharpe (1998) and Blume (1998) have also examined the underlying properties of the ratings system used 
by Morningstar. 
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lead to managers deriving superior returns relative to market benchmarks.  Khorana (2001) 
also documents manager replacement being responsive to asset inflows, where poorly 
performing managers experience significantly lower asset inflows. 
7.3 Data 
This study employs a unique dataset of investment manager information and 
performance data spanning the 10-year period January 1991 to December 2000.  Most 
performance studies in the literature have relied on time-series data reported by investment 
managers concerning the performance of individual product offerings.  This study extends 
the literature by also considering qualitative information pertaining to individual 
investment management institutions, the processes and strategies implemented and other 
characteristics directly relevant to the firm. 
Qualitative information was obtained directly from the investment managers via 
standard Investment and Financial Services Association Limited (IFSA) annual manager 
surveys.  IFSA is the industry body that acts as the representative of the Australian 
investment management industry, and the surveys are undertaken for the benefit of and on 
behalf of asset consulting and investment advisory companies servicing the institutional 
market.  The annual questionnaire requires investment managers to provide detailed 
information on various aspects of their organisation.  This includes information pertaining 
to the ownership and capital structure of the firm, the professional staff employed 
(including qualifications held, investment experience, the number of years service (loyalty) 
accumulated with the current firm), the manager’s investment philosophy and style, the 
asset allocation strategy, investment charges, and products available to institutional clients. 
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The questionnaire permits the investment manager to provide both qualitative and 
quantitative information for the previous five-year period, and provides the analyst with an 
understanding of how the organisation functions, the operational and risk management 
procedures in place and any significant changes which have occurred over time.  The 
questionnaire also captures information describing the significant changes that have 
occurred within management, investment style and strategy.  In some cases the analysis is 
able to refer to successive yearly questionnaires to extend the manager’s five-year 
observation window.  In other cases, the study only has available one questionnaire, which 
limits the observation interval for such managers to five years.  Where possible, 
information was also checked against public information reported by the financial media.  
While the information reported in the IFSA questionnaires is assumed to be accurate, given 
the detailed level of information it would be extremely difficult to verify every piece of 
information reported.  Certainly where cross-checking could be performed, the information 
was highly accurate.  Further, while the information disclosed in the questionnaires is not 
mandated by legislation, any inaccuracies or biases that exist should be small.  Significant 
discrepancies in questionnaires would be expected to cause substantial losses in reputation, 
the potential for failure in the awarding of new institutional mandates and the potential for 
investors to bring litigation (e.g. misrepresentation). 
Due to the sensitive nature of the information contained in these questionnaires, 
and the restrictions in information dissemination by IFSA, this study does not disclose 
specific information for individual investment management organisations, or the individual 
personnel comprising these firms.  Table 7.1 provides summary statistics based on the final 
questionnaires of investment managers evaluated, such that an aggregate description of the 
characteristics of the managers can be ascertained as at December 2000.  The institutional 
investment management companies comprising the study are identified in Tables 7.4, 7.6 
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and 7.7 where performance is reported.  These 28 individual funds management companies 
comprising the study are domiciled in Australia and engage in active investment strategies.  
Rainmaker Information data indicate the 28 investment managers controlled in excess of 
$A495 billion or 71.4 percent of all assets professionally managed as at 31 December 
2000. 
Table 7.1 – Descriptive Statistics Based on Last Reported Questionnaire for 28 Active Australian 
Investment Managers 
Senior Professionals are classified according to job description provided by the manager.  Staff are 
considered senior if they are Chief Investment Officers (CIOs), asset class sector heads, chief economists, 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with direct involvement in money management, heads of asset allocation 
(where appropriate), or other participants involved in the asset allocation team.  Due to different reporting 
dates of questionnaires, all questionnaire information relating to experience and loyalty was accrued to 31 
December 2000 to ensure comparability between institutions. 
 Average Standard 
Deviation 
Asset Size of Managers ($A billion) 17.7 15.1 
Per Capita Tertiary Years Education (years) 3.5 0.5 
Manager Experience – Senior Managers 16.2 3.6 
Manager Experience – Other Managers 9.2 2.2 
Manager Loyalty – Senior Managers 8.0 2.8 
Manager Loyalty – Other Managers 5.0 1.9 
 
                                                
Monthly performance data for these active investment managers were provided by 
the asset-consulting firm William M. Mercer, specifically from Mercer’s Manager 
Performance Analytics (MPA) database.85  Performance is evaluated for each investment 
manager in active Australian equities, active Australian bonds and diversified or multi-
sector portfolios offered to investors.  Performance in the diversified portfolio sector is 
measured after expenses and tax, whereas other returns are reported before expenses and 
tax. 
 
85 This study does not consider index-mimicking products as it is concerned with the performance of active 
managers.  Quantitative strategies and enhanced index products are also excluded. 
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The study employs performance data that are ‘representative’ of the investment 
performance of investment managers in Australian equities, Australian bonds and 
diversified (or ‘balanced’) portfolios (i.e. diversified pooled superannuation funds 
investing in securities across the broad asset class spectrum).86  The number of balanced 
funds evaluated numbered 22, 28 managers were evaluated in the assessment of Australian 
equities performance, and 24 were Australian bond fund managers.  The balanced fund 
performance data included benchmark weights that provide an understanding of the 
implemented investment strategy across multiple asset classes, such that appropriate 
benchmarks can be used to assess risk-adjusted performance. 
The market indices used in calculating each manager’s specific benchmark for 
diversified asset class investments are presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 – Benchmark Indices Employed in Performance Measurement by Asset Class 
Asset Class Market Index 
Australian Equities ASX 200 or ASX 300 Accumulation Indices (dependent on manager’s stated benchmark) 
International Equities MSCI World (ex-Australia) Accumulation Index, Net Dividends Reinvested in $A 
Australian Direct Property W. M. Mercer Direct Property Index 
Australian Listed Property ASX 300 Listed Property Accumulation Index 
Australian Fixed Interest UBS Warburg Composite Bond Index 
International Fixed Interest Salomon Bros. World Bond Index 
Australian Inflation-Linked Bonds UBS Warburg Inflation-Linked Bond Index 
Cash UBS Warburg Bank Bill Index 
Note: The ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index and ASX Listed Property Accumulation Index were 
employed for Australian equities and listed property prior to 1 April 2000. 
 
                                                 
86 In some cases, where sector pools were unavailable for bonds and equities, the investment manager’s 
composite portfolio performance is considered to ascertain the manager’s overall performance in these asset 
classes. 
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While the selection of funds included was determined using W. M. Mercer 
Company surveys, each manager is consulted by Mercers to determine the appropriateness 
of the performance data included in the survey as being ‘representative’ of the institution.  
This process is transparent and Mercers employs strict rules in the maintenance of the 
selection procedure.  Accordingly, investment managers are unable to ‘cherry-pick’ what 
performance series is ultimately reported.  In evaluating the institution’s performance, the 
analysis avoids problems with survivorship bias.87  This is achieved as follows: 
• where composite performance is reported (including all surviving and non-
surviving funds), the data is ‘representative’ of the investment manager in 
aggregate; 
• where sector pools are reported and where funds cease, these investment 
vehicles are also included in the analysis such that survivorship bias cannot 
overstate the manager’s true performance.  Where possible, to obtain 
performance data over a maximum possible horizon for analytical purposes, 
returns data in the specialist sector surveys were supplemented with returns 
derived from the relevant sector ‘carve-outs’ of balanced pooled products in 
Australian equities and Australian bonds; 
• while a few investment managers merged or were acquired by other entities 
during the observation period, the analysis accounts for these mergers where the 
                                                 
87 Survivorship bias exists where the performance of funds and/or managers is omitted from managed fund 
datasets due to these products not ‘surviving’ throughout the entire evaluation period.  Hence, non-surviving 
funds are omitted from the performance records compiled by data vendors.  The literature has found that 
survivorship bias will overstate the general population of ‘surviving’ funds’ performance, as fund termination 
is highly related to poor performance.  See Brown et al. (1992) and Elton et al. (1996b) for a thorough 
discussion of the issues inherent in survivorship biased studies. 
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acquirer either integrated the existing firm within its own organisation or the 
acquisition resulted in a significant loss of autonomy in the investment process. 
Table 7.3 below provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
regressions to explain the predictability of performance, risk and management expenses 
given the attributes of investment management firms.  The performance data employed are 
the manager’s balanced fund, indicating the collective performance of the manager across 
all asset class sectors.  The investment manager qualitative variables (education, 
experience and loyalty) used in the subsequent regression analysis employ year-end 
averages as a measure of the institution’s unique attributes observed by investors.  In other 
words, individual staff data for each firm is compiled on a yearly basis and evaluated at 31 
December, where for each of the qualitative variables at the firm level, the average for 
each variable is then computed. 
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Table 7.3 – Descriptive Statistics for 28 Active Australian Investment Institutions in the Period 
January 1994 to December 2000 
The data are aggregated at the firm level on a per annum basis using calendar years.  Regressions are then 
employed to evaluate the predictability of manager characteristics with respect to performance, risk and 
expenses for balanced funds.  The definitions of variables and their measurement are described in greater 
detail in the following section.  Alpha measures the risk-adjusted excess return per month for funds managers 
using calendar year monthly data.  Beta is a measure of systematic risk for balanced funds using annual data.  
The Expense Ratio captures the per annum management charges levied to institutional investors.  The 
coefficient of determination (R2) is reported from the market model.  The natural logarithm is applied to year-
end data of the total size of funds invested by managers and the number of years since inception of the 
organisation.  The Benchmark Allocation to Australian Equities represents the strategic benchmark weight 
applicable to the domestic equities sector as a component of the total portfolio of assets.  Per Capita Tertiary 
Years Education represents the average years enrolment at a University or college of advanced education by 
an individual for each investment firm.  Manager Experience and Manager Loyalty represents for each firm 
the average years employed in the sector and tenure with the incumbent employer, respectively.  ‘Senior’ and 
‘Other’ are dichotomised on the basis of whether staff held a position of responsibility with the asset 
allocation committee (or investment strategy committee). 
 Number of 
Observations 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
124 -0.059 0.173 
Beta 124 1.060 0.129 
Expense Ratio (per annum in %) 124 0.624 0.11 
R
9.068 
2 124 0.941 0.068 
Log Asset Size of Managers ($A billion) 151 1.084 
Log of Institution’s Age (years) 168 4.059 1.115 
Benchmark Allocation to Australian Equities (%) 156 37.942 2.956 
Per Capita Tertiary Years Education (years) 155 3.550 0.474 
Manager Experience – Senior Managers (years) 150 17.238 3.505 
Manager Experience – Other Managers (years) 138 10.338 2.240 
Manager Loyalty – Senior Managers (years) 156 9.079 2.913 
Manager Loyalty – Other Managers (years) 156 6.066 2.040 
Alpha (per month in %) 
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7.4 Evaluating Investment Manager Characteristics and Performance 
7.4.1 Performance Methodology 
The first metric evaluates the raw return or active return of an investment manager.  
This approach measures the return differential between the portfolio (Rp) and the 
underlying benchmark index (Rb) in a manner that does not account for the risk exhibited 
by the portfolio manager.  The raw return (RR) is expressed as: 
btptpt RRRR −=  
Second, the first risk-adjusted performance metric considered in this study and 
commonly referred to by industry participants is the Information Ratio (IR).  This approach 
is similar in specification to the Sharpe Ratio (1966, 1994), where portfolio performance is 
adjusted with respect to the variability (or standard deviation σp), of return differences in 
the period.  The Information Ratio can be expressed as: 
(7.2) 
 
(7.1) 
p
bp
p
RR
IR σ
−=  
Alternative risk-adjusted performance metrics (in addition to Sharpe (1966)) and 
commonly employed in the literature rely heavily on the theoretical Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM).  Risk-adjusted abnormal performance in markets explained by the CAPM 
can be measured following the seminal work of Jensen (1968).  Jensen’s Alpha, capturing 
the abnormal excess return of active funds, is estimated using ordinary least squares 
regression, where an active fund’s return in excess of the risk-free rate is regressed on the 
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excess return of the market proxy portfolio.  The standard excess returns market model 
regression is therefore expressed as follows: 
ptbtpppt RR εβα ++= 1  (7.3) 
where: 
Rpt = the return of fund p in period t in excess of the risk-free rate; 
α1p = the unconditional risk-adjusted excess return of fund p in the period; 
βp = systematic risk of the fund, measuring the sensitivity of the excess return of fund p to 
the excess return on the Index; 
Rbt = the return on the market portfolio in period t in excess of the risk-free rate; and 
εpt = the residual term of the model. 
The investigation of Australian equity manager performance also employs a three-
index model to account for additional factors that have been found to explain security 
returns.  The three-index model is based on both the Elton et al. (1993) and Fama-French 
(1993) approaches.  This three-index model controls for fund returns attributable to an 
active manager loading up on the factors that explain cross-sectional patterns in equity 
returns.  The model therefore excludes active returns that are attributed to active managers 
‘riding’ known style factors in their attempts to earn superior risk-adjusted excess returns.  
Elton et al. (1993) and Elton et al. (1996a) also advocate an extension to the single index 
model due to the potential sensitivity of performance to the choice of benchmark used as 
the reference portfolio.  In particular, Elton et al. (1993) show Ippolito’s (1989) 
conclusions (where active mutual funds satisfy the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) definition 
of market efficiency in an environment accounting for costly information acquisition) arise 
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due to the benchmark proxy excluding securities held in mutual fund portfolios.  The 
model is essentially the same as that employed by Elton et al. (1996a) and is specified as 
follows: 
pttSLtGVMtMppt SLGVRR εβββα ++++= 3  
where α3 measures a fund’s risk-adjusted excess return with respect to the set of risk 
factors, defined as the broad market factor (βM) (proxied using the S&P/ASX 300 
Accumulation Index), and two style factors controlling for book-to-market equity (βGV) (or 
growth-value strategies) and market capitalisation (βSL).  This essay employs the Salomon 
Smith Barney (SSB) style indices (All Value and All Growth benchmarks) that encapsulate 
seven style factors in the partitioning of Australian-listed stocks – four value factors and 
three growth factors.88  The size factor is measured as the difference between the return on 
the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Accumulation Index (small-cap firms) and the S&P/ASX 
20 Accumulation Index (large-cap firms).  The Elton et al. (1996a) bond factor is omitted, 
as equity managers do not invest in fixed income securities, hence the model would 
otherwise be misspecified.89 
The additional indices therefore attempt to capture additional risk characteristics 
with respect to an investment manager’s investment style as well as accounting for the 
possibility that equity securities from outside the market portfolio actually comprise part of 
the active fund’s portfolio.  The model can be considered as a performance metric that 
                                                 
88 SSB style factors consider 4 value factors, namely earnings per share to stock price, book value to stock 
price, sales revenue to stock price and cash flow to share price.  The three growth factors consider the past 5-
year period of historical earnings per share growth, historical sales revenue growth and the average internal 
growth rate per annum.  SSB indices are reconstituted annually as at 31 May and re-balancing of the index 
occurs on a quarterly basis due to corporate actions etc. 
89 While the bond factor was excluded, an analysis was also performed to consider the effect on risk-adjusted 
performance where the UBS Warburg Composite Bond Index was used as an additional factor.  As expected, 
the bond factor had a negligible impact on the performance estimates, and therefore did not change the 
conclusions. 
(7.4) 
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accounts for investment managers exhibiting preferences for either high or low beta 
securities (systematic risk), small versus large-cap securities and growth versus value 
stocks.  Overall, this model is argued to improve the quantification of active Australian 
equity managers’ portfolio risk. 
7.4.2 Manager Characteristics and Strategy 
Empirical studies evaluating whether performance is related to experience, loyalty 
and educational qualifications require specific assumptions in order to identify and 
measure the relationship these variables have to fund performance.  In evaluating the 
predictability of performance with reference to fund manager characteristics, this study 
relies on aggregated characteristics data at the institutional funds management level. 
The study employs the same methodology as Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) by 
assessing the characteristics of managers at 31 December of year t-1.  As outlined 
previously, differences in manager questionnaire reporting dates can cause some 
challenges in identifying all staff at the end of each year.  This challenge is mainly 
attributable to staff turnover within the organisation, and can cause difficulties in achieving 
an accurate estimation of the firm-wide characteristics.  The analysis in this study attempts 
to account for such changes by tracking individuals after the staff member resigns from the 
organisation.  The questionnaires indicate the money management personnel who have 
departed each firm.  Therefore, in cases where specific individuals cannot be ‘tracked’, and 
where staff turnover is relatively low, little variation is likely in the aggregated data across 
the period examined.  Further, the attributes of an investment company in terms of the 
individuals employed at a point in time represent a good proxy for the firm’s preferences 
with respect to the individual qualities of money management staff. 
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7.4.2.1 Experience and Loyalty 
The dataset permits classification of individual staff members into two groups – 
‘senior personnel’ and ‘other personnel’.  Senior personnel represent individuals who have 
executive responsibilities in leadership of the investment team, either as the chief 
investment officer of the firm, the head of an individual asset class or members of the asset 
allocation team.  Other personnel are the residual investment professionals providing 
support to the senior executives. 
Investment managers arriving at the firm are included for the year in which they 
join and individuals leaving the firm are included up to the year prior to their departure 
date.  This ensures that the measurement of manager attributes accounts for all staff at the 
firm at 31 December each year.  While this study attempts to track changes in personnel 
between investment firms, in some cases individual personnel characteristics are omitted.  
Where this occurs, and to minimise potential bias in the aggregated data for investment 
managers, the analysis assumes the former employee exhibits both the same educational 
characteristics and experience as the new appointee.  This approach appears to have merit, 
as the individual qualities of departing personnel are likely to be replaced by people with 
very similar qualities.90  Overall, the proportion of staff unable to be tracked appears to be 
relatively small. 
In terms of performance, investors may hypothesise performance as being 
positively related to both the experience and tenure of the institution’s employees.  Greater 
years of experience for staff suggests a proven track record (tenure), team stability 
(tenure), and greater likelihood that historical fluctuations and changes in markets can be 
more easily identified and exploited by individuals who exhibit many years of experience 
                                                 
90 Indeed, private discussions with a number of senior investment executives indicated this assumption was 
appropriate and broadly consistent with firms’ recruitment policies. 
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in the industry.  In terms of risk, investors may hypothesise beta as being inversely related 
to experience (which may be considered a proxy for age) as well as tenure.  Expenses 
levied may be positively related to both tenure and experience, given higher levels of 
loyalty indicate success (or survivorship at the current firm) whereas experience may be 
associated with more senior executive roles and the receipt of higher levels of 
remuneration. 
7.4.2.2 
                                                
Educational Characteristics 
Classifying and measuring the extent to which performance is related to the 
individual educational qualities of staff is more problematic and requires specific 
assumptions.  In this study, an individual’s years of tertiary education are used as a proxy 
for aptitude and scholastic achievement.  An individual’s aptitude or ability is measured 
with respect to the educational years enrolled at tertiary institutions in light of the standard 
durations of full-time candidature required to successfully meet the University 
requirements.91  This study assumes a standard undergraduate degree requires three years 
of full-time study.  Honours degrees are assumed to involve one-year of additional 
enrolment.  Double degrees at undergraduate level are assumed to require five years of 
full-time candidature.  Non-M.B.A. master degrees are assumed to be one year.  For the 
purposes of this study, the minimum candidature for an M.B.A. is assumed to be one-and-
a-half years.92  Doctoral degrees are equivalent to a three-year full-time minimum 
 
91 In rare cases, universities may have slightly different duration periods for satisfactory completion of 
degrees.  The manager questionnaires do not always identify the tertiary institution from which the individual 
has graduated, and therefore an assumption is required in calculating the length of time a candidate has been 
enrolled. 
92 Even where the minimum candidature for an M.B.A. is assumed to be two years, the empirical findings are 
consistent with those reported in this research.  The 1.5-year period was used to ensure conservatism with 
respect to minimum enrolment periods. 
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enrolment period.93  Using these standard duration periods according to degree type, an 
analysis may be performed to determine whether money management firms can be 
differentiated from their competitors on the basis of educational years of employed staff.94 
A further assumption is that degrees awarded by educational institutions are held 
for the entire five-year period used for analysis.  The investment manager questionnaires 
provide details of staff over the five-year period, and the degrees listed are all 
qualifications as at the reporting date.  While the personnel arriving and departing the 
organisation can be tracked, the dates on which degrees were conferred are not reported.  
Therefore, the extent of possible bias in the analysis is unknown where such an assumption 
is made.  However, in aggregate, it is expected to be small for the following reasons.  First, 
investment managers have listed the previous experience (years) directly served in the 
funds management industry as well as a separate category detailing the number of years 
experience in other professions (if appropriate).  If the standard assumption is that total 
experience is equal to or less than five years, an assumption can be made that the 
individual has most likely graduated with an undergraduate degree within the period.  
Therefore the conferral date can be inferred and the individual’s professional experience 
represents the period of time subsequent to graduation.  For other investment staff with 
greater than five-years of experience, it can be argued that graduation from their 
undergraduate studies has, in general, occurred prior to the commencement of the 
observation window.95 
                                                 
93 Some students may prolong their study beyond the assumed minimum durations, however the dataset 
collated does not permit identification of the number of years of successful study in attaining degrees.  In 
reality, this is not expected to seriously bias the measurement of an institution’s educational years per capita. 
94 In some cases it was difficult to track all departing investment managers and their qualifications held.  
However, most managers were included so that possible bias is extremely small. 
95 Interviews with investment managers confirmed that such assumptions had merit and were appropriate. 
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Second, if postgraduate studies occurred within the five-year period of the 
questionnaire, and the questionnaire indicates the completion of studies at the reporting 
date, this provides a signal of aptitude as well as the benefits of education accruing each 
year of study undertaken by individuals.96  Not having held the degree for the entire period 
should not be too problematic, as most individuals can be assumed to have held their 
degrees over the entire period.  Further, the eventual conferral demonstrates a propensity to 
acquire knowledge and to broaden skill sets with the view to career advancement, hence 
this assumption has some merit.  Analysis of qualifications is then determined on a per 
capita basis for each funds management organisation.  The quality of individual graduates, 
in terms of average academic grades, is not available.   
In terms of the predictability of performance, risk and expenses given the years of 
tertiary education of investment managers, this essay hypothesises a positive relationship 
with risk-adjusted return, beta and expenses.  This is because the educational years variable 
is a proxy for aptitude or ability, and individuals exhibiting higher levels of ability should 
earn higher returns.  It also is hypothesised that individuals with greater ability may have 
increased preparedness to engage in and successfully exploit more risky stocks.  Finally, in 
terms of the expenses incurred by managers, more gifted and able individuals are likely to 
receive higher remuneration, which should ultimately be incorporated into the manager’s 
expense ratio, hence the expense ratio is expected to be positively related to education. 
7.4.2.3 Manager Strategy 
The investment manager’s self-stated investment approach is used to determine 
investment strategy.  This includes information that provides inference with respect to 
                                                 
96 The data indicate that the general entry requirement in the industry is an undergraduate degree.  It is 
extremely rare for an individual managing money not to hold a degree qualification.  Therefore, it is highly 
likely that undergraduate degrees were obtained prior to commencement with a funds management 
organisation.  Second, postgraduate degrees are a much smaller proportion of total degrees. 
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whether the manager emphasises a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approach to portfolio 
management.  Managers emphasising top-down strategies place greater weight in the 
decision making process on the allocation of assets to various asset classes on the basis of 
expected market returns.  Top-down managers therefore seek to overweight (underweight) 
the portfolio, relative to their strategic benchmark asset allocation, in those sectors 
expected to provide higher (lower) returns.  Top-down managers then select the individual 
securities for their portfolios within their asset allocation constraints.  Bottom-up 
managers, on the other hand, place greater emphasis on the fundamentals of individual 
securities within each asset class, rather than placing strict limits on the maximum or 
minimum asset class weights applicable in each asset class sector (for diversified asset 
class funds) or industry sector (for sector specialist portfolios).  Certainly, the 
differentiation of investment managers into one of these two groups is likely to induce 
some degree of subjectivity bias, however the general description provided by the 
managers does indicate the process in which the investment firm intends to manage 
portfolios and also advertise to investors. 
In the sectors of Australian equities and Australian bonds, the predominant 
investment strategies are reported within each of the questionnaires, permitting an 
understanding of the degree of emphasis placed on each component strategy.  Specifically, 
Australian equities managers identify the percentage weight placed on factors such as 
valuation, projected growth, past growth history, management quality and technical 
analysis.  For Australian bonds, managers have identified the emphasis placed on duration, 
yield curve management, issue and sector selection and arbitrage in their attempts to earn 
active returns. 
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7.5 Empirical Results 
7.5.1 Do Active Australian Investment Managers Outperform? 
This study evaluates manager performance in Australian equities, Australian bonds 
and portfolios diversified across the broad asset class spectrum (Balanced).  Table 7.4 
presents the performance results of active Australian equity managers, and suggests active 
equity managers indeed beat the market before management expenses.  The majority of 
managers evaluated exhibit both positive and statistically significant raw and active returns 
(raw = 27 and α3 = 17).  The average equity manager outperformed the index in the 10-
year period by 21.9 (α3) basis points per month, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
The risk-adjusted excess returns using either a one-factor or three-index model both 
support the finding that the majority of active Australian share managers derive superior 
returns to the market.  The performance results indicate that controlling for additional risk 
factors that the literature has identified as explaining cross-sectional patterns in equity 
market returns is unable to account for the superior returns delivered by institutional 
managers. 
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Table 7.4 – Active Australian Equities Managers – 10 Year Period to 31 December 2000 
This table shows the performance of active Australian equity managers in the 10-year period to 31 December 2000 before expenses.  RR measures the average raw return of 
funds in the period, where raw returns are measured according to equation 7.1.  IR represents each manager’s information ratio, computed in accordance with equation 7.2.  
The one and three-index models are also used to measure risk-adjusted excess returns, according to models 7.3 and 7.4 respectively.  Performance (RR, α1 and α3 is expressed 
in percentage terms per month.  The coefficients on the style factors relating to growth-value and market capitalisation can be interpreted as follows: managers exhibiting 
biases towards growth (value) stocks derive positive (negative) coefficients on the GV factor.  Managers exhibiting greater sensitivity to small-cap securities (large-cap) 
derive positive (negative) coefficients on the SL variable. 
Managers Raw Active Returns   1 Factor Model  Three Factor Model 
 RR             t(RR) SD Max Min %>0  IR α1 t(α1) β  α3 t(α3) βM βGV βSL R2 Adj 
Aberdeen  0.624        0.185        3.60 1.070 2.891 -2.164 76.3 0.583 1.03 1.039 0.188 1.01 1.040 -0.071 0.011 0.902
AMP Henderson 0.721 11.70       
0.742        0.222     
            0.055   
  4.065        
       0.035 
  5.270             
      0.538 0.140 
          
       0.141    
   -4.022         
          
          
            
             
           
   -3.201       
    77.1  0.572    
            -0.070   
            
Salomon                 
          
      1.088    
0.676 2.844 -1.376 88.3 1.068 0.380 4.42 1.017  0.437 4.99 1.013 0.052 0.054 0.961 
ANZ 10.75 0.756 3.447 -0.607 86.7 0.981 3.14 0.999  0.247 3.56 0.982 0.088 -0.036 0.962
AXA 0.614 9.07 0.741 2.988 -1.325 82.5 0.828 0.063 0.98 1.053 0.078 1.20 1.041 -0.029 0.970
BGI 0.525 6.33 0.907 -3.602 79.2 0.578 0.185 2.38 1.021  0.194 2.38 1.020 0.028 0.001 0.980
BNP Paribas 0.924 7.81 1.078 3.121 -1.778 85.5 0.857 0.464 4.10 0.910  0.528 4.80 0.919 0.108 0.918 
BTFM 0.418 3.24 1.304 -3.170 70.6 0.321 0.073 0.58 0.910 0.165 1.40 0.894 0.227 0.090 0.900 
Colonial F.S. 0.870 4.96 1.616 4.618 -8.070 77.6 0.438 2.59 0.884  0.541 3.31 0.876 0.145 0.833 
Commonwealth 0.575 8.09 0.779 2.284 -1.559 80.8 0.738 0.211 2.12 0.996  0.218 2.09 0.994 0.019 -0.008 0.946
County 0.645 10.23 0.691 2.910 -1.101 85.0 0.934 0.146 2.47 0.966  2.34 0.962 0.000 -0.023 0.969
Credit Suisse 0.587 6.41 0.917 2.769 79.0 0.641 0.108 1.15 1.010 0.103 1.13 0.993 0.024 -0.092 0.949 
Deutsche 0.688 10.81 0.562 2.331 -0.981 88.5 1.224 0.181 2.90 1.029  0.189 2.88 1.028 0.010 0.006 0.977
HSBC 0.602 11.06 0.525 1.866 -0.860 88.2 1.147 0.113 2.06 1.018  0.123 2.26 1.009 0.044 -0.031 0.983
JB Were 0.625 8.34 0.822 3.199 -2.166 83.3 0.761 0.135 1.81 0.959  0.143 2.07 0.932 0.074 -0.091 0.960 
Macquarie 0.263 1.36 1.729 4.968 -6.531 70.0 0.152 -0.223 -1.14 0.994 -0.160 -0.86 1.027 -0.127 0.176 0.827 
MBA 0.967 8.85 1.197 3.790 -3.341 82.5 0.808 0.440 4.13 1.011  0.337 3.47 1.030 -0.254 -0.035 0.931
ING 0.833 8.11 1.126 3.739 81.7 0.740 0.328 3.21 0.976  0.297 2.85 0.982 -0.079 -0.008 0.915
Perpetual 0.691 5.61 1.207 5.873 -3.311 0.292 2.49 0.882  0.312 2.61 0.884 0.028 0.053 0.894
Portfolio Partners 0.523 4.13 1.073 2.944 -2.226 65.3 0.487 0.072 0.58 0.942 0.043 0.33 0.951 0.008 0.906
Rothschild 0.502 6.18 0.796 3.163 -2.327 79.2 0.631 0.064 0.81 0.941 0.061 0.76 0.935 0.012 -0.050 0.957 
0.560 8.07 0.761 3.574 -1.431 81.7 0.736 0.051 0.73 0.988 0.025 0.36 1.002 -0.083 0.025 0.961
Schroder 0.731 8.79 0.744 2.703 -0.664 82.5 0.982 0.268 3.20 0.948  0.279 3.27 0.937 0.062 -0.022 0.953
SSGA 0.694 8.84 0.638 2.275 -1.340 84.8 0.237 3.03 0.977  0.230 2.82 0.976 -0.001 -0.021 0.965
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Continued…       
Managers Raw Active Returns   1 Factor Model  Three Factor Model 
RR t(RR) SD Max Min %>0  IR α1 t(α1) β  α3 t(α3) βM βGV βSL R2 Adj 
Suncorp 0.596 14.12          
          
                
               
               
0.462 1.918 -0.837 94.2 1.289 0.151 2.37 0.999  0.175 2.65 0.996 0.042 0.005 0.982
Tower 0.868 9.61 0.989 3.603 -2.024 80.0 0.877 0.310 3.45 1.059  0.314 3.41 1.054 0.019 -0.014 0.942
Tyndall 0.836 3.46 2.650 6.675 -11.781 65.8 0.315 0.417 1.75 0.845 0.282 1.22 0.901 -0.400 0.071 0.637
UBS 0.669 6.65 1.015 4.015 -2.874 80.4 0.659 0.194 1.84 0.996 0.201 1.86 1.000 0.009 0.035 0.926
Westpac 0.433 5.32 0.806 2.929 -2.202 74.5 0.538 -0.054 -0.65 1.019 -0.033 -0.43 0.997 0.095 -0.072 0.964 
              
Note: Statistical significance of RR, α1, α3, βGV, βSL is at the 95 percent confidence level and is indicated in bold text.  F-statistics on all regressions are significant at 0.01 level. 
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These results for Australian equities are at first glance perplexing, given the 
overwhelming majority of studies in the literature suggest active managers do not earn 
superior risk-adjusted returns.  Ippolito’s (1989) findings of superior performance were 
shown by Elton et al. (1993) to be attributable to the benchmark failing to account for non-
S&P 500 securities.  Misspecification would not be expected to drive these findings as 
appropriate benchmarks for individual managers have been undertaken.  This is achieved 
through the managers’ participation in W. M. Mercer Performance Surveys.  Further, the 
conclusions for equity managers are not inconsistent with the recent findings of Daniel et 
al. (1997) and Wermers (2000).  These studies document active U.S. mutual funds being 
able to earn back most of their expenses in the form of active returns, which is consistent 
with the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) informational efficiency hypothesis.  Secondly, this 
study confirms the performance results of Joye (1999) for active institutional Australian 
equity funds before expenses.  While the analysis of performance is measured using gross 
returns, after expenses returns analysis is not possible as fund manager expenses are not 
available.  Gallagher (2001) also suggests some active managers exhibit superior 
selectivity skill in Australian equities before costs.  However, the W. M. Mercer Fee 
Survey of managers for 1999 and 2000 provides an estimate of the potential impact of fees 
on performance.97 
 
 
                                                 
97 Mercer’s survey of fees indicates that over the past few years, fees have generally been declining, albeit 
gradually.  Over the past four years, the average decline in fees per annum for larger mandates (greater than 
$50 million) was reported by Mercers is between 5 and 10 basis points per annum at the upper end. 
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Table 7.5 – Institutional Active and Index Management Fees in Australia 
This table shows the institutional management expenses levied by institutional investment managers for 
balanced funds, Australian equities funds and Australian bond funds for the years 1999 and 2000.  Fees (per 
annum) are for pooled investment mandates equal to $A50 million.98 
Sector Average 2000  Average 1999 
 Active Index Differential  Active Index Differential 
Australian Equities 0.60 0.15 0.45  0.59 0.10 0.49 
Australian Bonds 0.33 0.11 0.22  0.38 0.08 0.30 
Balanced 0.60 0.18 0.42  0.60 0.20 0.40 
Source: W. M. Mercer 
 
                                                
The average active equity manager in the past few years has levied management 
expenses around 5 basis points per month, compared with index equity managers of 
approximately 1 basis point per month (see Table 7.5).  The results in Table 7.4 suggest 
that the average α3 net of expenses is 16.9 basis points per month.  Even if fee levels were 
levied at double the period-end observation window over the 10-year period, the average 
manager would still outperform in risk-adjusted terms by more than 1.4 percent per annum.  
These findings suggest that the average active manager in the Australian equities asset 
class has earned active returns that have exceeded their investment expenses. 
One final consideration of the findings reported for active Australian share 
managers may be due to the sample exhibiting selection-bias issues.  The sample is 
constructed so that each manager is represented once through the use of one performance 
series.  While Mercers survey investment manager performance regularly using the firm’s 
‘flagship’ product, strict rules are maintained to ensure that self-selection of performance 
reporting cannot be manipulated by the investment managers.  If the product used in the 
surveys ceases to exist, Mercers retains the past return records such that bias in their 
surveys is eliminated.  Where managers reported more than one product, performance was 
 
98 Average fees applicable to the individual managers comprising the sample in equities, bonds and balanced 
are extremely close and consistent with the fees presented in the Table. 
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evaluated for the other funds to determine the extent to which the inclusion of a single 
‘flagship’ fund actually overstates the general performance of managers.  The results (not 
reported) indicate that each manager’s returns are highly correlated over time with the 
flagship fund, and the results reported earlier are generally consistent with those presented 
in Table 7.4. 
The empirical results in the 10-year period suggest Australian equity managers are 
predominantly growth oriented and are almost equally split between portfolios biased 
toward large and small capitalisation stocks.  The evidence also indicates that 
outperformance of the index occurs in the overwhelming majority of months.  Performance 
consistency, measured as the percentage of observations in excess of the Australian 
equities benchmark return, occurs between 65.3 and 94.2 percent of months in the 10-year 
period.  This is even more surprising when consideration is given to the balanced funds and 
bond funds which exhibit lower levels of performance consistency (see Table 7.6 and 
Table 7.7). 
In terms of the performance of active Australian bond fund managers, Table 7.6 
indicates that investors earn returns commensurate to the index, before expenses have been 
deducted.  While only two managers demonstrate the ability to earn significantly positive 
α1, the majority of managers earn risk-adjusted returns insignificantly different from zero 
before costs.  Similarly for diversified asset class managers, Table 7.7 indicates that the 
majority of active managers are unable to deliver investors with superior returns, after 
consideration of their heterogeneous fund strategic benchmark asset allocations. 
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Table 7.6 – Active Australian Bond Managers – 10 Years to 31 December 2000 
This table shows the performance of active Australian bond managers in the 10-year period to 31 December 
2000 before expenses.  RR measures the average raw return of funds in the period, where raw returns are 
measured according to equation 7.1.  IR represents each managers’ information ratio, computed in 
accordance with equation 7.2.  The single-index model is also used to measure risk-adjusted excess returns, 
according to model 7.3.  Performance (RR and α1) is expressed in percentage terms per month. 
 
Managers Raw Active Returns   1 Factor Model 
 RR t(RR)  β SD Max Min %>0 IR α1 t(α1) R2 
Aberdeen  0.008 0.44 0.126 0.248 -0.527 55.6  0.059 0.017 0.99 0.970 0.988 
AMP Henderson 0.026 1.51 0.188 0.440 -1.312 61.7  0.138 0.019 1.07 1.021 0.983 
ANZ 0.049 1.54 0.346 1.993 -0.837 70.0  0.141 0.029 0.92 1.058 0.951 
AXA 0.059 2.90 0.224 0.867 -0.653 63.3  0.265 0.045 2.20 1.043 0.979 
BGI -0.019 -0.55 0.383 0.990 -1.594 55.0  
4.372 
-0.050 0.004 0.12 0.931 0.925 
BNP Paribas 0.100 1.17 0.791 -3.473 51.7  
 
0.127 0.115 1.33 0.919 0.711 
BTFM 0.062 1.60 0.390 1.492 -1.262 50.0 0.158 0.051 1.32 1.040 0.933 
Colonial F.S. -0.061 -1.08 0.615 0.746 -5.347 58.3  -0.099 -0.060 -1.03 0.998 0.837 
Commonwealth 0.007 0.25 0.298 0.952 -1.269 53.3  
0.262 
0.023 -0.033 -1.41 1.118 0.975 
County 0.012 0.50 0.709 -0.917 53.3  -0.012 
Credit Suisse 
0.045 -0.51 1.070 0.974 
0.010 0.66 0.155 0.664 -0.578 70.0  
0.422 
0.067 0.006 0.34 1.020 0.988 
0.20 
0.39 0.221 0.993 -0.906 55.0 
0.01 0.465 1.582 0.001 0.012 
ING 
Schroder 
Tyndall 
HSBC 0.006 0.17 1.790 -1.449 51.7  0.015 
JB Were 
0.008 0.995 0.916 
0.009 0.64 0.136 0.353 -0.586 50.0  0.064 0.014 1.02 0.980 0.989 
Macquarie 0.008 0.035 -0.012 -0.63 1.059 0.981 
MBA 0.001 48.3 0.29 0.965 0.895 
0.015 0.50 0.326 1.223 -1.462 56.7  0.046 -0.004 -0.15 1.057 0.956 
Rothschild 0.048 1.10 0.478 1.215 -2.111 53.3  
 0.974 
-0.001 
0.100 0.025 0.57 1.067 0.910 
Salomon 0.012 0.81 0.164 0.371 -0.567 51.7 0.074 0.021 1.38 0.986 
-0.02 0.379 0.778 -1.884 55.0  -0.002 -0.012 -0.34 1.033 0.936 
Suncorp 0.080 2.87 0.305 1.761 -0.665 66.7  1.008 0.262 0.077 2.69 0.955 
Tower 0.072 1.09 0.721 3.175 -4.869 40.0  0.099 0.034 0.51 1.111 0.829 
0.023 0.85 0.302 0.803 -0.912 48.3  0.077 0.033 1.15 0.973 0.954 
UBS 0.047 2.46 0.211 1.012 -0.592 66.7  0.225 0.032 1.69 1.045 0.981 
Westpac 0.018 0.91 0.222 0.808 -0.793 56.7  0.083 -0.010 -0.59 1.085 0.985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.057  
Note: Statistical significance of RR and α1is at the 95 percent confidence level and is indicated in bold text.  
F-statistics on all regressions are significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 7.7 – Active Diversified Asset Class Managers – 10 Years to 31 December 2000 
This table shows the performance of active diversified asset class managers in the 10-year period to 31 
December 2000 after expenses and tax.  RR measures the average raw return of funds in the period, where 
raw returns are measured according to equation 7.1.  IR represents each managers’ information ratio, 
computed in accordance with equation 7.2.  The single-index model is also used to measure risk-adjusted 
excess returns, according to model 7.3.  The benchmarks employed for each manager are dependent on the 
stated strategic benchmark allocations across the broad spectrum of asset classes.  Performance (RR and α1) 
is expressed in percentage terms per month. 
 
Managers Raw Active Returns   1 Factor Model (Mgr. Specific) 
RR t(RR) SD Max Min %>0  IR α1 t(α1) β R2 
AMP Henderson -0.034 -1.19 0.292 -0.541 44.8  -0.116 -0.037 -1.29 1.014 0.968 
ANZ 0.083 1.36 0.668 2.362 -2.273 60.0  0.78 0.124 0.046 0.903 
AXA -0.010 -0.20 0.528 1.605 -1.094 43.3  0.948 -0.018 -0.057 -1.27 1.119 
BGI -0.063 -1.10 0.626 -1.617 47.5  
1.585 
-0.101 -0.118 -2.20 1.140 0.926 
BNP Paribas 0.030 0.39 0.680 -2.254 51.3 
 
0.932 
1.117 
2.161 
0.020 0.24 0.962 0.843 
BTFM -0.048 -0.87 0.602 2.562 -1.766 45.8  
2.045 
-0.080 -0.074 -1.35 1.072 0.914 
Colonial F.S. 0.194 2.12 0.626 -1.241 61.7  
49.6 
0.309 0.188 1.016 0.914 
Commonwealth -0.024 -0.55 0.473 1.428 -1.452  0.929 -0.051 -0.036 -0.81 1.038 
County -0.037 -1.01 0.397 1.312 -1.042 43.3  -0.057 -0.092 -1.58 1.047 0.968 
Credit Suisse 0.065 1.36 0.377 1.431 -0.813 56.5  0.173 0.064 1.28 1.003 0.962 
HSBC 0.137 2.28 0.661 2.489 -1.614 53.3  0.208 0.097 1.67 1.136 0.902 
Macquarie -0.102 -1.46 0.678 1.534 -2.119 42.6  -0.150 -0.111 -1.55 1.023 0.884 
MBA 0.143 2.78 0.563 1.917 -1.158 60.8  0.254 0.179 3.55 0.912 0.912 
ING 0.042 0.74 0.553 1.220 -1.313 51.0  0.076 0.221 2.22 1.016 0.695 
Portfolio Partners -0.002 -0.03 0.442 1.034 -1.271 55.9  -0.005 0.003 0.05 0.988 0.945 
Rothschild 0.053 0.99 0.586 2.035 -1.558 51.7  0.091 0.014 0.26 1.102 0.932 
Salomon 0.025 0.59 0.456 1.328 -1.105 48.3  0.054 0.004 0.09 1.059 0.941 
Schroder 0.050 1.01 0.484 1.902 -1.158 51.0  0.104 0.238 2.45 0.976 0.732 
Suncorp 0.078 1.50 0.572 1.961 -2.203 54.2  0.136 0.046 0.90 1.115 0.901 
Tower -0.046 -0.95 0.528 1.435 -1.556 46.7  -0.086 -0.033 -0.67 0.974 0.934 
Tyndall -0.075 -1.18 0.626 1.425 -1.496 44.8  -0.120 0.119 1.12 1.041 0.701 
Westpac -0.014 -0.27 0.567 1.642 -2.202 50.8  -0.025 -0.044 -0.86 1.081 0.925 
 0.044 
2.04 
Note: Statistical significance of RR and α1is at the 95 percent confidence level and is indicated in bold text.  
F-statistics on all regressions are significant at 0.01 level. 
7.5.2 Performance by Tenure Period 
An outstanding issue existing in the literature is that performance is only evaluated 
at the aggregate funds manager level.  Accordingly, such analysis ignores the likelihood 
that senior investment professionals serve shorter periods of time with their employers than 
is the case for the lives of funds.  There is also an implicit assumption that top management 
should be ultimately responsible for the investment decisions made and the performance 
delivered to investors.  Therefore, the extent to which individuals driving the investment 
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process and managing the investment team are capable of earning superior returns remains 
an empirical issue. 
While the empirical literature widely confirms the inability of funds to outperform 
appropriate benchmark indices, the literature has seldom evaluated fund performance with 
respect to the tenure periods of key investment staff (for example, see Khorana (1996, 
2001) and Golec (1996)).  Where performance periods disregard key staff changes, 
improper performance inferences may be drawn – i.e. fund performance may be mean 
reverting.  In other words, superior (or inferior) performance may occur more often when 
evaluation periods consider tenure periods of senior staff than at the funds level over 
longer time frames.  Analysis of performance in the 7.5-year period to 30 June 2001 for 
heads of domestic equities and domestic bonds was performed and results are presented in 
Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8 – Performance of Individual Sector Heads in the period 1 January 1994 – 30 June 2001 
Performance is evaluated for all sector heads during their tenure in the 7.5-year period as well as for 
managers commencing and departing within the 7.5-year period.  Managers must have served at least 12 
months for reasonable regression estimates to be derived.  Alpha is expressed in percentage terms per month 
before fees and tax for equities and bonds and after expenses and tax for balanced. 
 Model Number Mean α 
 Median 
α 
# Sig 
α>0* 
# Sig 
α<0* 
# α 
Insig* 
Panel A: All Management Periods 
Heads of Australian Equities 3 Factor 52 0.206 *** 0.125 14 0 38 
Heads of Australian Equities 1 Factor 52 0.184 *** 0.147 12 0 40 
Heads of Australian Bonds 1 Factor 34 0.012 0.013 3 0 31 
Chief Investment Officers 1 Factor 43 -0.046 ** -0.048 2 10 31 
Panel B: Management According to Strict Tenure 
Heads of Australian Equities 3 Factor 19 0.218 *** 0.140 5 0 14 
Heads of Australian Equities 1 Factor 19 0.201 *** 0.187 5 0 14 
Heads of Australian Bonds 1 Factor 2 -0.005 -0.005 0 0 2 
Chief Investment Officers 1 Factor 13 -0.027 -0.016 0 0 13 
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
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Panel A of Table 7.8 evaluates performance of sector heads and CIOs for the 
periods of service within the 7.5-year period examined.  Both the single and three-index 
models for Australian equities indicate that around one-quarter of all appointed sector 
heads were able to deliver investors with superior risk-adjusted returns before expenses at 
the 95 percent confidence interval.  The conclusion for Australian shares suggests 
performance measurement is independent of whether a single or multi-index model is 
employed to adjust for risk.  In other words, the three-factor model cannot eliminate the 
source of value added which is attributable to the common factors that explain equity 
returns.  The average α3 of the superior managers was 47.1 basis points per month (not 
reported directly), which outperformed the other sector heads by 36.2 basis points per 
month.  This performance differential is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  An 
examination of the factor loadings of the successful appointments (not reported directly) 
indicates 11 out of 14 and 10 out of 14 managers exhibited positive loadings to the market 
capitalisation (i.e. small-cap biased) and growth factors respectively.  Of further note was 
the finding that the remaining Australian equities sector heads did not significantly 
underperform the index before expenses.  Therefore, performance is in line with the 
objectives of an index fund.  However, the average equity manager’s performance not 
deriving superior performance is equal to 10.9 basis points per month above the index. 
On the other hand, the findings for Australian bonds sector heads and chief 
investment officers in Panel A of Table 7.8 indicate that very few individuals driving the 
investment process are able to deliver investors with superior risk-adjusted excess returns.  
In terms of balanced manager returns, it may be argued that the chief investment officer is 
more reliant on key individuals driving the individual sectors, and that overall, the 
performance attributed to them is not entirely reliant on their own stewardship of the 
investment firm.  Another insight may be that managers have better skills in only one or 
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two sectors, and that inferior performance attributable to these other investment classes 
detracts from value-added.  Overall, the analysis of individual managers in domestic bonds 
and balanced sectors confirms the main findings in managed fund studies, in that actively 
managed portfolios are unable to earn superior returns to appropriately specified market 
benchmarks. 
The results presented in Panel B of Table 7.8 evaluate performance with respect to 
strict tenure periods of senior investment managers.  These findings are generally 
consistent with the results of Panel A. 
There are a number of caveats with respect to the results in Panel B of Table 7.8.  
These include the sample size being restricted due to data availability, the time period 
considered and the relatively small number of managers comprising the study.  Also, a 
manager’s poor short-term performance may be the predominant reason for a change in 
personnel, in which case the measurement of top management’s ability from 
commencement may represent an inaccurate event window for evaluation purposes.  In 
addition, the absence of clear reasons given by the investment management firms for 
changes in top management can create ‘noise’ in the data.  While there is every likelihood 
management changes are performance-related, the extent to which the superior performers 
are ‘poached’ by competitors and the poor performers are terminated is an area for future 
research. 
7.5.3 Manager Performance and Top Management Turnover 
This section provides an empirical analysis of senior staff departures and 
performance for the following top management roles: head of domestic equities, head of 
domestic bonds and chief investment officer in the period January 1994 to June 2001.  The 
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literature concerning U.S. mutual funds indicates performance is related to top 
management changes (for example, see Khorana (1996, 2001)).  However, the extent to 
which the departure of a senior investment manager is related to performance remains an 
empirical question in the Australian literature.  Top management changes in investment 
management firms may well occur in cases of both poor performance (prompted by 
significant cash outflows, ultimately affecting firm profitability) and superior performance 
(manager is ‘poached’ by a competitor or occurs due to inadequate compensation offered 
to the incumbent manager).99 
One of the problems in analysing performance surrounding a change in top 
management is that such changes are rarely accompanied by an accurate disclosure of the 
exact reasons for the departure.  The database compiled and used in this study included 
some cases where the company stated the reason behind the departure of key individuals 
and in others the departure was noted, however no explanation accompanied the disclosure.  
In all cases, the formally stated reason provided in the IFSA Questionnaires included 
politically sensitive descriptions such as ‘personal interests’, ‘career opportunities’, 
‘resigned’, ‘confidential’, ‘joined competitor’, and ‘restructure of group’.  Other changes 
may arise due to the retirement of a key member or due to the acquisition of another 
investment management entity.  However, from the descriptions provided by managers, it 
is extremely difficult to accurately identify whether the change was effected on the basis of 
performance issues alone (good and bad) or due to a combination of issues.  Indeed, these 
problems also arise in other studies, notably Jensen and Murphy (1990) examining the 
turnover in CEOs, and Khorana (1996) in terms of changes in top mutual fund managers.  
While poor performance may well be the most likely factor contributing to a change in 
senior management (see Khorana (1996)), an analysis that decomposes performance 
                                                 
99 Staff movements may also occur through internal promotions or changes in existing roles. 
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between the pre and post periods in terms of the real reasons underpinning a departure 
represents a very arduous task. 
This section evaluates two questions related to top management changes.  First, the 
analysis considers the effect on performance where changes in top management arise for 
Australian equities, bonds and diversified asset class sectors.  Second, the study examines 
the possibility that performance is related to the length of tenure served by top 
management in the Australian equities asset class. 
7.5.3.1 Pre and Post Top Management Changes 
Analysis is performed at the aggregate fund manager level employing pre-and-post 
performance periods of six and twelve months given the departure of a senior staff 
member.  Hypothetically, in cases of poor performance leading to the termination of a key 
investment member, the new appointee would be expected to implement changes to the 
existing portfolio, and in the short-term, ceteris paribus, performance is likely to be 
negatively impacted due to the restructure.  However, after the portfolio has been 
reconfigured, the expectation would be that performance should have improved from the 
prior period.  Performance is measured using equation (7.1) to calculate raw returns (or 
returns not adjusted for risk). 
Table 7.9 presents the pre/post findings for both the six and twelve-month periods 
surrounding the departure of sector heads and chief investment officers.  The results 
indicate that a change in Australian equities leadership increases performance in the 
subsequent 12-month period, however statistical significance prevents the general 
conclusion that personnel changes significantly improve performance.  The departure of 
heads of Australian fixed interest indicates that performance further deteriorates in both 
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six-and-twelve month periods after the appointment of a new sector head.  Both periods are 
statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels respectively.  In terms of changes 
applicable to the general management of investments at the organisational level, a change 
in chief investment officer indicates that both the subsequent six and twelve month periods 
delivered investors with superior returns compared with the prior period. 
Table 7.9 – Percentage monthly return difference (post period less pre period) in the Period January 
1994 to June 2001 
Panel A of this table provides summary statistics of departures of top management in Australian equities, 
Australian bonds and chief investment officer levels.  Panel B evaluates the pre and post performance from 
the benchmark index using both 6 and 12-month evaluation periods. 
 Head AEQ Head AFI CIO 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics    
Number of Departures in Period 44 16 39 
Average Tenure to Departure (in years) 2.47 N/A# 2.01 
Average Tenure in 7.5 Year Period (in years) 4.04 4.77 4.47 
Panel B: Pre/Post Performance Analysis    
6 Month Pre/Post Period -0.020 -0.059 0.121 
t-stat -0.23 -1.88* 1.78* 
12 Month Pre/Post Period 0.084 -0.049 0.093 
t-stat 0.82 -1.98** 1.92** 
# Small sample size of 2 top management personnel makes the average distorted, however the mean tenure of 
these fixed income senior managers is 6.33 years. 
Significance levels evaluated at 0.10 (*) and 0.05 (**) 
 
7.5.3.2 Tenure, Manager Service and Australian Equities Performance 
Another empirical question surrounds the issue of whether performance is related 
to the length of time (years) served by senior investment professionals.  Risk-averse 
investors may well prefer their investment managers to have longer rather than shorter 
tenure periods, ceteris paribus, as longer tenure is likely to indicate relative management 
stability, founded on a proven and disciplined investment process that has succeeded over a 
long period of time.  Indeed, Golec (1996) examines the issue of tenure periods for U.S. 
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mutual fund managers and documents those managers with longer tenure earn higher 
returns. 
Track record is also likely to be an important and desirable trait in the awarding of 
a new investment mandate by prospective clients.  Given this preference by investors, 
coupled with Khorana’s (2001) empirical findings that poor performance leads to asset 
outflow, higher turnover in senior management ranks should subsequently arise.  The 
theory described above hypothesises investment performance being directly related to a 
senior manager’s tenure period.  The implicit assumption is that good performers are 
retained through appropriate remuneration policies for their superior management 
capabilities and that their compensation structure is suitably tied to future performance.100  
The theory also assumes the majority of turnover in top management is ultimately 
performance dependent.101 
Cross-sectional regressions evaluating risk-adjusted performance and tenure 
periods for Australian equities sector heads are considered to determine the relationship 
between these two variables.  Due to the limited sample size, analysis is restricted to 
Australian equities, which comprise the greatest number of staff movements.102  Tenure 
period is measured as the number of months served in the role, after excluding both the 
month of the commencement and month of departure.  The exclusion of starting and 
ending months helps to ensure complete months of service are counted. 
                                                 
100 Whether performance is ‘good’ is likely to be determined by investors on the basis of both performance 
relative to the benchmark, as well as performance relative to a predetermined peer group of investment 
managers. 
101 The turnover of staff from Australian equities and Australian fixed income sector heads to promotion to 
Chief Investment Officer role in the incumbent firm is very small in the sample.  In some of these cases, the 
sector head retained their sector responsibilities in conjunction with the CIO position. 
102 Combining all management changes for equities, bonds and balanced sectors was not performed in light of 
the performance differences in sectors noted earlier. 
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The results in Panel A of Table 7.10 account for all Australian equities directors in 
the 7.5-year period (irrespective of whether such individuals remained in their roles at the 
end of June 2001).   
This table shows the results of a regression, where risk-adjusted performance is regressed on the number 
of months served in the role of Australian equities director.  Panel A includes all management changes 
during the periods served within the 7.5 years to 30 June 2001.  Panel B examines those top managers that 
both commence and terminate within the 7.5-year period to 30 June 2001. 
 
  
Table 7.10 – Cross-sectional Regression of Australian Equities Performance by Management Period 
AEQ α3 t-stat AEQ β3 t-stat  
Panel A: All Top Management Changes 
Constant 0.329 3.96 *** 1.030 62.88 *** 
Independent Variable -0.003 -1.70 * -0.001 -2.23 ** 
R2 0.054 -  0.090 -  
F-stat - 2.88 
-1.11 
0.012 -  
 
* - 4.96 ** 
Panel B: Management Changes According to Strict Tenure Periods 
Constant 0.268 2.19 ** 1.027 34.40 *** 
Independent Variable -0.002 -0.46  -0.001  
R2  0.068 - 
F-stat - 0.21 - 1.23  
* Significant at 0.10 level 
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
 
The findings presented in Panel A suggest risk-adjusted performance is inversely 
related to the months tenure served in senior equity positions.  This suggests Australian 
equities managers’ performance declines as the length of time served in the position 
increases.  In terms of systematic risk, Panel A indicates that managers serving longer 
periods as equities director exhibit significantly lower market risk.  In other words, 
systematic risk for Australian equities directors is inversely related to the tenure period 
served.  Where consideration is provided to equities directors that commence and leave 
within the observation period Table 7.10, Panel B), a more strict definition of service 
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provides a similar negative relationship between tenure and performance as well as tenure 
and systematic risk.  However, due to the earlier discussion of the limitations in sample 
size, the statistical tests are inconclusive.  Further analysis is therefore warranted using an 
expanded data set, encompassing a longer period of evaluation.  This is another area for 
future research. 
7.5.4 
                                                
Investment Performance, Strategy and Manager Characteristics 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) consider the extent to which manager characteristics 
predict the cross-sectional distribution of returns derived by U.S. mutual funds.  This is an 
important issue, as investors making future investment decisions are likely to consider all 
available information concerning the characteristics exhibited by investment managers and 
their likely ability to earn superior returns.  This essay employs the same methodology to 
examine the predictive ability of manager characteristics, where investors rely on manager 
characteristics information in the period prior to making investment decisions.103  Annual 
data are used and the measurement of variables is at calendar year end (i.e. 31 December).  
This study incorporates similar variables to Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), however there 
are some differences, which largely arise from data availability. 
The data cover yearly periods from January 1994 to December 2000 for which 
investment manager information was available.  Yearly evaluations were performed to 
minimise the potential of bias arising from changes in risk profiles of investment manager 
organisations (see Chevalier and Ellison (1999b).  The quantitative data are measured as at 
the end of each calendar year in the period examined. 
 
103 The analysis recognises that investors make selection decisions using all available information, 
recognising that the future cannot be predicted with certainty. 
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The cross-sectional analysis considers the extent to which balanced (or multi-
sector) fund performance is predictable using variables that account for investment 
manager characteristics and strategy.  The determinants of investment performance (α) are 
considered using the regression model below: 
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Additional models are also considered when evaluating the relationship between manager 
characteristics, systematic risk (β) and management fees (MF) charged as follows: 
(7.5) 
(7.6) 
(7.7) 
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The independent variables evaluated are the natural logarithm of the institution’s 
total assets (AST), the natural logarithm of the parent company’s age (in years) (INSAGE), 
the strategic benchmark weight of balanced funds invested in the largest asset class sector 
(Australian equities (AEQ)), a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the predominant 
portfolio strategy is bottom-up stock selection (PORT), the educational years study at 
tertiary institutions (EDU), the average years experience of senior and non-senior 
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managers at the firm level (EXPS and EXPO respectively), and the average years of 
loyalty (or tenure) of senior and other staff at the firm-wide level (LOYS and LOYO).104 
This section evaluates risk-adjusted performance, systematic risk and management 
expenses with respect to a set of investment management characteristics information for 
investment companies.  The results are presented in Table 7.11, and discussed in sections 
7.5.4.1 to 7.5.4.3.  An analysis of investment strategy and performance for Australian 
equities and Australian bond managers is outlined in section 7.5.4.4. 
                                                 
104 An evaluation of the potential econometric problems associated with multicollinearity was considered.  
The correlation matrix, presented in Appendix 4, indicates most variables have low correlations, and 
according to Gujarati (1995) (p.335), these do not appear to be problematic. 
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Table 7.11 – Aggregate Manager Characteristics, Strategy and Performance (Diversified Funds) in the Period January 1994 – December 2000 
The evaluation of manager performance, risk and expenses are regressed on a number of manager attribute and strategy variables in the period January 1994 to December 
2000.  The observations employed in the analysis are in years.  Performance is measured as the risk-adjusted excess return (α) per month over calendar year periods.  Where 
alpha is the dependent variable, the statistical significance of the parameter estimates is determined using heteroskedastic-adjusted standard errors.  Beta (β) and Management 
Fee (MF) models are also evaluated using Newey-West consistent standard errors.  Management fees (MF) are estimated with respect to the annual expense ratio applicable in 
the calendar year for a $A50 million portfolio. 
 
 Alpha (α)  Beta (β)  Management Fees (MF)  
Variables Coefficient         
Constant         
 Coefficientt-stat t-stat Coefficient t-stat
0.916 1.55 1.072 2.60 ** -0.158 -0.89
Log of Assets (AST) -0.029 -1.05  0.022 1.56  -0.001 -0.13  
Log of Institution’s Age (INSAGE) -0.040 -2.25 ** 0.039 2.92 *** 0.008 1.54 
         
0.096 *** 
Educational Years (EDU) 
       1.72 * 
-0.86 -0.001  
          
 
Australian Equities Benchmark Allocation (AEQ) 0.005 0.65 -0.004 -0.64 0.009 3.25 ***
Portfolio Strategy Dummy (PORT) 2.88 *** -0.105 -2.99 -0.162 -10.01 *** 
-0.183 -1.43  0.016 0.36  0.100 4.27 *** 
Senior Manager Experience (EXPS) 0.003 0.46  0.001 0.18  0.005 1.94 * 
Other Manager Experience (EXPO) 0.010 0.95 -0.017 -1.59 0.008
Senior Manager Loyalty (LOYS) -0.007  -0.010 -1.70 * -0.40 
Other Manager Loyalty (LOYO) -0.029 -2.66 *** 0.006 0.64  0.005 2.07 ** 
R2 (Adjusted) 0.066 - 0.063 - 0.492 -
F-statistic    1.66    - 1.67 * -  * - 10.48 ***
* Significant at 0.10 level 
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
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7.5.4.1 Risk-Adjusted Performance and Manager Characteristics 
With respect to risk-adjusted returns, the diversified portfolio performance of 
Australian investment managers is significantly negatively related to the institution’s age 
(INSAGE), significantly positively related to bottom-up (rather than top-down) investment 
strategies (PORT) and significantly negatively dependent on the loyalty of money 
management staff who do not comprise the senior levels of the organization’s hierarchy 
(LOYO). 
The negative relation between performance and an institution’s age (INSAGE) may 
be related to the ownership structure of the firm, where more recently formed boutique’s 
with a higher degree of equity ownership exhibit higher incentives related to performance 
compared to older and more potentially bureaucratic firms.  The culture exhibited by a 
younger firm may also be associated with smaller teams of individuals, a flatter 
hierarchical structure, improved efficiencies and an increasing willingness to take on new 
challenges and refine existing processes with enthusiasm and drive. 
Bottom-up portfolio strategies outperform top-down strategies (PORT), and this 
finding may occur given the very nature of the process’ first priority involving a rigorous 
examination of an individual stock’s fundamentals, such as balance sheet, profit and loss 
statement and cash flows, combined with the strategic direction of the corporation over the 
medium to long term.  Such an approach, based on the empirical findings, has significant 
performance advantages over a top-down strategy. 
In terms of the loyalty of non-senior staff (LOYO) (which comprise the substantial 
majority of an investment firm’s human capital), the results imply that performance is 
inversely related to loyalty.  This may be explained in two ways.  First, the more successful 
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investment managers may be more willing to recruit talented individuals from competitor 
firms, which in turn causes the average loyalty of ‘emerging’ senior professionals to be 
relatively lower.  In turn, the inclusion of these new staff delivers superior performance in 
the following year.  This may also infer that new employees are pro-active and determined 
to succeed in their new roles.  Second, fund managers exhibiting relatively higher levels of 
loyalty among non-senior personnel may indicate that senior staffs are less willing to 
discipline poor performance, career progression to senior levels is more difficult, or the 
firm’s recruitment at non-senior levels is less active (thereby forgoing the opportunity of 
integrating new staff, who in turn contribute new ideas to current processes and improve 
synergies). 
The insignificant coefficients on educational years (EDU) and experience (EXPS 
and EXPO) suggest the measure of quality, aptitude or track record of staff cannot be used 
to distinguish between superior and inferior performance of investment managers.  This 
result indicates that education levels and experience are relatively homogenous across 
institutions or are inappropriate proxies of manager skill.  An alternative explanation for 
the insignificant coefficient on EDU is that educational years alone may not represent the 
most accurate proxy of a manager’s intellectual aptitude.  Risk-adjusted performance is 
also shown to be unrelated to the benchmark allocation of managers to the largest asset 
class component of diversified funds, namely Australian equities (AEQ).  This is 
surprising, particularly in light of the relative success that a substantial number of actively 
domestic equity managers in earning superior risk-adjusted returns.  In the end, it may well 
be that due to the cross-sectional strength of managers in this sector, and it’s dominance 
over all other sector allocations, differential aggregate performance cannot be easily 
distinguished across the group of managers.  The results also indicate that the institutional 
investment manager’s asset size (AST) does not serve as a useful predictor of performance. 
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The empirical findings presented in this essay are in some ways unique when 
comparing performance with the U.S. evidence of Golec (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999b).  This is mainly due to the differences in the analyses.  This essay involves slightly 
different measurement methods for the variables, and in some cases unique variables, as 
well as the investment manager characteristics data being aggregated from across the 
company (i.e. compiled using all money management individuals employed by the asset 
management firm).  This is in comparison to both U.S. studies that analyse performance 
and characteristics from a more individualistic mutual fund level (where either one of a 
few individuals are responsible for an individual mutual fund).  In terms of α, this essay 
does not identify education (EDU) as being a useful predictor of superior performance 
across managers, whereas Golec (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) both find strong 
evidence that younger managers with M.B.A.’s from higher SAT schools earn superior 
returns.  While the analysis presented in this essay does not allow for tests of individual’s 
performances based on their educational qualifications, the aggregation, measurement as 
well as the inability of the EDU variable to differentiate across university institutions does 
not provide useful information in predicting performance.  As discussed previously, 
inferring ‘quality’ in an institution’s stock of human capital using aggregate data may 
inhibit inferences being made and therefore may not allow confirmation of the findings of 
Golec (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999b).  Interestingly, tenure (loyalty) is 
significantly negatively related to α for the non-senior manager category (LOYO).  While 
LOYO and LOYS are controlled for separately, Golec (1996) finds tenure is significantly 
positively related to alpha, whereas Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) report a positive 
coefficient that is not significant at standard confidence intervals.  While this difference at 
the first instance is perplexing, the contradiction is likely to be attributable to the variables’ 
measurement. 
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7.5.4.2 Systematic Risk and Manager Characteristics 
Regressions are also performed to determine the relationship between aggregate 
manager characteristics and strategy with respect to the systematic risk of managers’ 
performance and the investment expenses charged (models 7.6 and 7.7, respectively).   The 
analysis for risk and expenses employs Newey-West adjusted standard errors, as the 
expectation is the residuals of the model will be affected by serial correlation.  Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999b) find evidence of managers with longer tenure as well as those 
managers without M.B.A.s exhibit significantly lower betas.  In terms of systematic risk, 
Table 7.11 indicates that older institutions exhibit significantly higher systematic risk than 
younger institutions.  This result may be related to the lower performance levels achieved 
by investment firms with greater longevity, who may take on higher systematic risk to 
improve poor past performance.  Alternatively, senior management loyalty (or tenure) is 
significantly negatively related to risk, and is more comparable to the U.S. results of Golec 
(1996).  This finding suggests managers mitigate exposing their portfolios to higher risks 
due to perceived difficulties in future employment prospects or damage to reputation, as 
senior staff are likely to be perceived as exhibiting greater responsibility for the 
institution’s performance outcomes.  Chevalier and Ellison’s (1999b) results with respect 
to tenure and systematic risk also appear consistent with this essay’s findings.   
Table 7.11 also reports systematic beta risk as being negative and statistically 
significant, implying that beta is significantly lower for portfolio managers that emphasise 
bottom-up strategies.  Bottom-up managers, by definition, will construct portfolios with 
greater attention to an individual asset’s qualities and fundamentals, rather than setting 
macro-level goals attached to the sector weights and subsequently identifying the best 
combinations of assets within those asset classes.  The evidence also suggests that bottom-
up managers may provide closer attention to the actual portfolio’s security weights 
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(relative to the appropriate market benchmarks), and hold more securities in their 
portfolios such that systematic risk is minimised.   
In terms of education (EDU), the Australian findings in relation to risk do not 
corroborate the U.S. evidence.  Golec (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) both 
report evidence of educated managers with M.B.A. degrees as exhibiting significantly 
higher β risk, due in part to their tuition reinforcing that only beta risk is compensated and 
not residual risk (i.e. unsystematic risk, measured as the standard deviation of the residuals 
of portfolio returns).  While the results in Table 7.11 appear consistent with the U.S. 
evidence, indicating managers with higher levels of educational participation exhibit 
higher systematic risk, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at standard 
confidence levels. 
7.5.4.3 Expenses and Manager Characteristics 
In terms of investment charges, Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) report that managers 
from higher-SAT institutions have significantly lower expenses and turnover, as well as 
managing significantly larger funds.  In this study, Table 7.11 indicates expenses are not 
significantly related to a manager’s aggregate asset size.  This result is likely to be 
explained due to the use of aggregate funds under management for each investment 
manager as well as providing consideration to the fact that the Australian investment 
management industry is highly concentrated (and dominated) by asset managers actually 
comprising the study.  Accordingly, the low variability in assets under management does 
not yield a statistically significant point estimate.  However Table 7.11 shows that 
management fees are significantly higher for managers with larger Australian equities 
benchmark allocation exposures, managers whose investment in educational years is 
higher as well as being directly related to experience (senior and other) and loyalty (other).  
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W.M. Mercer surveys of expenses indicate that active equity mandates have the highest 
fees of all asset classes, so these findings concerning Australian equities benchmark 
allocations and expenses should be expected.  Golec (1996) also reports a significantly 
positive relationship between expenses and years of education, which is consistent with 
human capital theory.  The significance of experienced professionals suggests fund 
managers levy a premium on their management fees according to the stability of their 
investment team.  The results also indicate managers who emphasise bottom-up portfolio 
strategies charge significantly lower management expenses and fees are directly related to 
the years of loyal service provided by non-senior staff. 
7.5.4.4 Investment Strategy and Performance 
This study also evaluates the predominant investment strategies employed by active 
investment managers in the Australian equities and Australian bonds sectors.  This section 
evaluates these two sectors using data provided by the investment managers to determine 
the extent to which performance is related to specific investment strategies.  Manager 
performance is considered using monthly data over calendar year periods, consistent with 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999b).  Performance is measured using α1 (fixed income) and α3 
(Australian equities) for which each manager has specified qualitative information over the 
relevant periods.  The data can be applied to analyse managers across the entire period, 
except where there have been changes in the investment policy during the evaluation 
period.  Where such changes were indicated within the questionnaires, the analysis 
evaluates performance in a manner consistent with the manager’s change of strategy. 
In Australian equities, investment strategy is generally identified as follows.  
Performance is evaluated with respect to a finer partitioning of the importance of the major 
components in the manager’s portfolio strategy and the factors expected to contribute to 
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performance.  The variables identified in terms of strategy are – ‘valuation’, ‘past growth 
history’, ‘projected growth’, ‘technical analysis’, ‘quality management’, ‘quantitative 
methods’, and ‘index weights of stocks’.  The components expected to contribute to 
performance in Australian equities are identified as ‘market segments’, ‘industry and sector 
selection’, ‘factor tilts’, and ‘stock selection’.  Investment managers attribute percentage 
weights to identify how strongly each component (if appropriate) contributes towards the 
implementation of their unique strategy.  In terms of Australian bonds, investment 
managers also identify factors expected to deliver performance as well as the significance 
of each component.  These components for bonds are as follows: ‘duration’, ‘yield-
curve/maturity’, ‘issue selection’, ‘arbitrage-oriented’ and ‘technical analysis’. 
Analysis is performed to determine the extent to which performance is related to 
specific factors cited by fund managers in achieving risk-adjusted returns.  The data 
provided by the fund managers include the expected drivers of performance for both 
Australian shares and bonds as well as more specific investment strategy information for 
the Australian equities asset class.  Investment managers indicate the relative importance 
of specific factors used in the portfolio management process by reporting the percentage 
weighting given to each factor.  Where the investment manager does not rely on a factor, a 
zero percentage weighting applies.  The purpose of the analysis is to determine the relative 
importance of each cited component in the derivation of performance across Australian 
portfolio managers.  This methodology helps to standardise the respective factors across 
managers and to identify the importance of each factor in their decision making process.  
Alpha and systematic risk by manager is then sorted according to whether each component 
of the manager’s strategy is ranked above or below the median manager.  This process then 
allows evaluation in terms of whether the manager places either lower or higher emphasis 
on each of the specific strategies.  The results are presented in Table 7.12. 
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The results suggest risk-adjusted performance for Australian equities managers is 
significantly higher where managers place greater emphasis on the past earnings growth 
history of listed securities, as well as placing higher importance on index weights of stocks 
comprising the benchmark.  While not directly reported, investment managers emphasising 
growth strategies in Australian equities outperformed managers that implemented other 
styles in the period examined. 
Systematic risk is significantly higher where investment managers emphasise 
technical analysis, quantitative methods and market segmentation between industrials, 
resources, large and small capitalisation stocks.  Australian bond managers exhibited 
significantly higher systematic risk where greater emphasis was placed on duration 
management.  Beta was also significantly higher for managers indicating higher preference 
for yield-curve management. 
Overall, managers were well diversified across a number of Australian equities 
strategies, however duration management in domestic bonds was the single most important 
strategy identified.  Future research should investigate further the extent to which 
investment managers’ surveyed responses accurately reflect their portfolio strategies and 
their relative contribution to active performance. 
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 Table 7.12 – Investment Strategy and Performance for Active Australian Equities and Australian 
Bond Managers in the Period January 1994 to December 2000 
This table presents the performance differences across investment strategies in actively managed domestic 
equities and domestic bonds.  Alpha (BM) and Beta (BM) represents the average portfolio of fund manager’s 
risk-adjusted returns and systematic risk, respectively, where the manager’s weight of importance attached to 
the specific investment strategy is below the median manager’s weight of importance.  The converse is the 
case for managers who are above median, denoted Alpha (AM) and Beta (AM).  Risk-adjusted performance 
is reported before expenses and tax on a monthly basis in percentage terms. 
 Alpha  Beta  
Management Strategies AM BM AM-
BM 
t-stat  AM BM AM-
BM 
t-stat  
Panel A: Australian Equities        
Valuation 0.105 0.214 -0.109 -1.57  0.961 0.988 -0.027 -1.36  
Past Growth History 0.223 0.067 0.156 2.11 ** 0.970 0.981 -0.011 -0.52  
Projected Growth 0.191 0.127 0.064 0.92  0.971 0.978 -0.007 -0.36  
Technical Analysis 0.270 
* 
0.06 
** 
0.152 0.118 1.07  1.045 0.970 0.075 2.72 *** 
Management Quality 0.179 0.114 0.065 0.71  0.973 0.978 -0.005 -0.20  
Quantitative Methods 0.173 0.145 0.028 0.39  0.991 0.956 0.035 1.72 
Index Weights 0.229 0.106 0.123 1.81 * 0.975 0.974 0.001  
Market Segment 0.209 0.117 0.092 1.33  0.993 0.950 0.043 2.18 
Industry and Sector 
Selection 0.169 0.146 0.023 0.31 
  
0.174 0.960  
0.123 0.971 
0.027 -0.31 
1.30 ** 
0.032 0.52 
0.034  
0.035  
0.972 0.967 0.005 0.23 
Factor Tilts 0.147 -0.027 -0.36  0.984 -0.024 -1.12 
Stock Selection 0.192 0.069 0.97  0.969 0.002 0.08  
Panel B: Australian Bonds         
Duration 0.031 -0.004  0.997 0.949 0.048 2.21 ** 
Yield Curve/Maturity 0.037 0.020 0.017  0.956 0.999 -0.043 -2.14 
Sector Selection 0.025 0.007  0.991 0.963 0.028 1.37  
Issue Selection 0.025 -0.009 -0.55  0.981 0.974 0.007 0.30 
Arbitrage 0.024 0.011 0.71  0.975 0.980 -0.005 -0.24 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
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7.6 Conclusion and Suggestions For Future Research 
This essay examines the performance of active Australian investment managers, the 
performance of senior investment personnel by tenure period, and the relationship between 
risk-adjusted returns and fund manager characteristics for institutional balanced (or 
diversified asset class) funds. 
In terms of investment manager attributes, performance of balanced funds is 
negatively related to the institution’s age and the loyalty of non-senior investment staff.  
Performance is also found to be significantly higher for managers that predominantly 
operate their portfolios using a bottom-up, stock selection approach.  Interestingly, the 
human capital of managers, measured as the years of tertiary education undertaken, does 
not explain risk-adjusted excess returns.  Systematic risk is positively related to an 
institution’s age while negatively related to both senior manager loyalty and the 
implementation of bottom-up portfolio management strategies.  In terms of management 
expenses, fees are directly related to the benchmark allocation to Australian equities, the 
years of tertiary education, the number of years service (loyalty) for non-senior investment 
professionals and the total years experience of senior money managers.  While this 
research is the first Australian empirical study, further investigation should be performed 
using a longer time period, larger sample and more explanatory variables in an attempt to 
provide further evidence on the attributes that predict fund manager performance. 
This study finds that changes in top management have significant performance 
effects.  In the 12-month period after a change in fixed income director and chief 
investment officer, performance is significantly lower and significantly higher, 
respectively.  There is no significant difference in performance where top management 
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changes occur for Australian equities.  The years of service provided to asset management 
firms by equities directors is inversely related to risk-adjusted return. 
Perhaps the most perplexing issue identified in this study is the success of a large 
proportion of active Australian equity managers that earned superior risk-adjusted excess 
returns in the period.  This finding is consistent with Joye (1999) in the Australian 
institutional market as well as other U.S. studies, notably Daniel et al. (1997) and Wermers 
(2000).  Research is currently under way in terms of providing an explanation for this 
apparent contradiction to the majority of managed fund studies in the literature. 
There are a number of avenues for future research.  These include an analysis of 
additional factors beyond absolute or relative performance that influence the termination or 
resignation of senior investment staff using a larger sample of data over a longer time 
period.  Khorana (1996) indicates that replacement of mutual fund managers is indeed 
predictable based on past performance, however Australian evidence is non-existent.  
Khorana (2001) also identifies asset inflows being an important determinant of manager 
replacement, representing the means by which investors exercise their role in the 
managerial decision process.  Such analysis in an Australian context is therefore warranted. 
The Australian literature should also consider the influence of compensation 
arrangements and their role in rewarding performance and retaining staff.  While all 
managers in this study exhibit various profit-sharing agreements and/or incentive structures 
(in addition to base-level remuneration), analysis of the structure of such agreements and 
their relation to investment performance and risk is an important research issue.  The 
author is currently examining this issue. 
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8 
 
CHAPTER 8  – THE PERFORMANCE OF ACTIVELY 
MANAGED AUSTRALIAN BOND FUNDS 
8.1 Introduction 
The performance evaluation literature concerning managed funds has been 
extensively addressed internationally, where the empirical evidence widely documents the 
inability of active funds to outperform market indices (Jensen (1968), Cumby and Glen 
(1990), Elton et al. (1993), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Cai et al. (1997), Blake and 
Timmerman (1998), Blake et al. (1999)).  Australian research supports the international 
evidence (Bird, et al. (1983), Robson (1986), Hallahan and Faff (1999), Sawicki and Ong 
(2000)).  However, almost all of the empirical research conducted internationally has 
investigated the investment performance of equity funds or funds that invest in diversified 
portfolios comprising both equity and non-equity securities. 
In Australia, published research concerning the investment performance of 
domestic bond funds is largely non-existent.  While Hallahan (1999) investigates 
performance persistence of rollover funds in Australia (including fixed interest funds), 
investment performance measurement was not the objective of the study.  This gap in the 
Australian literature is surprising, given that Australian bond securities managed by 
investment managers, either as specialist vehicles or as part of balanced or multi-sector 
funds, represented more than $A110 billion or around 20 per cent of total assets under 
279 
management at 30 September 1999.105  This represents the second largest of all asset 
classes managed by institutional fund managers in Australia.  Given the fixed interest 
sector’s size as a proportion of the total market and the absence of empirical investigation, 
this study fills a gap in the performance evaluation literature through the analysis of 
actively managed domestic bond funds.  The study also provides a performance 
comparison between the two segments of the funds management market in the Australian 
bonds sector – actively managed institutional and retail products. 
The handful of studies which have evaluated the performance of bond mutual funds 
appears to be largely confined to the U.S., where research concludes that active funds do 
not outperform passive benchmarks (Blake et al. (1993), Elton et al. (1995)).  Cornell and 
Green (1991) investigate the performance of high-yield U.S. bond funds and find no 
evidence of significant performance differences between high-grade and low-grade funds.  
However evidence presented by Blume and Keim (1987) and Blume et al. (1991) indicates 
that lower grade bond portfolios earn higher returns than portfolios of higher investment 
grade, even after accounting for risk.  Detzler (1999) evaluates the performance of active 
global bond mutual funds and finds no support of superior fund performance net of 
expenses against a wide range of benchmarks. 
This study evaluates the performance of active Australian bond funds using both 
unconditional and conditional approaches.  Ferson and Schadt (1996) argue that the use of 
the traditional or unconditional performance evaluation techniques can lead to performance 
measurement biases which arise due to common time variation in managed fund risks and 
risk premia.  With the exception of Sawicki and Ong (2000), all published Australian 
                                                 
105 Rainmaker Information Services.  In correspondence with a number of the managers and William M. 
Mercer Pty. Ltd., these sources indicated that active bond fund management was the predominant strategy 
adopted by domestic fixed interest managers. 
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studies have relied on the use of unconditional performance evaluation methods, while in 
the U.S. and other international markets the conditional performance approach has not 
been extended to bond funds.  Accordingly, this study provides an indication of the level of 
potential bias existing between unconditional and conditional methods for active bond 
funds.  The conditional methodology incorporates public information variables in addition 
to the naive benchmark (market) proxy to provide more accurate inferences concerning the 
magnitude of abnormal returns – that is returns earned beyond information that is widely 
available to the public.  In the U.S., Fama and French (1992, 1993) found that two factors 
explained the variation in bond returns, namely default risk and maturity.  Elton et al. 
(1995) evaluate the performance of relative asset pricing models for bond portfolios to help 
determine the factors exhibiting the greatest influence on returns.  They find that bond fund 
returns are best explained by return indices and fundamental economic variables, namely 
inflation and economic growth.  An innovation also used in the Elton et al. (1995) study is 
the employment of expectations data that capture unexpected changes in macroeconomic 
variables.  However, Ferson and Harvey (1999) caution the use of the Fama and French 
(1993) and Elton et al. (1995) models where no attempt is made to control for systematic 
patterns in risk and expected return. 
                                                
This study also provides evidence concerning the influence of fund flow volumes 
on active portfolio performance for Australian retail funds.  The literature concerning the 
impact of fund flow on performance is non-existent in the Australian literature and limited 
in the U.S.106 Edelen (1999) argues that where an active manager, trading in a market in 
informational equilibrium, experiences an exogenous fund flow shock that is material, 
underperformance cannot be avoided.  Indeed, Edelen (1999) documents that where 
 
106 Sawicki (2000) evaluates the relation between fund flow and past performance, however the focus of the 
study does not assess the impact of flow on performance.  Other international studies evaluating fund flows 
and performance include Warther (1995), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Edelen and Warner (1998). 
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performance measurement techniques are applied to open-ended funds that ignore the level 
of uninformed, liquidity-motivated trading activity, security selection and market timing 
estimates will be adversely affected.  Edelen (1999) shows that funds’ negative market 
timing estimates based on traditional performance measures are completely attributable to 
fund flow.  However, where the relative magnitude of the liquidity shock each fund 
experiences is small, it may be argued that the negative impact on active returns could be 
negligible.  From an empirical perspective, this study considers the extent to which active 
bond fund performance, conditioned on publicly available information and fund flow, 
improves inferences in performance measurement. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows.  Section 8.2 outlines the 
methodology used in measuring investment performance for Australian bond funds.  
Section 8.3 describes the data used in the analysis.  Section 8.4 provides a discussion of the 
empirical results.  The final section concludes the research. 
8.2 Methodology 
8.2.1  Performance Measurement – Unconditional Measures 
The CAPM-based approach, where risk-adjusted abnormal performance is 
measured following the seminal work of Jensen (1968), has been used extensively in the 
performance evaluation literature.  Jensen’s alpha, capturing the abnormal excess return of 
active funds, is estimated using ordinary least squares regression, where an active fund’s 
return in excess of the risk-free rate is regressed on the excess return of the market proxy 
portfolio.   
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The standard excess returns market model regression is therefore expressed as 
follows: 
ptbtpppt RR εβα ++=  
β atic risk of the fund, measuring the sensitivity of the excess return of fund p to 
the excess return on the Index; 
where: 
Rpt = the return of fund p in period t in excess of the risk-free rate; 
αp = the unconditional risk-adjusted excess return of fund p in the period; 
p = system
Rbt = the return on the market portfolio in period t in excess of the risk-free rate; and 
εpt = the residual return of fund p in period t not accounted for by the model.  
The Jensen (1968) approach, however, does not consider an active investment 
manager’s attempts to outperform the market portfolio through the use of ‘timing’ 
strategies.  Treynor and Mazuy (1966) proposed the use of a quadratic term in addition to 
(8.1), arguing that funds with market timing ability will hold a greater (smaller) proportion 
of their portfolios in the market portfolio of risky assets when they expect the market to 
rise (fall).  This attribution model decomposes active performance into either security 
selection or market timing ability.  The intercept term in the Treynor-Mazuy model 
captures abnormal excess returns attributable to stock selection skill only and successful 
market timing exists where the coefficient γ is significantly positive: 
(8.1) 
(8.2) ptbtpbtpppt RRR εγβα +++= 2  
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8.2.2 Performance Measurement – Conditional Measures 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) propose the use of conditional performance evaluation 
methods given that the unconditional approach assumes that risks and risk premia remain 
constant over time.  They argue the failure to account for the time variation in risks and 
returns may lead to biases in the evaluation of investment performance.  Indeed, Ferson 
and Schadt (1996) and Becker et al. (1999) find supporting evidence of negative Jensen 
alphas more often when an unconditional approach is adopted relative to a conditional 
methodology.  In semi-strong form efficient capital markets, security prices fully reflect all 
publicly available price sensitive information.  However, Ferson and Schadt (1996) argue 
that the traditional CAPM-based approach ignores the role of publicly available 
information used in the portfolio management process.  Indeed, Becker et al. (1999) argue 
that the role of conditional models is to account for the potential predictability in future 
market returns given the existence of publicly available information.  In other words, 
active managers should not be attributed with superior performance as a result of 
exploiting publicly known market anomalies.  Where a portfolio manager incorporates 
public information within the investment strategy, unconditional models may indicate the 
fund exhibiting superior risk-adjusted performance when in actual fact none exists.  
Therefore a potential bias may exist when traditional performance models are used. 
The conditional approach involves an extension to the traditional Jensen (1968) 
model where a vector of lagged public information variables is incorporated to estimate 
alpha that is conditional on the public information they possess.  In other words δp are the 
response coefficients of the conditional beta (or incremental changes in beta) for all lagged 
public information variables (i.e. Zt-1).  In the measurement of conditional betas using the 
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regression model (8.3), the excess market return must first be multiplied by each lagged 
public information variable. 
pttbtpbtpppt xZRRR εδβα +++= − )( 1  (8.3) 
 
where: 
pα = the conditional estimate of risk-adjusted performance; 
1−tZ = the vector of public information variables lagged one period; 
pδ = measures the response coefficients of conditional beta with respect to lagged public 
information variables. 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) measure conditional alpha for mutual funds (primarily 
funds invested in equity assets) using the following lagged public information variables – 
treasury note yield, dividend yield, term structure of interest rates, a corporate quality yield 
spread and a dummy variable for the month of January.  Sawicki and Ong (2000) employ 
the Ferson and Schadt (1996) approach (excluding the corporate quality yield spread 
variable) to assess the conditional performance of active Australian equities and active 
balanced funds.  There have been a number of empirical studies investigating factors that 
explain stock returns, for example, Chen et al. (1986) and Fama and French (1993).  Elton 
et al. (1995) argue that the same factors explaining equity returns should also be important 
factors driving bond returns.  In separate regressions (not reported), we evaluated 
empirically the extent to which the returns derived in the Australian bond market (proxied 
by the Warburg Dillon Read Composite Bond Index) were explained by the factors 
documented by Sawicki and Ong (2000).  The model also accounted for the Australian 
equity market (proxied by the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index) as a broader 
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measure of economic activity.  The results indicated that the equity return was the most 
important and significant determinant of bond returns. 
Accordingly, this study estimates conditional alpha for active Australian bond 
funds employing two conditional models.  First, the conditional model in (8.3) incorporates 
all lagged public information variables used by Sawicki and Ong (2000), namely dividend 
yield, treasury note yield, term structure of interest rates and a January conditional 
variable.  Second, the conditional model in (8.3) estimated conditional performance using 
all variables in Sawicki and Ong (2000), with the exception of dividend yield, which was 
replaced by another conditional variable, namely the returns on the All Ordinaries Index, 
as a broader proxy for industrial production and corporate profitability.107  This equity 
return variable, measuring domestic economic conditions, was empirically found to have 
significant explanatory power for bond returns in Australia whereas dividend yield was not 
as strong an explanatory variable.  Therefore, the substitution of the economic conditions 
variable and the dividend yield variable was used to assess the variability in estimated 
conditional bond fund performance.  While the January anomaly has been extensively 
documented in stock returns, a number of studies find supporting evidence of a January 
seasonal in the corporate bond market (Chang and Pinegar (1986), Chang and Huang 
(1990), Fama and French (1993) and Maxwell (1998)).  Accordingly, a dummy variable 
for January is included within the models as a public information variable. 
Equation (8.3) may be considered an unconditional multi-factor model, where the 
first factor is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate and the additional factors 
represent the product of the lagged public information variables and the excess market 
                                                 
107 Ferson and Schadt (1996) measure corporate quality variable as the difference between high-yield or low-
grade corporate bonds (BAA-rated by Moody’s) and AAA rated bonds.  Australia does not have an 
established high-yield market in corporate bonds, therefore the variable is excluded from the analysis.  This is 
also consistent with Sawicki and Ong (2000). 
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return.  Consistent with Ferson and Schadt (1996), heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
are calculated for analyses where market timing is considered.  The conditional 
performance evaluation method incorporating market timing is an extension of (8.3) and is 
estimated as follows: 
ptbtptbtpbtpppt RxZRRR εγδβα ++++= − 21)(  
8.2.3 Fund Flows and Performance 
Fund flows and their influence on managed fund performance is an emerging area 
in the literature.  Two important reasons behind the increasing focus of fund flow activity 
are (1) obtaining improved measures of active fund performance with respect to the 
liquidity service provided to clients of managed funds and (2) solving the puzzle of why a 
negative covariance exists between fund betas and market returns (see Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) and Sawicki and Ong (2000)).  This negative covariance implies that investment 
managers reduce (increase) their market betas despite the available public information 
predicting high (low) expected returns. 
In terms of the provision of client-driven liquidity, Edelen (1999) shows that active 
fund performance for open-end U.S. mutual funds is adversely affected due to the fact 
investment managers engage in uninformed, liquidity-motivated trading.  Edelen (1999) 
further documents that perverse market timing ability derived from unconditional models 
can be attributed to the liquidity function these managers provide mutual fund investors.  
Edelen’s (1999) argument follows from the analysis of Warther (1995), who demonstrates 
a strong positive correlation between monthly aggregate fund flow and market returns.  
Indeed, Edelen and Warner (2001) also document a strong positive relationship using daily 
data, providing further evidence of a negative market timing effect.  Becker et al. (1999) 
(8.4) 
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also postulates that the exogenous liquidity shocks experienced by funds may lead to 
inaccurate conclusions being made concerning a mutual fund’s true market timing ability 
when the liquidity effect is not accounted for in performance models. 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) hypothesise that the negative covariance between fund 
betas and market returns may be driven by new money flows into mutual funds.  The 
hypothesis here is that new money flows occurs when managed fund investors expect 
future market returns to be high.  Where the manager subsequently experiences a delay in 
investing the new inflow, the higher cash level within the portfolio causes a reduction in 
the fund’s beta.  The extent to which new money flows reduce fund betas depends on the 
size of the inflow relative to the fund’s total assets.  An alternative explanation cited by 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) may be due to the variability in asset betas from the underlying 
securities comprising the fund manager’s portfolio or changes in the weights of the 
securities in the fund.  Sawicki and Ong (2000) also proposition both of these possibilities. 
This study considers the extent to which the liquidity service provided to retail 
investors influences the performance estimates.  Fund flow data for the institutional sample 
were not available.  Flow-adjusted performance for the retail sample is evaluated using 
both unconditional and conditional performance evaluation techniques.  Edelen’s (1999) 
analysis incorporates gross fund flows.  This study employs net fund flows due to the 
unavailability of gross flow data.  However, while gross flows capture the entirety of fund 
flow activity, the use of net flows may not be problematic, as inflows and outflows may be 
‘crossed’ with unit holders either buying or redeeming their managed fund units, meaning 
that the manager is not required to engage in trading.  Net flows will still provide important 
inferences in understanding how fund flow activity impacts on active bond fund managers.  
However, the potential for bias in the use of net flows is dependent on the frequency and 
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magnitude of the flow relative to the total size of the fund.  Therefore, there is a possibility 
that this study may understate the total effects of fund flow activity on investment 
performance. 
An examination of net fund flows of retail bond funds reveals that such funds 
experience a significant volume of flow, measured as the absolute value of monthly net 
flow scaled by the funds’ asset size at the beginning of each period (or normalised flow).  
After controlling for extreme flows (for example, those flows that occur around the early 
stages of a funds life), on average retail funds exhibit net flow volume per month 
equivalent to 6.58 percent of total fund assets.  Considering that a fund’s gross flows 
exceed net flows, flow volume would therefore be even more significant.  Overall, the 
average fund, in net terms at least, experiences a material volume of flow in managing its 
active bond portfolios, and the extent to which flow impacts on performance is an 
empirical issue. 
Net fund flows (NFF) are estimated from monthly bond fund asset values, where 
total fund assets (TFA) at period t minus total fund assets from the previous period t-1 
(after the adjustment for the appreciation/depreciation in period t-1 due to fund 
performance).  Net fund flows (NFF) can be expressed as follows: 
NFFpt = TFApt – [TFApt-1(1+Rpt)] (8.5) 
Extending the unconditional model in (8.3) with an additional variable accounting 
for the link between fund flows and market timing, Edelen (1999) advocates the use of an 
interactive regressor to control for the effect of the volume of fund flow on market timing.  
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From (8.5), the volume of fund flows is scaled by the monthly fund size (SFF) and 
incorporated in unconditional and conditional models respectively:108 
ptbtptpbtpbtpppt RSFFRRR ελγβα ++++= 22 )(  
 
ptbtptpbtptbtpbtpppt RSFFRxZRRR ελγδβα +++++= − 221 )()(  
 
                                                
The additional flow variable assists in differentiating an active fund’s true market 
timing ability from the uninformed, liquidity-motivated trading function that funds are 
required to perform.  Hence, if fund flow is adversely captured in the timing coefficient of 
(8.3) and (8.4), the expectation is that (8.6) and (8.7) would document an improved timing 
coefficient coupled with a negative coefficient on the interactive flow term.  If this is the 
case, then the interactive regressor accounts for the negative timing induced on funds 
arising from the flow they experience.109 
8.3 Data 
8.3.1 Active Australian Bond Fund Data 
This study incorporates monthly returns for 66 institutional and 77 retail Australian 
open-end active bond funds in existence within the 10-year period to 30 September 1999.  
 
108 At the beginning of a fund’s life, usually within the period of the first six months, extreme or abnormal 
fund flows (as a proportion of the fund’s total assets) may arise due to significantly rapid asset growth.  We 
omitted fund flows that exceeded 75 percent of a bond fund’s asset size to avoid potential bias in the analysis.  
In all, extreme values only affected 15 funds in the sample group and of these, only around 3% of fund 
observations required omission. 
109 In addition, this paper also accounts for the potential problem of reverse-causality bias by lagging flow 
one period.  This adjustment accounts for the possibility that fund returns are correlated with flow.  The 
results were consistent with those presented in Section 4.  For further information, see Warther (1995) and 
Edelen (1999). 
(8.7) 
(8.6) 
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The study does not evaluate the performance of passively managed bond index funds.  
While index funds should earn returns in line with the underlying index, the number of 
index-oriented bond funds available to Australian investors is small and these funds do not 
have long performance histories, therefore this study focuses on active bond funds only.  
The average institutional and retail fund’s age is 7.5 years and 6.1 years respectively. 
The combined market value of assets of the sample of actively managed 
institutional and retail bond funds at 30 September 1999 was in excess of $A20 billion and 
$A1.6 billion respectively.  Australian bond funds invest in Australian fixed interest 
securities including CGB, SGB and corporate bonds.  The investment managers indicated 
to us that the WDRCBI is the most widely cited index referenced by domestic fixed 
interest portfolio managers and that this index is considered to be the most appropriate 
market proxy with which to evaluate active bond fund performance.  This is confirmed in 
the single index model regressions (equation 8.1) showing high R2 in Table 8.3a.  Given 
this information, active bond managers would attempt to add value above the benchmark 
through active bets relative to the index, in terms of duration management and security 
selection (i.e. under or overweighting the component issues of the WDRCBI). 
The institutional fund performance data were obtained from William M. Mercer 
Pty. Ltd. and Towers Perrin Australia.  The retail fixed interest fund returns data were 
obtained from ASSIRT and include domestic bond funds classified as retail trusts, retail 
superannuation and allocated pension funds.  Net fund flow data for retail funds are 
estimated using monthly data provided by ASSIRT.  Fund flow data from Mercer and 
Towers Perrin was not available for the institutional bond fund sample; hence the fund 
flow analysis is limited to retail bond funds.  Returns are calculated as the total return to 
investors arising from changes in capital value and income derived from portfolio assets.  
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Performance is reported before investment management fees for the institutional sample 
and post fees for the retail sample.110  The study evaluates performance for all funds in 
existence within the 10-year period to 30 September 1999, including an evaluation of non-
surviving funds for the wholesale bond fund sample.  Funds were required to have a 
minimum of two years of performance data to help ensure estimates of risk-adjusted 
performance were not significantly influenced by the start-up phase of the fund as well as 
providing enough observations to incorporate in the individual fund regressions.  The 
advantage of not applying strict limits on the basis of a fixed, long-term evaluation horizon 
(e.g. all funds requiring 10 years of data to be included in the sample) helps to ensure a 
broader cross-section of funds being captured in the performance evaluation period.  
Constraining the fund sample to only funds with sufficient longevity, as is the case in most 
managed fund performance studies, leaves the study open to potential selection biases.  
While the institutional bond fund dataset contains performance of funds that have closed, 
merged into other funds or ceased to exist entirely, the sample may contain a small, but 
unknown degree of survivorship bias.111  The retail bond fund sample does not contain 
non-surviving funds.  Studies including Brown et al. (1992), Elton et al. (1996b) and 
Carpenter and Lynch (1999) highlight the problems performance evaluation studies face 
where survivorship bias exists. 
8.3.2 Measurement of Public Information Variables 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Becker et al. (1999) advocate the use of conditional 
performance evaluation models to control for time variation in risk premia, the level of 
                                                 
110 The ASSIRT database reports performance data after investment management expenses but does not 
account for entry or exit charges in the net return reported. 
111 While William M. Mercer has an outstanding institutional database, there may exist slight possibility that 
one or more closed/terminated funds have been omitted from the database.  While this is extremely unlikely, 
we cannot say with complete certainty that all non-surviving funds have been accounted for. 
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public information available to active managers, while also minimising the potential biases 
inherent in traditional methods.  In this study, two conditional performance evaluation 
models incorporate three lagged (t-1) public information variables similar to those 
identified by Ferson and Schadt (1996) and consistent with Sawicki and Ong (2000).  The 
first conditional model (A) employs a lagged 90-day Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
Treasury note, adjusted to a monthly rate.  Second, a lagged measure of the term structure 
of interest rates, expressed as the monthly difference in yield between the Commonwealth 
10-year bond and 90-day RBA Treasury note.  Third, the lagged monthly dividend yield of 
equity securities comprising the ASX All Ordinaries Index.  Following Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) and Sawicki and Ong (2000), this study also incorporated a dummy variable for the 
month of January as a conditional variable.  The second conditional model (B) evaluated in 
this study substituted an economic conditions variable – a proxy for industrial production, 
corporate profitability and general economic growth (measured as the lagged excess return 
on the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index) as an alternative (and possibly broader) 
information variable to dividend yield.  The remaining variables comprising conditional 
model A were also included in B.  The study considered model B as an alternative model 
to A as a result of separate regressions (not reported) indicating the economic conditions 
variable to be a significant determinant of Australian bond returns, defined as the 
WDRCBI.  Overall, both conditional models provided similar risk-adjusted excess returns 
and hence do not contradict the overall conclusion that active bond funds do not 
outperform passive indices. 
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8.4 Empirical Results 
8.4.1 Overall Active Bond Fund Performance 
Table 8.1 presents the summary results for the individual, actively managed 
Australian bond funds included in the study over the 10-year period to 30 September 1999.  
The table shows the number of funds in both the institutional and retail samples exhibiting 
either significantly positive, significantly negative or statistically insignificant performance 
estimates at the 95 percent confidence interval.  An important point to consider in the 
evaluation of performance is investment management expenses.  The retail sample of 
active bond fund returns provided by ASSIRT is reported net of expenses, however, the 
institutional database of William M. Mercer Pty. Ltd. reports returns before fees.  In 
addition, given that investment managers levy higher fees for retail investors than is the 
case for institutional clients, ceteris paribus, actively managed retail funds will earn lower 
active returns after expenses.  The main conclusion derived from the summary of 
individual fund performances at the total portfolio level from Table 8.1 is that the majority 
of funds do not exhibit superior risk-adjusted performance in the period.  These 
conclusions are consistent with the use of either a conditional or unconditional 
methodology to adjust for fund returns for risk. 
There are a number of active strategies that domestic fixed income managers may 
use in their attempts to add value, such as duration management, yield curve analysis, re-
weighting their portfolio from benchmark index weighting across CGSs, SGSs or 
corporates, and issue selection with respect to credit risk.  However, Table 8.1 clearly 
indicates that in overall portfolio performance, the majority of active managers were 
unable to employ active investment strategies in such a manner that earned their clients 
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superior returns to the market index.  In particular, the results strongly indicate that retail 
fund managers significantly underperform as a result of security selection.  While we do 
not have pre-expenses data with which to report gross performance for retail funds, we do 
know that the average management expense ratio of the sample at 30 September 1999 was 
163 basis points per annum (or 13.6 basis points per month).112  While these reported fees 
are static at a single point in time, on the basis of the results presented in Table 8.1 (Panel 
B), it would appear that fees only account for around half of the average retail bond fund 
underperformance.  However quantification of the exact component of underperformance 
attributable to fees in this sample is not possible due to data constraints.  In terms of the 
inherent survivor bias that exists in the retail sample, the results presented are also likely to 
be more favourable than would be the case if closed and terminated funds were included in 
the sample.  Overall, the study confirms the inability of active Australian fixed income 
funds to outperform passive indices, and this finding is consistent with the empirical 
evidence of Blake et al. (1993) for active U.S. mutual bond funds. 
In terms of the performance of retail funds when fund flow is considered using both 
the unconditional and conditional models, Table 8.1 shows that around half of all funds 
exhibit negative λ coefficients, indicating that fund flow is negatively related to 
performance.  However, only a small percentage of the sample generates significantly 
negative λ estimates, which seems to indicate that fund flow activity does not significantly 
impact on active fund performance across the majority of the sample.  There is only a 
small percentage increase in the number of funds whose performance estimates for market 
timing improve where flow is evaluated. 
                                                 
112 The standard deviation of annual expenses at 30 September 1999 was 35 basis points per annum, and the 
maximum and minimum fees in the sample were 227 and 71 basis points per annum. 
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Table 8.1 – Evaluation of Individual Active Australian Bond Funds in the 10-Year Period to September 1999 
This table shows the number of individual active Australian bond funds in the 10-year period that exhibit performance estimates which are statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence interval.  Panel A evaluates the performance of institutional funds on a before fees basis, whereas Panel B presents summary results for retail bond funds 
using fund returns data after expenses.  Given that Panels A and B differ on the basis of gross and net of fees, respectively, direct comparisons between institutional and retail 
funds are not possible.  Performance is evaluated using both unconditional (equations 8.1, 8.2 and 8.6) and conditional approaches (equations 8.3, 8.4 and 8.7).  The 
conditional model (B) accounts for the variables economic conditions, term structure, treasury yield and January dummy.  The results for conditional model (A) were similar 
and are not reported.  Retail funds are also evaluated using fund flow data to assess the potential impact that flow causes on performance estimates.  The columns labelled 
‘Total’ refer to the portfolio’s overall return that arises from an active manager’s security selection and market timing strategies.  Alpha (α) represents the active fund’s stock 
selection skill; Gamma (γ) refers to the bond manager’s market timing ability; Lambda (λ) denotes the fund flow variable’s impact on performance for actively managed retail 
bond funds.  Fund flow data for the institutional sample was not available.  The t-statistics used to determine statistical significance are calculated using White (1980) 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors for models (8.2), (8.4), (8.6), (8.7). 
 Conditional Unconditional Unconditional 
(ignoring flow) (including flow) (ignoring flow) 
Conditional 
(including flow) 
Total 
(Eq. 1) 
α 
(Eq. 2) 
γ 
(Eq. 2) 
α 
(Eq. 6) 
γ 
(Eq. 6) 
λ 
(Eq. 6) 
Total 
(Eq. 3) 
α 
(Eq. 4) (Eq. 4) 
α 
(Eq. 7) 
γ 
(Eq. 7) 
λ 
(Eq.7) 
Panel A: Institutional Bond Funds* 
Negative & Insignificant    -         
     -        
           -  
             
 66 66 66          
             
       3    36  
             
          0   
           77  
22 18 41 - - 25 21 39 - - -
Positive & Insignificant 35 35 19 - - 30 31 21 - - -
Negative & Significant 2 2 6 - - - 2 2 5 - -
Positive & Significant 7 11 0 - - - 9 12 1 - - -
Funds in Sample - - - 66 66 66 - - -
Panel B: Retail Bond Funds* 
Negative & Insignificant 19 21 39 25 28 21 27 35 42 35 38 34
Positive & Insignificant 1 4 32 1 35 35 4 30 2 23
Negative & Significant 57 52 1 51 4 16 47 38 3 40 2 10
Positive & Significant 0 0 5 0 10 5 0 0 2 1 10
Funds in Sample 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
 γ 
* Significance level = 0.05 
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Table 8.2 indicates that institutional bond funds earn risk-adjusted excess returns 
comparable to an index fund before expenses, where the average alpha is insignificantly 
different from zero for both unconditional and conditional techniques.  Retail funds on the 
other hand levy higher fees than institutional bond funds, and, ceteris paribus, will 
underperform to a greater extent than institutional funds where management expenses are 
deducted.  The overwhelming majority of retail bond funds have negative alphas and the 
average retail fund exhibits significantly negative risk-adjusted excess returns after 
expenses, irrespective of whether an unconditional or conditional performance model is 
considered.  Analysis of bond funds using the unconditional Sharpe Ratio (not directly 
reported) also supports the evidence that active bond funds do not outperform the market 
benchmark. 
The high R2 reported for both the conditional and unconditional models indicates 
that active bond fund returns are explained well by the independent variable(s).  While 
there is a difference in the coefficient of determination reported for institutional and retail 
funds of approximately 20 percent, the most likely explanation for this is due to the higher 
variability in performance for retail funds arising from returns being reported post-fees.  In 
other words, due to retail funds being evaluated after expenses (whereas institutional funds 
are analysed before fees) the different expense ratios charged by retail funds ensure a lower 
R2.  In addition, retail funds may have different portfolio allocations to fixed income assets 
compared with institutional funds.  For example, retail bond funds may hold higher cash 
levels, allocations to other debt securities including mortgage securities (which are not 
accounted for in the WDRCBI) or prefer exhibiting a shorter duration relative to the index. 
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Table 8.2 – Overall Risk-Adjusted Performance of Active Australian Bond Funds 
This table presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics for 66 institutional and 77 retail actively managed 
Australian bond funds in the 10-year period to 30 September 1999.  Alpha is expressed in percentage terms 
per month and represents the total active return (adjusted for risk) derived through the use of both security 
selection and market timing strategies.  The table shows total portfolio risk-adjusted returns using both an 
unconditional (equation 8.1) and 2 conditional approaches (equation 8.3).  The conditional model A 
incorporates the following public information variables – dividend yield, term structure, treasury note yield 
and a January conditional variable.  The conditional model B uses the economic conditions variable in place 
of dividend yield, and all other remaining variables defined in conditional model A.  The systematic risk of 
funds is measured as β.  R2 for the conditional model is reported as the adjusted R2. 
Model Mean α t-stat  SD α Min α Q1  α Q2  α Q3  α 
Max 
α 
Mean 
β 
Mean 
R2 
Panel A: Institutional Bond Funds – Before Fees 
Unconditional 0.009 1.10 0.065 -0.365 -0.015 0.011 0.035 0.154 1.027 0.927 
Conditional (A) 0.011 1.42 0.059 -0.238 -0.014 0.013 0.042 0.162 1.161 0.938 
Conditional (B) 0.001 0.10 0.093 -0.567 -0.016 0.008 0.040 0.188 1.053 0.932 
Panel B: Retail Bond Funds – After Fees 
Unconditional -0.279 -11.46 *** 0.236 -0.926 -0.293 -0.179 -0.135 0.005 0.807 0.721 
Conditional (A) -0.307 -10.61 *** 0.253 -0.968 -0.578 -0.195 -0.130 0.026 0.954 0.705 
Conditional (B) -0.244 -10.50 *** 0.224 -0.971 -0.245 -0.168 -0.114 0.087 1.002 0.742 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
An interesting point to note in Table 8.2 is the general improvement in the average 
alpha of funds when a conditional model is employed.  With the exception of the 
conditional model A for retail funds, the conditional models shift the distribution of alphas 
to the right, however this shift is not large enough to change the general conclusion that 
active bond funds cannot significantly outperform the benchmark index.  The shift in the 
distribution of fund alphas to the right is also supported in the literature, namely the 
empirical studies of Ferson and Schadt (1996), Becker et al. (1999) and to some extent the 
results of Sawicki and Ong (2000). 
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Table 8.3 – Cross-Sectional Averages of the Conditional Variable Coefficients for Active Institutional 
and Retail Australian Bond Funds 
This table presents the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients of the conditional public information 
variables for conditional models A and B.  The sample comprises 66 institutional and 77 retail actively 
managed Australian bond funds in the 10-year period to 30 September 1999.  The number of funds in the 
sample with statistically significant conditional variable coefficients (at 0.05 level) is also documented. 
 Institutional Bond Funds  Retail Bond Funds 
Variable Coefficient t-stat  No. Funds 
Significant** 
 Coefficient t-stat  No. Funds 
Significant** 
Panel A: Conditional Model A 
Dividend -0.867 -3.45*** 20  -0.799 -2.45** 8 
Term 0.210 1.68* 20  -0.067 -0.43 12 
Treasury Note 0.246 2.88*** 25  -0.098 -0.81 12 
January -0.012 -0.97 8  -0.053 -2.54** 3 
Panel B: Conditional Model B 
Economic -0.002 -1.90* 7  -0.002 -0.99 7 
Term 0.330 2.40** 25 
0.006 
 0.194 1.35 12 
Treasury Note 0.07 25  -0.020 -0.10 13 
January -0.019 -1.28 3  -0.152 -5.51*** 13 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
** Significant at 0.05 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
 
Table 8.3 presents the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients used as 
conditional variables for active institutional and retail bond funds.  This study employs two 
conditional models applied specifically to active bond funds study.  The difference 
between the models is that conditional model A (Panel A) evaluates performance 
conditioned on lagged public information variables consistent with Sawicki and Ong 
(2000) – dividend yield, term structure, treasury note yield and a January dummy.  On the 
other hand, conditional model B (Panel B) substitutes an economic conditions variable for 
dividend yield.  Sawicki and Ong (2000) report that the treasury note yield and term 
structure conditioning variables for tax-paying (PST) Australian share funds are 
statistically important in explaining equity fund returns.  Sawicki and Ong (2000) also find 
dividend yield is an important determinant for their tax-paying (PST) balanced funds 
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sample.  The institutional bond fund results documented in Table 8.3 (Panel A) indicate 
that the coefficients on dividend yield, the term structure of interest rates and Treasury note 
yield are statistically significant.  Panel B indicates that the economic conditions variable 
and the term structure of interest rates are also significant explanatory variables for 
institutional Australian bond fund returns.  While the results for retail bond funds are not as 
strong as for the institutional sample, the average retail fund exhibits a significant 
coefficient for dividend yield (which is consistent with institutional bond funds), however 
the remaining variables are not significant.  An important difference between institutional 
and retail funds is the presence of a significantly negative January coefficient for both 
conditional models A and B. 
Sawicki and Ong (2000) find 48 percent of individual balanced and equity-oriented 
funds exhibit a significant coefficient for the dividend yield conditional variable, however 
the other variables were not found to be important.  The results presented in Table 8.3 
indicate that the dividend yield coefficient is significant for 30 percent of institutional 
funds and 10 percent of retail funds.  The term structure of interest rates and Treasury note 
yield also appears reasonably important for around one-third of institutional funds.  The 
results are not as strong for the retail sample at the individual fund level. 
In light of the empirical evidence presented in the literature (for example, Elton et 
al. (1996b)), the inclusion of non-surviving funds in performance evaluation studies 
reduces the average alphas compared with survivorship-biased samples.  In other words, 
survivor-biased samples will overstate the ‘true’ performance of managed funds.  Elton et 
al. (1996b) argue that attrition rates for managed funds are high for those funds that 
perform poorly relative to their peers.  In such cases, investment managers are likely to 
find the marketing of poor performing funds difficult, and as a result may choose to merge 
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the underperforming fund into another fund or terminate the fund altogether.  The 
institutional sample used in this study includes both surviving and non-surviving active 
Australian bond funds.  While poor performance may be the single most important factor 
behind the closure of a fund, managed funds may also cease to operate due to merger or 
takeover activity by another competitor.  In addition, takeover or merger activity may also 
arise due to poor performance. 
The William M. Mercer institutional database does not include information 
explaining why funds cease, however subsequent analysis of performance prior to closure 
may assist in determining the proportion of funds that terminate.  In terms of the 
institutional active bond fund sample employed in this study, 17 of the 66 bond funds (25.7 
percent) do not have full performance histories to 30 September 1999.  These 17 
terminated funds are managed by 15 different managers, of which just under half the 
investment managers (7 managers, managing 7 defunct funds) remained as distinct and 
independent investment organisations at the end of September 1999.  On the basis of this 
information, analysis was performed using the unconditional and conditional models to 
evaluate the performance of the funds in the period of survival.  The results are presented 
in Table 8.4 and show that non-surviving funds underperform on average where an 
unconditional approach is employed.  However the statistical power of the test is likely to 
be affected due to the small sample size.  Panel B, which evaluates surviving and non-
surviving funds using the conditional measure, shows no significant difference in the 
average performance of surviving and non-surviving funds.  While not reported directly, 
analysis was also performed by partitioning the sample of non-surviving funds on the basis 
of (a) whether the investment manager ceased to exist after the fund was terminated and 
(b) whether the manager remained in existence until September 1999.  While power of the 
statistical tests is weak, due to the small sample size, the results indicated that non-
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surviving managers, whose funds also ceased, underperformed the terminated funds 
offered by surviving managers. 
Table 8.4 – Analysis of the Performance of Surviving and Non-Surviving Institutional Active 
Australian Bond Funds 
This table presents the cross-sectional average returns for actively managed institutional bond funds that both 
survive and do not survive through until 30 September 1999.  Alpha is expressed in percentage terms per 
month and represents the total active return (adjusted for risk) derived through the use of both security 
selection and market timing strategies.  Panel A shows cross-sectional average risk-adjusted returns using the 
unconditional model (equation 8.1) and Panel B employs a conditional approach (B) employing conditional 
variables economic conditions, term structure, treasury yield and January dummy (equation 8.3).  The results 
for conditional model (A) were largely consistent and are not reported. 
Category No. Funds Mean α t-stat  SD α 
Panel A: Unconditional Model      
Non-Surviving 17 -0.016 -0.66 0.103 
Surviving 49 0.018 2.90*** 0.042 
Difference - 0.034 1.32 - 
Panel B: Conditional Model     
Non-Surviving 17 0.011 0.52 0.090 
Surviving 49 -0.002 -0.18 0.095 
Difference - 0.013 0.54 - 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
 
8.4.2 Market Timing and Selectivity for Active Bond Funds 
Table 8.5 presents the performance attribution results for security selection and 
market timing for the institutional and retail bond fund samples.  Panel A summarises the 
results for the institutional bond fund sample and shows the average active manager earned 
significantly positive returns attributable to the selection of bond securities before 
management fees.  However, institutional funds exhibit significantly negative market 
timing ability, which indicates that macroeconomic forecasting on the part of active bond 
managers detracts from their ability to earn significantly positive risk-adjusted excess 
returns (see Table 8.2, Panel A).  Panel B of Table 8.5, which controls for public 
information, indicates active returns attributable to security selection and market timing for 
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institutional funds are consistent with an efficient capital market.  In terms of both 
performance estimates, the average institutional fund exhibits improved selectivity and 
market timing estimates compared with the unconditional model.  This is consistent with 
Ferson and Schadt (1996), who also document improved performance when conditional 
models are employed.  However Ferson and Schadt (1996) indicate that this phenomenon 
is attributed to the negative covariance between fund betas and market returns, where 
information conditioning controls for this effect.  Sawicki and Ong (2000) also highlight 
the perplexing nature of this result, because a negative covariance suggests irrationality on 
the part of active investment managers who increase (reduce) their exposure to the market 
when returns are low (high). 
In terms of active retail bond funds, both the conditional and unconditional models 
show significantly negative risk-adjusted excess returns arising from bond selection.  
While retail funds on average exhibit negative market coefficients, both models evaluated 
are statistically insignificant at conventional levels, although the p-value derived using the 
conditional model is close to being statistically significant.  Overall, the general findings 
that active bond funds are unable to earn significantly positive risk-adjusted excess returns 
confirm the U.S. evidence documented by Elton et al. (1993) using unconditional models. 
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Table 8.5 – Security Selection and Market Timing Performance of Active Institutional and Retail 
Australian Bond Funds 
This table presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics for 66 institutional and 77 retail actively managed 
Australian bond funds existing in the 10-year period to September 1999.  Panels A and C employ the 
unconditional approach (equation 8.2) whereas Panels B and D evaluate active bond funds using the 
conditional model (B) (equation 8.4) incorporating conditional variables: economic conditions, term 
structure, treasury yield and January dummy (model B).  The results for conditional model (A) were 
consistent and are not reported.  Alpha is expressed in percentage terms per month (before fees) and 
represents the active return (adjusted for risk) derived through the use of security selection only.  Market 
timing is denoted by γ, and superior ability is present when γ is significantly positive.  The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient between selectivity and timing estimates is denoted ρ. 
 Mean Q3  t-stat SD Min Q1 Q2 Max 
Panel A: Institutional Funds - Unconditional Model (ignoring fund flow) 
α 0.020 * 1.83 0.089 -0.500 -0.008 0.024 0.054 0.265 
γ -0.006 * -1.92 0.027 -0.057 -0.015 -0.007 0.002 0.152 
ρ (α,γ) -0.588 *** - - - - - - - 
Panel B: Institutional Funds - Conditional Model (B) (ignoring fund flow) 
α 0.011  0.76 0.114 -0.566 -0.017 0.019 0.051 0.320 
-0.105 
- 
γ -0.004  -1.36 0.025 -0.082 -0.014 -0.006 0.006 0.071 
ρ (α,γ) -0.540 *** - - - - - - - 
Panel C: Retail Funds - Unconditional Model (ignoring fund flow) 
α -0.316 *** -10.08 0.276 -0.907 -0.624 -0.196 -0.138 0.091 
γ 0.006  0.98 0.051 -0.019 -0.001 0.029 0.256 
ρ (α,γ) -0.480 *** - - - - - - 
Panel D: Retail Funds - Conditional Model (B) (ignoring fund flow) 
α -0.254 *** -8.48 0.261 -0.914 -0.424 -0.156 -0.096 0.210 
γ -0.010 ^ -1.66 0.051 0.223 -0.028 -0.009 0.016 0.141 
ρ (α,γ) -0.379 *** - - - - - - - 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
^ p-value = 0.11 
 
An interesting finding reported in Table 8.5 is the existence of strong negative 
correlation (cross-sectional) between selectivity and timing estimates where flow is not 
accounted for.  Both the unconditional and conditional models derive significantly negative 
Pearson correlation coefficients.  Other studies, including Henriksson (1984) and Coggin et 
al. (1993) also find evidence of a strong negative relationship between timing and 
selectivity, indicating that perceived skill in one component of portfolio management 
activity does not necessarily imply skill in the other.  There have been a number of 
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hypotheses concerning why this negative correlation phenomenon exists.  Henriksson 
(1984) postulates that the existence of a negative relationship is due to the market proxy 
being misspecified or the model omitting relevant factors explaining the derivation of fund 
returns.  Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) suggest the negative correlation between 
timing and selectivity may occur as a result of portfolio managers holding options or 
option-like securities such as listed securities with high leverage.  Alternatively, Coggin et 
al. (1993) argue the negative relationship between timing and security selection is derived 
due to sampling errors of the two estimates being negatively correlated. 
8.4.3 Fund Flow Effects on Active Bond Fund Performance 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Sawicki and Ong (2000) speculate that new money 
flows into mutual funds may explain the existence of the negative covariance between fund 
betas and the market returns.  Analysis by Warther (1995) indeed confirms the existence of 
a negative relationship between fund betas and new money flows for Ferson and Schadt’s 
(1996) sample. Ferson and Warther (1996) document that money flows into mutual funds 
partly explain the changes in betas over time, and represent a plausible interpretation 
highlighting the negative impact on market timing that is attributable to fund flow.  The 
results of Ferson and Schadt (1996), Warther (1995) and Ferson and Warther (1996) all 
contribute to Edelen’s (1999) examination of the relationship between fund flow activity 
and a fund’s market timing performance.  Indeed, Edelen (1999) finds the source of 
negative market timing is attributable to the flow experienced by active mutual funds.  
Given the empirical evidence in the U.S., this study therefore attempts to explain the 
impact of fund flow activity on active bond fund performance with respect to market 
timing. 
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Table 8.6 presents the results for the retail bond fund sample using a similar 
approach to Edelen (1999) that accounts for the effect of fund flow on market timing 
through the use of an interactive regressor term (see equations 8.6 and 8.7).  If the liquidity 
effect is detrimental to an active manager attempting to successfully time the market, then 
the coefficient on the interactive term (λ) should be negative and a corresponding 
improvement of the market timing coefficient should subsequently be reported. Panel A of 
Table 8.6 presents the cross-sectional performance results of active retail fixed interest 
funds that account for flows according to the unconditional model.  Consistent with 
Edelen’s (1999) results for U.S. mutual funds, the interactive term (accounting for both 
market timing and fund flow) is significantly negative, and the coefficient determining 
market timing ability is correspondingly significantly positive.  At the individual fund 
level, the unconditional model indicates that 21 percent of retail funds have significantly 
negative interactive flow coefficients.  When the cross-sectional results in Panel A of Table 
8.6 are compared with the unconditional model that excludes flow for retail funds (Table 
8.5, Panel C), market timing ability appears to be understated when flow is not considered.  
However, the conditional flow-control model (Panel B) does not (statistically) support the 
findings presented in Panel A.  While the results indicate that flow for the sample is on 
average negative, the coefficient is not significant.  While the market timing estimate has 
improved (marginally) compared with Table 8.5 (Panel C), the conditional model does not 
suggest retail bond fund managers are successful market timers. 
306 
Table 8.6 – Security Selection, Market Timing and Fund Flow for Active Retail Australian Bond 
Funds 
This table presents the cross-sectional averages for 77 retail actively managed Australian bond funds in the 
10-year period to September 1999.  Panel A evaluates active bond funds employing the unconditional model 
that accounts for fund flows (equation 8.6).  Panel B accounts for fund flows within the conditional model 
(B) (equation 8.7).  Flows are incorporated into the models in concurrent terms with returns.  The results are 
similar (but not directly reported) when flows are lagged one period.  The conditional model (B) accounts for 
economic conditions, term structure, treasury yield and a conditional January dummy. The results for 
conditional model (A) were largely consistent and are not reported.  Alpha is expressed in percentage terms 
per month (after fees) and represents the active return (adjusted for risk) derived through the use of security 
selection only.  Market timing is denoted by γ, and superior ability is present when γ is significantly positive.  
The influence of fund flow on performance is represented by lambda (λ). 
Coefficient Mean  t-stat 
Panel A: Retail Funds - Unconditional Model 
α -0.296 *** -9.96 
γ 0.011 * 1.70 
λ -0.008 *** -4.19 
Panel B: Retail Funds - Conditional Model(B) 
α -0.266 *** -8.77 
γ -0.008 -1.05 
λ -0.030 -0.99 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
8.5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This is the first study that evaluates the performance of actively managed 
Australian bond funds, using both unconditional and conditional performance evaluation 
techniques, as well as assessing the impact of flow on retail bond fund performance.  The 
evidence presented in this study overwhelmingly indicates that the average active bond 
fund does not outperform the market index.  These conclusions are independent of whether 
performance is (a) considered pre-or post-expenses and (b) whether an unconditional or 
conditional performance model is employed.  These results indicate that performance is 
equivalent to an index fund before costs.  Furthermore, conditional models improve the 
performance of active bond fund managers relative to traditional evaluation techniques.  
However, performance remains consistent with an efficient market. 
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The study also documents that retail fund flows negatively impact on market timing 
coefficients when flow is not accounted for in unconditional models.  In other words, 
unconditional models ignoring flow activity may bias performance inferences – 
specifically, an active manager’s market timing ability.  In terms of the conditional model, 
while market timing estimates are improved with the flow variable, statistical significance 
is absent. 
There are a number of avenues that future research in this area may follow.  First, 
additional research is warranted concerning the effects of fund flow on performance.  
Second, further research should also consider whether other factors have explanatory 
power in determining bond fund returns.  In particular, attention should be given to the 
apparent differences in performance between retail and institutionally managed bond funds 
and the preferences these two market segments exhibit for different types of fixed income 
securities.  Third, an evaluation of active bond funds should also be considered in light of 
the specific investment strategies adopted by investment managers to determine whether 
particular groups of managers who emphasise specific strategies deliver a performance 
advantage to their competitors.  An interesting consideration may include an analysis of 
bond fund strategy across different months of the year.  Fourth, a decomposition of the 
sources of value added or lost from portfolio strategies adopted by fixed interest managers 
could also provide interesting findings of how these portfolios are managed.  Fifth, the 
extent to which fund managers adjust their fixed income portfolios in anticipation of 
announcements concerning macroeconomic variables such as inflation and interest rates 
would also be an interesting area for research.  And lastly, research should consider why 
active bond funds have been unable to beat passive benchmark indices.  Potential 
explanations may be due to the structure of the market and the underlying benchmark 
indices, the degree of market efficiency that exists in the domestic bond market, the 
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transaction costs incurred or size-related issues that may place constraints on active bond 
fund managers. 
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9 
 
CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIRECTIONS 
This dissertation is concerned with providing an examination into the performance 
of managed funds in light of the predominant investment strategies adopted by asset 
management firms.  To this end, the evaluation of performance for both actively managed 
and index funds was considered, as well as documenting the ability of investment 
managers’ across sector specific and sector-diversified fund types.  Chapter 2 provided an 
extensive institutional review of the investment management industry in Australia, which 
gives context as to the importance of the topic area, size and structure of the industry, 
identification of the mainstream participants, documentation of the major asset classes 
available to investors, divergence in managed fund offerings and expenses charged, 
investment strategies adopted by fund managers, characteristics and compensation 
arrangements of individual asset managers, historical mergers and acquisition activity and 
future directions for the Australian investment industry.  The institutional details 
component provided important background concerning the Australian investment industry 
and the various reasons why performance evaluation is fundamentally important.  Chapter 
3 provided a broad review of the performance evaluation literature.  This section of the 
dissertation detailed the history and evolution of the literature around the world, theory, 
criticisms and refinement of performance evaluation techniques and methods, as well as 
documentary evidence related to the performance of managed investment products.  The 
overwhelming finding concerning managed fund performance, even across different 
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markets, is that active management has been unable, on average, to earn superior risk-
adjusted excess returns to appropriate specified market indices. 
The first essay was presented in Chapter 4.  This essay empirically evaluated the 
performance of pooled superannuation funds, including the components of performance 
(market timing and security selection).  Pooled superannuation funds invest across the 
broad spectrum of asset classes, namely Australian and international equities, Australian 
and international bonds, property and cash.  Evaluation of both stock selection and market 
timing components of investment performance is surprisingly scarce in the Australian 
literature despite active investment managers engaging in both market timing and security 
selection.  The essay also evaluated performance for the three largest asset classes within 
diversified superannuation funds and their contribution to overall portfolio return.  The 
importance of an accurately specified market portfolio proxy in the measurement of 
investment performance was also demonstrated.  The essay employed performance 
benchmarks that accounted for the multi-sector investment decisions of active investment 
managers in a manner that was consistent with their unique investment strategy.  
Consistent with the literature, the empirical results indicated that Australian pooled 
superannuation funds did not exhibit significantly positive security selection or market 
timing skill. 
Given the empirical evidence concerning actively managed funds and the 
consistency of performance being in alignment with the fundamental tenets of capital 
market efficiency, index funds have experienced considerable growth in the last decade.  
Given the increased attention and use of these alternative investment strategies, it is 
surprising that an empirical examination of index fund performance has been largely 
neglected.  The second essay presented in Chapter 5 provided an Australian perspective on 
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index investment management, the challenges facing index managers, the magnitude of 
tracking error and the determinants of tracking error in performance.  While index portfolio 
management is theoretically straightforward, in reality, index funds experience 
considerable difficulty in replicating the target index.  This is largely due to the index 
representing a mathematical calculation that does not take into account market frictions.  
While Australian equity index funds are shown to meet their investment objectives over 
the long run (that is performance in line with the underlying index), tracking error was 
shown to be inherent in their portfolios.  Further analysis documented that the magnitude 
of tracking error was related to fund cash flows, market volatility, and transaction costs.  
Investment managers implementing full replication strategies were found to have 
significantly lower tracking error than the non-replication strategies incorporating stratified 
sampling and optimisation techniques. 
Chapter 6 formed the third essay of the dissertation, and provided an analysis of 
S&P 500 index fund tracking error as well as a direct performance comparison between 
actively managed U.S. mutual funds and index mutual funds benchmarked to the highly 
liquid S&P 500.  The essay again highlighted the reasons why tracking error is inherent in 
index fund performance, empirically evaluated the magnitude of S&P 500 index fund 
tracking error and compared the performance of active funds relative to index mutual 
funds.  Seasonality in S&P 500 index mutual fund tracking error was demonstrated, where 
tracking error was shown to be significantly higher in the months of January and May, 
together with a seasonal trough in the quarters ending March-June-September-December.  
Statistical evidence indicated tracking error was both positively and significantly correlated 
with the dividend payments arising from constituent S&P 500 securities.  The results of the 
essay concerning the performance of active mutual funds were consistent with the evidence 
presented in the literature.  Active funds on average significantly underperformed passive 
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benchmarks.  S&P 500 index mutual funds, on the basis of this research, earned higher 
risk-adjusted excess returns after expenses than large capitalisation-oriented active mutual 
funds in the period examined.  One may therefore conclude the S&P 500 is consistent with 
capital market efficiency.  These findings strongly suggest an absence of economic benefit 
accruing to the average investor utilising actively managed equity mutual funds. 
The essay presented in Chapter 7 examined the performance of active Australian 
investment managers, the performance of senior investment personnel by tenure period, 
and the relationship between risk-adjusted returns and fund manager characteristics for 
institutional balanced (or diversified asset class) funds.  In terms of investment manager 
attributes, performance of balanced funds was found to be negatively related to an 
institution’s age and the loyalty of non-senior investment staff.  Performance was also 
found to be significantly higher for managers that predominantly operate their portfolios 
using a bottom-up, stock selection approach.  Interestingly, the human capital of managers, 
measured as the years of tertiary education undertaken, did not explain risk-adjusted excess 
returns.  Systematic risk was positively related to an institution’s age, while negatively 
related to both senior manager loyalty and the implementation of bottom-up portfolio 
management strategies.  In terms of management expenses, fees were directly related to the 
benchmark allocation to Australian equities, the years of tertiary education, the number of 
years service (loyalty) for non-senior investment professionals and the total years 
experience of senior money managers.  The essay also concluded that changes in top 
management have significant performance effects.  In the 12-month period after a change 
in fixed income director or chief investment officer, performance is significantly lower and 
significantly higher, respectively.  There is no significant difference in performance where 
top management changes occur for Australian equities.  The years of service provided to 
asset management firms by equities directors was found to be inversely related to risk-
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adjusted performance.  Perhaps the most perplexing issue identified in the study was the 
success of a large proportion of active Australian equity managers that earned superior 
risk-adjusted excess returns in the period.  Future research is currently under way in terms 
of providing an explanation for this apparent contradiction to the majority of managed fund 
studies in the literature. 
The concluding essay (Chapter 8) evaluated the performance of actively managed 
Australian bond funds.  An important feature of this study is its originality in terms of 
Australian research, the use both unconditional and conditional performance evaluation 
techniques as well as providing an assessment of the impact of fund flow on retail bond 
fund performance.  The evidence presented in this essay overwhelmingly indicated that the 
average active bond fund does not outperform the market index.  These conclusions were 
independent of whether performance is (a) considered pre or post expenses and (b) whether 
an unconditional or conditional performance model was employed.  In other words, active 
fixed income funds would appear comparable to an index fund before costs.  Furthermore, 
conditional models that accounted for time variation in fund betas improved the 
performance of active bond fund managers relative to the traditional evaluation techniques, 
however performance remained consistent with an efficient market.  The study also 
documented that retail fund flows negatively impact on market timing coefficients when 
flow is not accounted for in unconditional models.  Hence, unconditional models that 
ignore flow activity may bias performance inferences – specifically, an active manager’s 
market timing ability.  In terms of the conditional model, while market timing estimates 
were improved with the flow variable, statistical significance remained absent. 
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A number of future research directions were highlighted and discussed in each of 
the essays presented in this dissertation.  Chapter 4 further highlighted the negative 
correlation between timing and selectivity, and the literature should empirically examine 
the reasons for this phenomenon.  For example, Edelen (1999) is one study highlighting the 
role of fund cash flows in causing perverse market timing.  Ferson and Schadt (1996) and 
Ferson and Warther (1996) also highlight the problems in performance measurement for 
market timing attributable to fund cash flows. 
Chapters 5 and 6 evaluated index equity funds, offered in both the U.S and 
Australia.  Future research should evaluate the extent to which S&P 500 index fund 
tracking error can be empirically explained by cash flows, transaction costs, volatility of 
the benchmark, dividends and differences in replication strategies across funds.  Further 
analysis should be performed using daily data as a means of understanding how index 
portfolios are managed, and the extent to which some index fund managers will allow 
tolerable levels of tracking error as a means of offsetting at least some of the funds’ 
expenses. 
Chapter 7 also identified the need for further analysis of investment performance in 
a manner that considers both qualitative and quantitative factors exhibited by asset 
management firms and their investment personnel.  In particular, future examination 
should include an analysis of the additional factors beyond absolute or relative 
performance that influence the termination (or resignation) of top investment management 
staff.  The Australian literature should also consider the influence of compensation 
arrangements and their role in rewarding performance and retaining staff.  While all 
managers in this study exhibited various profit-sharing agreements and/or incentive 
structures (in addition to base-level remuneration), analysis of the structure of such 
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agreements and their relation to investment performance and risk is an important research 
issue.  These empirical issues are currently being examined. 
The concluding essay (Chapter 8) highlighted the need for future research along six 
specific avenues.  First, additional research is warranted concerning the effects of fund 
flow on performance.  Second, further research should also consider whether other factors 
have explanatory power in understanding bond fund returns.  In particular, attention should 
be given to the apparent differences in performance between retail and institutionally 
managed bond funds and the preferences these two market segments exhibit for different 
types of fixed income securities.  Third, an evaluation of active bond funds should also be 
considered in light of the specific investment strategies adopted by investment managers to 
determine whether particular groups of managers who emphasise specific strategies 
delivers a performance advantage to their competitors.  An interesting consideration may 
include an analysis of bond fund strategy across different months of the year.  Fourth, a 
decomposition of the sources of value added or lost from portfolio strategies adopted by 
fixed interest managers may also provide interesting findings in terms of how these 
portfolios are managed.  Fifth, the extent to which fund managers adjust their fixed income 
portfolios in anticipation of announcements concerning macroeconomic variables (such as 
inflation and interest rates) would also be a worthwhile avenue area for research.  And 
finally, a rigorous investigation of why active bond funds have been unable to beat passive 
benchmark indices should be undertaken.  Potential explanations may be due to the 
structure of the market and the underlying benchmark indices, the degree of market 
efficiency that exists in the domestic bond market, the transaction costs incurred or size-
related issues that may place constraints on active bond fund managers. 
316 
APPENDIX 1: ACADEMIC JOURNAL ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviation Journal 
AAAJ Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
A&F Accounting and Finance 
AEL Applied Economic Letters 
AJM Australian Journal of Management 
AER American Economic Review 
BP Brooking Paper: Microeconomics 
ECON Econometrica 
EFR European Finance Review 
EJOR European Journal of Operational Research 
FAJ Financial Analysts Journal 
GFJ Global Finance Journal 
HBR Harvard Business Review 
JAM Journal of Asset Management 
JBF Journal of Banking and Finance 
JBFA Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 
JB Journal of Business 
JEB Journal of Economics and Business 
JF Journal of Finance 
JFQA Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
JFE Journal of Financial Economics 
JFR Journal of Financial Research 
JFM Journal of Futures Markets 
JFSR Journal of Financial Services Research 
JMBC Journal of Money, Banking and Credit 
JPE Journal of Political Economy 
JPM Journal of Portfolio Management 
PBFJ Pacific Basin Finance Journal 
QJE Quarterly Journal of Economics 
RES Review of Economics and Statistics 
RFS Review of Financial Studies 
RQFA Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
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APPENDIX 2: UNIVERSITY DEGREE AND INDUSTRY 
QUALIFICATION LONG NAMES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
USED 
 
Abbreviation Qualification Name 
Panel A: Bachelor Degrees 
B.Ec. Bachelor of Economics 
B.Com. Bachelor of Commerce 
B.B.A. Bachelor of Business Administration 
B.Bus. Bachelor of Business 
B.Sc. Bachelor of Science 
Panel B: Master Degrees 
M.Ec. Master of Economics 
M.Com. Master of Commerce 
M.B.A. Master of Business Administration 
M. App. Fin. Master of Applied Finance 
M.Bus. Master of Business 
M.Sc. Master of Science 
Panel C: Honours Degrees 
Hons. Bachelor or Masters degree with Honours 
Panel D: Doctorates 
Ph.D. Doctor of Philosophy 
Panel E: Industry Qualifications 
A.S.I.A. Associate of the Securities Institute of Australia (requires award 
of graduate diploma in applied finance and investment) 
A.I.A.A Associate of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (requires 
successful completion of actuarial examinations) 
A.C.A. Australian Chartered Accountant (requires successful completion 
of professional year qualification) 
C.P.A Certified Practising Accountant (requires successful completion of 
examinations) 
C.F.A Chartered Financial Analyst (requires successful completion of 
A.I.M.R.’s examinations) 
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APPENDIX 3: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR VARIABLES 
IN TABLE 7.11 
 
 AST INSAGE AEQ PORT EDU EXPS EXPO LOYS LOYO 
AST 1.00 - - - - - - - - 
INSAGE 0.13 1.00 - - - - - - - 
AEQ -0.03 -0.18 1.00 - - - - - - 
PORT 0.03 -0.05 -0.19 1.00 - - - - - 
EDU -0.19 -0.32 -0.02 0.08 1.00 - - - - 
EXPS -0.06 -0.12 0.20 -0.28 -0.24 1.00 - - - 
EXPO -0.03 0.22 -0.31 -0.36 -0.45 -0.05 1.00 - - 
LOYS 0.24 0.21 0.36 -0.10 -0.58 0.46 -0.01 1.00 - 
LOYO 0.13 0.45 -0.09 -0.09 -0.61 0.01 0.50 0.49 1.00 
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